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Pioneers, mentors, friends, and 
colleagues who taught us about error 
and its effects on patients,
and
To the nurses who take care of us
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Foreword
I guess we all live history in some sense. But, for some of us, that 
phrase has a more specific meaning. For Lucian Leape, it has meant, 
not just witnessing the historic birth of the health care patient safety 
movement, but, arguably, creating it.
This book is an invaluable and unique account of the evolution of 
the evidence, concern, activities, and structures that inform the world’s 
current understanding of how patients are injured too often by the care 
that is intended to help them and what can and should be done about 
that. For a topic of such enormous gravity, involving life-or-death 
consequences every year for tens of thousands of people in the USA, 
alone, and many hundreds of thousands globally, this story is remark-
ably recent. The modern scientific foundations for safety in every sec-
tor of human endeavor were laid first no earlier than the mid-twentieth 
century, and the application of those sciences to medical care, with 
just a few, slender exceptions, began only in the mid- 1980s, barely 
40 years ago as of this writing.
It is, of course, not at all the case that medical errors and injuries 
from care appeared de novo in the past half-century. We know now 
that hazards to patient safety have been with us as long as there have 
been patients at all – that is, for many millennia. Such hazards come 
part and parcel with any complex human activity, and even more when 
that activity includes invading the human body with sharp instruments 
and foreign chemicals and invading the human psyche with intimidat-
ing hierarchies and opaque rites. No count exists of the number of 
people killed by medical errors since Hippocrates and despite physi-
cians’ best intentions, but the toll, if known, would be staggering.
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The culprits for that toll, we know now, would not be, for the most 
part, rogue clinicians or even incompetent ones, but rather the very 
designs of health care delivery, itself, in which even the best of the 
workforce get trapped. Or, to be clearer, they are the myriad interac-
tions of those delivery system designs and the frailties of unaided 
human minds and manipulations – the so-called “human factors” that 
set up normal people – most of us – for slips, errors, and lapses, the 
familiar “oops” of daily life. When I forget to set my alarm clock, 
that’s a nuisance; when I forget to give a medication to a critically ill 
patient, that can be a disaster. But the causes are the same; being 
human. Only when medicine ceases to rely on heroism for excellence 
can the pursuit of real safety begin effectively.
Modern safety sciences and their first cousins, the sciences of 
human error, first gelled in the 1960s and 1970s. The seeds were there 
in studies of cognitive psychology, social psychology, and general 
systems theory of the preceding century or so. But it was not until a 
group of engineers and psychologists began to name the problems of 
human error and system safety beginning in the 1960s that the field of 
safety science coalesced. Among the founders was Professor James 
Reason, from the University of Manchester, whose 1990 book, 
“Human Error,” was and remains the leading monograph on that topic.
Lucian Leape became a student of these emerging sciences of 
safety not long after Reason’s book first appeared. He was primed for 
the field, having participated as a highly regarded pediatric surgeon in 
the groundbreaking Harvard Medical Practice Study, which was the 
brainchild of Dr. Howard Hiatt and New York State Commissioner of 
Health David Axelrod. That study set out in commanding detail 
empirical findings about injuries to patients in New York hospitals, 
defining “adverse events,” and convincingly showing that the vast 
majority of those injuries could be seen as preventable, not inevitable.
Streams converged: the evidence of errors and their consequences, 
the growing awareness of the value of systems thinking regarding 
health care quality, the maturation of the safety sciences in other indus-
tries, and the self-education of Lucian Leape. The result was a turning-
point publication: Lucian’s magisterial December 1994, article in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association: “Error in Medicine.” 
Not often can we trace a change in the consciousness of an entire 
industry to a single treatise; but this time, we can. Within just a few 
years of Lucian’s call to arms, massive shifts were underway in health 
care’s awareness of and concern about patient safety and its defects.
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In this book, Lucian recounts the key events and actors preceding 
and following his seminal article. With dignity and generosity, he 
describes the contributors to the development of the field he helped to 
found. Some were conferences, in many of which Lucian had a big 
role: the “Annenberg Conferences” where the actual voices of injured 
patients and families first rang out as loudly as they must; the Salzburg 
Seminar on Patient Safety, which first brought together a truly interna-
tional group of patient safety scholars, and which incorporated lead-
ing scholars from outside health care, including Jim Reason, himself. 
Some were action collaboratives, such as IHI’s Breakthrough Series 
Collaborative on Medication Safety, which Lucian, himself, chaired.
Some were new structures, most importantly the National Patient 
Safety Foundation, and its daughter, the Lucian Leape Institute, which 
gave formal homes to the movement and whose sponsors included the 
needed range of public and private sector organizations. Most impor-
tant of all was the decision of the Institute of Medicine, and especially 
its courageous President, Dr. Ken Shine, to establish a Committee on 
the Quality of Care in America, whose first report, “To Err Is Human,” 
released late in the year 1999, made headlines across the nation, with 
its astounding assertion that 44,000 to 98,000 Americans each year 
died in US hospitals as a result of errors in their care. Lucian, of 
course, served on and helped to guide that Committee.
No one but Lucian Leape could have written the book that follows 
this Foreword. He, and he alone, was present at almost every single 
step of the 40-year journey between the Harvard Medical Practice 
study and today. To boot, I know from years of delightful personal 
collaboration with Lucian, that his memory is astounding, and that he 
can recall, and has herein set down for all time, otherwise lost details 
about the people, events, and lessons along the way. This book will be 
a delight for those who, having seen or heard about part of the patient 
safety movement, want to experience it vicariously in its entirety.
It is, of course, important to acknowledge that giants, like Lucian, 
stand always on the shoulders of others before them. There are too 
many names to summon here, but take note that Ernest Amory 
Codman, Florence Nightingale, Ellison C. (“Jeep”) Pierce, David 
Gaba, and Richard Cook, for example, are just a few of the medical 
pioneers of the nineteenth and twentieth century who courageously 
began to ring alarms about the harm that well-meaning health care can 
do, and, equally important, to offer ideas about how transparency, 
Foreword
x
systems science, standards, and good leadership can save lives by 
making care delivery safer just as care itself can save lives by using 
biomedical breakthroughs. Lucian, of course, gives them their proper 
due, and acknowledges both his debt and ours.
Note, too, that the journey to patient safety has, in actuality, barely 
begun. Lucian and his colleagues advocating for safer care, I among 
them, are all too aware of how incomplete the victory is. To our cha-
grin, and to the disadvantage millions of patients and families, 
improving safety still lacks the strategic centering it ought to have in 
the health care organizations both public and private. Governments 
around the world still generally lack agencies and individuals respon-
sible for assuring and nurturing safety systems and safety results. 
Professional training still barely mentions the topic, and the scientific 
armamentarium for safe systems is almost nowhere taught to the 
physicians, nurses, and health care managers of tomorrow. No one 
escapes medical school without studying the Krebs cycle and hearing 
about the discovery of insulin; but almost all will graduate without 
1 minute of learning about human error or a single encounter with the 
work of James Reason.
As a result, the toll of error and injury to patients continues to be 
massive. In 2018, three important reports on defects in quality in 
global health care were published, one (“Crossing the Global Quality 
Chasm”) from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine in the USA, one from The Lancet Commission on High-
Quality Health Systems in the Sustainable Development Goals Era, 
and one (“Delivering Quality Health Services: A Global Imperative 
for Universal Health Coverage”) from the World Health Organization, 
OECD, and the World Bank. Though carried out separately, these 
reports each estimated that over five million deaths a year in the world 
can be attributed to defects in the quality of health care. Problems in 
patient safety are high among those causes.
So, the story told in this book, as compelling as it is, will be but 
Chapter One of the longer term saga of the patient safety movement. 
The work of safety improvement, indeed, is hardly begun. No one 
hopes more than does Lucian Leape that the next book will be able to 
recount vast successes not yet in our hands.
Donald M. Berwick, 





In late1999, Americans were shocked to learn that the number of 
patients dying in hospitals from medical errors was the equivalent of 
the crash of a jumbo jet each day. Some experts even said it was twice 
that many. The response was immediate. Government, hospitals, pro-
fessional organizations, regulators, and researchers mobilized in a 
massive effort to reduce medical injury. This is the story of what 
happened.
It is a remarkable story, full of heroes and villains, awesome suc-
cesses and discouraging failures. We had much to learn, and we still 
have a long way to go to make health care safe, but in the past two 
decades we have made great progress. Health care workers have truly 
saved millions of lives. Most importantly, we are now poised to dra-
matically accelerate progress to achieving zero harm.
All histories fall short one way or another. They have more than 
you want to know about some things, less than you want to know 
about others, and invariably neglect important events. They suffer 
from the bias of the writer. This is no exception. It is to some extent a 
personal history, shaped by my point of view.
I have been privileged to be part of many of the efforts in the jour-
ney to make health care safe, sometimes as a participant, other times 
as an instigator. As a result, I have a wealth of stories to share that 
illuminate and provide insights into what happened. I think they add 
interest to the history. Hopefully, you will agree.
More important, having “been there” – and kept notes – I am also 
able to provide a reasonably accurate account of what actually hap-
pened. The desire to provide an accurate account is what motivated 
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me to write this book. I repeatedly heard people telling stories in good 
faith about how something came about that just weren’t true. But they 
were becoming part of the myth that was growing about how patient 
safety started. So, I am trying to set the record straight.
But a more important objective is to enable people to understand 
what patient safety is all about. To help health care professionals, stu-
dents, administrators, and policymakers understand the basic concepts 
of error prevention, the key issues that need to be wrestled with, and 
how to create a culture of safety, and to provide information about the 
impressive array of safety programs carried out by organizations 
devoted to keeping us safe.
I also want to enable people working in safety to be more effective 
by providing them information on what works and what doesn’t, and 
why. How do you change systems? How do you create a supportive, 
safe, and respectful workplace? How do you engage patients in their 
care? How do you talk with and support patients after they have been 
injured? How do you create a culture of safety?
This is not a collection of anecdotes, however. It is a history. Of the 
ideas, the data, and the theories that drove the patient safety move-
ment. And of the actions of the key players and institutions that made 
it happen. Of the energy, imagination, and devotion of these leaders, 
of the strategies they used, and the incredible amount of work they did 
to make health care safe.
For these stories, I relied not just on my own experience and analy-
sis of published information but on firsthand accounts by the leaders 
of the organizations who made it happen. In every instance – without 
exception – these true “movers and shakers” were incredibly generous 
in sharing information, not just in helping me get the details straight, 
but also in sharing “back stories.”
The process was iterative. For each subject, I interviewed several 
leaders, usually more than once, and then wrote the story. That account 
was sent to them for review and editing. It was then revised and sent 
back once again for a final check on its accuracy. Thus, while the pre-
sentations reflect my point of view, to the best of our combined recol-
lections these are the facts.
It is a history of patient safety in the USA. Although there are chap-
ters on developments in the UK and the international safety efforts of 
the World Health Organization, other important work done elsewhere 
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is not included. Hopefully, however, overseas readers will find useful 
information and insights throughout the book. The last six chapters on 
key issues should be of universal interest.
This book is also not a history of everything that happened in patient 
safety during those early years. Significant advances took place in 
technology (especially simulation and monitoring), research, training, 
and education. Leaders in nursing and pharmacy, the frontline profes-
sionals who provide patient care, as well as risk managers and others, 
made important advances to improve safety. A number of health care 
organizations implemented safety programs. Federal agencies other 
than the ones described here, such as HHS and DOD, contributed, as 
did many professional organizations and advocacy groups.
These efforts were important, but they were not the essential driv-
ers of the patient safety movement. An example: 15 years before the 
legendary IOM report, “To Err is Human,” the Anesthesia Patient 
Safety Foundation pioneered in using human factors principles to 
make dramatic reductions in the mortality of anesthesia. While the 
rest of health care took notice, it did not follow suit. This important 
and successful initiative did not start the patient safety movement. 
That required the shock from the IOM and the intensive work of the 
organizations described in the following chapters.
The story runs roughly from 1987 to 2015. It is structured in four 
parts: Part I, In the Beginning, describes the research and theory that 
defined patient safety and the early initiatives to deal with it. Part II, 
Institutional Responses, tells the stories of the efforts of the major 
organizations that began to apply the new concepts and make patient 
safety a reality. Most of these stories have not been previously told, so 
this account becomes their histories as well. Part III, Getting to Work, 
provides in-depth analyses of four key issues that cut across disciplin-
ary lines and required special attention. Part IV, Creating a Culture of 
Safety, looks to the future, marshalling the best thinking about what it 
will take to achieve the safe care we all deserve.
It is an inspiring story, and a hopeful one. I hope you will enjoy it.




This book tells the story of the efforts of a large number of people 
who grasped the seriousness of the problem of medical errors and 
decided to apply their knowledge, skills, and imagination to its solu-
tion. The willingness of those individuals to share their experiences 
and insights made it possible for me to tell their stories. I am forever 
grateful for their generosity and the privilege of their friendships.
First, I want to express my gratitude to the mentors who inspired 
me to take on the safety journey. Howard Hiatt, former dean of the 
Harvard School of Public Health, got me started. Mentor to so many 
and supporter of numerous worthwhile causes, he conceived of the 
Medical Practice Study that revealed the extent of medical injury. By 
including me on the team, he gave me the opportunity to discover the 
enormity of medical error. His friendship and support have been con-
stant and invaluable ever since, and I am eternally grateful.
Jim Reason taught me most of what I know about errors and their 
causes. First, through his magnificent book, Human Error, still the 
universally respected “Bible” on the subject 30 years after it was writ-
ten, and subsequently through our friendship and collaboration over 
the years on finding ways to apply theory to practice.
Charles Vincent opened my eyes to the psychological impact on 
patients of our mistakes and the failure to effectively communicate 
and support them in their hour of need. These perceptions formed the 
basis for his later work on disclosure and restitution. His method for 
investigating adverse events provides insights far beyond the usual 
root cause analysis; I taught it to generations of students over the 
years. We have become close friends and collaborators on many 
projects.
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Don Berwick, the father of quality improvement, was quick to rec-
ognize the importance of patient safety and the applicability of QI 
principles to its solution. His leadership of IHI and his persuasive 
powers have inspired thousands. As the reader will discover, his 
insights and imagination were behind many important safety initia-
tives. We have partnered on many of these and become good friends. 
I am honored and delighted to have him write the foreword.
I am grateful to Bob Blendon and Arnie Epstein, department chairs 
of Health Policy and Management, who provided support at the 
Harvard School of Public Health for a professor of surgery who had 
some interesting ideas but few academic health policy credentials. 
Their encouragement over the years, as well as the welcoming climate 
in our department, gave joy to my daily work. And I am indebted to 
my colleague David Bates, with whom I originally conceived the idea 
of writing the definitive story of the patient safety movement. Our 
early conversations about the shape of the story, and the importance of 
telling it, convinced me that this was a task worth undertaking.
Second, I wish to recognize and give heartfelt thanks to the experts 
and leaders in each topic who graciously helped me write the stories 
of their institutions. Most of them friends from our years working 
together, they told me what really happened, turned my general per-
ceptions into specifics, corrected misunderstandings, and helped me 
get the details straight. They shared the “back stories” that give tex-
ture to the narrative. Most importantly, they made sure there were no 
factual errors. I am very grateful for their generosity in sharing their 
time, their interest, and their insights. I literally could not have written 
this history without them:
Ron Arky Allan Frankel Patricia McGaffigan
David Bates John Fromson Don Melnick
Don Berwick Tom Gallagher Gregg Meyer
Rick Boothman Tejal Gandhi Julie Morath
Hal Bressler Atul Gawande Tom Nasca
Helen Burstin Paul Gluck Dennis O’Leary
Carolyn Clancy Paula Griswold Diane Pinakiewicz
Jim Conway Frank Hartman Peter Pronovost
Jeff Cooper Marty Hatlie Edgar Schein
Janet Corrigan Howard Hiatt Paul Schyve
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Chapter 1
The Hidden Epidemic: The Harvard 
Medical Practice Study
Malpractice! The word strikes terror in doctors’ hearts—and with 
good reason. All doctors are at risk of being sued when things go 
wrong, and most doctors are in fact sued at some time in their career, 
whether or not they did anything wrong. For some high-risk special-
ties, including neurosurgery, vascular surgery, and cardiology, the 
percentage sued is very high, and multiple suits are not uncommon. 
For all doctors, the cost of malpractice insurance is substantial.
So it was not surprising that a sharp rise in medical malpractice 
insurance premiums in 1985 was viewed by the profession as a “cri-
sis.” Such “crises” occurred periodically and were not necessarily 
associated with either an increase in malpractice claims or in payouts. 
In this case, the rise had several causes. Because of several years of 
substantial gains from their investments in the stock market, liability 
insurance carriers had not raised premiums very much for nearly a 
decade, but annual payouts (claims settlements) had continued their 
steady increase.
The need to “catch up,” coupled with rising reinsurance rates 
imposed by overseas reinsurers because of strengthening of the dollar, 
led companies to raise premiums 40–100% or more. On Long Island, 
malpractice premiums for obstetricians jumped from $68,000 per 
year to $100,000 [1]. Doctors perceived a crisis.
How big a problem was actual malpractice? No one really knew. 
No one knew how many people were hurt by negligent care—that is, 
substandard care. No one knew how many of those patients filed a 
malpractice suit. Some suspected the number was quite small, but no 
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one knew. Doctors seemed to complain about being sued all the time, 
but no one knew the facts. No one knew what percentage of malprac-
tice suits were successful. Or how many people suffered from injuries 
that were caused by medical treatment that was not negligent. No 
one knew.
And no one had any idea of the costs of medical injury—financial, 
physical, and emotional: not just the costs of continuing medical treat-
ment, but of lost wages, childcare, home assistance, and long-term 
disability.
Reflecting on all of this, Howard Hiatt, dean of the Harvard School 
of Public Health (HSPH), and his good friend, James Vorenberg, dean 
of the Harvard Law School, conceived of the idea of doing a study to 
answer these questions. What were the costs of medical injury? How 
much of it was due to negligence? How successfully did the liability 
insurance system meet its purported objectives of compensating the 
injured and deterring bad practice? Did the risk of being sued make 
doctors more careful and thus reduce the likelihood of patients being 
harmed? Did the system fairly compensate those who were harmed?
Some experts had expressed interest in no-fault insurance that 
would pay for all the costs of injury for all patients, irrespective of 
negligence. Would such a scheme be an economically feasible alter-
native to litigation? Surely among the faculty of their two schools, 
they reasoned, there should be enough brainpower to answer these 
questions and perhaps even develop a better solution.
The place to start, they thought, was with the facts. How many peo-
ple were harmed by medical treatment in hospitals? What percentage 
was caused by errors? By negligence? Of those harmed by negligent 
care, how many sued? What were the costs of medical injury—not 
just for those harmed by bad care, but for all patients, including those 
who suffered nonpreventable injuries? How were these costs paid for? 
All was unknown. All was potentially knowable.
With colleagues, they designed a study to get this information. 
They used as a model a 1978 study by Don Harper Mills of “poten-
tially compensable events” (PCEs): medical injuries for which a jury 
might award malpractice money damages. Mills and his team had 
analyzed 20,684 patient charts of patients discharged from 23 
California hospitals in 1974. They found that 4.65% of the patients 
experienced PCEs of varying severity [2].
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Like the California study, the Harvard study would also be a review 
of medical records. However, Hiatt and Vorenberg believed that to 
influence policy-makers it needed to be designed as a population-
based study, i.e., based on a scientifically designed sample of patients 
from all types of acute care hospitals serving all patients in a defined 
geographic area. Only that way would the information be likely to be 
used for public planning.
Howard’s first thought was to seek the approval of the Massachusetts 
Medical Society, so he approached the president of the society, whom 
he knew. She thought it was a very bad idea! As we will see with the 
AMA later, anything that might possibly make doctors look bad was 
unacceptable. Similarly, Howard found no “takers” among the various 
private foundations or governmental authorities in Massachusetts.
But, suddenly, there was interest in New York. Howard described 
the plan to his friend Alfred Gellhorn, who introduced him to the 
Commissioner of Health in New York State, David Axelrod, whose 
response was quite positive. Axelrod took him to meet Governor 
Mario Cuomo, who said, “We’ve been looking for you! When can you 
get started?”
Cuomo was struggling with state spending for medical liability 
claims that was substantial and increasing. Would the Harvard team 
be willing to do it in New York State? They were delighted to do so—
New York’s large size and diversity would make the results more cred-
ible. When told how much it would cost, Cuomo commented that he 
expected it to be several times that amount, and he readily authorized 
an appropriation of $3.2 million for the study. The Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation contributed an additional $250,000.
Hiatt led the research team. Troy Brennan and Nan Laird led the 
study design. Troy was just finishing his chief residency in medicine 
at the Massachusetts General Hospital, but he was uniquely qualified 
for this study. A Rhodes scholar, he was an honors MD and MPH 
graduate of Yale Medical School, while simultaneously receiving his 
JD from Yale Law School. Nan Laird was a professor of statistics, 
later department chair, at the Harvard School of Public Health, and 
was a national leader in survey design methodology.
In addition to Brennan, three other physicians were members of 
this planning group: Benjamin (Bunny) Barnes, a surgeon from Tufts; 
Howard Frazier, a nephrologist and health services researcher at 
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HSPH; and Lynn Peterson, a Brigham and Women’s Hospital inter-
nist. Harvard’s William Hsiao (later replaced by Joe Newhouse) and 
Bill Johnson from Arizona State University were the economists on 
the team. Paul Weiler, professor at the Harvard Law School, oversaw 
legal issues. Russell Localio served as project manager, and Ann 
Lawthers oversaw data management.
The team was about 6 months into the study when, in the spring of 
1987, Howard Hiatt approached me to determine my interest in join-
ing them. After 20 years in academic pediatric surgery, I wanted to 
work in health policy and was finishing a year as a fellow at RAND 
studying epidemiology, statistics, and health policy in preparation for 
my new career. At RAND I had become involved in several studies of 
overuse of healthcare services and was leading a study of underuse. I 
was returning to Boston and looking for additional opportunities in 
my new career.
Bunny Barnes, an old friend of mine and surgical colleague from 
my days as a resident at the MGH and on the staff at Tufts, had recom-
mended me to Howard as someone who could contribute to the study 
because of my newly acquired analytic skills and substantial clinical 
experience.
I remember the interview well. In my usual blunt manner, I told 
Howard that I had no interest in working on malpractice! I had not 
made a career change and spent a year of my life learning how to do 
Howard Hiatt. (All rights reserved)
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health policy research just to waste it on an issue that was so polariz-
ing and for which I saw no reasonable prospect for change. I was cool 
to the whole idea.
But Howard explained that the scope of the study was much bigger 
than malpractice in that it would collect interesting and previously 
undeveloped data about the substance behind malpractice, medical 
injury, and also measure its costs to patients. That piqued my interest. 
I wanted to work on quality improvement; injury and costs were 
clearly quality issues. At the time, I had not thought much about medi-
cal errors. Like most of my colleagues, I considered minor errors 
unavoidable and serious errors malpractice, the result of incompe-
tence or carelessness. Howard offered me a half-time position, which 
fit nicely with my commitments to continuing research work at 
RAND. I accepted his offer, not suspecting it would change my life.
I joined the team just after they had completed the study design. 
The next major effort was to agree on our definitions, particularly the 
term for medical injury. Many different terms had been used: 
“unplanned event,” “unanticipated outcome,” “unexpected result,” 
“adverse outcome,” and, of course, just plain “complication.” A com-
mon thread was that the injury was beyond the control of the caregiv-
ers—and therefore not blameworthy.
Measurement of harm at the time was haphazard, even casual, with 
little analysis and few records. Even surgical departments, which tra-
ditionally had weekly mortality and morbidity (“M&M”) confer-
ences, classified deaths from complications as due to errors in 
judgment, management or technique, or “patient’s disease.” Remedies 
recommended were better education for residents and admonishing 
all to try harder.
This lack of consistent terminology, as well as physicians’ con-
cerns about culpability, led to substantial underreporting of iatrogenic 
injuries. Physicians had few incentives to report. Reporting mecha-
nisms were underdeveloped and largely voluntary. States required 
hospitals to report deaths but rarely investigated their causes. The 
Joint Commission asked hospitals to report “sentinel events” (serious 
injuries), but few hospitals did. Surgical departments had M&M meet-
ings, but neither other departments nor the hospitals kept tabulations 
or continuing records of iatrogenic injuries. Medical injury was 
largely invisible, and hospitals and doctors liked it that way.
1 The Hidden Epidemic: The Harvard Medical Practice Study
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We sought a neutral term that captured all events and to which we 
could apply a judgment of negligence when indicated. We finally set-
tled on “adverse event.” We spent many hours debating its exact defi-
nition and ultimately agreed on “an unintended injury that was caused 
by medical management rather than the patient’s underlying disease.” 
The important point was to distinguish harm caused by treatment 
from harm caused by disease, independent of whether there was an 
error or negligence. We knew that making this judgment would be dif-
ficult for doctors, as it indeed proved to be.
Physicians are very sensitive to any implication that their perfor-
mance is deficient in any way. Complications were considered either 
“preventable,” which meant someone was to blame, or unpreventable. 
Most were put in the latter category, which included certain types of 
complications that everyone knew occasionally happened and were 
thought to be unavoidable and therefore no one’s fault, as well as the 
occasional unanticipated outcome that seemed to come out of the 
blue. Our hope was that reviewers could view “adverse event” as a 
neutral term.
The most common source of injury caused by treatment in the hos-
pital, of course, is a surgical operation, so it was necessary to distin-
guish this form of planned harm from that due to errors or other 
failures. Use of the word “unintended” resolved that problem.
We struggled unsuccessfully to devise a reliable way to measure 
psychological harm, despite its obvious importance, so we restricted 
our study to physical harm. For “error,” we used Reason’s definition: 
“The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the 
use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.” For “negligence,” we used the 
standard accepted legal definition: “Failure to meet the standard 
of care.”
The plan was to obtain data by reviewing medical records of hospi-
talized patients. We would focus on adverse events that could poten-
tially trigger a malpractice suit. These were injuries that resulted in 
some degree of disability, temporary or permanent, including death, 
or were sufficiently severe to prolong the hospital stay. Concurrently, 
we developed the instruments for data collection and the training 
materials for record reviewers, both nurses and doctors.
By early 1988, we had settled on our definitions, developed our 
screening criteria and record review instruments, and constructed 
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instruction manuals for nurse and physician reviews. We designed a 
two-step review process: First, registered nurses who were trained in 
record review for quality assurance would read each randomly selected 
hospital record in search of one or more of 18 screening criteria (such 
as post-op fever or transfer to an ICU) that suggested the possibility of 
an adverse event. Second, records that met one or more of the screen-
ing criteria would then be independently reviewed by two board-cer-
tified physicians to determine if, in fact, there had been an adverse event.
Physicians were asked to rate suspected adverse events on a six-
point scale based on their confidence—from the information provided 
in the medical record—that an adverse event had in fact occurred. We 
used a six-point scale (1 =  little or no confidence, 2 = some confi-
dence, 3 = less likely than not, 4 = more likely than not, 5 = highly 
probable, 6  =  virtually certain) to mimic the legal system, which 
requires a predominance of the evidence with no room for equivoca-
tion (50-50).
Reviewers categorized adverse events (AEs) by type (drug reac-
tion, fall, wound infection, etc.) and rated the disability caused by the 
AE by severity and by duration (temporary or permanent). If an error 
was found, it was classified as one of five types: diagnostic, preven-
tion, performance, drug treatment, and system. For each type there 
were additional questions as to the nature of the failure.
Physician reviewers then made a judgment of whether the adverse 
event constituted negligence, also rated on a six-point scale of confi-
dence. Finally, the AE was rated as to severity (slight, moderate, 
grave). Except for the well-established definition of negligence, we 
developed all these definitions and classifications anew, since we 
found few in the literature and no consensus among physicians or 
researchers.
The initial screening review of the hospital records was to be per-
formed by a cadre of nurse record reviewers who were skilled at this 
type of review and were employed by the Hospital Association of 
New York State (HANYS) which did record reviews as a business. 
Part of the funding agreement with New York was that HANYS would 
perform this function for us.
Unfortunately, our project manager had been unable to get agree-
ment on a contract with them, despite many months of negotiations. 
Time was running out. We were ready to begin the study, but had no 
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one to review the records! Howard turned to me and asked me to see 
if I could negotiate a contract. I arranged to meet with the head of the 
HANYS program and flew to Albany on a Saturday morning to meet 
her over coffee at her home.
Since I had never negotiated a contract in my life, the night before 
our meeting, I read Roger Fisher’s Getting to Yes. It was just the ticket. 
I asked her what they wanted and told her what we wanted, and within 
an hour we had agreed on the contract and departed friends. At last, 
the study could begin. We could begin to train these nurses in the use 
of the record survey instrument.
Finding and training physicians to review the records was more dif-
ficult. With help from the NY Department of Health and strong sup-
port from the NY State Medical Society, we identified and recruited 
board-certified internists and surgeons in each of the 51 towns where 
our study hospitals were. To minimize conflicts of interest, we required 
that these physicians not be on the staff or have admitting privileges at 
the hospital whose records were being studied. They were paid the 
going rate for physician record review.
We met with each group of physicians (typically 4–8 for a hospital) 
to instruct them in the review process and make sure they understood 
the definitions. This was a crucial task, since “adverse event” was a 
new concept for many, and distinguishing treatment-caused injuries 
from complications of the disease was not something any had 
ever done.
We also made clear that the term “adverse event” did not mean 
there had been an error in care. They would find that some were caused 
by errors and others were not. Part of the purpose of the study was to 
find out how many there were of each. Despite this caution, we dis-
covered later that many of them considered error the equivalent of 
negligence, that is, they resulted from the physician not being careful 
enough. In truth, at that time most of us more or less shared that point 
of view.
The final design included a random sample of over 31,000 patients 
who were selected from 51 randomly selected acute care New York 
hospitals. Government hospitals and mental institutions were 
excluded. Study hospitals were asked to provide a list of all patients 
discharged in calendar year 1984. From those lists, patients were ran-
domly selected to reach the appropriate number for each hospital. The 
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hospitals were then asked to make their medical records available for 
our review.
We were about to launch this enterprise when the leader of data col-
lection, Bunny Barnes, informed Howard that he was leaving the 
study to go on a round-the-world cruise with his new wife! Howard 
turned to me to take over. Suddenly, my involvement and time com-
mitment to the study expanded considerably.
We divided the study hospitals into five geographic regions with a 
similar number of hospitals (10) in each. No one wanted to do the 
traveling required to supervise data collection in upstate New York, so 
I volunteered to take it on. From my undergraduate days at Cornell, I 
knew how beautiful upstate New York was. I looked forward to spend-
ing the spring and summer driving around from city to city. By the 
end of the study, those who chose NYC because it was so easy to get 
to found that it was rough at times and were envious of my less-stress-
ful experiences.
Data collection began late in the spring of 1988, after training ses-
sions of the physicians at each hospital in each region. We made peri-
odic visits back to oversee the process and personally review a sample 
of records to make sure they were being reviewed correctly. We later 
did a formal review of ten charts at each hospital to check reliability 
of the physician reviews.
Hospitals were very cooperative and retrieved almost all of the 
records we requested. It is worth noting that at the time we were not 
required to obtain permission from the patients to review their medi-
cal records, something later required by HIPAA rules. This constraint 
makes it difficult to perform a similar study today.
By mid-1989, we had the results of our initial analysis of the data 
from the record review in the New York hospitals. In our sample of 
30,121 records, we found that 1133 patients had suffered an adverse 
event, which computed to a serious injury rate of 3.7%, a bit lower 
than what the Mills study found. Twenty-seven percent of AEs were 
judged to be due to negligent care. From these data we estimated that 
in 1984 there were 98,689 adverse events in New York hospitals, of 
which 13,451 (13.6%) were fatal [3].
There were no differences in rates by sex, but older patients had 
higher rates. Adverse event rates were substantially higher in some 
specialties (such as vascular surgery, thoracic surgery, and 
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neurosurgery) than in others. Adverse event rates were higher in large 
academic medical centers than in community hospitals, but the frac-
tion due to negligence was much lower. Higher negligence rates were 
found in hospitals with high minority populations.
But the surprising finding was that more than two-thirds of the inju-
ries seemed to be potentially preventable. Reviewers were able to 
identify specific errors from information in the medical records for 
58% of the AEs [4]; subsequent analysis revealed that an additional 
11% of AEs resulted from failure to follow accepted practices, raising 
the total fraction of potentially preventable AEs to 69% [5].
Complications of the use of medications was the most common type 
of AE, accounting for 19.4% of the total, followed by wound infec-
tions (13.6%) and technical complications of surgery (12.9%). Surgical 
complications accounted for 48% of all adverse events [4] (Table 1.1).
We were very much aware of the limitations of our study—how far 
it could fall short of our goal of identifying every adverse event and 
only adverse events. The likelihood is that our numbers underesti-
mated the number of AEs. There were opportunities at each stage for 
missing an adverse event. At the first step, where nurses identified 
whether the patient met any of the 18 screening criteria, they undoubt-
edly overlooked a few. Since our screening criteria were not perfect, 
some injuries almost certainly occurred that did not trigger one of the 
criteria. And, since all of our information came from the medical 
record, if the caregiver chose not to record a symptom or event in the 
medical record, then we could not measure it. We suspected this was 
not a small problem, but had no way to quantify it.
At the review stage, physicians also undoubtedly failed to find 
some AEs that were present. Although some of those would be simply 
Table 1.1 Major types 
of adverse events
Type of AE % of total
Medication errors 19.4
Wound infections 13.6
Technical complications of 
surgery
12.9




Adapted from Ref. [4]
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overlooked, others likely resulted from inadequate documentation, 
ambiguous statements, handwriting problems, and the like. These 
documentation issues were more common in small private hospitals, 
where records were less standardized and notes were sparse because 
only the patient’s physician writes progress notes. In teaching hospi-
tals, by contrast, there are multiple notes by residents, medical stu-
dents, and nurses as well.
Bias also probably played a role, leading physician reviewers to 
under-identify adverse events and over-label negligence. We defined 
an adverse event as any injury caused by treatment, whether or not 
there was an error and whether or not it was preventable. This included 
common and well-accepted complications. While this seems clear on 
the surface, it was a new concept to our reviewing physicians.
At this time—remember it was 1988—most physicians considered 
errors blameworthy; they were thought to result from failure to be 
careful enough and, therefore, negligent. Some physicians had trouble 
understanding the term “adverse event” as a neutral descriptor, to be 
applied to all treatment-related injuries, whether or not they were 
caused by an error.
Thus, despite extensive training and reviews, some physicians still 
equated “adverse” with error and accordingly might not call an injury 
an adverse event if there was no error. Some complications were inev-
itable, the thinking went; they should not be “held against” the physi-
cian. Evidence of this kind of thinking is the fact that several types of 
adverse events that later studies showed to be quite common, such as 
hospital-acquired infections, falls, and pressure ulcers, were infre-
quent in our study.
It is unlikely that we were overcounting. Reviewers would not 
“see” events that hadn’t happened! On balance, we believed that our 
rates, shocking as they were, underestimated the true extent of harm. 
In fact, later studies would bear this out.
The implications of our findings were profound. If our rates were 
representative, i.e., if adverse event rates in hospitals across the coun-
try were similar to what we found in New York State, then nationwide 
1.3 million patients were injured by medical care in American acute 
care hospitals that year, and 180,000 died from these injuries! These 
numbers were an order of magnitude higher than had ever been sug-
gested. Medical injury was truly a hidden epidemic.
1 The Hidden Epidemic: The Harvard Medical Practice Study
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But I was struck with something else: more than two-thirds of the 
AE were caused by errors and systems failures that we could detect in 
the medical record. This meant that of the projected 180,000 deaths 
each year, more than 120,000 were potentially preventable. I was sur-
prised that no one else in the study group found this particularly 
alarming or of interest. The focus of the study was on malpractice—
the costs of injuries and who paid. But it was the fact that two-thirds 
were potentially preventable that captured my attention. Surely, we 
should be able to eliminate those—or at least some of them. Preventing 
these errors and failures could be a huge agenda for improvement. My 
colleagues disagreed and warned, “Don’t go there. The doctors will 
hate you.”
The results of the study were published in two papers in the New 
England Journal of Medicine in February 1991 [3, 4]. It got substan-
tial local coverage in the New York media and some national notice. 
The New York State Medical Society was not pleased, but made the 
best of it by claiming that the 1% negligence rate (27% of 3.7% injury 
rate) was quite low and showed that doctors were performing at a 99% 
perfect level! [6] But interest in the study faded quickly. No one knew 
what to do about it, so after a few commentaries from assorted parties, 
everyone, lay and professional, pretty much quit talking about it.
The Medical Practice Study did one other thing: it determined the 
feasibility of no-fault insurance as an alternative to the tort system to 
compensate patients for medical injury. Malpractice suits only com-
pensate patients whose injuries were caused by negligence and who 
succeed in winning a malpractice suit. Most people don’t sue, and 
most of those who do don’t win. The net result is that very few injured 
patients are compensated by the tort system.
In a no-fault plan, all patients who suffer a treatment-caused injury 
are compensated for all of its subsequent costs, irrespective of whether 
the injury was caused by error or negligence. Importantly, these costs 
also include lost wages, home care, and long-term disability care.
To determine the feasibility of no-fault compensation, we did a 
follow-up study of the economic consequences of the adverse events. 
We interviewed the patients from our study who had been injured—or 
their next of kin if they had died—to determine the long-term effects 
of the injuries on the victims (such as permanent disability and inabil-
ity to work), and we estimated their total costs, medical care, lost 
wages, disability care, etc., over their lifetimes.
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From our analysis, we estimated that the total lifetime cost of 
adverse events in New York State in 1984 was $3.8 billion in 1989 
dollars. Over three-fourths of that cost was paid for by medical insur-
ance or programs such as Medicaid, disability income insurance, and 
workman’s compensation. But the rest was paid by patients.
The cost of a no-fault compensation scheme to compensate for that 
remainder would be $878 million per year. In that same year, hospi-
tals and doctors in New York paid $1.1 billion for malpractice insur-
ance premiums. The obvious conclusion was that we could compensate 
everyone who was seriously injured for all of their expenses for less 
than the amount that doctors and hospitals were already paying for 
liability insurance that compensated only the small percentage of 
patients who received a settlement for malpractice [7].
We called for implementation of no-fault insurance. The potential 
benefits seemed overwhelming. Only 4% of our patients with signifi-
cant adverse events ever filed a malpractice claim. Multiple studies 
have shown that fewer than half of malpractice claims ever result in a 
payment to the patient. Thus, fewer than 2% of the 98,689 patients 
who were injured in New York in 1984 were likely to receive compen-
sation. By contrast, a no-fault insurance plan would compensate all 
patients who had significant disability.
Our plea fell on receptive ears. David Axelrod, New York’s Health 
Commissioner who commissioned the study, was in full agreement. 
He got the governor to propose enabling legislation for statewide no-
fault insurance. It was not to be. Axelrod was tragically disabled by a 
stroke a few months later, and the state fell onto hard fiscal times. 
Without his leadership and drive, the legislation perished. An unprec-
edented opportunity for enlightened government and fairness for vic-
tims of medical harm evaporated.
Nonetheless, the Medical Practice Study had a profound impact. 
Although it was designed to address malpractice, its far greater sig-
nificance came from the revelation of the horrendous extent of harm 
that resulted from routine medical care. Here for the first time was 
indisputable evidence that hundreds of thousands of people were 
being harmed every year by care intended to help them. And, for the 
first time, evidence that many of those injuries were potentially pre-
ventable. Patient safety was a much greater problem than any of us 
realized. But it would take some time for this to sink in for the medi-
cal profession and its leaders.
1 The Hidden Epidemic: The Harvard Medical Practice Study
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Chapter 2
It’s Not Bad People: Error 
in Medicine
“Don’t go there.” Howard Hiatt and Troy Brennan were emphatic: 
investigating medical error and writing about it would bring the wrath 
of the medical profession down on my head. But how could we not go 
there? How could we not go there, now that we knew from the Medical 
Practice Study (MPS) that 120,000 people were dying from medical 
errors every year? How could we not act?
The Harvard Medical Practice Study confirmed what smaller stud-
ies had shown earlier—that nearly 4% of patients in acute care hospi-
tals suffered a significant injury from their medical treatment. What 
was shocking, and previously totally unrecognized, was that two-
thirds of those injuries resulted from errors. Surely we should be able 
to do something about that.
What was known about how to prevent errors? I knew very little. 
So, in typical academic fashion, I started my education with a litera-
ture search. I clearly remember the day in September 1989 when I 
went to the Countway Library at Harvard Medical School to carry out 
a search of the medical literature to find out what was known about 
preventing medical errors. I came up empty-handed! There were case 
reports and a few commentaries, reports of surgical complications, 
and the like, but little about errors or how to prevent them other than 
to try harder and be more careful. But healthcare professionals—espe-
cially doctors, nurses, and pharmacists—are some of the best trained 
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and most conscientious workers there are. They were already trying 
hard and being careful. So why were there no descriptions of error 
prevention?
I took my search strategy to the librarian and asked for help. She 
thought the strategy was fine but asked if I had looked in the social 
sciences or engineering literature. It hadn’t occurred to me. When she 
did, hundreds of references came up. It turned out that many people, 
in several disciplines—particularly cognitive psychology and human 
factors engineering—knew a great deal about why people make mis-
takes as well as how to prevent them. Thus began my education on the 
mental processes that lead to errors and on the methods of preventing 
them. I had a lot of reading to do. I dug in.
By early 1990, I had decided to work on a paper to bring these les-
sons from human factors engineering and cognitive psychology to my 
profession of medicine. My reading had introduced me to the insights 
of a host of experts, but three had the greatest influence: James Reason 
(Human Error) [1], the true father of error research, later to become a 
good friend; Don Norman (The Design of Everyday Things) [2]; and 
Charles Perrow (Normal Accidents) [3].
 The Causes of Errors
James Reason, of the University of Manchester, UK, is without doubt 
the person who has contributed the most to the understanding of the 
causes and prevention of errors. His book, Human Error (1990), is the 
“Bible” of error theory. While Reason had many insights, his most 
original and useful contribution was to differentiate between active 
and latent failures. Active failures (or errors) are the individual unsafe 
acts that cause an injury (such as a nurse’s miscalculation of a drug 
dose). Latent failures (or latent errors) are contributory factors that are 
“built in” to the system—defects in design—that lay dormant and “set 
up” the individual to make a mistake. One reason a nurse may make 
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an error in calculating the dose of a medication, for example, is the 
latent failure of a work environment full of interruptions and distrac-
tions. Latent errors create “accidents waiting to happen.” Latent errors 
result from poor system design [1, 4].
From this distinction between active and latent errors came the fun-
damental principle that underlies essentially all safety efforts: errors 
are not fundamentally due to faulty people but to faulty systems. To 
prevent errors, you have to fix the systems. As Reason put it so pun-
gently: “Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, opera-
tors tend to be the inheritors of system defects. . . . Their part is that of 
adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have 
already been long in the cooking” [1].
After studying many industrial accidents, Reason further developed 
a general theory that accidents result from failures in one or more of 
four domains: organization, supervision, preconditions (such as 
fatigue from long hours of work), and specific acts. He is best known 
for his “Swiss cheese” model that depicts the organizational defenses 
(systems) as a series of slices of cheese. Each defense has defects, 
represented by the holes, which vary in size, timing, and position. 
Jim Reason. (All rights reserved)
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Normally the multiple layers of defenses work, but when the defects 
temporally coincide—when the holes in the slices align—the poten-
tial for an “accident trajectory” is created, leading to the failure.
Charles Perrow, professor of sociology at Yale, studied risks and 
accidents in large organizations. His book, Normal Accidents: Living 
with High-Risk Technologies, advanced the theory that accidents are 
inevitable in highly coupled and complex systems and hard to predict. 
From analysis of a number of famous accidents, he described the 
latent failures and what could have been done to prevent the catastro-
phes. He has been a consistent and effective promoter of sys-
tems theory.
Donald Norman, director of The Design Lab at the University of 
California, San Diego, is the author of the delightful book, The Design 
of Everyday Things, in which he laments the everyday annoyances—
and the error potential—posed by poor design, such as door openers 
for which it is not obvious whether to push or pull. Though that design 
failure results only in trivial annoyance, others, such as confusing 
instructions for programing navigation systems in aircraft, can result 
in crashes. Norman introduced me to “affordances”—designs that 
make function obvious, such as door handles that show by their posi-
tion or design which way to push or pull, and “forcing functions”—
designing a process to make it impossible to do it wrong, such as 
design of a car’s ignition switch so that the engine cannot be started 
unless the gear is set in “park.”
This was fascinating stuff. It was all new to me despite my excel-
lent undergraduate and medical education at fine universities. I knew 
nothing about the extensive knowledge that psychologists and human 
factors engineers had developed about why we make mistakes, nor 
about the ideas they had for preventing them. The light bulbs went off: 
this is what we need! This is something we can use. It was clearly 
applicable to healthcare: we had to redesign our systems.
The more I read, the more excited I got about the relevance of this 
knowledge to what we needed to do to reduce iatrogenic harm. I 
assumed that, like me, very few doctors, nurses, or other healthcare 
workers had any knowledge of this body of thought. It seemed ines-
capably clear that healthcare needed to take a systems approach to 
medical errors. We needed to stop punishing individuals for their 
errors since almost all of them were beyond their control, and we had 
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to begin to change the faulty systems that “set them up” to make mis-
takes. We needed to design errors out of the system. I had no doubt we 
could do that.
 Application of Systems Thinking to Healthcare
Healthcare lacked effective systems at many levels. At the most obvi-
ous level, there was no fail-safe system for identifying the patient to 
make sure that a test or medication was being given to the right per-
son. We lacked a system for guaranteeing that a medication dose was 
correctly calculated and measured out or given to the right patient. 
The only system for preventing a patient from getting the wrong dose 
or a substantial overdose of any drug was double-checking by another 
nurse, but this was required only for certain medications such as nar-
cotics. Nothing prevented a nurse from inadvertently confusing two 
vials with similar labels, such as solutions of sodium chloride and 
concentrated potassium chloride, and accidentally giving the patient 
a lethal infusion of potassium—which, in fact, was not all that rare.
Although the evidence was clear that disinfecting your hands 
reduced hospital- acquired infections, there was no system to ensure 
that doctors and nurses did it for every encounter. And, of course, the 
hospital environment was notorious for distractions and interruptions 
of nurses and resident physicians, who were also overworked and 
sleep-deprived—all “preconditions” that are well-known to 
cause errors.
As noted, my colleagues—particularly Howard Hiatt and Troy 
Brennan from the MPS—tried to dissuade me from writing about this. 
They said that “error” was a “third rail” issue that doctors—including 
my friends and associates—would be very upset if I brought this to 
public attention, since it would make them look bad; the medical 
establishment, i.e., the AMA, would line up against me.
I understood that risk but saw no choice. Here was an answer to the 
problem of medical errors. How could we not pursue it? We needed to 
make a fundamental change in how we practiced. There was no way 
to make that happen unless we talked about error. We needed to change 
physicians’ (and nurses’ and everyone’s) mindset away from thinking 
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of an error as a moral failing to recognizing that it resulted from a 
systems failure. I was very excited about the possibility of doing this.
 Error in Medicine
By mid-1992, I had finally finished the paper. I decided to call it “Error 
in Medicine” [5]. It was a comprehensive look at the problem. It began 
by referencing the findings of the MPS, which found that nearly 4 
percent of hospitalized patients suffered a serious injury, of which 
14% were fatal and 69% were due to errors and were thus 
preventable.
From these findings we had estimated that nationwide more than a 
million patients were harmed annually, and 180,000 died from these 
injuries. I noted that this was the equivalent of three jumbo-jet crashes 
every 2 days, an analogy that was later picked up by others and became 
popular after the IOM report came out in 1999. Two-thirds of the 
deaths, or about 120,000, were due to errors. What could be done 
about the high rate of preventable injury?
The paper set out to do four things. It first explored why the error 
rate in medicine is so high. It noted that some of the lack of response 
comes from lack of awareness—errors are not part of a doctor’s every-
day experience—and the fact that most errors are, fortunately, not 
harmful. But a more important factor is that doctors and nurses have a 
great deal of difficulty dealing with errors. They are taught to believe 
that they should make no mistakes; when they inevitably do make a 
mistake, they view it as a character failing.
The second section explored the institutional approach to errors in 
medicine, which is based on this “perfectability” model: the expecta-
tion of faultless performance. This leads to blame when individuals 
fail, followed by punishment or more training. Since all humans err, 
any system that relies on error-free performance is destined to fail. I 
called for a fundamental change in the way we think about errors.
The third section summarized the lessons from the extensive 
research about the cognitive mechanisms of error in the field of cogni-
tive psychology and the research on latent error (poor system design) 
and the effectiveness of system design in reducing errors in the field 
of human factors engineering.
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The aviation experience provided a useful model: physicians and 
pilots are highly trained professionals committed to maintaining high 
standards while performing complex tasks in challenging environ-
ments. But aircraft designers assume that errors are inevitable and 
design systems to prevent them or, if that fails, “absorb” them with 
buffers, automation, and redundancy to prevent accidents. Procedures 
are standardized and pilots use checklists. Training is extensive, both 
in technical aspects and communication; pilots must take proficiency 
examinations every 6 months. The other major difference from health-
care is that adherence to standards is monitored and enforced by the 
Federal Aviation Administration, and accidents are investigated by the 
National Transportation Safety Board.
The impressive improvement in safety from application of this sys-
tem-design approach in aviation (where there has been no fatality in 
the USA from a commercial air flight in more than 10 years!) con-
trasts dramatically with the medical model that focuses on the indi-
vidual. There was one exception: the specialty of anesthesia, where 
application of systems changes had already resulted in dramatic 
improvements in mortality.
Starting in 1978, Jeff Cooper and his colleagues published a series 
of pioneering studies of critical incidents in anesthesia [6, 7] in which 
they identified specific systems failures and recommended system 
solutions (such as alarms for airway disconnections, procedures and 
practices for handovers, and greater preparation of residents before 
their care of patients). That led Ellison Pierce, the president of the 
American Society of Anesthesiologists, to partner with Cooper and 
others in 1984 to found the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation 
(APSF), with the mission “To ensure that no patient is harmed by 
anesthesia.” Under Cooper’s direction, APSF distributed a newsletter 
to all anesthesia providers highlighting patient safety issues and estab-
lished a program to fund grants for research in anesthesia safety.
These efforts were dramatically successful: they reduced the mor-
tality of anesthesia 90%, from 1 in 20,000 to 1 in 200,000, within a 
decade [8]. In the first years of the APSF grant program, David Gaba’s 
group at Stanford was funded to develop and study the use of simula-
tion to train anesthesia providers to effectively work in teams to man-
age critical events. The use of simulators was later expanded 
throughout all of healthcare and in medical schools.
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In the final section, I urged hospitals to implement a systems 
approach by creating systems for error reporting, changing processes 
to reduce reliance on memory, standardizing routine procedures, and 
reducing error-inducing conditions such as long hours and high 
workloads.
I ended the paper with a summary that was more prophetic than I 
realized at the time: “But it is apparent that the most fundamental 
change that will be needed if hospitals are to make meaningful prog-
ress in error reduction is a cultural one. Physicians and nurses need to 
accept the notion that error is an inevitable accompaniment of the 
human condition, even among conscientious professionals with high 
standards. Errors must be accepted as evidence of systems flaws not 
character flaws. Until and unless that happens, it is unlikely that any 
substantial progress will be made in reducing medical errors” [5].
I knew this was important stuff. I thought it would be a paradigm-
shifting paper—as in fact it turned out to be. So I was stunned when 
The New England Journal of Medicine rejected it without even send-
ing it out for reviews! I knew the editor, Jerry Kassirer, from our days 
together at Tufts, so I called him and asked him to tell me why they 
had rejected it so I could revise it. I will never forget his answer: “It 
just didn’t meet our standards.” I was so stunned that I didn’t know 
what to say, so I said nothing, thanked him, and said goodbye.
Not long after, I happened to see George Lundberg, editor in chief 
of JAMA, in the hallway at HSPH. He was there that day teaching. I 
a b c
(a) Jeff Cooper, (b) Jeep Pierce, (c) David Gaba. (All rights reserved)
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asked him if he would take an informal look at my paper. He did, 
immediately recognized its “huge importance” (his words), and asked 
me to submit it to JAMA. I was delighted and greatly relieved. George 
handled itself at JAMA and accepted it shortly after. It would be 
months before it was published, however. Such delays—a year some-
times—between acceptance and publication are not unusual with 
high-impact medical journals, but there was something else going 
on here.
 Response to Error in Medicine
George realized that my paper would be a red flag for many doctors, 
who were very sensitive to anything that might make them look bad. 
Their institutional arm was the AMA, which saw its primary respon-
sibility as the defense of physicians’ pride and privilege. Naively, I 
thought the paper offered so much in the way of opportunity to reduce 
harm to patients that it would be rapidly embraced by doctors. Here 
George Lundberg. (All rights reserved)
Application of Systems Thinking to Healthcare
26
was the way they could reduce harm to their patients and decrease the 
risk of malpractice suits. Why wouldn’t doctors be excited about that?
George had the better political sense. He deliberately published the 
paper just before Christmas, on December 21, 1994, knowing that 
holiday issues are the least read by the press; hopefully, it would not 
attract a lot of media attention. It almost worked. Only NPR picked it 
up: David Baron (later of “Spotlight” fame) recognized its importance 
and gave it public notice. A month later The Washington Post wrote 
about it and then the reaction began. Lundberg began to receive hate 
mail, and a lobbying campaign to get rid of him began. James Todd, 
the executive vice president of the AMA stood by him, however, and 
the furor subsided.
Curiously, I don’t recall receiving any “hate” mail—although I may 
have just put it out of my mind. I certainly did not get a lot. But he did, 
and this proved to be an early episode in a series of courageous pub-
lishing decisions that ultimately cost him the JAMA editorship. I am 
forever indebted to George Lundberg, who had the courage to do the 
right thing.
On the other hand, within days of the publication of Error in 
Medicine, I received letters from friends and others congratulating me 
and thanking me for the paper. I even received a speaking engagement 
request. JAMA received a deluge of letters to the editor disagreeing 
with one or another of the points I had made. It ignored most of them 
but asked me to respond to nine—a huge number for a single paper. I 
did so, and the letters and my responses were subsequently published 
in JAMA [9, 10].
Amazingly, almost as if on cue, suddenly a series of highly publi-
cized events occurred in early 1995 that drew public and professional 
attention to the paper. In January, The Boston Globe reported that 
Betsy Lehman, a beloved health reporter for the paper, had died from 
a massive overdose of chemotherapy at the prestigious Dana-Farber 
Cancer Institute (DFCI). The community was shocked; Globe report-
ers relentlessly pursued the story, with a litany of frontpage articles 
week after week castigating the Institute for its mistakes and poor 
systems.
As a leading cancer research organization, DFCI always had a 
number of new drug trials going on simultaneously. Sometimes these 
included tests of high doses of toxic chemotherapeutic drugs, and 
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treatment protocols varied substantially by dose, time of dosage, etc. 
Study protocols were complicated and many pages long. It was diffi-
cult for nurses and doctors to keep it all straight. So, when the physi-
cian mistakenly wrote an order for Lehman for a dose that was four 
times the usual amount, neither the nurses nor the pharmacy ques-
tioned it. The system failed.
In April, I was asked to meet with the DFCI staff to talk with them 
about our new thinking about systems causes of errors in an effort to 
help the devastated staff deal with the crisis. They were visibly shaken. 
Years later people commented to me about our session, so I think it 
helped. The Lehman case was a life-changing event for DFCI, which 
underwent a major reorganization under the leadership of Jim Conway 
to dramatically improve its safety and ultimately achieve the lowest 
medication error rate in the nation.
The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Nursing was not so 
moved. Four years later (!) it censured 18 nurses for their role in the 
Betsy Lehman case. I wrote a scathing op-ed for the Globe [11].
The Betsy Lehman tragedy, plus several other egregious errors that 
got national coverage that spring, the amputation of the wrong leg of 
a patient in Florida, removal of the wrong breast of a patient in 
Michigan, death from accidental disconnection of a ventilator in 
Florida, and an operation on the wrong side of the brain of a patient in 
Chicago, stimulated reporters and others to inquire deeper into why 
these things happen. They discovered my recently published Error in 
Medicine paper. It undoubtedly got much more early attention because 
of the coincidence of these tragic accidents.
Betsy Lehman. (All rights reserved)
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The combination of the paper and these highly visible preventable 
deaths also created the climate for a favorable reception of the results 
of our adverse drug event (ADE) study at the Massachusetts General 
Hospital and the Brigham and Women’s Hospital that David Bates 
and I published just a few months later in JAMA in July 1995 [12, 13]. 
Not only did we find high rates of ADEs, further evidence of the seri-
ousness of the error problem, but we were also able to show that 
underlying systems failures could be identified. (See next chapter.)
It is hazardous to ascribe causation, but it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that the “one-two-three punch”—the error paper, which 
raised the issue and recommended a system solution, the serious cases 
that got public attention, and the evidence from the ADE study that we 
could identify systems causes underlying medical errors—was instru-
mental in beginning to get patient safety and systems change on the 
national agenda.
The paper also influenced the thinking of future leaders in patient 
safety. Within a year, Jerod Loeb, from the Joint Commission, and 
Mark Eppinger of the Annenberg Center decided to convene a confer-
ence on medical error. Despite the displeasure with Lundberg at the 
AMA, its legal counsel, Marty Hatlie, convinced the leadership to 
shift its efforts from tort reform to error prevention. That ultimately 
led the AMA to found the National Patient Safety Foundation. (See 
Chap. 5.)
Most importantly, however, the paper influenced Ken Shine, presi-
dent of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and its Quality of Care 
Committee, to make safety a focus of its work in quality of care. (See 
Chap. 9.) The Committee’s later report To Err is Human [14] was in 
many ways a detailed explication of the information in Error in 
Medicine, amplified with patient examples and specific recommenda-
tions for policy changes. It brought to public attention what the paper 
brought to the profession.
Error in Medicine called for a paradigm shift. It challenged every-
one in healthcare to change their approach to its most sensitive and 
most taboo failing: medical errors. It called for replacing a stale, failed 
policy of blame and retribution after a mistake with a radically new 
approach to prevent future mistakes. It looked forward, not backward; 
it replaced fear with hope. It gave medicine a way to deal with our 
national shame of preventable deaths. “It’s not bad people, it’s bad 
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systems.” would be the guiding principle for the work to follow. 
Things would never be the same.
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Chapter 3
Changing the System: The Adverse 
Drug Events Study
It was clear from the beginning of my investigation into the applica-
tion of systems theory to error prevention in healthcare that however 
strong the theory and the evidence—and for me it was compelling—
the idea of a systems approach to preventing errors would get little 
acceptance from physicians unless we could demonstrate that it actu-
ally worked in healthcare.
Doctors are the ultimate “NIH” (not invented here) thinkers; they 
have trouble imagining that something that works in another industry 
would be relevant to healthcare. “Healthcare is different.” “Healthcare 
is special.” And, of course, it is, but couldn’t we learn from others? 
Not easily, I knew. It was clear to me that if I wanted to get acceptance 
of systems theory and motivate doctors—as well as everyone in 
healthcare—to change, we would have to demonstrate that systems 
theory could be successfully applied to real-world medical problems.
But it is even more complicated. Any demonstration in healthcare 
would have to resonate—be applicable—for all kinds of physicians. 
Making a systems change in the operating room, for example, would 
be of little interest to internists. And a change eliminating errors in the 
diagnosis of diabetes would not carry much weight with the surgeons. 
To prove the point, we needed to address a systems failure that affected 
all physicians.
The obvious choice was medication errors. All doctors write pre-
scriptions. Moreover, we knew from the Medical Practice Study that 
misuse of medications was a serious problem, indeed the most serious 
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problem we found, accounting for a fifth of all serious adverse events 
discovered in the study. Medication errors it would be.
Who knew anything about medication errors? More to the point, 
who might be interested in collaborating on this type of project? I 
spoke with Tony Komaroff, professor of medicine at Harvard and edi-
tor in chief of the Harvard Health Letter and the Harvard Medical 
School Family Health Guide. He knew just the person: David Bates, a 
young internist-investigator at Brigham and Women’s Hospital (BWH).
I first met David on April 12, 1990. We immediately hit it off. He 
got interested in medication errors when he learned that adverse drug 
events (ADEs) were the leading type of harm found by the Medical 
Practice Study. David was also the key person at the Brigham evaluat-
ing a computerized physician order entry (CPOE) system being devel-
oped by a team led by Jonathan Teich in which physicians were to 
enter orders on the computer instead of writing them by hand. It 
seemed obvious that this could be a powerful systems change for 
reducing errors. Could we demonstrate that it did in fact do that?.
We agreed on a strategy: first, we would do a study to get an accu-
rate measure of the extent of medication errors and the harm they 
caused. We would categorize them by type and when in the medica-
tion process they occurred. And we would see if we could identify the 
systems failures causing them. Most previous studies of medication 
errors relied on self-reporting, which was known to be unreliable, and 
none were comprehensive in the sense of considering all of the stages 
David Bates. (All rights reserved)
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in the medication process. Most significantly, none had linked medi-
cation errors to harm, and none inquired into underlying causes.
After getting this information, we would implement a systems 
change, such as CPOE, to see if it reduced the harm. None of this was 
assured. How to find the errors? How to find the underlying systems 
failures? All new territory, but very exciting.
Fortunately, the Risk Management Foundation (RMF) of CRICO 
(the Controlled Risk Insurance Company that provides liability cover-
age to all the Harvard hospitals and doctors) was intrigued by the 
Medical Practice Study and was interested in exploring the possibility 
of preventing medical injury, not just paying for its consequences 
through malpractice suit settlements. They gave us a small grant for a 
pilot study at BWH. Thus began a long and fruitful relationship with 
this incredibly enlightened insurer.
We were aware that many complications of the use of medica-
tions—such as unpredictable allergic reactions—are not caused by 
errors, so we decided to focus on drug-related harm, not just errors. 
Referring to the Medical Practice Study definition of adverse event, 
we defined “adverse drug event” (ADE) as “an unintended injury 
caused by use of a medication.” To determine those caused by errors, 
we used the MPS definition: “The failure of a planned action to be 
completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.”
Our objective of finding every episode of harm caused by a medica-
tion led us to develop a totally new approach to data collection. Rather 
than rely on reporting of events by the unit nurse, we would have a 
specially trained nurse visit the study care units in the hospital several 
times a day to review each patient’s record, follow up on laboratory 
test results, and interview the unit nurses searching for evidence that 
the patient had experienced an ADE. She would also count the medi-
cation errors and find out as much as she could about what caused 
them. In short, we did everything we could think of to try to find every 
ADE and every medication error.
The results of the pilot study were encouraging. The intensive data 
collection enabled us to identify many more ADEs than had been 
reported in other studies that largely depended on review of medical 
records [1]. We were also able to determine how many medication 
errors result in harm. We drew up a proposal for a large multi-institu-
tional study that would have a sample size big enough to have 
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statistical significance. We would also find out if we could identify 
underlying systems failures. We sought funding from the Agency for 
Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR).
Meanwhile, acutely aware of our lack of knowledge and experience 
in how to train people to find causes of errors, we sought help from a 
psychologist and were finally steered to Richard Hackman, professor 
of social and organizational psychology at Harvard. Hackman was an 
expert on teamwork, having studied airplane crews, sports teams, cor-
porate boards, and even symphony orchestras. He was intrigued by 
our project, and we enlisted him in our study.
We also recruited David Cullen, a senior anesthesiologist from the 
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) who had research experi-
ence and a long-standing interest in patient safety. He had done medi-
cation safety research in anesthesia and was very enthusiastic about 
joining the team. As is often the case in a strong collaboration, we 
each brought different things to the table. I had clinical experience 
from my long surgical career to draw on, as well as experience in 
finding and classifying adverse events from the Medical Practice 
study. David Bates was an internist at the Brigham with epidemiology 
training and informatics skills. And David Cullen brought his anes-
thesia experience and was well positioned to recruit a team at MGH.
David Cullen. (All rights reserved)
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In 1992 our proposal was funded by AHCPR. We called our coali-
tion the ADE Prevention Study Group and conceived of the project in 
two phases. In Phase 1 we had two objectives: to identify every ADE 
and potential ADE (an error that could have but did not result in an 
ADE) and to identify the systems failure(s) underlying each one. In 
Phase 2 we would introduce one or more specific systems changes to 
correct an identified failure and find out whether it prevented ADEs.
The Agency funded Phase 1 but to our disappointment declined to 
fund Phase 2 until we showed that we had succeeded with Phase 1. 
Based on our pilot study results, we were confident we would suc-
ceed, although we were worried about making the timing work out. 
We established an investigative team at each hospital and selected 11 
nursing units for the study at the 2 hospitals: 5 intensive care units and 
6 general, non-obstetric care units. David Bates was the leader of the 
Brigham team and David Cullen led the MGH team.
As in the pilot study, we identified adverse drug events by having a 
trained nurse investigator review the charts and laboratory test results 
of every patient and talk with the nurses in each of the study units daily.
To identify underlying systems failures, something that had not 
been done before, we developed data forms with questions regarding 
the what, where, when, and how of each incident. We trained our 
nurse investigators to use them to assess each ADE they found. We 
also gathered data about within-team communication, between- team 
communication, as well as environmental information.
The nurse investigators also inquired about circumstances around 
the event such as the person’s health, job stressors, sleep the previous 
night, education about the drug, and experience with the drug. In other 
words, we were looking for all possible explanations for why errors 
might be made.
To develop and refine our data collection methodology, David Bates 
and I had multiple meetings with Richard Hackman and his graduate 
student, Amy Edmondson. Despite this, things almost came unglued 
at our first training session for the nurse investigators. Through what 
in retrospect was a major miscommunication, David and I thought 
Amy was going to do the training. However, when we had the meeting 
with the nurses, it was immediately obvious that she had no idea that 
was to be her role. Without revealing our problem to the trainees, I 
took over and spontaneously ran the program. David and I had thought 
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a lot about our objectives and measures and had spelled them out, so 
it wasn’t starting from scratch, but more planning would have been 
better. In any case, it had to do. In the end it worked out all right. After 
a few weeks, the process worked fairly smoothly.
The study team at each hospital conferenced every other week to 
review every adverse drug event and potential adverse event that had 
been identified and to classify errors by type. Using the data the nurses 
had collected about the circumstances surrounding each ADE, we 
then systematically identified the underlying causes of errors at two 
levels: the proximal (obvious) causes and the underlying causes, or 
systems failures. For example, a doctor prescribed the wrong medica-
tion (error), because of insufficient knowledge about the drug (proxi-
mal cause) due to a failure in the drug knowledge dissemination 
system (systems failure). Although we were all new at this type of 
analysis, it proved surprisingly easy to do, which gave us confidence 
that our findings were valid.
In 1994 we completed the fieldwork and analyzed our data. There 
had been some pitfalls; partway through the study, a medical unit was 
switched to a surgical unit, for example. But overall data collection 
went well. We found 247 adverse drug events in the study population 
of 4031 admissions, a rate of 6.5 per 100 admissions. Of these, 70 
(28%) were preventable [2]. We also found 194 potential ADEs, errors 
that did not result in harm or were intercepted before the medication 
was given (Table 3.1).
Errors occurred at every stage of the process. Nearly half (49%) 
occurred during ordering, followed by nurse administration, 26%; 
pharmacist dispensing, 14%; and transcription, 11%. Dosing errors 
were the most common type of medication error, and more than half 
Table 3.1 Adverse 
drug event rates No. (%)
Rate/100 
admissions
ADEs 247 (100) 6.5




Potential ADEs 194 (100) 5.5
Nonintercepted 111 (57) 3.1
Intercepted 83 (43) 2.4
Adapted from Ref. [2]
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of these occurred at the physician ordering stage. Fortunately, nearly 
half of physician errors were intercepted (largely by nurses), but no 
one backstopped the nurses; only 2% of nursing administration errors 
were intercepted (Table 3.2).
This rate of ADEs, 6.5 for every 100 patients, was astounding! It 
was almost ten (10) times higher than had ever been reported. And 
this was at the two flagship teaching hospitals of Harvard, institutions 
that considered themselves the best in the country! [2]
To my delight, we were also able to identify systems failures under-
lying the errors and to categorize them into operationally useful cate-
gories. The leading failures were in systems for (1) drug knowledge 
dissemination (example of an error: failure to reduce dose for elderly 
patient), (2) dose and identity checking (error: mix-up of two “look-
alike” packaged drugs), (3) patient information availability (error: 
lack of information about reduced kidney function), (4) order tran-
scription (error: handwriting errors), and (5) allergy defense (error: 
giving medication to a patient known to be allergic to it) [3] (Table 3.3).
We now had evidence that systems failures could be identified in a 
healthcare environment, the first step in my quest to develop data to 
convince doctors and hospitals that changing systems would be more 
effective in reducing harm than punishing people who made mistakes. 
We still had a long way to go: we needed to show that we could change 
the systems and that changing them would reduce the harm. But we 
were on our way. Needless to say, this was pretty exciting.
While we were analyzing our results for publication, we com-
pleted planning for Phase 2, the implementation of systems changes 
in a controlled study to determine if the changes would, in fact, 
Table 3.2 Types of 
medication errors
Type of error No. (%)
Wrong dose 95 (28)
Wrong choice 30 (9)
Wrong drug 29 (9)
Known allergy 27 (8)
Missed dose 24 (7)
Wrong time 23 (7)
Wrong frequency 20 (6)
Wrong technique 20 (6)
Drug-drug interaction 9 (3)
Wrong route 6 (2)
Adapted from Ref. [3]
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reduce harm. Suddenly the roof fell in! Despite our brilliant results 
in Phase 1, the rating of our grant proposal to AHCPR fell a fraction 
of a point below their funding level. We had no funding for the 
next phase.
We were in deep trouble. We had the team assembled, we had the 
instruments, and we had the plan all worked out to move ahead. Most 
importantly, we had a potentially powerful systems change to test—
but no money! Into the breach came the Risk Management Foundation, 
which had funded our original pilot study. They agreed to pay for the 
project, one more example of their generosity at crucial times that was 
so helpful for our team. We were profoundly grateful.
The systems change to be tested in Phase 2 at BWH was computer-
ized physician order entry (CPOE) in which all physician orders are 
written on the computer. This enabled medication orders to be auto-
matically checked for errors such as wrong dose, overlooking a drug 
allergy, or giving two incompatible drugs, thus preventing the physi-
cian from making the error.
This had been our plan from the start. David Bates and colleagues 
at BWH had been working to get it designed and tested, and it was 
ready to go. The timing was perfect. This would be a powerful sys-
tems change; we anticipated it would have a significant effect in 
reducing prescribing orders, the most common type of error found in 
Phase 1.




 1.  Drug knowledge 
dissemination
98 29
 2. Dose and identity checking 40 12
 3.  Patient information 
availability
37 11
 4. Order transcription 29 9
 5. Allergy defense 24 7
 6. Medication order tracking 18 5
 7. Interservice communication 17 5
 8. Device use 12 4
 9. Std. doses/frequencies 12 4
10. Std. drug distribution in unit 11 3
Adapted from Ref. [3]
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But what systems change would the MGH implement? They were 
far from having a computer order entry system, so we needed some-
thing else. Fortunately, we were aware that there was some evidence 
that having a pharmacist present on rounds with clinicians reduced 
prescribing errors. This made sense, but the practice had not been 
tested in a controlled trial. We decided to see if implementing this 
systems change of having a pharmacist make rounds every morning 
with the physician care team would significantly decrease ADEs.
Morning rounds are when care decisions are made, including what 
medications to prescribe, so having the pharmacist’s input at the time 
of decision-making might reduce prescribing errors. We would try it 
in an intensive care unit (ICU) where patients are cared for by a true 
“team” that meets to make rounds at a predictable time. Another ICU 
would be the control unit. We began the study.
The big event of 1995 for our research team was the publication of 
our first two papers from the drug prevention study: the incidence study 
and the systems analysis study [2, 3]. Prior to submitting the papers to 
a journal, we ran them by the CEOs of the Mass General and the 
Brigham, as well as the chair of medicine at the Brigham, Dr. Eugene 
Braunwald, so they would not be blind-sided by what we anticipated 
might be extensive publicity when the papers were published.
Despite the fact that the high rates of ADEs could potentially make 
them look bad, to their credit, neither CEO suggested that we not pub-
lish nor, for that matter, change a single word in the papers. They did, 
however, arrange for and pay for media training for both of us! It 
proved very helpful. I learned for the first time that when being inter-
viewed, you don’t answer the reporter’s question but use it to make 
your points. We were taught some techniques for turning the conver-
sation around to what we wanted to talk about.
George Lundberg welcomed our first two papers, and they were 
published fairly soon in JAMA in July 1995—just 7 months after my 
Error in Medicine paper and 5  months after the news about Betsy 
Lehman’s tragic death from an overdose of chemotherapy. The papers 
got a lot of publicity: all three major television networks covered them 
on the nightly news, and both David and I had live interviews with 
them. Ted Koppel even did a special on Nightline about them. Our 
media training paid off.
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But Nancy Dickey, the president of the American Medical 
Association, was not pleased. In a television interview, she criticized 
us and said the numbers were exaggerated. Of course, the reverse was 
true—we knew we missed some, and indeed, later more sophisticated 
studies showed even higher rates. David Bates was shocked by this. I 
was not surprised, having previously had a similar experience with 
her and the Medical Practice Study. To her credit, Dr. Dickey later 
came around and subsequently became an important advocate for 
patient safety and led the establishment of the National Patient Safety 
Foundation.
On the other hand, both of us got favorable letters from other physi-
cians, as well as a number of letters to the editor, most of which were 
positive. The papers were also well accepted by the general healthcare 
community. They have since been cited over 2500 times, the most-
cited studies of the frequency of harm related to the hospital use of 
medications.
An interesting sidebar was an episode in the review process after 
we submitted the papers. As is typically the case, the acceptance was 
tentative, conditioned on our revising them in response to reviewers’ 
comments. One reviewer wrote a five-page single-spaced review of 
the systems paper that raised multiple important points, all of which I 
would have to respond to!
I knew as soon as I read it that it was written by Don Berwick. Don 
was the founder and CEO of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
(IHI), the pathbreaking organization teaching quality improvement 
(QI) to healthcare professionals. QI, of course, was about process 
improvement, or systems change. IHI had applied QI techniques to 
issues such as overuse and underuse of services, but not to medi-
cal errors.
I had met Don some years earlier when I was exploring options for 
my new career. From talking with him and reading his papers, I imme-
diately recognized that he was the author of the critique. I was 
reminded of the old saw, “With friends like that, who needs enemies?” 
But, of course, revising with his points addressed made it a much 
stronger paper. The paper was also Don’s introduction to my work 
(the review was before my Error in Medicine paper came out) and led 
him to later involve me in the IHI Breakthrough Collaborative work 
on adverse drug events and begin our long-term collaboration.
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Another interesting wrinkle related to our psychology colleagues. 
Amy Edmondson became curious about why two of the four seem-
ingly identical nursing units at the MGH had substantially lower rates 
of ADE than the other two. Were they better managed? Were nurses 
there more careful? If so, why?
Using the data from our study and further interviews of nurses, she 
was able to show that the units with the higher rates of reported ADE 
were those that had more supportive nurse managers. In the units with 
lower rates, nurses were less likely to report errors because they feared 
they would be punished or reprimand. In the high- rate units, that 
wouldn’t happen. The high-rate units did not have more ADEs, they 
just knew about more of them because the environment made it pos-
sible for them to be brought to the surface. Edmondson developed this 
finding into her PhD thesis, and it became the stimulus to her later 
work. She is now a full professor at Harvard and an internationally 
recognized expert on teamwork.
Phase 2, studying the effect of our two systems changes—comput-
erized physician order entry (CPOE) at the BWH and pharmacist 
presence on rounds in the ICU at the MGH—was well underway 
before the results of the first study came out. Our methods had been 
worked out and our teams were experienced at finding ADEs. BWH 
had previously committed to implementing CPOE. At the MGH, the 
extra cost of including a designated pharmacist as part of the care 
team for daily rounds in the ICU was funded by the nursing depart-
ment and pharmacy, who were both keenly interested.
When the results came back from the studies, we were ecstatic. 
Both systems changes had significant impact. The before-after study 
at BWH showed that CPOE reduced all medication errors by 83% and 
ADEs by 17% [4]. The estimated cost saving if the system were 
implemented hospital-wide was $480,000 per year. The controlled 
study of pharmacist participation on rounds at the MGH showed a 
66% reduction of ADEs caused by errors in prescribing [5]. Finally, 
we had evidence that systems change worked in healthcare.
Not surprising, our systems change papers received less coverage 
in the popular media than the studies that had demonstrated the extent 
of the problem. The media prefer bad news to good. Sadly, evidence 
of a problem is much more newsworthy than the demonstration of its 
solution.
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However, our colleagues in safety took notice. Here was the proof 
needed that systems change worked in medicine. The papers were 
discussed in trade journals, and both systems change papers were part 
of the evidence cited as part of the Institute of Medicine recommenda-
tions in its famous report, To Err Is Human, that came out 2 years 
later. The groundwork was laid. Now began the hard job of getting 
doctors, nurses, and hospitals to incorporate systems thinking into 
their work.
 BWH Center for Patient Safety Research 
and Practice
As we concluded our research, I turned my attention to promoting 
systems change and influencing policy. David kept his focus on 
research. He wanted to establish a “Center of Excellence,” a new vehi-
cle that AHRQ had just announced and was generously funding. Our 
studies showed how broken the medication delivery system was. 
Basic research was needed in the epidemiology of medication errors, 
not just in the hospital, but in all venues. Safe practices needed to be 
developed for all stages: ordering, dispensing, and administration and 
for communication and interactions between them. More needed to be 
known about costs and barriers to improvement.
From his work developing an electronic medical record, David 
could see the technological explosion that was coming, and he was 
eager to apply the new technology to medication error problems. 
There was much to do. AHRQ funded the proposal, and the BWH 
Center for Patient Safety Research and Practice was born. I was hon-
ored to chair its advisory board.
The scope of the Center’s work under David’s leadership more than 
lived up to the prospectus. Early on, the group demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of real-time decision support during computer prescribing 
using alerts to adjust doses for renal impairment and age. Some elderly 
patients were receiving 10 times the recommended dose of psychoac-
tive drugs! But alerts were not universally regarded as a benefit. If the 
system provided too many, as it often did, physicians ignored all of 
them. Center researchers found that if the alert was accompanied by 
specific advice, e.g., the correct dose, it was readily accepted.
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The Center sponsored Rainu Kaushal’s first study of medication 
errors in a pediatric hospital. It found a similar rate of ADE to that 
found in adult patients, except for newborns, where it was 10 times 
higher. Potential ADEs—the near-misses—were 3 times as common, 
testimony to an alert staff and a poor system [6].
The first study of ADE in office patients led by Tejal Gandhi showed 
that they were even more common than in the hospital. The ADE rate 
was 21%, of which 36% were preventable [7]. The study was unique 
and pathbreaking in another way: it demonstrated the value of asking 
patients about their experiences when assessing harm. We were 
stunned to find that patients reported 8 times as many ADEs as were 
noted in the physicians’ charts.
From the beginning, a major focus of the Center was on the use and 
effectiveness of technology to reduce ADE. The early work with com-
puterized ordering helped increase the national will to spread the use 
of computers into office practice. A pioneering study of bar coding of 
drugs showed it dramatically reduced errors in pharmacists’ dispens-
ing and when nurses give the medication to the patient [8]. Based on 
this evidence, the NQF endorsed bar coding, and it has since been 
adopted as standard practice in hospitals nationwide.
Over time David expanded the Center’s agenda well beyond the 
issue of ADEs to patient safety in general. Center researchers studied 
the costs of adverse events and of adopting information technology in 
healthcare. They demonstrated that the use of sensors under the mat-
tress to monitor hospitalized patients’ vital signs and activity led to 
improved responses by nurses and a 50% reduction in ICU days. Dr. 
Patti Dykes, a nurse, developed a fall prevention protocol that 
decreased its risk by a third. It is now being used at more than 100 
hospitals around the country.
David Bates proved to be an incredibly effective leader, who over 
the years created a leading center—probably the leading center—of 
innovation, research, and development in patient safety. He inspired 
and mentored a new generation of researchers, attracting postdocs and 
others from around the world to the center. He has trained more than 
100 researchers in patient safety research who have published over 
1000 papers on patient safety. His Center exemplifies patient safety 
research at its best.
BWH Center for Patient Safety Research and Practice
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Chapter 4
Coming Together: The Annenberg 
Conference
1996 was the year that patient safety began.
One day in the early spring of 1996, Marty Hatlie, a lawyer and 
lobbyist at the American Medical Association (AMA), called to invite 
me to participate with the AMA, the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS), and the Annenberg Center for 
Health Sciences in planning a big meeting on preventing errors.
I didn’t know Hatlie, nor was I aware that he had been a diligent 
opponent of our work on drawing attention to medical error! He was 
the lead lawyer for the AMA dealing with malpractice issues. When 
the Medical Practice Study came out in 1991, he coordinated the 
AMA attack on the study, questioning the methodology and therefore 
the results. When Error in Medicine was published, he coordinated 
the attack on that as well.
The AMA then, as now, saw its role as advocating for doctors and 
opposing anything that seemed to be against their best interest. 
Discussion of errors, or even admitting that they happened, was seen 
as extremely threatening. The AMA’s approach was to deny that doc-
tors made mistakes, to stonewall any investigations, and to push for 
federal tort reform, the centerpiece of which was a cap on liability 
payments.
To that end, Hatlie led the AMA’s intensive lobbying effort in 
1995  in support of federal legislation that would limit the dollar 
amount of tort settlements in malpractice cases and make it more 
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difficult for patients to sue. He was joined in this effort by the American 
Tort Reform Association and the Healthcare Liability Alliance, a 
coalition built by Hatlie that included the major hospital associations, 
liability insurers, and Big Pharma. Together these organizations spent 
tens of millions of dollars lobbying Congress for the legislation.
Despite these formidable efforts, legislation failed to pass. The tim-
ing was bad. 1995 was the year that the public conscience was shocked 
by stories such as The Boston Globe journalist Betsy Lehman’s death 
from an overdose of chemotherapy, the amputation of “the wrong 
foot” of Willie King in Florida, and a seemingly endless series of mis-
haps. It was also the year that our research was published that docu-
mented that these cases reflected a deeper problem. Although the 
AMA was successful in the House, the Senate would not cave to the 
powerful special interests.
With the congressional defeat, Marty and the AMA needed to 
regroup. Although he later admitted that he began to change his think-
ing after reading my Error in Medicine paper, he was still a skeptical 
“hired gun.” However, he could see that it would help the AMA’s 
somewhat tarnished image if it could show some interest in 
patient safety.
Jim Todd, executive vice president, and Nancy Dickey, incoming 
chairman of the AMA Board of Trustees, were easily persuaded to 
take a new approach. Supporting the Annenberg Conference was just 
what they needed to improve their image. Todd, a surgeon, had fought, 
Marty Hatlie. (All rights reserved)
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and lost, a battle to change the tort system from court battles to negoti-
ated claims settlements; after the latest setback at getting tort reform 
legislation, he was ready for a new approach to the malpractice prob-
lem. Hatlie had another prominent ally within the AMA orbit who 
was a sincere, even passionate, truth teller about patient safety: George 
Lundberg, editor of JAMA who had published Error in Medicine and 
strongly favored the AMA acknowledging the evidence and changing 
its position.
The idea for a conference on medical error came from Jerod Loeb, 
head of research at JCAHO, and Mark Eppinger, the Annenberg 
Center program director. They approached Deborah Runkle of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in the 
hope of getting an issue of Science magazine dedicated to the topic. 
The AAAS had a session on medical injury at its annual meeting the 
year before where Richard Cook, an anesthesiologist and early thinker 
about patient safety, spoke and I presented the results of the MPS.
Jerod and Mark had developed the proposal for a conference 
focused on patient safety but had not succeeded in getting funding 
when Marty approached Jerod about collaborating. Marty convinced 
the AMA leadership to fund the conference. He also recommended 
the organizing group invite me, which they agreed to do.
When Marty asked me to join the planning meeting, I accepted 
without a second thought. Although we had never met, I was sure glad 
he called me! It was the beginning of a long and productive friendship 
in the fight for patient safety. Marty remembers that I had one condi-
tion: that they invite Jim Reason, the world’s leading expert on human 
error, and pay for his first-class air ticket from Britain, which they did. 
When Jim accepted, Marty recalls him saying he’d been hoping for 
such a call for 20 years!
I will never forget the scene as I walked into my first meeting with 
the planning group at JCAHO headquarters in Chicago in early 1996. 
When I saw who was there, I suddenly realized that I was not only the 
sole physician in the group but also the only one who knew anything 
about medical errors! I was relieved not to have missed it. Clearly, this 
could be a big deal. They wanted to invite people from numerous 
industries as well as healthcare, which I thought was a terrific idea. 
The decision was made that Annenberg would host a program in the 
fall at the Annenberg Center in Rancho Mirage, CA.
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A nationwide call for papers was put out on May 17 for the confer-
ence on October 13–15, 1996. To our surprise (and relief), we received 
an avalanche of proposals for presentation: over 200. To facilitate the 
review and selection of those we would have on the program, I sug-
gested the committee meet for several days at our vacation home in 
Newfane, Vermont, in August. That turned out to be great fun and an 
efficient way to get the job done.
The Conference brochure listed the objectives as:
• Develop an agenda for further research into errors, identify educa-
tional or other approaches to their prevention, and target next steps 
for stakeholders.
• Promote greater understanding of the occurrence of errors and 
strategies for preventing them.
• Generate candid discussion of accountability in healthcare and 
explore alternate ways to respond to errors.
• Provide an opportunity for networking in a multidisciplinary 
setting.
The conference opened on October 13, 1996. Preregistration num-
bered 274; more than 300 ultimately attended. It was truly a mixed 
group. Almost 20% of the speakers were scientists and scholars from 
non-healthcare fields, such as psychology, engineering, and organiza-
tional behavior. Another 20% were nonacademic and also not from 
healthcare, such as lawyers and representatives of patients and 
families.1
The atmosphere from the start was electric. It was the first time that 
those who were concerned about errors in medicine had ever met 
together, and to do so with leaders in safety from other industries was 
exhilarating. I had the privilege of giving the opening keynote address, 
which I dedicated to the memory of Betsy Lehman. This was followed 
by a panel presenting different perspectives and an address by Jim 
Reason on lessons from other sectors. John Nance, pilot and aviation 
1 Lead faculty for the conference included, in addition to me and James Reason, 
Donald Berwick, IHI; Marjorie Beyers, American Organization of Nurse 
Executives; Victor Cohn, The Washington Post; James Conway, Dana-Farber; 
Nancy Dickey, AMA; Linda Emanuel, AMA; Linda Golodner, Nat’l Consumers 
League; Brent James, Intermountain Health; John Nance, Alaska Airlines; and 
Dennis O’Leary, The Joint Commission.
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reporter for ABC News, gave his usual stem-winder talk at dinner, 
telling the riveting story of the crash of the KLM and Pan Am air-
planes on the runway in Tenerife in 1977 that killed 538 people.
The second day opened with a presentation of the case of Ben Kolb, 
a 7-year-old boy who died from a mix-up of medications in the oper-
ating room at Martin Memorial Hospital in Stuart, FL. The clinicians 
involved in the case described the investigation and their despair. 
What made it memorable was the hospital was transparent from the 
first conversation with Ben’s parents. Driven by the belief that the 
kind of error that took Ben’s life had probably happened many times 
before in many other hospitals, the hospital CEO, anesthesiologist in 
the surgery, and risk manager jointly promised Ben’s family they 
would share what they had learned. It was almost unheard of at the 
time (and, it should be noted, still a challenge 25 years later).
The audience was very moved. It was the part of the conference that 
most people remember clearly years later. It was also years later that 
I learned Hatlie had “found” the Ben Kolb case through his contacts 
at MMI, a liability insurer that wanted to honor the hospital leader-
ship’s promise to Ben’s family to tell his story so others could be 
saved. Marty urged it on the program committee because he could see 
the public interest value of a story where providers communicated 
openly with the family. That judgment was validated when USA Today 
made it the lead story the next day [1], and the New York Times Sunday 
Magazine featured it as the cover story a few months later [2].
The rest of the meeting consisted of breakout group sessions, where 
more than 50 presentations were given on issues related to patient 
safety: education and training, communication, legal issues, organiza-
tional processes, human factors, fatigue, drug use, anesthesia, surgery, 
and medication errors. And, of course, “networking” as attendees 
found others who shared their interests and concerns.
Dennis O’Leary, president of JCAHO, announced that in an effort 
to be less punitive, the Commission was changing its response to sen-
tinel events from “Conditional Accreditation” to “Accreditation 
Watch.” The 3-day event concluded with a compelling plenary address 
by Don Berwick, the founder of the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI).
But the part of the program that would have the most significant 
long-term impact came on the second day of the conference from 
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something the program committee had not anticipated: a surprise 
announcement by Nancy Dickey, the incoming chairman of the AMA 
Board, that the AMA was founding and funding a National Patient 
Safety Foundation. Modeled on the Anesthesia Patient Safety 
Foundation, its objective was to fund innovative research projects to 
move the needle on patient safety and provide a forum for discussion. 
The JCAHO was a co-sponsor. Patient safety was no longer just a 
good idea. We would have a gathering, a focus, and a strategy for 
going forward. It assured that there would be more “Annenbergs.”
And indeed there were. The second Annenberg Conference was 
held in November 1998. The original conveners and the new National 
Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) (with Hatlie as its first president) 
were joined by representatives from the Department of Veterans 
Affairs. Don Berwick gave the keynote address outlining the compo-
nents of a safety system. I chaired a panel on Creating a Culture of 
Safety. The conference focused on the challenges of replacing a cul-
ture of blame and punishment with one of cooperation and curiosity 
that exposes errors as opportunities to change the systems failures that 
caused them.
Several hospitals reported success in eliminating sanctions for 
reporting errors. Other presentations included use of information 
technology to support safe practice, the use of national incident data-
bases as in aviation, and the impact of sleep deprivation on physician 
performance. There were calls for greater involvement of regulators, 
legislators, and patients in the dialogue, as the Massachusetts Coalition 
for the Prevention of Medical Errors was doing.
At the first Annenberg Conference, the memorable event was an 
uplifting case presentation of hospital transparency after an error. At 
Annenberg II, it was a depressing story of three nurses who were 
prosecuted for criminal negligence for their role in a fatal medication 
error. The audience heard from all parties, including the prosecuting 
attorney, followed by a presentation on the importance of not punish-
ing individuals for systems failures. It was a stark reminder of how 
far we had to go to implement the fundamental principle that it isn’t 
bad people, it’s bad systems.
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The third and final Annenberg Conference, Let’s Talk; 
Communicating Risk and Safety in Health Care, was convened in 
May 2001 in Minneapolis. As the title suggests, speakers and panels 
addressed the human and legal issues surrounding disclosure. After 
this meeting, the conferences were sponsored annually by the NPSF 
and were called Patient Safety Congresses.
“Annenberg,” as we all later called the first conference, was the 
birthplace of patient safety—in the USA and, truly, the world. A num-
ber of us on the faculty, Don Berwick, Brent James from Intermountain 
Health, and I, as well as researchers Richard Cook and David Woods, 
Jeep Pierce and Jeff Cooper of the Anesthesia Patient Safety 
Foundation, and Jim Reason and Charles Vincent in the UK, had been 
speaking out and writing about error prevention for years. Annenberg 
was the first time we all came together to exchange ideas and make 
common cause.
For us it was exciting and validating to interact with experts outside 
of healthcare and reinforce our commitment to the science of safety. 
It gave weight to our efforts. For others with less experience, some of 
whom came just out of curiosity, the demonstration of industrial con-
cepts of human factors principles and the efforts to apply them in 
healthcare by anesthesia, IHI, and others was enabling and energiz-
ing. For all, it was a powerful shared emotional experience.
The meeting brought into focus the challenges of the next decade in 
research, reporting, standardization, changing processes, technology, 
and culture. It empowered the attendees to continue their work and 
“carry the word” to a larger audience. The quest for safe healthcare 
had finally begun.
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Chapter 5
A Home of Our Own: The National 
Patient Safety Foundation
Prior to the first Annenberg Conference, none of us who were inter-
ested in patient safety had given any thought to forming a national 
organization—except for Marty Hatlie, the AMA’s legal counsel. 
Marty was intrigued by the success of the Anesthesia Patient Safety 
Foundation (APSF) that Jeep Pierce and Jeff Cooper had founded. He 
envisioned the formation of a similar national organization as the cen-
terpiece of the refashioning of the AMA’s stance on patient safety 
after its stinging legislative defeat of tort reform.
Hatlie began to internally advocate that the AMA establish a simi-
lar organization for all of healthcare, and he ultimately persuaded the 
executive vice president, Jim Todd, and incoming chair of the Board 
of Trustees, Nancy Dickey, that they should do this. At Annenberg, 
Dickey, together with two other AMA trustees, Don Palmisano and 
Tim Flaherty, decided on the spot to announce that the AMA was 
founding an independent National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF).
Some questioned whether the AMA would really permit the 
Foundation to be independent. Dennis O’Leary, head of the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), 
was particularly “leery,” as was I, having been snookered by the AMA 
in a previous research program. But we all decided to give it a try, and 
JCAHO signed on as a sponsor. I thought having a national organiza-
tion would make a huge difference in improving the visibility of 
patient safety, which in fact it did.
A few months after Annenberg, in February 1997, the AMA con-
vened a Consensus Conference of a broad group of healthcare leaders 
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and safety experts to help it develop the NPSF agenda. Along with 
several others, I gave a talk to share my vision of what we needed to 
do for patient safety. Marty Hatlie laid out the objectives of NPSF, his 
hopes for collaboration across multiple stakeholders, and the details 
of how it was to be organized.
The group concluded that the first task for NPSF was to establish 
priorities. The first priority should be to support patient safety research. 
NPSF could also help by improving taxonomy and making data avail-
able on safety to a wide audience. Most importantly, we agreed that, 
unlike typical medical professional organizations, all stakeholders 
should be represented.
Unbeknown to most of us at the time, when Dickey and friends 
announced the formation of the NPSF at Annenberg, it was far from a 
done deal. It had not been approved by the Board of Trustees of the 
AMA. It turned out that many Board members were not at all sure that 
the AMA should be involved in anything to do with medical errors, 
much less sharing control with other organizations.
It took 7 months and six Board meetings before Dickey and her col-
leagues convinced them it was the right thing to do. However, once it 
did so, the AMA was generous in its support, providing $1,000,000 
over 3  years, including valuable in- kind support in terms of office 
space and staff for the foundation in its early years.
Dickey and Hatlie were also very successful in raising money from 
outside groups. By the time of its official founding in May 1997, 
funding had been secured from multiple commercial sources, includ-
ing major grants from 3M ($1m over 3 years), CNA HealthPro ($1m 
over 3 years), and Schering-Plough (500K over 3 years) as well as 
substantial contributions from the Physician Insurers Association of 
America, DuPont, Merck, Hoffman-La Roche, MMI, Kaiser 
Permanente, and Hoechst Marion Roussel.
The first meeting of the NPSF Board of Directors took place July 
28–29, 1997, in Chicago. There were 40 directors in all, representing a 
wide range of stakeholders. Twelve of us comprised the Executive 
Committee: Richard Cook, anesthesiologist and safety researcher at the 
University of Chicago; Nancy Dickey, AMA president; Steve Fountain 
(Physicians Insurance Association of America); Linda Golodner 
(National Consumers League); Doni Haas, safety leader at Martin 
Memorial Hospital; Carol Ley (3M); Jim Macdonald (CNA); Henri 
Manasse (American Society of Healthcare Pharmacists (ASHP)); Jeep 
Pierce (Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation); Diane Pinakiewicz 
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(Schering-Plough); John Rother (AARP); and myself. Hatlie served as 
executive director and did all the work of organizing and planning.
The Executive Committee developed a simple mission statement: 
to assure patient safety in the delivery of healthcare. We would do that 
by promoting research on error, promoting solutions to prevent patient 
harm, developing information and educational approaches that 
advance patient safety, and raising awareness. From the beginning, 
NPSF funded research through a Research Committee chaired by Jeff 
Cooper, who held a similar role with the APSA. By the time of the 
AMA’s official announcement of the establishment of the NPSF in 
October, it was fully functioning.
The first major event the NPSF sponsored was a public briefing in 
New  York on October 9, 1997. Charles Meyers of ASHP issued a 
public call for bar coding of drugs. But the news hook was the report 
of a public attitude survey done by Harris Associates of 1513 inter-
views in August 1997, commissioned by Research!America, and pre-
sented by Mary Woolley, its president.
The survey results confirmed the extent of stereotypes about patient 
safety and highlighted the lack of public awareness of it as a problem, 
even though safety issues were pervasive. The study found that 42% of 
respondents had been affected by a medical mistake personally or through 
a friend or relative, and 84% had heard of a medical mistake situation.
Half of the respondents thought carelessness, improper training, and 
poor communication were the major causes of mistakes; 75% thought 
that better training and preventing physicians with bad track records 
from providing care would be the most effective solution to medical 
mistakes. A minority believed that lawsuits or government regulation 
was effective. Healthcare was perceived as moderately safe (5 on a 
7-point scale)—and safer than nuclear power (which was far from true), 
but less safe than airline travel. It was clear we had a long way to go.
The first meeting of the NPSF was held in Chicago December 15–17, 
1997, and featured a Workshop on Assembling the Scientific Basis for 
Patient Safety Research, led by Richard Cook and David Woods, that 
drew international experts. They made the case for a systems approach 
and the need to seriously investigate errors. They labeled their session 
a “Tale of Two Stories,” contrasting the usual response to celebrated 
cases—mostly blame and punishment—with in-depth investigation of 
a serious adverse event that leads to systems changes.
Meanwhile, at the AMA, all hell was breaking loose. Jim Todd, the 
CEO who strongly supported founding NPSF had retired and had 
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been replaced by John Seward. One of his first acts was unprecedented 
and an absolute disaster: he quietly contracted with Sunbeam Products 
in the summer of 1997 for the AMA to provide, for a fee, an AMA 
seal of approval of Sunbeam appliances [1].
The AMA membership (and the public) revolted, and there were 
calls for senior executives, Board chairman Nancy Dickey, and the 
entire Board of Directors to resign. NPSF funders were outraged and 
began to grumble about NPSF needing to distance itself from the 
AMA. AMA management scrambled, fired the CEO, and ultimately 
paid Sunbeam $9.9 million to break the contract [2]. Things gradually 
quieted down.
Despite all this, the NPSF rolled ahead. Patient safety was beginning 
to be talked about widely. In the report of the President’s Advisory 
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care 
Industry, led by Don Berwick, head of the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI), reduction of error was one of six recommended 
national aims, and NPSF was cited. JCAHO revised their sentinel event 
policy to make reporting voluntary, and the Agency for Healthcare 
Policy and Research (AHCPR) (later renamed the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) identified patient safety as a 
priority. In November 1998, we held the second Annenberg Conference.
Also in 1998, Ken Kizer, undersecretary for health in the Veterans 
Administration, established the VA National Patient Safety Partnership 
and worked with NPSF to explore issues in changing institutional cul-
ture. At the urging of George Lundberg, editor of JAMA, Kizer joined 
David Woods and Richard Cook. (All rights reserved)
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me, Steve Schroeder from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
Lundberg, and others in issuing a call for action to improve patient 
safety by a clear focus on medical error [3].
But most importantly, Ken Shine, president of the Institute of 
Medicine, decided to put quality of care and patient safety on its 
agenda. Advised by staff who had attended the Annenberg Conference, 
he convened the IOM Quality of Care Committee. A year later the 
Committee would issue the legendary IOM report, To Err Is Human, 
that rocked the world (Chap. 9).
Over the next 20 years, the NPSF initiated an impressive array of 
programs to improve patient safety. In the early years, the focus was 
on raising awareness and engaging all stakeholders. We viewed NPSF 
as a catalyst, a force for change, designed to facilitate dialogue and 
cooperative work on patient safety among diverse stakeholder groups.
To operationalize these goals, NPSF quickly developed activities 
and initiatives to advance the field. These early years were incredibly 
productive. From the beginning, NPSF engaged consumer groups and 
included patients on its Board. The well- funded research grant pro-
gram facilitated the growth of a cadre of young investigators who 
focused on this brand new field of patient safety research. The NPSF 
annual meeting, later named the Patient Safety Congress, provided a 
forum for presentation of research, education in patient safety, exam-
ples of successful practices, and, of course, networking. It attracted an 
increasing number of attendants each year as the movement took hold.
NPSF also sought to facilitate the application of research. To this 
end, early on it created a comprehensive literature Clearinghouse, 
providing access to literature covering all aspects of medical error and 
patient safety, as well as a monthly survey of literature, called Current 
Awareness that continues today.
By 2001, the Clearinghouse offered more than 2500 articles, papers, 
and books on patient safety and healthcare error. A NPSF website was 
created to provide resources, reports, newsletters, and information to 
practitioners and the public on how to get involved in patient safety 
initiatives.
For direct help to patient safety practitioners, NPSF established a 
Patient Safety ListServ and a quarterly newsletter. Within a year, the 
ListServ e-mail discussion group included more than 1300 active sub-
scribers and participants who exchanged patient safety information, 
strategies, suggestions, and resources.
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A newsletter, Focus on Patient Safety, gave patient safety profes-
sionals up-to- date information on patient safety research and new 
practices and ideas and monitored the expansion of patient safety ini-
tiatives worldwide. All these resources were designed to help those 
“in the trenches” doing research or redesigning their practices to 
improve safety.
To advance the role of patients in safety, in 2001 NPSF established 
a Patient and Family Advisory Council (PFAC) to provide input to all 
Foundation initiatives. The PFAC included the leaders of the major 
patient advocacy groups. From the beginning of the movement, moth-
ers of children who had died or were seriously harmed by a medical 
error had spoken out, most notably Sue Sheridan, Helen Haskell, Ilene 
Corina, and Sorrel King. They were welcomed by the leaders of the 
movement and contributed to the program at every Congress.
To facilitate training of the next generation of patient safety lead-
ers, NPSF collaborated with the American Hospital Association’s 
Health Research and Educational Trust to establish a Patient Safety 
Leadership Fellowship Program. NPSF also reached out to its corpo-
rate and institutional members, creating a Corporate Council to edu-
cate and involve industry representatives.
In 2002 NPSF initiated Stand Up for Patient Safety, a program for 
hospitals and healthcare systems committed to serious effort to 
a b
(a) Sue Sheridan, (b) Helen Haskell and Lewis. (All rights reserved)
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improve safety. The program offered practical tools to enhance exist-
ing patient safety and quality improvement initiatives, educational 
programs, information resources, leadership seminars, and online 
forums for sharing patient safety innovations and best practices. The 
program expanded substantially in 2004 with funding from AIG, the 
large insurance company, which brought its hospitals into membership.
At the prompting of patient advocate, Ilene Corina, NPSF initiated 
the first annual Patient Safety Awareness Week. It is celebrated in 
March, coinciding with the date of the death of her son, Michael, from 
a medical error. The PFAC published a National Agenda for Action: 
Parents and Families in Patient Safety – Nothing About Me Without 
Me, a white paper outlining how NPSF would lead in education, cul-
ture, research, and support of patient engagement. The NPSF website 
was generating more than 15,000 hits each week. In 2005, the patient 
safety research community’s dreams were realized with the launch of 
the Journal of Patient Safety, with Nancy Dickey as editor in chief.
Despite these awesome early accomplishments of NPSF, there was 
turmoil within the organization. Its internal culture was suffering. 
Almost from the beginning, turnover of management and chronic staff 
unhappiness were the norm. The Board, dominated by the AMA, took 
the classic position that it should not interfere with the CEO or 
(c) Ilene Corina, (d) Sorrel King and Josie. (All rights reserved)
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interact with any staff, so these problems remained unresolved. But 
from the beginning, many other Board members were concerned 
about NPSF’s lack of independence from the AMA.
The AMA’s generosity had made the Foundation possible, but the 
nature of the affiliation with the AMA, including its provision of staff-
ing and office space, represented control. In 2004, the issue came to a 
head. The Board voted to separate NPSF from the AMA and elected 
founder and Board member Diane Pinakiewicz to be the president. 
The AMA was not pleased. It canceled all its funding, including, 
sadly, the fund for research named for Jim Todd, which had suppos-
edly been endowed in perpetuity.
Pinakiewicz turned things around. She created a new business strat-
egy and moved the headquarters first to distant and inexpensive space 
at the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art (MASS MoCA) 
in North Adams, MA, and then to Washington, DC. NPSF began to 
develop business partnerships across the industry, moving from a con-
tributory revenue model to an earned revenue model. Programs such 
as Stand Up for Patient Safety and Corporate Council were redefined 
and grown significantly. The annual Congress grew in number of 
attendees as well as in the number of commercial exhibitors.
In 2007, in response to a proposal from its chairman, Paul Gluck, 
and president Pinakiewicz, the NPSF Board decided to establish a 
think tank to be called the Lucian Leape Institute. Over the years, 
Diane Pinakiewicz. (All rights reserved)
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NPSF had created a group of distinguished advisors, leaders in patient 
safety who were not on the Board but whose support was important to 
NPSF’s mission.
Paul and Diane decided to harness their expertise to provide strate-
gic guidance at the systems level and to identify and tackle the issues 
that were beyond the capabilities of individual organizations. The 
Institute was to be the vehicle for doing that. They asked me to chair 
it. The Board promised adequate financial support for its work.
I liked the idea of an institute for strategic planning but was, to say 
the least, nonplussed by having it named for me. I wryly observed to 
them that an “institute” is usually named for someone after they die or 
contribute a sizeable sum to endow it! I had done neither. But the 
opportunity to brainstorm with some of my favorite and smartest peo-
ple was appealing. Further information about the efforts of the Lucian 
Leape Institute will be found in Chap. 22.
Under Pinakiewicz’s leadership, NPSF extended its programs con-
siderably. An important step forward was the formation of the 
American Society of Professionals in Patient Safety (ASPPS) in 2011 
to provide caregivers who devoted their efforts to patient safety higher 
visibility and standing. Membership was open to individuals who 
were working in formal patient safety roles, as well as clinicians and 
executives, all in the healthcare workforce, patients, and those work-
ing in industry who had a commitment to patient safety.
But more was needed if patient safety was to be recognized as a 
true discipline. Accordingly, in 2011, NPSF established the 
Certification Board for Professionals in Patient Safety. The Board set 
appropriate educational and training requirements and developed a 
qualifying examination for its credential, Certified Professional in 
Patient Safety (CPPS). In recognition that patient safety must be a 
team effort with broad responsibility, certification is open to inter-
ested parties across multiple disciplines. Within 4 years 1100 indi-
viduals were certified. To meet the educational needs of students and 
professionals, NPSF created a comprehensive online Patient Safety 
Curriculum. By 2018, over 5000 had taken this online course, and 
3000 individuals held the CPPS credential.
In 2011, NPSF severed its sponsorship of the Journal of Patient 
Safety which had appointed Charles Denham as editor without con-
sulting NPSF. Denham had already fallen out of favor with NPSF 
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because he had produced a video for the annual Congress and then 
refused to let NPSF have further use of it, claiming copyright protec-
tions. Denham later was forced to leave the National Quality Forum 
because of undisclosed conflicts of interest and forced to resign as 
JPS editor (see Chap. 11).
In 2013, Tejal Gandhi, patient safety researcher and head of safety 
for Partners Healthcare, became president and CEO of NPSF. At the 
Board’s behest, she implemented a new strategic plan to incorporate 
workforce safety as a critical aspect of patient safety. This was an 
outgrowth of the LLI white paper on finding joy and meaning in work, 
Through the Eyes of the Workforce [4]. The NPSF vision statement 
was expanded: “to create a world where patients and those who care 
for them are free from harm”.
LLI increased its thought leadership. By 2015, it had published its 
fifth white paper on transforming concepts. It then convened experts 
to evaluate best practices for root cause analysis, a core function of 
safety and risk professionals. The report, RCA2: Improving Root 
Cause Analyses and Actions to Prevent Harm [5], was very well 
received by the field, and over 7000 persons participated in the initial 
webcast in 2015 to discuss the report. Since that time, many hospitals 
Tejal Gandhi. (All rights reserved)
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and health systems in the USA and abroad have adopted the RCA2 
methodology, and the RCA2 report continues to remain one of the 
most downloaded reports.
Another high impact report released in 2015 was Free from Harm: 
Accelerating Patient Safety Improvement Fifteen Years after To Err Is 
Human [6]. The report was the product of a roundtable convened to 
reflect on what had been accomplished in patient safety since To Err 
Is Human and where the field needed to go. Free from Harm has been 
widely cited, and its eight recommendations have become the basis 
for safety strategies for a range of health systems as well as for several 
national safety agencies globally.
Recognizing that leadership is the key to creating a culture of safety, 
in 2017 LLI partnered with the American College of Healthcare 
Executives to convene a series of roundtables that examined how 
leaders can create and sustain a culture of safety. The resulting report, 
Leading a Culture of Safety: A Blueprint for Success, identified prac-
tical strategies and tactics to truly advance a safety culture and has had 
widespread dissemination globally [7]. Many hospitals, health sys-
tems, state hospital associations, and countries are using the Blueprint 
to advance their culture efforts.
But all was not well with the NPSF. While its work continued to 
expand, it was unable to get adequate, stable, assured funding. At the 
beginning, a number of generous funders joined with the AMA to get 
it started. Their support continued for the first few years, but none 
were willing to commit to long-term annual support. NPSF had come 
to rely on grants for specific projects and on income from programs 
such as Stand Up for Patient Safety, the Certification Board for 
Professionals in Patient Safety, and the Patient Safety Curriculum and 
fees from commercial exhibitors at the annual Congress. It was 
not enough.
The problem was resolved in 2017, when NPSF merged with the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement. In addition to providing the 
needed financial support, IHI’s global network and forums greatly 
extended NPSF’s reach and provided the means to move thought lead-
ership to action through its collaborative models, expanding safety 
programs to health systems around the globe. The strategic planning 
Lucian Leape Institute continued as an active program at IHI.
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The impact of NPSF over the years was enormous. From the begin-
ning it was the driving force behind the patient safety movement. 
Without it, it is unlikely there would have been a national effort; at 
best, it would have been a slow and stuttering one. AHRQ played a 
crucial early role in funding patient safety research and advancing 
training and various programs, but it was NPSF that provided the 
forum for bringing together the various stakeholders, increasing their 
awareness, and getting their buy-in. NPSF educated America, and to 
some extent the world, on what patient safety was all about, and it 
created the infrastructure that would change a powerful idea into a 
movement.
Through its support of research, facilitation of communication and 
education, and dissemination of new safety information, a community 
that put patient safety “on the map” for many was built. It provided 
invaluable information, assistance, and identity for individuals who 
were just beginning to get interested in this new field. It brought 
together leaders and experts to deepen our understanding of the myr-
iad complex barriers to making healthcare safe and to develop strate-
gies to overcome them.
Its programs stimulated hospitals, educators, and policy-makers to 
make a commitment to improving safety and provided them with tools 
to do so. And NPSF embraced diverse groups outside of organized 
medicine, such as private corporations and patient advocates, giving 
them a voice and the means to have an impact.
NPSF provided a home for the burgeoning field of patient safety 
specialists, first with a specialty association, later with specialty certi-
fication. The annual Patient Safety Congress conference became the 
place for safety professionals to come together to learn and share 
research and experience. The NPSF provided the structure and sup-
port for the new patient safety movement. Without it, the movement 
would have been slow and halting in coming. NPSF was for many 
years the soul of patient safety.
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Chapter 6
We Can Do This: The Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement Adverse 
Drug Events Collaborative
Rewind to 1995, before Annenberg and the NPSF. “Patient safety” 
was not on many agendas, but methods to change systems to improve 
quality of care were beginning to be developed. Policy-makers and 
the healthcare establishment were slow to respond to the new infor-
mation on the extent of medical error and our calls for a new approach, 
but one person instantly recognized the challenge: Don Berwick of 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI).
Don Berwick was a pediatrician, an honors’ graduate of Harvard 
and Harvard Medical School, with a MPP from Harvard Kennedy 
School of Government. “Preparation H” he would call it. He was 
interested in health policy and quality of care. After joining the 
Department of Health Policy and Management at the Harvard School 
of Public Health, he was hired as the vice president for Quality-of-
Care Measurement at the Harvard Community Health Plan, where his 
attempts to motivate physicians and managers by providing them with 
performance data were not always welcomed. At the advice of the 
CEO, Tom Pyle, Berwick began to explore approaches to quality in 
other industries.
Berwick read extensively the literature on quality improvement in 
industry. He visited and was powerfully influenced by Guy Cohen of 
NASA and A. Blanton Godfrey, head of quality systems and theory at 
Bell Labs. At about this time, he had a chance meeting with Paul 
Batalden, who introduced him to the work of W. Edwards Deming.
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Paul Batalden was also a pediatrician and was COO of Park Nicollet 
Medical Center when he discovered the work of W. Edwards Deming. 
Batalden, like Berwick, had been working on improving quality of 
care for some time, with frustratingly little to show for it. He found 
Deming’s work on quality management in industry fascinating [1].
Deming had been a careful student of approaches to improving 
industrial and agricultural efficiency during World War II. But in the 
postwar period, a booming economy and pent-up demand led US 
manufacturers to focus on production and not worry about quality. 
Deming was sent instead to Japan, which was struggling to recover 
from the war, and found his advice eagerly sought—and listened to. 
The results of his efforts came home to America—literally—in the 
early 1970s when Japanese cars that were cheaper and better than 
those produced by the American “big three” entered the market. 
Deming returned to the USA and found increasing audiences for his 
courses on quality management.
Batalden took Deming’s course and had an epiphany. The 
approaches Deming was teaching were just what healthcare needed. 
He persuaded the CEO of the Hospital Corporation of America to 
fund basic quality improvement courses in their 390 hospitals. 
Batalden convinced Don Berwick to take Deming’s course, which 
was similarly transforming for him and led to his conversion to qual-
ity-focused methods of management and improvement.
a b
(a) Don Berwick and (b) Paul Batalden. (All rights reserved)
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At the suggestion of Howard Hiatt, Berwick wrote up his ideas 
about how these concepts could be applied in healthcare in a NEJM 
article, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care [2], 
launching his career and a new field.
But how to make it happen? Blanton Godfrey had an idea: why not 
try a demonstration project that paired healthcare organizations that 
wanted to learn CQI with industrial companies that were actually 
doing it? Between them and with grant support from the John 
A. Hartford Foundation, they recruited healthcare organizations and 
companies to the National Demonstration Project on Quality 
Improvement in Health Care. Its success led to the founding of IHI 
in 1991.
Don became familiar with our work on preventing adverse drug 
events (ADEs) when he was asked by JAMA to review my ADE 
systems paper in late 1994. IHI was already working on patient 
safety as a result of Don’s introduction to it by Guy Cohen at NASA 
earlier, and its faculty were engaged in safety designs for several 
early collaboratives. But Don recognized that it deserved more 
focused attention. Our ADE systems paper showed what needed to 
be done. IHI knew how to do it.
IHI was by then the emerging leader in quality improvement in 
healthcare and had considerable experience in making change. Since 
its inception, IHI had trained thousands of people from hundreds of 
healthcare organizations in the fundamentals of improving quality of 
care through courses on improvement and its annual conference, the 
National Forum on Quality Improvement in Health Care.
Yet actual change, measurably improved quality of care, was hard 
to come by. Physicians in particular were often reluctant to partici-
pate. They had difficulty reconciling QI concepts with the classical 
individual performance-centered approach they learned in medical 
school. The Institute was not having the breadth of impact on quality 
of care that it desired. IHI needed to try something different to engage 
organizations in making real, system-level changes that would lead to 
dramatic improvements in care.
One day, at a meeting of IHI’s Group Practice Improvement 
Network, Don and Paul Batalden were chatting about ways to acceler-
ate improvement in healthcare beyond what IHI had achieved using 
traditional educational approaches. Batalden sketched a model on a 
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paper placemat and handed it to Don. It contained two new concepts. 
First, it would pair clinical subject matter experts with quality improve-
ment application experts to help organizations select, test, and imple-
ment changes on the front lines of care.
Second, it would bring QI teams from different hospitals together 
to enhance learning by providing them with instruction on change 
methods and the opportunity to learn from one another, providing 
mutual support, reinforcement, and peer pressure. It would build on 
the work of Tom Nolan, Lloyd Provost, Gerald Langley, and their col-
leagues in Associates in Process Improvement (API) on rapid cycle 
change [3]. In a flush of confidence, they decided to name them 
Breakthrough Series Collaboratives (BTS) [4].
 What Is a Collaborative?
A collaborative is a collection of teams of healthcare workers who 
come together to work on a specific problem. The rationale for the 
collaborative is that meaningful change requires teamwork and that 
teams can learn from one another. The collaborative facilitates this 
interaction by bringing teams together from a number of similar 
healthcare organizations across the country to work on problems such 
as overuse of cesarean section or medication errors. The sponsor pro-
vides structure, instruction in theory and technique, data collection, 
and feedback and periodically brings the teams together for reinforce-
ment and learning from one another.
IHI established four aims for a collaborative: to find, describe, and 
diffuse best practices throughout the collaborating organizations, to 
improve outcomes in each organization by teaching it to understand 
its systems of care and change them, to develop expertise in the sci-
ence of improvement in each topic, and to disseminate the knowledge 
gained during the collaboratives as broadly as possible to others in the 
healthcare community.
Participants are educated in the evidence of care process changes 
that have been proven to be effective for the specific topic, and they are 
taught to use rapid cycles of change to help test and learn from changes 
in a short period of time. Teams are challenged to adapt these methods 
to their own situation to improve care. Early BTS Collaboratives 
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consisted of 20–40 organizations working together for 6–12 months 
on a specific topic. Over time the model evolved, sometime to incor-
porate hundreds of organizations in a single collaborative.
 How It Works
IHI begins by identifying topics ripe for change. First, a topic has to 
be a significant quality of care issue. Second, there must be evidence 
that a different approach is effective, or at least promising. That is, 
proof that some healthcare organizations had achieved better out-
comes by implementing a new system; a gap existed between com-
mon practice and what is possible. Third, the problem has to have 
risen to national, or at least local, attention so there is tension for 
improvement.
Next, an expert planning group is formed of researchers and spe-
cialty practitioners to clarify the nature of the gap and consolidate the 
scientific knowledge—what to do—and the improvement knowledge, 
how to do it. From this review the group identifies “change concepts,” 
which are design ideas (often including human factors concepts such 
as standardization and reducing reliance on memory) that teams will 
use to implement the new knowledge. Methods to measure progress 
are identified, and realistic numerical goals for achievement are 
created.
Collaborative participants are multidisciplinary teams recruited 
from hospitals and systems in the wide IHI network. The ideal team 
varies with the topic but often includes a systems leader “sponsor” 
who has the authority to get things done, a technical expert who is the 
improvement leader, a day-to-day leader to make the project go, and 
at least one clinician champion.
The typical collaborative process starts with a 2-day learning ses-
sion attended by all participating teams. The planning group instructs 
participants in improvement methods, the core of which is the “Model 
for Improvement” first formulated by Associates in Process 
Improvement. The Model guides teams toward real-world, rapid tests 
of change: so-called “Plan-Do-Study-Act” or “PDSA” cycles.
The way the Model for Improvement works is that a team identifies 
a specific aim and plans a small change in process to achieve it. The 
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change is implemented quickly, and just enough data is collected as 
quickly as possible to see results. If the change fails to yield progress, 
they start over. If it succeeds, they build on it to improve its success 
and spread it more widely in the organization. Each test of change 
informs the rest, as confidence grows in the understanding of what 
works—a “ramp” of growing knowledge. For any significant aim, a 
family of changes is required in order to achieve major success. Today, 
that family of changes is often represented in what IHI calls a “driver 
diagram.”
At the first meetings of the Collaborative, teams decide on their 
aims, select specific process changes to try out, and plan the initial 
“tests of change” they are going to carry out when they return home. 
In subsequent meetings, teams report their progress to the entire 
group, learn from others, and plan the next changes. (One important 
rubric of the Breakthrough Series Collaborative model is “All Teach; 
All Learn.”)
During the intervals between the whole-group learning sessions, 
teams are “supported by conference calls, peer site visits, and Web-
based discussions that enable them to share information and learn 
from national experts and other health care organizations” [4].
A social media network is created for rapid and easy sharing of 
information. Teams are encouraged to visit other teams. Throughout, 
the emphasis is on results, not on collecting data. Written progress 
reports are filed to IHI monthly. Many collaboratives conclude with a 
National Congress to which all participants as well as other interested 
healthcare professionals are invited, and the results are reported. Most 
publish a monograph report or prepare papers for peer-reviewed jour-
nals, summarizing the collaborative’s experiences.
 The Reducing Adverse Drug Events Collaborative
Early in 1995, when the collaboratives were just forming, Don 
approached me about chairing one of the new breakthrough collab-
oratives, Reducing Adverse Drug Events. I was delighted to do so. It 
was exactly what I was looking for: an opportunity to get clinicians to 
apply what we were talking about regarding changing systems to pre-
vent errors. Unlike the first collaboratives that focused on waiting 
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times and inappropriate care such as high cesarean section rates, the 
Adverse Drug Event (ADE) Collaborative was IHI’s first effort 
focused solely on the problem of harm resulting from errors in care. It 
is described in some detail to show how this powerful method of sys-
tems change works to actually reduce harm.
In July we began planning the collaborative. We were able to recruit 
a group of safety noteworthies to advise us, including James Reason, 
the world’s expert on error; Bob Helmreich, developer of aviation 
crew resource management; Don Norman, psychologist and author of 
The Design of Everyday Things; Earl Weiner, cognitive psychologist 
and communication specialist; Michael Cohen, founder of the Institute 
for Safe Medication Practices; Marilyn Bogner, specialist in technol-
ogy and human error; Charles Meyers, pharmacist leader; David 
Bates, my research colleague from Brigham and Women’s Hospital; 
and Ken Barker, research pharmacist.
I chaired the planning group of IHI experts, Andrea Kabcenell, 
Donald Goldmann, Carol Haraden, and Frank Federico, together 
with Tom Nolan of API and Michael Cohen from ISMP. Ross 
Baker, psychologist from the University of Toronto, attended as an 
observer. I think we all had the sense that this could be the enter-
ing wedge for getting healthcare to adopt a systems approach 
to errors.
The initial gathering of teams (called a Change Symposium) for the 
Breakthrough Series on Reducing Adverse Drug Events and Medical 
Errors was held January 22–23, 1996. We were delighted that 40 hos-
pitals sent teams. Each consisted of a physician, a nurse, and a 
a b c
(a) Mike Cohen, (b) Frank Federico, (c) Carol Haraden. (All rights reserved)
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pharmacist. I found it fascinating that for most of these hospitals, it 
was the first time the participants had ever worked together as a team!
We taught the teams the basic theory of systems redesign and then 
asked them to identify a specific ADE problem they wanted to work 
on at home. They were instructed in the use of the API Model for 
Improvement and PDSA cycles for improvement [3].
Five weeks later, in February, we reconvened the teams for the first 
learning session. Chuck Kilo from IHI joined Frank Federico as team 
coaches. Participants were given more specifics of how to use the 
PDSA cycle, and teams planned their first cycles with faculty coach-
ing. They then went home to carry out their plans. They filed monthly 
progress reports with IHI, and we had frequent individual and group 
conference calls.
Early on, we surveyed all participants regarding the extent to which 
11 “basic” adverse drug event/medication error preventive measures 
were already in place in their institutions. These were procedures that 
were known and had been recommended and talked about for many 
years. They included unit dosing, standardization of doses, protocols 
for lethal drugs, pharmacy admixture of IVs, 24-hour pharmacist 
availability, prohibition of double shifts, etc.
The survey results were sobering. Only 8 of the 41 institutions had 
as many as 8 of the 11 measures in place; none utilized all. The use of 
unit dosing, computer drug profiling in pharmacy, and 24-hour avail-
ability of the pharmacist was quite high, but for others, such as 
enforcement of standard protocols, prohibition of double shifts, and 
use of effective systems to monitor ADEs, the rates were sadly low.
Measuring adverse drug events proved to be a challenge for many 
hospitals, so early on we developed a standardized ADE reporting 
form and distributed it to all participants. In addition, participants 
identified specific measures that applied to their changes, such as 
blood glucose level for changes in insulin administration and the doc-
umentation of allergy information.
The second learning session was held in June. We reviewed the 
problems in making change, lessons from human factors, and mea-
surement. Teams shared experiences of their successes and failures 
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and interacted with other teams to learn secrets of success. With fac-
ulty coaching they refined their projects.
Midway in our Collaborative, in July 1996, IHI held a retreat for 
the leaders of all six Collaboratives underway to compare notes and 
learn from one another. All were struggling, with only a modest num-
ber of hospital teams notching up major successes in changing their 
systems. The process seemed straightforward to us; for the hospitals 
it was anything but.
The third and final learning session was held November 17–19. We 
focused on lessons learned, how to sustain changes, and strategies for 
moving forward. Teams presented storyboards of their projects and 
made presentations of their work and plans. A month later, we pre-
sented our experience with the ADE collaborative at the IHI annual 
forum, and in March 1997 we concluded the collaborative with a 
National Congress in which all of the groups reported out and pre-
sented plans for sustaining the gains.
 Results
Of the original 41 teams, 36 completed the collaborative and imple-
mented significant changes. Overall, they implemented 209 ramps, of 
which 120 were successful. The most common changes were imple-
menting nonpunitive reporting (24 hospitals, 50% success), enforcing 
standardized prescribing (22 hospitals, 64% success) implementing 
heparin protocols (18 hospitals, 72% success), and removing KCl 
from nursing units (15 hospitals, 100% success) (Table  6.1). The 
change concepts that worked best were reducing reliance on memory, 
standardization, simplification, use of constraints, forcing functions, 
and the use of protocols [5, 6].
One of the interesting findings was that success was not related to 
hospital characteristics such as size, teaching status, ownership, or 
urban/rural location. It depended instead on the commitment of the 




The experience of the ADE collaborative was similar to that of the 
other IHI collaboratives. Three major factors led to success: strong 
leadership, effective processes, and appropriate choice of intervention.
Leadership is essential at two levels: the CEO and the team leader. 
Change of any kind induces resistance. Support from the top is essen-
tial to overcome natural and expected objections. At the team level, 
consistent and persistent leadership was needed to maintain momen-
tum for change and enthusiasm. Teams failed if they had poor leaders 
or if the leader suddenly left. Although their participation was essen-
tial to success, physicians were not necessarily, or usually, the leaders 
of the teams, which were variously led by representatives from all 
three professions: nurses, doctors, and pharmacists [7, 8].
Successful teams were also those that were able to define and 
relentlessly pursue their aims. They had a clear idea of what they 
wanted to accomplish and were rigorous both about measuring prog-
ress and following the PDSA cycle model for improvement. Teams 
were more likely to succeed when they involved all stakeholders, thus 
co-opting potential resistors, and if they included a physician.
Successful teams chose practical small-scale interventions that 
attempted to change processes, not to educate or reform people. The 
ideal intervention redesigned the work so that it was both difficult to 
make errors and easy to perform.
Table 6.1 Most common changes implemented
Type of change No. of ramps No. successful (%)
Nonpunitive reporting 24 12 (50)
Enforce standardized prescribing 22 14 (64)
Implement heparin protocols 18 13 (72)
Remove KCI from nursing units 15 15 (100)
Ensure documentation of allergy 
information
12 10 (83)
Standardize medication administration 
times
12 8 (67)
Implement chemotherapy protocols 9 7 (78)
Implement insulin ordering protocols 7 3 (43)
Totals 119 82 (70)
Reprinted with permission (JQI). All rights reserved
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Conversely, the most important causes of failure were lack of these 
features: absence of supportive leadership, failure to clearly define 
aims, and poor choice of intervention. Failure to involve all stakehold-
ers was almost always a prescription for failure. Resistance by physi-
cians and nurses to change can be profound if they are not involved in 
the process, especially if the new process requires additional time or 
effort. Other stumbling blocks were fixating on data collection and 
focus on the error rather than on the underlying systems failure.
The Breakthrough Collaborative has turned out to be one of the 
most effective methods for achieving systems change. The limited 
time frame of the collaborative puts pressure on teams to actually 
make changes, not just talk about them. The previous experience with 
many QI efforts was that weeks or months were spent gathering data 
and talking about and planning elaborate changes. The Collaborative 
forced action.
The API Model for Improvement and the PDSA method, the use of 
small tests of change and repeated iterations, is very powerful when 
used properly. A momentum is developed that energizes the team and 
facilitates change. But improvement teams often struggle when they 
are on their own. The collaborative helps them succeed by providing 
structure, instruction, discipline, and the reinforcement that comes 
from sharing with others. It is a powerful tool for improving 
patient safety.
 Use of Collaboratives
IHI convened a second collaborative on ADEs that focused on “high-
alert” drugs: medications that can be fatal when used improperly. It 
was one of many collaboratives led by IHI over the ensuing years, 
teaching hundreds—thousands—of hospital teams the PDSA model. 
The Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors 
used collaboratives—with the help of IHI—to implement two medi-
cation safe practices statewide. (See Chap. 8.)
Some years after IHI introduced the collaborative model, in 2004, 
Peter Pronovost dramatically demonstrated its effectiveness in reduc-
ing central line catheter- associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) 
in a statewide collaborative in Michigan [9, 10].
Use of Collaboratives
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Central lines are plastic infusion tubes inserted into the atrium of 
the heart via a large vein in the neck. They are typically inserted by a 
resident physician using sterile technique with the patient in bed. 
Because they provide reliable access for giving intravenous fluids, 
blood, and medications, their use is a standard practice for seriously 
ill patients, who may need them for a long time. But they are risky: 
infections occurred in 10–20% of patients with long-dwelling cathe-
ters; 10% or more of those were fatal. Infection is almost always the 
result of bacterial contamination at the time of catheter insertion.
Pronovost previously had incredible success in eliminating CLABSI 
in an intensive care unit at the Johns Hopkins Hospital. He and his 
team implemented a protocol to ensure that guidelines for the process 
of inserting the catheter were followed. A key feature was the use of a 
checklist that specified each step in the process, such as use of a sterile 
drape, gown, and gloves. (This is the work that introduced the term 
“checklist” to medicine.)
Pronovost’s protocol also introduced a truly radical innovation: if 
sterile technique was breached, the nurse was empowered to stop the 
procedure and require the physician to re-prep, re-gown, and re-drape. 
This was a profound cultural change. It required psychological safety 
for the nurse, i.e., no fear of speaking up, and physician willingness to 
accept a role as a true member of a team. As we will see later, these are 
building blocks of the culture change needed to make healthcare safe.
Pronovost’s results were astounding: within months the CLABSI 
rate was reduced to zero, and the improvement was sustained for more 
1. Implement educational intervention
2. Create a Central Catheter Insertion Cart
3. Asking providers daily whether catheter can be removed
4. Implement a checklist to be completed by the bedside nurse
5. Empower nurse to stop procedures if guidelines are not followed
Johns Hopkins Hospital CLABSI protocol (Adapted from Ref. [9])
1. Clean hands
2. Clean the skin with chlorhexidine
3. Drape site
4. Use Hat, mask, sterile gown
5. Use sterile gloves
6. Apply sterile dressing
Checklist for inserting central line (Adapted from Ref. [9])
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than a year [11]. At last, someone had “gotten to zero”! I considered 
it then, and still do, a major milestone in the safety journey; it was 
certainly the most important breakthrough until then.
Building on this success, Pronovost later enlisted the support of the 
Michigan Hospital and Healthcare Association (MHHA) and secured 
funding from Michigan Blue Cross-Blue Shield to carry out a state-
wide collaborative to implement his protocol. With Christine Goeschel 
and others, he recruited 127 hospitals to participate in the collabora-
tive run by his team.
Ninety-six hospitals completed the collaborative. They reduced the 
mean rate of CLABSI/1000 catheter days from 7.7 to 1.4 in 18 months. 
Even more impressively, over half of the hospitals replicated the 
Hopkins experience, totally eliminating the infections, getting their 
infection rates to zero, and keeping them there for 3 years [9].
Dixon-Woods and Bosk subsequently carried out an intensive 
analysis of how the Michigan collaborative had been so incredibly 
successful. They concluded that five features were crucial to its suc-
cess: (1) social pressure among state’s ICUs to participate (as the 
program got underway, ICU leaders didn’t want to be left out); (2) 
creation of a network community by immersion coaching, work-
shops, and data, as used by IHI; (3) combining grassroots features 
and inclusion of all stakeholders with a vertically integrated pro-
gram structure; (4) use of data on infection rates as a disciplinary 
force by making performance visible and ranking units’ perfor-
mance; and (5) use of “hard edges,” coercive measures, by program 
leaders, such as contacting hospital CEOs to ask for data and asking 
ICUs to withdraw from the program if the data were not forthcoming 
(none did) [12].
Motivated by Pronovost’s work in Michigan, the World Health 
Organization launched an international “Match Michigan” pro-
gram to encourage country organizations to adopt the collaborative 
method to reduce bloodstream infections. In the UK it was taken 
up by 215 ICUs. While they were unable to “match” Michigan, 
they did succeed in reducing the infection rate by more than 
50% [13].
In the USA, AHRQ funded Pronovost and JHH faculty to lead a 
national effort supported by the American Hospital Association and 
the MHHA. State hospital associations coordinated hospital teams in 
their states. Following a national campaign, which included promotion 
by Consumers Union, the Leapfrog Group, the Center for Medicare 
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and Medicaid Services (CMS), and The Joint Commission, 45 states 
participated. In addition, 22 states instituted required reporting of 
bloodstream infections [14]. Central line infections in ICU patients 
have been reduced by 80% [15].
An important result of these successes was that CMS decided that 
CLABSI was preventable and stopped reimbursing hospitals for the 
additional costs of bloodstream infections [14].
Thanks to the pioneering work of IHI that developed the 
Breakthrough Series Collaborative model and the success of Peter 
Pronovost in applying it on a large scale to get results, the collabora-
tive method has proved to be a highly successful method for changing 
a system and sustaining the change. Convening collaboratives to 
address the many other issues in patient safety should be high priority 
for AHRQ and for state health departments and hospital 
associations.
 Subsequent IHI Initiatives
The Breakthrough Collaboratives added to the influence that IHI was 
having on quality improvement. By then, the annual National Forum 
was attracting thousands, and in 1996 IHI teamed with BMJ to host 
the first European Forum on Quality Improvement in Health Care. At 
Peter Pronovost. (All rights reserved)
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the turn of the century, hundreds of hospitals were engaged with IHI 
in Idealized Design programs for clinical office practices, medication 
systems, and the ICU. In 2002, IHI launched IMPACT, a national net-
work for change.
But the most exciting IHI initiative at this time was Pursuing 
Perfection, a collaboration with the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
to provide $20 million to a small number of hospitals that would make 
a serious commitment to redesigning processes and building capacity.
The goal was for an organization to show that it could improve not 
just one or two aspects of care, in one clinic, unit, or department, but 
could make high levels of performance improvement a way of life for 
healthcare providers, all the time, in all dimensions of quality, through-
out an entire organization or system of care. To undergo organiza-
tional transformation [16]. The initiative would not only raise 
expectations among providers, payers, and consumers for higher-
quality care; it would demonstrate how to attain this level of 
achievement.
When the program was launched in 2001, over 220 organizations 
applied; 12 were selected for Phase 1, the planning process. In 2002, 
seven US organizations—four hospitals and three outpatient organi-
zations—were awarded Phase II implementation grants of up to $1.9 
million each. In addition, six self- funded international sites in Holland, 
Sweden, and four in the UK joined in this collaborative learning 
model. (IHI had been working with the National Health Service 
since 1999.)
The initiative was highly successful, with several hospitals in the 
USA and overseas achieving transformational change. Cincinnati 
Children’s Hospital attributes its culture change to the Pursuing 
Perfection initiative.
In 2004, IHI launched its most ambitious project, the 100,000 Lives 
Campaign. The design components came from Don Berwick’s son, 
Dan, who had worked on political campaigns. “Some is not a number, 
soon is not a time,” he said—a slogan that resonated as IHI strove for 
greater and more sustainable impact. They set a date, June 14, 2006, 
to achieve the goal of saving 100,000 lives—the number the IOM had 
estimated died every year from medical errors. IHI reached out for 




The campaign called on healthcare organizations to reliably—100% 
of the time—implement six specific interventions: rapid response 
teams, medication reconciliation, immediate revascularization for 
myocardial infarction, CLABSI protocol, ventilator-associated pneu-
monia protocol, and use of perioperative antibiotics.
The campaign was incredibly successful: over 3000 hospitals 
joined, and by the due date hospital self-reports suggested that the 
project had saved more than 100,000 lives. This was followed by the 
five million lives campaign, ending in January 2008, that added six 
more practices and enlisted additional hospitals. While an accurate 
count was impossible, the amount of change was substantial. 
Improving quality and safety was finally becoming ingrained in 
healthcare.
Of the many other IHI initiatives within the time frame of this book, 
two deserve brief mention. In 2008, IHI created the IHI Open School 
for Health Professions, with online courses in patient safety and qual-
ity improvement provided free to students and at low cost to others. 
Medical and nursing students rapidly enrolled to make up for their 
schools’ failure to make room for these subjects in their curricula. 
Within 10 years, 890 voluntary “chapters” of students with faculty 
advisors had been established in 92 countries, and 4.5 million courses 
had been completed by 715,000 learners (IHI website). More than 
1000 organizations and universities use the courses in their training 
programs or formal curricula.
The second powerful innovation of this period was the Triple Aim, 
initially crafted by Tom Nolan and another IHI faculty member, Dr. 
John Whittington. In 2008, recognizing that improving the healthcare 
system requires simultaneous pursuit of improving the experience of 
care, improving the health of populations, and reducing per capita 
costs of healthcare, IHI codified these objectives in a new framework, 
the Triple Aim. This concept recognized and validated the role of 
quality improvement in controlling costs and that our responsibili-
ties—and effectiveness—depend on efforts beyond the walls of our 
healthcare institutions [17].
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 Conclusion
It is impossible to overstate the impact of IHI on quality of healthcare 
and patient safety. Under the inspired, skilled, and impassioned lead-
ership of Don Berwick, IHI established a corporate model that has 
yielded a never-ending stream of innovative and effective methods to 
improve care and reduce harm. Its influence is global and continually 
expanding. Its initiatives have both deepened and broadened our 
understanding of quality of care and the roles of institutions and pro-
fessionals in providing it. Much of what most people in healthcare 
understand about quality improvement they learned from IHI.
The merger with the NPSF has led to global expansion of efforts to 
improve patient safety. IHI support of the Lucian Leape Institute 
ensures continuing development of innovative strategies to reduce 
harm. Of all types of quality failure, our inability to prevent harm is 
the least defensible. Under IHI guidance and inspiration, continued 
progress is assured.
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Chapter 7
Who Will Lead? The Executive 
Session
A few weeks after the Annenberg Conference, Saul Weingart called 
me on the phone, introduced himself and said, “We should do an 
Executive Session on medical errors.” “What is an Executive Session?” 
I replied. He then told me about the work he had been involved in at 
the Harvard Kennedy School of Government (HKS) on juvenile jus-
tice and community policing. Developed in the late 1970s at HKS, an 
executive session is a prolonged confidential conversation among 
leaders in a practice field to solve a complex problem for which there 
is no evident technical solution.
In contrast to the usual approach to social problem-solving in which 
ideas are translated from research to practice, the executive session 
assumes that neither academics nor practitioners have the necessary 
knowledge, and therefore they must work together to create a solu-
tion. Sessions are ideally directed at problems that require changes in 
policy and management [1]. In a prior session on policing, for exam-
ple, chiefs of police from major cities developed the concept of com-
munity policing.
Saul thought it was a promising model for the infant patient safety 
movement. I was intrigued from the start. Engaging the leaders of the 
major healthcare systems was key to getting patient safety moving. If 
we could get them and leaders of other national organizations to rec-
ognize the importance of patient safety, their own role, and the impor-
tance of developing meaningful interventions, we might be able to 
jump-start improvement for safety. This sounded like a good way 
to do it.
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Saul had come to safety in a roundabout way. After graduating from 
Cornell, he got a PhD in public policy at the Kennedy School but then 
decided to go into medicine and graduated from the University of 
Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry. During his internal 
medicine residency at Beth Israel Hospital, he got interested in quality 
improvement, which he could see as an organizational problem. He 
came across the announcement of the Annenberg Conference in 
JAMA and decided to apply. I think he was the only medical resident 
who attended the conference.
The Harvard politics were a bit sensitive, as the various schools 
(Medicine, Public Health, and Government) and affiliated teaching 
hospitals each had an interest and stake in the emerging field of patient 
safety. To navigate potential territorial conflicts, we sought out Joe 
Newhouse, the director of the Harvard-wide Division of Health Policy. 
A nationally known health economist, Joe agreed that his Division’s 
sponsorship would offer the proper auspices for the endeavor.
We formed a planning group that also included Miles Shore, a psy-
chiatrist with long-standing interest in policy and leadership, Joe 
Newhouse, and the executive director of the Kennedy School Criminal 
Justice Center, Frank Hartmann, who was an architect of the execu-
tive session and a master facilitator.
We identified a diverse group of healthcare movers and shakers—
individuals in positions of formal authority and important “influenc-
ers.” It turned out to be easier than I had expected to recruit key 
leaders. The people we were after were already aware that medical 
error was something that they had to deal with. With few exceptions, 
they readily signed on.
One of those exceptions was David Lawrence, head of Kaiser 
Permanente, who was initially cool to the idea. I thought that it was 
absolutely necessary to have him participate since Kaiser Permanente 
was both a premier provider of healthcare and highly organized, the 
type of healthcare organization that could more easily implement sys-
tems change. Because of its outstanding reputation, having it do so 
would send a powerful message to the rest of healthcare. So, although 
we had never met, I shamelessly “twisted his arm” over the phone, 
telling him he had to do it. Fortunately, he relented and came aboard. 
I later had the privilege of working with David on the IOM Quality of 
Care Committee, where his leadership was essential as we fashioned 
the legendary IOM reports.
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We were able to secure financial support from several sources: 
Agency for Health Research and Quality (AHRQ), Veterans Health 
Administration, National Patient Safety Foundation, American 
Society of Health-System Pharmacists, and the WK Kellogg and 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundations.
Executive sessions follow a loose game plan. The early meetings 
are designed to draw out the participants by asking members to share 
personal stories of leadership success and failure. Discussions are 
topical, prompted by brief presentations and case studies, with the 
expectation that the discovery of lessons would be an iterative and 
collective process. Presenters and “reactors” are often drawn from the 
members. Some of the work of the session is done between meetings. 
And future agendas are built from the unresolved issues raised at ear-
lier meetings. We would be making it up as we went along—which 
was the whole idea.
 First Meeting, January 22–24, 1998
The first meeting of the Executive Session on Medical Error and 
Patient Safety convened January 22–24, 1998, at the Kennedy School. 
We had an unbelievable roster of participants, 30  in all—a “who’s 
who” of leadership in American healthcare delivery—exactly what 
we had hoped for. As well as leaders from key healthcare 
a b c
(a) Saul Weingart, (b) Miles Shore, (c) David Lawrence. (All rights reserved)
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organizations, the group included business leaders, editors and news 
people, and academics. (See Appendix 7.1 for full list of members.)
After dinner, we welcomed everyone and explained what we were 
up to—the idea behind the executive session—and I gave the basic 
talk explaining the problem of medical error. The next day in the 
morning, we had two open discussions in which each member intro-
duced himself and described examples of their leadership success and 
challenges. This helped create solidarity among the members and 
began a shared inventory of leadership lessons. Members also dis-
cussed the emerging recognition of patient safety as a silent epidemic. 
We agreed that CEOs are ultimately responsible for the persistence of 
error and are in the key position to do something about it.
In the afternoon, we had short talks, followed by respondents, fol-
lowed by discussion. First, Mitch Rabkin, president and CEO of Beth 
Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BIDMC), talked about barriers, fol-
lowing which members had an extensive discussion about the costs of 
error and fixing them. (There were little data on this at the time, but 
they were all keenly aware of it.) Next, Bob Frosch, former director of 
NASA, described his experience with NASA and other industries, 
with emphasis on principles of management, management by walking 
around, and the need for CEOs to think of healthcare as a production 
process. David Woods, systems engineering professor at Ohio State, 
spoke about error theory, the Swiss cheese model, and cognitive bias, 
especially hindsight bias.
Following dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club, John Nance, pilot 
and ABC News aviation correspondent, gave his exciting talk on avia-
tion safety, emphasizing the value of crew resource management and 
communication against an authority gradient.
On Saturday, Don Berwick, president of the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI), summarized the previous day’s discussions and 
emphasized the need to adopt in healthcare lessons from human fac-
tors research. He then did something quite remarkable that proved to 
be fundamental to getting the CEOs really engaged: he gave the sys-
tem CEOs homework. He challenged each of them to personally 
investigate an incident, including personally interviewing five or six 
involved participants, and to report back their experiences at the next 
meeting. He also asked them to invite a human factors specialist to 
spend a day in their institution and tell them their observations and, 
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finally, to come back to the next meeting with a financial analysis of 
the cost of one error.
After an extensive discussion on the problems of confidential 
reporting because of the legal environment—something the group had 
interest in addressing—we concluded by members identifying a num-
ber of tasks for the group:
• Define a working vocabulary for discussions about medical error.
• Identify lessons from other industries.
• Probe aviation for applicable lessons, such as confidential reporting 
and the value of a NASA-Ames research lab model for medi-
cal error.
• Explore the relationship between error reduction and quality of care.
• Identify areas of hazard or vulnerability in medicine.
• Explore the impact of the tort system on reporting and the roles of 
oversight and regulatory organizations in maintaining accountability.
• Identify constituencies whose voices should be represented at the 
exec. session.
• Pilot test innovations at home.
The planning group was delighted with how it all went. We clearly 
had the interest and engagement of key leaders. Our job was to learn 
with them about how to move the needle on patient safety and to moti-
vate them to take action. We thought we were off to a good start. We 
planned to have meetings every 6 months for 2–3 years.
 Second Meeting: June 25–27, 1998
We had 24 in attendance, including 4 of the 5 who had missed the first 
meeting. We added a new member to the group: Timothy Johnson, 
medical editor, ABC News. Mark Moore of HKS gave the after-din-
ner talk on the role of the executive session and organizational strat-
egy. The idea was to bring everyone, especially the new attendees, up 
to speed on what we are doing.
On Friday, Miles Shore gave an overview of the first meeting, and 
new members introduced themselves. I gave a presentation, Medical 
Error: Working Definitions. We then moved to the CEO’s reports on 
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their experiences personally investigating a medical error in their 
own institutions. For all, it was eye-opening, sobering, and very 
motivating. Most of them had discovered things they had no idea 
were going on.
One member investigated an error in which a patient in the emer-
gency department who was having a heart attack had a serious bleed 
after receiving a clot- busting thrombolytic drug. It turned out that the 
patient had received the wrong dose of thrombolytic, in part because 
it was difficult to obtain an accurate weight in the emergency depart-
ment. On further investigation, it turned out that none of the last six 
patients with heart attacks had received the correct thrombolytic 
dose—and none of these cases had been previously identified or 
reported.
Another investigated a series of infections occurring among the 
patients of one plastic surgeon. After the second infection, nasal cul-
tures were recommended for the whole operating room team, but the 
surgeon had refused to have one done. He was later required to have 
one and it was positive.
All of us learned how pervasive and serious the effects of errors are 
on the patients and on the staff. The research statistics we had pre-
sented earlier were jarring and interesting, but it was the personal sto-
ries that compelled these leaders toward resolve to change. Several 
CEOs were clearly moved by what they found—and that they had 
been so unaware of what was going on in their own institution. One 
described how he had reached out to a faculty member with expertise 
in human factors for advice. To his surprise, the faculty member said, 
“I’ve been waiting for your call for 20 years.”
Saul Weingart then gave a presentation describing high quality in 
the service sector, with examples from Taco Bell and the Ritz-Carlton. 
The goal was to translate promising approaches into concepts that 
might work in healthcare. We then had a discussion on putting worker 
safety first: a Harvard case study about Paul O’Neill, the CEO at Alcoa.
O’Neill had initiated a worker safety program at Alcoa in what was 
already the safest company in his industry. The case study raised for 
the group the linkage between keeping patients safe and keeping 
employees safe. Were there common principles? On Saturday, we dis-
cussed another fundamental concept in the construction of a safety 
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culture: reporting. We considered confidential error-reporting sys-
tems, referring to the Billings work with the ASRS. Don then gave the 
challenge for the future.
But the big surprise of the meeting was provided by Jim Mongan, 
CEO of the Massachusetts General Hospital. He had missed the first 
meeting. After attending this one for 2 days, he announced that he was 
resigning because “I can’t tell my doctors how to practice.” We were 
stunned. Of course, what we were up to was pretty much what he 
said—not exactly telling doctors how to practice but trying to con-
vince and inspire them to practice differently. That, of course, is what 
leadership is about. Interestingly, years later (post-IOM and after 
some good work by members of his own staff), Mongan became a 
strong advocate for safety. But he wasn’t there yet.
Following the meeting, at George Lundberg’s urging, six of us 
wrote an editorial that provided an update on patient safety activities, 
and he published in JAMA [2]. We discussed the application of human 
factors concepts to healthcare and described the work being done by 
NPSF, JCAHO, the Veterans Health Administration, and the 
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine.
 Third Meeting: January 21–23, 1999
Two new members were introduced: Jack Rowe, CEO of Mt. Sinai 
Hospital in New York, and Troy Brennan, representing Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital.
Our guest was Paul O’Neill, who gave the evening keynote, a com-
pelling description of what he did to reduce harm at Alcoa. Bringing 
his case study to life, O’Neill emphasized that you cannot provide 
safe care if you don’t provide a safe workplace for your employees. 
O’Neill told the group that patient safety wasn’t a priority—it was a 
precondition. Paul became an outspoken advocate for patient safety 
and later joined the Lucian Leape Institute.
In the morning, members gave progress reports. There was no 
shortage of material! Bob Waller told us about the culture at Mayo, 
where the long-standing tradition is “the interest of the patient is the 
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only interest.” Peter Van Etten described changes at UCSF to hold 
doctor’s accountable. Ken Kizer talked about the considerable changes 
he and Jim Bagian had made at the VA health system. These included 
medication bar coding, nonpunitive error reporting, removal of con-
centrated potassium chloride from floor stock, hazardous drug proto-
cols, nursing upgrades, and assessing pain as the fifth vital sign.
Discussion followed on what needed to be done, and presentations 
were given on the lack of human factors testing for drug naming and 
labeling (a recognized contributor to medication errors), nonpunitive 
reporting, and building a culture of safety, followed by discussions 
focused on taking action.
 Fourth Meeting: June 17–19, 1999
Don Berwick gave the evening keynote on Effective Executive 
Leadership. In the morning, Saul gave a recap of where we had come 
during the previous meetings of the executive session, and then we 
heard progress reports.
David Lawrence told about changes at K-P. He had launched major 
efforts at all levels—national, regional, and local. He writes a biweekly 
CEO journal on cases of harm and actions taken and shares best prac-
tices system-wide with all 70,000 members. He described his philoso-
phy: no data without stories and no stories without data. But he also 
offered a cautionary note that effective messages require a relentless 
drumbeat and that people begin to understand what you mean at about 
the time when you are tired of saying it. He had stimulated a California 
statewide ADE initiative and was developing nationwide K-P account-
ability system. Joyce Clifford talked about nursing innovations 
at BIDMC.
Gordon Sprenger gave the most complete and inspiring account. 
He had engrafted patient safety into the governance of Allina, articu-
lated safety as a major organizational goal, and integrated it into the 
strategic and operational plan. This included designating safety lead-
ers, establishing a safety agenda, establishing the business case, and 
establishing nonpunitive reporting—including feedback about 
response. He personally inquired into medical accidents, coached 
senior managers in nonpunitive reporting, and kept talking with every-
one about it.
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He supported people who had made errors but had zero tolerance 
for violation of standards. He has changed the vocabulary from asking 
“who” to asking “what happened?” They were tapping 3-M engineers 
to help them with systems change. He disclosed plans to replicate the 
executive session for all CEO and Board chairs of Minnesota hospi-
tals—which he subsequently did with the help of his safety leader, 
Julie Morath, and Saul Weingart.
Sprenger, Lawrence, and Robert Waller had spoken out publicly on 
behalf of patient safety as well as fostering patient safety initiatives 
within their organizations. Jim Reinertsen, who had moved to become 
CEO of Boston’s CareGroup, made medication reliability one of four 
corporate priorities. Medication safety teams at each CareGroup hos-
pital attempted to implement 16 best practices in 1 year and demon-
strate measurable improvements in the safety of patients on 
anticoagulants and postoperative pain medications.
We then talked about how doctors and hospitals respond when a 
patient is harmed. Why are disclosure and apology so difficult? We 
showed the video from Annenberg of the Martin Memorial case, 
where the hospital stepped up and took responsibility for a death 
caused by a mistake. This was followed by a presentation by legal 
scholar Randy Bovbjerg on alternatives to the tort system and presen-
tations by the executive director of National Alliance for the Mentally 
Ill, Laurie Flynn, on the consumer’s view; Sandy Fleming, executive 
a b
(a) Paul O’Neill and (b) Gordon Sprenger. (All rights reserved)
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director of MA Board of Registration in Medicine; and Dennis 
O’Leary, president of The Joint Commission on regulation and over-
sight. We had more discussion of actions that leaders could initiate. 
Overall, it was a very feisty meeting, with members fully engaged.
 Fifth Meeting: January 27–29, 2000
This was the first meeting after the IOM report came out 2 months 
earlier, so we spent a whole session discussing it and its implications 
for leadership. We added two new members, Thomas Garthwaite, the 
new head of Veterans Health, replacing Ken Kizer, who had stepped 
down and Michael Wood, CEO of Mayo, replacing retiring Bob 
Waller. Jim Bagian gave the evening talk on his experience as an 
astronaut and now director of patient safety for the VA.
An interesting innovation was the presentation of a group of 
Harvard Business School-type case studies that Saul Weingart had 
commissioned with the goal of capturing the early experience of exec-
utive session members’ initiatives: creating a safety culture in the VA, 
creating a safety program at Allina, and patient safety at Mayo Clinic. 
Member reports included David Lawrence’s account of many new 
activities at Kaiser Permanente.
 Lessons Learned
This was the last meeting of the executive session. We discussed how 
to spread the message and engage a broader swatch of leaders. We 
agreed on our key findings and principles, which in retrospect now 
seem remarkably applicable 20 years later. These were later summa-
rized by Saul Weingart in testimony at the AHRQ Patient Safety 
Summit later in the year [3]:
 1. Medical error is a problem of organizations. Members of the execu-
tive session embrace the view that medical error is an attribute of 
the systems and processes by which we deliver care. Scientific evi-
dence and a wealth of experience from other industries demonstrate 
that human errors almost always result from defective systems. 
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Improvement strategies that punish individual clinicians are mis-
guided and do not work. Fixing dysfunctional systems, on the other 
hand, is the work that needs to be done.
 2. Medical error is an executive responsibility. Because managers are 
responsible for organizing and shaping the systems and processes 
of care, hospital and health system executives share an essential 
and nondelegable responsibility for reducing medical error. 
Moreover, leadership lessons in patient safety can be learned and 
disseminated. To make progress, healthcare CEOs must commit 
their own time to working on behalf of patient safety. They must 
communicate its importance relentlessly. They must hold them-
selves personally accountable for patient safety in the same way 
they do for financial performance.
 3. Many important lessons about high-reliability performance can be 
adapted from manufacturing, aviation, and the service sector. 
Executives should assess their organizations’ core processes for 
safety, inventory their organizations’ patient safety activities, report 
the results, implement best practices, and create a culture of safety.
 4. Medical error is an urgent and strategic priority. Members of the 
executive session were impressed with the magnitude of harm rep-
resented by medical error. Ensuring that care is safe is a profes-
sional obligation for healthcare professionals and the organizations 
where they work. It is an urgent problem that requires the kind of 
immediate, focused, and sustained attention that motivated organi-
zations to ensure Year 2000 (Y2K) compliance. Safety also makes 
good business sense. It builds consumer confidence and market 
share. Increased efficiencies and decreased rework may contribute 
to the bottom line.
 5. Error reporting systems must be improved. Healthcare organiza-
tions must remain accountable to their patients and to the commu-
nity by disclosing errors that result in harm, providing fair 
compensation for injuries, and introducing measures to prevent 
recurrence. Physicians have an ethical obligation to inform patients 
when they have been harmed because of an error in care.
 6. Gross negligence and unethical behavior should not be shielded. 
Professional misconduct is a grave threat to patient safety and 
should be dealt with accordingly. But errors that do not result in 
harm must be protected from legal discovery, so that we can learn 
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from them. Fear of discovery and punishment of clinicians’ acci-
dents drives information underground and decreases organizational 
learning. We need to create robust nonpunitive error reporting sys-
tems. Sharing information about errors with frontline workers will 
build a sense of collaboration and shared mission.
 7. The federal government should play an active role in patient safety, 
requiring pharmaceutical and device manufacturers to use human 
factors principles in naming, packaging, and labeling medications 
and to participate in post-market surveillance of adverse events.
 Conclusion
Was the executive session a success? It did not create a national con-
sensus or a comprehensive strategy for addressing patient safety. In 
retrospect, that would have been an unreasonable expectation, and it 
isn’t the purpose of executive sessions. Patient safety was in its 
infancy. Its definitions, methods, and scope were just developing. The 
major problems had yet to be defined. Patient safety was not ready for 
a grand strategy. But it was ready for big thinking.
Moreover, we were beginning to appreciate what an incredibly 
complex field patient safety is, bridging diverse disciplines from 
research to clinical care to administration, involving a broad range of 
stakeholders: patients, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, ancillary medical 
personnel, administrators, risk managers, lawyers, engineers, and 
government agencies. Achieving safe healthcare would require major 
changes in a physician-dominated culture that is more conservative 
and more authoritarian than in any institution in our society.
But the executive session was extraordinarily successful in other 
ways. While 99% of people working in patient safety have probably 
never even heard about it, the session educated major healthcare 
leaders in depth about patient safety and created awareness and 
understanding of its complexity. A community of concern developed 
in which leaders of major organizations in healthcare became col-
leagues in the pursuit of safe care. It motivated them to take action 
to advance the cause:
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• Dennis O’Leary led The Joint Commission to be more aggressive 
about safety, setting out National Patient Safety Goals and 
Standards.
• David Lawrence made major changes at Kaiser Permanente that 
led it to become a model for patient safety among large healthcare 
systems.
• Gordon Sprenger made Allina an exemplar of safety.
• Steve Schroeder steered the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to 
become the largest private funder of patient safety research and 
training.
An unanticipated effect of the executive session was its influence 
on observers. Although membership was by invitation, we encour-
aged participants to bring colleagues as observers. Two are of particu-
lar note. Gordon Sprenger brought Julie Morath, who went on to be a 
leader in patient safety as COO at Minnesota Children’s Hospitals and 
Clinics, and later as chief quality and safety officer at Vanderbilt 
University Medical Center and then as the president/CEO of the 
California Hospital Quality Institute, and member of the Lucian Leape 
Institute.
The other was Atul Gawande, a surgical resident who I had gotten 
to know during his year at the Harvard School of Public Health. Atul 
later developed the surgical checklist for WHO and created Ariadne 
Labs, an influential collaboration of innovators, implementers, and 
healthcare leaders focused on quality and safety. His books, 
Complications and Better, have succeeded more than any other in 
making safety issues accessible and understandable to the public.
The Harvard Executive Session concluded shortly after the IOM 
report was released and just as AHRQ and NQF began to play major 
roles in developing the foundations for the new field of patient safety 
(see chapters below). The executive session was complementary to 
these initiatives in that it helped develop the professional foundation: 
commitment by key leaders in the field. Patient safety is about chang-
ing systems of care. Systems leaders have to make that happen. The 
executive session set a stake in the ground early on, declaring that the 
most senior leaders in healthcare organizations had both the responsi-
bility and capability to ensure safe care.
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The young National Patient Safety Foundation recognized the 
potential of the executive session as a reproducible model for engag-
ing leadership and motivating change. It subsequently sponsored 
executive sessions led by Saul Weingart in Minnesota and Indiana that 
brought together state hospital association leaders, health system 
CEOs, and (importantly) hospital trustees to navigate the emerging 
challenges of patient safety in their regions and communities [1]. 
Fierce economic competitors created a shared commitment to reduc-
ing medical errors and agreed to collaborate on patient safety inter-
ventions. This created a reservoir of good will and shared purpose 
among leaders in Minnesota and the regional Minnesota Alliance for 
Patient Safety that enabled bold interventions such as the 2003 first-
in-the-nation Minnesota Adverse Health Events Reporting Law.
 Appendix 7.1: Executive Session Members
 CEOs of Healthcare Delivery Organizations
• Harris Berman—CEO of Tufts Health Plan
• Kenneth Kizer—VA Undersecretary for Health, CEO of Veterans 
Health Admin.
• *David Lawrence—CEO of Kaiser Permanente
• *James Mongan—CEO of Mass General Hospital
• Mitchell Rabkin—CEO of CareGroup (BI-Deaconess Medical 
Center and its affiliates)
• James Reinertson—CEO of Minnesota HealthPartners
• *Gordon Sprenger—CEO of Allina Health System
• Peter Van Etten—CEO of UCSF Stanford Health Care
• Robert Waller—CEO of Mayo Clinic
• *Gail Warden—CEO of Henry Ford Health System
 Leaders of Health-Related Organizations
• Donald Berwick—CEO of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement
• Charles Buck—GE VP for Healthcare Quality
7 Who Will Lead? The Executive Session
103
• Joyce Clifford—SVP for Nursing at BI-Deaconess Medical Center
• Dan Creasey—CEO of CRICO (Harvard Medical Institutions 
Liability Insurer)
• Nancy Dickey—President-elect of the AMA
• Alexander Fleming—Exec. Director of MA Board of Registration 
in Medicine
• *Laurie Flynn—Exec. Director of National Alliance for the 
Mentally Ill
• Martin Hatlie—Exec. Director of NPSF
• Henri Manasse—CEO of American Society of Health-System 
Pharmacists
• Dennis O’Leary—President, the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations
 Others
• Robert Frosch—Former Administrator of NASA
• Francis Hartmann—Exec. Dir. of KSG Malcolm Weiner Ctr for 
Social Policy
• Lucian Leape—Adj. Prof. of Health Policy, Harvard School of 
Public Health
• George Lundberg—Editor in Chief, JAMA
• Joseph Newhouse—Prof. of Health Policy and Management, Harvard
• Steven Schroeder—President of the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation
• Miles Shore—Professor of Psychiatry, HMS
• Saul Weingart—Clinical Fellow, General Medicine, BI-Deaconess
• David Woods—Prof. of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Ohio 
State Univ.
*Unable to attend the first meeting
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Chapter 8
A Community of Concern: 
The Massachusetts Coalition 
for the Prevention of Medical Errors
One day in January 1997, John Noble, an internist from Boston City 
Hospital who I knew from somewhere—perhaps residency days—
walked into my office and said, “We should form a state coalition for 
the prevention of medical errors.” His idea was to bring to the table 
the key players in health who tended not to talk much with one 
another—regulators and the regulated, academics and practitio-
ners, etc.
I thought it was a capital idea. John was at that time a regent of the 
American College of Physicians and a JCAHO Commissioner. We 
went to see David Mulligan, the Commissioner of Public Health, who 
was very supportive. Similarly, when approached, we found the lead-
ership of the Mass Medical Society (MMS) was in favor, and Ron 
Hollander, president of the Mass Hospital Association (MHA), was 
downright enthusiastic.
The timing was right. Even before the release of the legendary IOM 
report, interest in medical errors had begun to develop among the pub-
lic, health providers, the media, and regulatory agencies. This was 
especially true in Massachusetts because of the Betsy Lehman trag-
edy. That such a thing could happen at one of our premier institutions 
made both patients and professionals feel vulnerable. The fact that 
these events occur in all settings in spite of extensive oversight and 
quality monitoring mechanisms led healthcare leaders in Massachusetts 
to begin to rethink how its industry looked at and learned from medi-
cal errors.
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With the commissioner, we called a meeting of leaders of the 
Department of Public Health (DPH), MHA, MMS, MassPro, the fed-
eral peer review organization, and several hospitals. We stated that our 
hope was to drive improvement by sharing information and to restore 
the public trust by increasing public awareness of what we were doing 
to prevent errors. The Coalition would make information available to 
health professionals and healthcare institutions for quality improve-
ment programs. It would be a vehicle for taking action to improve 
care. Everyone was enthusiastic.
By May a number of additional organizations had signed up, includ-
ing the state licensing boards, nurses organizations, the Harvard 
Controlled Risk Insurance Company (CRICO), the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), state and federal agencies, 
and professional associations, as well as several hospitals and clinical 
researchers.
We agreed on a mission statement that our goal was to develop and 
implement a statewide initiative to improve patient safety and mini-
mize medical errors. The specific goals were:
• To establish and implement best practices to minimize medi-
cal error.
• To increase awareness of error prevention strategies through public 
and professional education.
• To identify areas of mutual interest and minimize duplication of 
regulatory and The Joint Commission requirements so that efforts 
are focused on initiatives that can best improve patient care.
The energy at the first meeting was palpable. Virtually everyone in 
Massachusetts had been touched by the Betsy Lehman story. Most of 
the participants, however, knew little else about patient safety. Many 
were not aware of the Medical Practice Study or of the recent 
Annenberg Conference. But they were eager to learn and anxious to 
be at the table. From the beginning, a critical element in moving ahead 
was the strong support of the DPH and the MHA, who provided staff 
and office space.
The focus of this and the other early meetings was on framing the 
problem properly and understanding the perspectives of the different 
stakeholders (providers, regulators, public, and media). We acknowl-
edged the tension existing between providers and the agencies that 
regulate them. This was the first time that healthcare providers and 
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government agencies in Massachusetts had ever sat down together to 
talk openly about medical errors and what they could do together to 
prevent them.
We believed that the strength of the Coalition would come from 
participation of representatives from all stakeholders. Thus, a con-
certed effort was made to ensure that the membership reflected all 
segments of the healthcare industry, regional interests, providers, pay-
ers and regulators, as well as all types of practitioners. We enlisted 
membership from state and federal agencies with responsibility for 
licensure and oversight; professional associations representing hospi-
tals, physicians, nurses, nursing executives, and long-term-care insti-
tutions; individual healthcare providers; malpractice insurance 
carriers; accrediting bodies; clinical researchers; and consumer 
organizations.
Four people provided the leadership that made it happen. John 
Noble was an academic internist at Boston University who brought a 
practicing physician’s concern about safety, as well as the perspective 
of the chief regulator, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), where he was a Board member 
and later chairman. Leslie Kirle was an enthusiastic administrator and 
public health advocate who represented MHA’s strong commitment 
and support. Connie Crowley-Ganser, a registered nurse and the qual-
ity VP at Children’s Hospital, brought the perspectives both of nurs-
ing and hospitals. Nancy Ridley was an experienced bureaucrat with 
the DPH who felt a strong obligation to make healthcare safe.
a b c
(a) John Noble, (b) Leslie Kirle, and (c) Connie Crowley-Ganser. (All rights 
reserved)
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The energy of these four people, their skills, and their cooperation 
as a team were crucial to the early success of the Coalition. As noted, 
members had never all worked together on anything as sensitive as 
medical errors. These four leaders embodied something quite revolu-
tionary: not just collaboration, but enthusiastic commitment to a cause 
by a diverse group of key stakeholders.
The Coalition was officially launched on July 31, 1998. The found-
ing members were John Noble (JCAHO), Jim Conway (Dana-Farber 
Cancer Institute), Connie Crowley-Ganser (Children’s Hospital), 
Harry Greene (MMS), Sheridan Kassirer (Partners Healthcare), Leslie 
Kirle (MHA), Lucian Leape (Harvard School of Public Health), 
Randy Peto (MassPro), and Nancy Ridley (DPH).
The mission statement, structure, and process had been devel-
oped, and 21 organizations had confirmed their commitment to the 
Coalition’s mission and goals. The Massachusetts Hospital 
Association took the lead in providing the initial seed money and 
resources to launch the Coalition and move it forward. DPH and 
MMS also provided support. The full list of participating organiza-
tions is in Appendix 8.1.
We held a press briefing to educate selected print media about the 
Coalition and its mission. This resulted in several positive stories in 
key newspapers and journals. It was an important first step in engag-
ing the public in a meaningful dialogue about errors and strategies for 
prevention.
In a presentation at Annenberg II a few months later, John Noble 
reflected on the Coalition and its initial success. He noted that the 
motivating force for buy-in for all members was the shared goal of 
making the healthcare system as safe as possible for patients and care 
providers.
From the beginning, the Coalition worked unceasingly to promote 
communication between key parties. In addition to being a forum for 
the “heavies” (professional societies and regulators), it also provided 
a setting that encouraged input from clinicians and consumers as indi-
viduals and through their organizations’ representatives. The message 
was clear: patient safety is everyone’s responsibility. This emphasis 
on inclusivity helped enlist broad support for practice and systems 
changes while building trust and credibility.
John Noble and Connie Crowley-Ganser co-chaired the meetings 
of the Coalition for the first several years, and they and Leslie Kirle 
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“made things happen.” The founding members were the steering com-
mittee until a governing Board elected by the members was estab-
lished in 2002.
 Medication Consensus Group
Early on, the Coalition formed a Medication Consensus Group to 
focus on preventing medication errors. This built on an earlier MHA 
project that showed poor use of safe medications recommended by the 
Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP). The group included 
nurses, physicians, pharmacists, and administrators representing 20 
hospitals of different sizes from around the state. They developed 
short-term (immediate implementation) recommendations, such as 
unit dosing and removal of concentrated KCl from nursing units, and 
long-term recommendations such as bar coding, computerized pre-
scriber order entry systems, and electronic medication administration 
records.
By mid-1999, we had finalized Best Practice Recommendations to 
Reduce Medication Errors. After they were formally endorsed by the 
Coalition, I made a presentation about it to the MHA Board, assuming 
their support would be pro forma since the hospital association had 
been a leader of the medication safety effort even before the Coalition 
was founded.
To my surprise, some members of the Board, CEOs of hospitals, 
were dubious. They were concerned about “telling doctors how to 
practice.” Fortunately, others spoke out in its defense, and the Board 
approved it. The DPH also gave its stamp of approval.
The best practice recommendations were then sent to doctors and 
hospitals. Again, we got helpful media coverage. In 2001, a survey of 
Massachusetts hospitals showed that 70% had fully implemented 
some of the Best Practice Recommendations and 90% had partially 
implemented some. The recommendations soon spread widely. Within 
a year they were being used by hospitals in Michigan and Wisconsin 
in addition to Massachusetts. They were cited in the IOM report.
Looking back 20 years later, it is gratifying to note that while only 
a few of these practices were in common use at the time, they are now 
all standard practice. The Coalition was not the only group pushing 
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for standards—ISMP had long advocated most of them—but it was 
one of the first outside the pharmacy world to do so.
The Medication Consensus Group also developed Safety First 
Alerts. The first three, Look Alike/Sound Alike Drugs and Packages, 
Transcription and Administration of Medications, and Automation, 
were published in 2000. The Group also collaborated with the Institute 
for Family-Centered Care to develop and publish a brochure for 
patients, Your Role in Safe Medication Use. This was distributed to 
physicians to be given to patients in their offices. It was well received 
and is still available 20 years later!
 Leadership Forum
In July 1999, the Coalition and the Massachusetts Medical Society 
sponsored another innovation: the first Leadership Forum. We brought 
experts together with a diverse group of stakeholders to talk for the 
first time about barriers and solutions to medical errors.
After welcoming remarks by the leaders of the MMS, MHA, and 
DPH, John Noble gave the history of the development of the Coalition, 
and I gave the keynote address on creating a culture of safety. Marty 
Hatlie spoke about the NPSF and Eleanor Vogt presented the new 
video, Beyond Blame. John Nance of ABC News then moderated a 
star-studded panel of local experts to discuss barriers to talking 
about errors.
The forum was a great success and became an annual event there-
after, focusing on specific issues, such as reducing restraints and 
seclusion, communicating unanticipated outcomes and medical errors, 
and improving safety and quality of ICU care.
 Regulatory Consensus Group
A Regulatory Consensus Group was created to align regulatory envi-
ronments to facilitate adoption of best practices. We had the right 
people at the table to work on this issue and compare current regula-
tory requirements. Could we consolidate forms to simplify reporting? 
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A workshop was held with stakeholders, followed by development of 
a detailed comparison of requirements levied by the Board of 
Registration in Medicine (BRM), DPH, the Department of Mental 
Health (DMH), the Medical Examiner, JCAHO, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) for reporting of incidents, time frame, nature 
of the incident, investigation, corrective measures, definitions, and 
codes. The group brought awareness in an objective and concrete way 
to the magnitude of overlapping regulatory requirements and served 
as the seed for the later work on accountability that the coalition 
spearheaded.
 Restraint Consensus Group
The Restraint and Seclusion Policy and Practice Consensus Group 
addressed these issues in various venues: psychiatric care, children’s 
care, emergency rooms, and long-term-care facilities. It brought 
together leaders, staff, administrators, physicians, and nurses from 
across Massachusetts to review practices, share experiences and tech-
niques that worked, and brainstorm new ideas to minimizing the use 
of restraints.
The group’s report, Best Practice Recommendations To Improve 
Patient Safety Related to Restraint & Seclusion Use, advocated the 
appropriate use of restraints and seclusion by ensuring staff are well-
trained, implementation of a comprehensive clinical assessment 
before restraints are applied, development of guidelines for the need 
for restraint or seclusion use, routine monitoring of the safe use of 
restraints and seclusion, and education of patients and their responsi-
ble parties about the organization’s restraint and seclusion reduction 
efforts. The Coalition promoted adoption of these recommendations 
by developing an improvement workbook and through educational 
programs and leadership initiatives showcasing restraint-free practices.
Through all the early years, Leslie Kirle of MHA was the person 
that made the initiatives work. She was the “go to” person who 
recruited members for consensus groups, organized and convened 
meetings, and generally made it all work. It was a heady time, with a 
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multitude of projects and intense interest by all members. Many peo-
ple had good ideas. Leslie turned them into action. But Leslie could 
only do it part time. She had other duties at MHA. The Board recog-
nized the need for a full- time director. It took more than a year to find 
the right person, but in the end they succeeded brilliantly.
In 2001, Paula Griswold was appointed as the first executive direc-
tor. She quickly took over management of the many Coalition activi-
ties. In addition to updates on activities of the participants, she built a 
strong educational component into the monthly Coalition meetings. 
Coalition members and local or national experts share research and 
new programs in patient safety. This educational aspect of the monthly 
meetings has been very helpful to the members and a key reason they 
attend the meetings regularly.
Also in 2001, Senator Moore succeeded in getting the state legisla-
ture to create the Betsy Lehman Center. However, it would be several 
Paula Griswold. (All rights reserved)
8 A Community of Concern: The Massachusetts Coalition…
113
more years before it would be funded and able to carry out its mission 
of motivating and implementing statewide safety programs. By 2001, 
coalitions had developed in Michigan, Pittsburgh, and Delmarva 
(Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia).
 DPH Project
But were we actually making patient care safer? By 2002 the Coalition, 
MHA, and DPH recognized the need for a more aggressive approach 
to action and research to implement safe practices and to improve 
reporting. In collaboration with the DPH, we applied for and received 
a substantial grant from the Agency for Health Research and 
Quality (AHRQ).
The grant had four aims: to improve the DPH reporting system, to 
evaluate hospital leadership perceptions of public reporting, to mea-
sure perceptions and experience of hospitalized patients concerning 
adverse events and disclosure, and to develop and implement two safe 
practices. Eric Schneider, Joel Weisman, and Arnie Epstein of HMS 
and HSPH and Jack Fowler of the Center for Survey Research led the 
research team for the first three aims.
The purpose of Aim 1 was to evaluate and improve the DPH man-
datory hospital reporting system (MARS), possibly by adopting the 
National Quality Forum (NQF) list of serious reportable events. After 
evaluating the content and characteristics of a representative sample 
of 800 incident reports made by 72 hospitals during 1999–2004, the 
researchers concluded that if Massachusetts had adopted the NQF 
standard and accompanying list of reportable events, up to 83% of 
incidents would not have been reported.
A new system was developed, along with a data abstraction tool to 
capture key elements from medical records. Use of Internet technol-
ogy was analyzed to identify where there might be a good fit for the 
medication error-web-based reporting system, but no solution was 
identified. In 2003 the project was expanded to include a comparison 
of MARS to the patient care assessment (PCA) reports required by 
the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine. However, they 




To evaluate leadership perceptions of public reporting, CEOs and 
COOs were surveyed in six states: two with mandatory reporting and 
public disclosure (CO and MA), two with mandatory reporting and no 
public disclosure (FL and PA), and two with no mandatory reporting 
(GA and TX). The results from the sample of 203 hospitals were sur-
prisingly similar: 69% believed that public disclosure discourages 
internal (within the hospital) reporting, 79% believed it encourages 
filing of lawsuits, and only 28% felt it improved patient safety [1]. 
Although all three groups were strongly opposed to public disclosure, 
hospitals in states where it was required were less concerned about 
increased lawsuits, suggesting that familiarity bred less contempt.
Patient perceptions and experience with adverse events in the hos-
pital were evaluated by a patient survey of 2582 randomly selected 
patients from 16 hospitals in Massachusetts. The results were shock-
ing: 25% of patients reported “negative” events that study physicians 
identified as adverse events (AEs). Three-fourths of these were sig-
nificant or serious; 31% were preventable. These rates were 2–3 times 
those reported by previous record review studies [2].
The study then compared the yield of patient reports to standard 
record review by examining their medical records using the Medical 
Practice Study method of nurse screening and two physician indepen-
dent reviews (Chap. 1). Patients reported AE in 29% of cases, and 
record review found an additional 11% of patients with AE. But the 
striking finding was that three-fourths of patient-reported AE were not 
discovered by record review [3].
Further analysis showed that disclosure of the AE to the patient by 
the medical team only occurred 40% of the time. Disclosure was more 
likely if additional treatment was needed and less likely if the AEs 
were preventable (an error). Patients were twice as likely to rate the 
quality of care high when there was disclosure [4]. High patient par-
ticipation in their care was associated with fewer AE (49%) and higher 
likelihood that patients would rate the quality of their care good or 
excellent [5].
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 Implementing Best Practices
The fourth part of AHRQ grant provided support to the Coalition and 
MHA to develop two voluntary best practice initiatives and get them 
adopted statewide.
We began by widely soliciting input, calling on clinicians to tell us 
what “kept you awake at night.” To select the practices, we used four 
criteria: importance, existence of elements of a practice, effective-
ness, and feasibility of implementation. From ten widely suggested 
topics, we chose two: reconciling medications and communicating 
critical test results. It fell to me and the Coalition staff to make them 
happen, so I chaired planning groups for each. We made sure to have 
several change experts from IHI on each committee.
 The Reconciling Medications Project
Reconciling medications is the process of making sure that “every 
hospitalized patient receives all the medications they were taken prior 
to admission unless they are specifically discontinued by their care-
givers and ensuring that they are ordered in the correct dose, route, 
and frequency.” [6] It is a problem because the information may be 
difficult to obtain, and the responsibility for doing it is unclear. Often, 
it just isn’t done. Reconciling is a classic system problem.
Gina Rogers staffed this project and did a terrific job. We convened 
a consensus group of physicians, nurses, and pharmacists to develop 
the best practice, as well as core measurements and an implementa-
tion toolkit of suggested strategies for the QI teams to use.
The best practice for reconciling included four steps: (1) establish 
who (doctor, nurse, pharmacist) has primary responsibility, (2) obtain 
an accurate preadmission medication list, (3) write accurate admis-
sion orders, and (4) reconcile all variances. In addition, the best prac-
tice called for providing continuing support and maintenance by 
adopting clear policies and procedures, adopting a standard form, and 
providing ongoing education and monitoring. 
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To implement the practice, we used the IHI Breakthrough Series 
Collaborative approach in which hospitals use the PDSA (Plan-Do-
Study-Act) Model for Improvement. Frank Federico joined us from 
IHI to help.
The MHA urged all hospital CEOs to participate. Of the 50 hospi-
tals in the state, three-fourths did. Baseline risk assessment in 20 hos-
pitals revealed that 59% of medications were unreconciled. The need 
for the project was clear.
We brought participating teams together four times in 2003 and 
2004 for 2-day learning sessions, coaching on the PDSA method, and 
to report on progress and share successful strategies. The teams tested 
implementation strategies and monitored their progress with common 
measures. They filed monthly reports and communicated with each 
other over a listserv guided by expert faculty.
Adoption of the safe practice proved challenging. At the conclusion 
of the collaborative, 64% of hospitals had succeeded in establishing a 
workable system for reconciliation of medications, but only 20% had 
succeeded in getting it used hospital- wide at all locations.
A survey of hospital teams after the collaborative ended showed 
that the factors associated with successful implementation were those 
common to all collaboratives: strong leadership support, engagement 
of key stakeholders, use of small tests of change, use of data and 
examples of errors to motivate change, measuring whether changes 
are leading to improvement, and attendance at the collaborative learn-
ing sessions.
The key lesson specific to reconciliation was that there must be a 
clear assignment of responsibility—everyone must know whose job 
reconciliation is, and if it is the admitting nurse, there must be a clear 
backup assignment of a physician or pharmacist to correct the 
variances.
The second and even more challenging practice was communicat-
ing critical test results.
 Communicating Critical Test Results
Communicating critical test results is the process of ensuring that test 
results are immediately and reliably communicated to the responsi-
ble physician. For critically ill patients or those with life-threatening 
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conditions, getting the results of blood tests, imaging, EKGs, or 
biopsies in a timely fashion can make the difference between life 
and death.
One might assume that would occur without fail. Unfortunately, 
that is not the case—even in the best of hospitals. Wide variations 
exist in the definitions of critical test results and how they are com-
municated to the responsible clinician [7–9]. Each hospital had its 
own system; there were no uniform standards at the state or national 
level. Even within a single institution, laboratories, radiology, and 
cardiology often differed in their practices, and significant delays 
occur frequently. All shocking, when you think about it. Lives are in 
the balance—and lives can be lost when treatment is delayed.
The Communicating Critical Test Results collaborative took on 
these problems. As with the reconciling medications project, a 
Consensus Group was convened that included the full array of stake-
holders: doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and administrators, plus repre-
sentatives from blood testing laboratories, radiology, cardiology, and 
pathology.
The process of developing the safe practice recommendations took 
months, but under the competent leadership of the project director, 
Doris Hanna, and medication safety expert David Bates, the Consensus 
Group succeeded in developing a set of Safe Practice Recommendations 
(Appendix 8.2) and a “starter set” of critical test results.
Recommendations addressed five issues: (1) definition—what tests 
are critical?, (2) how quickly should they be reported?, (3) to whom?, 
(4) backup recipient, and (5) how should they be reported?
Definition and timing. The essential first point is that each institu-
tion must reach a consensus about which tests are critical. Criteria 
must be agreed on and applied uniformly in all venues, laboratory, 
radiology, cardiology, etc., and in all practice areas: inpatient, outpa-
tient, and ED. The typical hospital list is too long, definitions are not 
clear, and there is no agreed-upon standard for what qualifies as a 
critical test result (CTR). We recommended a color-code system that 
is useful and easy to understand:
Red values indicate the patient is in imminent danger of death, 
significant morbidity, or serious adverse consequences unless treat-
ment is initiated immediately (e.g., a blood potassium level of 6 or 
greater). Results must be reported as soon as possible, at most within 
an hour.
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Orange values are abnormalities that warrant rapid, but not imme-
diate, attention by the responsible clinician (e.g., BUN over 100). The 
report should be delivered to the responsible party within 6–8 hours.
Yellow values are abnormalities that are not urgent but require diag-
nosis and treatment in a timely and reliable manner (e.g., a biopsy 
showing cancer). Maximum time: 3 days.
To whom should the report be given? This must be the person who 
can take appropriate action. In many institutions the report was deliv-
ered to the nurse on the unit, who then had to find the doctor to take 
action. It was agreed that practice must stop.
Who does the report go to if the ordering provider is not available? 
This proved to be a difficult problem. If the responsible physician is 
not in the hospital, finding them quickly can be difficult. If it is a resi-
dent, they may no longer be on call. Hospitals must implement call 
systems that link every patient with a responsible provider at all times.
How should results be reported? For red values, person-to-person 
verbal communication by phone to the responsible physician was 
deemed essential. For orange and yellow values, indirect delivery by 
e-mail or through an intermediary such as a nurse or ward clerk is 
acceptable. The provider must acknowledge to the sender receipt of 
the result within the defined time frame (6–8 hours or 3 days), and the 
system must verify that it happens.
The full set of recommendations can be found in Appendix 8.2, 
which also includes the implementation context for each recommen-
dation. For example, the recommendation for red results includes the 
explicit steps of whom to call in addition to the responsible physician; 
what to do if no response after 15, 30, and 45 minutes; and the fail-
safe plan at 1 hour.
To facilitate adoption, the consensus group developed a starter set 
of specific thresholds for red, orange, and yellow values for all labora-
tory, cardiology, and radiology tests. Hospitals were encouraged to 
modify these values to make them their own. The starter set is avail-
able at http://www.macoalition.org/initiatives.shtml.
As with reconciling medications, the recommendations and starter 
set of critical test results were disseminated in a statewide collabora-
tive of Massachusetts hospitals where we assisted hospital teams in 
implementing the system, testing changes, and sharing successful 
strategies.
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A year after the conclusion of the two collaboratives, we commis-
sioned the Center for Survey Research to survey the participating 
institutions to determine the extent to which they implemented the 
new practices. How successful were we in actually changing practice?
Of 66 acute care hospitals in Massachusetts, 58 (88%) participated 
in 1 collaborative and 32 participated in both. For reconciling medica-
tions, 50% had some implementation, and 20% had fully implemented 
them. For communicating critical test results, 65% had some imple-
mentation, and 20% fully implemented [10].
These rates were comparable to IHI success rates for collabora-
tives. It would be another several years before Peter Pronovost dem-
onstrated the power of a more intensive implementation strategy to 
yield a much higher rate of implementation (75%) of a safe practice 
for insertion of central lines [11, 12]. (See Chap. 6.)
The major barriers to success were resistance to change, complex-
ity, and competing priorities for staff time. Few teams met as fre-
quently as required, and hospitals sometimes didn’t send full teams to 
collaborative meetings. Despite a lot of advance preparation, getting 
leaders involved and learning change methods proved difficult 
for most.
We published the recommendations from each of the initiatives and 
the results of our experiences in three papers in The Joint Commission 
Journal on Quality and Patient Safety in 2005 and 2006 [6, 13, 14] 
and an overview paper in Quality and Safety in Health Care in 
2006 [10].
Despite the mixed results, these initiatives had considerable impact 
statewide and on individual participants. They demonstrated that 
important systems change was possible and that the Coalition was a 
major force making that happen. A nurse manager at a hospital that 
implemented both practices commented that the work she did was the 
most rewarding work she had done during her 25-year career.
But the greatest impact of these initiatives was nationwide when 
The Joint Commission (whose journal published our results) made 
them two of their National Patient Safety Goals, signaling to all hos-
pitals not only that these were important, but that hospitals were 
expected to implement them. By 2006, The Joint Commission reported 
that 90% of hospitals had improved reporting of CTR and 100% had 
developed a process for reconciliation.
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 Impact of the Coalition
The coalition was a powerful force for change in Massachusetts. One 
reason is clear: from the beginning, the key players—the Department 
of Public Health, the Massachusetts Hospital Association, and the 
Massachusetts Medical Society—were enthusiastic participants and 
provided both leadership and material support. This was several years 
before the legendary Institute of Medicine report, To Err Is Human. 
The stimulus was much closer to home: the tragic death of Betsy 
Lehman, which had a powerful impact on our community at every level.
We had another advantage: Several of the national leaders in qual-
ity improvement and error prevention were in Boston, and by 1997, 
thanks to IHI, there was already a cadre of people in the hospitals with 
first-hand experience in improvement. They welcomed the support of 
their work and the opportunity to learn from others. The Coalition got 
the conversation about patient safety into the C-suites and board 
rooms. Patient safety became a priority.
The support of the Massachusetts Hospital Association was partic-
ularly critical. The president, Ron Hollander, strongly supported the 
coalition and sincerely wanted the effort to succeed, as did his succes-
sor, Andy Dreyfus. MHA provided space, staff support, and day-to-
day leadership by Leslie Kirle. Likewise, strong support from the 
Commissioner of Public Health, Howard Koh, and leadership by 
Nancy Ridley, the DPH representative to the coalition, were critical to 
getting the coalition going.
Since the coalition came into being, a number of other states and 
regions have created coalitions: Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin [15].
Under Paula Griswold’s leadership, the Coalition expanded its 
efforts. She made the monthly meetings a “must-do” for members 
who want to stay current with developments in patient safety. A num-
ber of statewide educational programs have been held. The Coalition 
continued to convene collaboratives, including ones on long-term care 
and ambulatory care. Keeping up is also facilitated by links to relevant 
research and notices that the Coalition distributes each month about 
virtually everything happening in patient safety worldwide. The 
Coalition website, http://www.macoalition.org, lists initiatives and 
educational programs.
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The Coalition accomplished an incredible amount in the first few 
years, both in agenda setting and in activities that brought together 
key stakeholders to produce meaningful deliverables. It was a major 
force in beginning to change the mindset of its members away from 
punishment of individuals to changing systems, the paradigm shift 
that drives patient safety. Its initiatives produced tangible results, driv-
ing home human factors lessons about the effectiveness of systems 
change. It truly changed the conversation and understanding.
Now, more than 20  years after its founding, the Massachusetts 
Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors continues to be a major 
influence for patient safety in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
 Appendix 8.1: Initial Coalition 
Member Organizations
• American Association of Retired Persons
• American College of Physicians
• Boston University School of Medicine
• Harvard Risk Management Foundation
• Health Care Financing Administration
• Harvard School of Public Health
• Institute for Healthcare Improvement
• Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
• Massachusetts Association of Behavioral Health
• Massachusetts Board of Nursing
• Massachusetts Board of Pharmacy
• Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine
• Massachusetts Department of Public Health
• Massachusetts Extended Care Federation
• Massachusetts Hospital Association
• Willis Massachusetts Medical Society
• Massachusetts Nurses Association
• Massachusetts Organization Executives
• Massachusetts Peer-Reviewed Organization
• Professional Liability Foundation
• PRO Mutual Group
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 Appendix 8.2: Communicating Critical Test Results
 1. Who should receive the results?
• The results must go to someone who can take action—usually 
the person who ordered the test or the attending physician. 
Whoever orders it gets the results and has the responsibility to 
take action.
 2. Who should receive the results when the ordering provider is not 
available?
• Have a clear backup system with clear delineation of when to 
escalate.
• Link every patient with a responsible provider.
• Use central call systems with a call schedule for all providers.
 3. What results require timely and reliable communication?
• All parties must agree on which tests require immediate com-
munication; these are the critical test results (CTR).
• Include all types of tests, all practice areas.
• Limit the list to those findings that if left untreated could result 
in harm to the patient. Most of these will require a change in 
therapy.
• Recommend three discrete categories according to the maximum 
amount of time that should elapse before identification of a CTR.
• Defined by a three-tier system with color labels:
• Red Zone: Patient is in imminent danger of death, significant 
morbidity, or serious adverse consequences if treatment is not 
initiated immediately. Requires immediate clinical response
• Orange Zone: A significant abnormality that requires rapid, but 
not immediate, attention. Not a clinical emergency
• Yellow Zone: Test results that indicate a significant abnormality 
that my threaten life or cause significant morbidity, complica-
tions, or serious adverse consequences unless diagnosis and 
treatment is initiated in a timely manner. No immediate 
threat to life
 4. When should the results be provided?
• Red: within 1  hour—requires “stat” page and immediate 
acknowledgment
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• Orange: within the shift (6–8 hours)
• Yellow: within 3 days
 5. How is the provider notified?
• Describe explicit steps in notification system; when reporters 
should initiate and follow up on notifying the ordering provider.
• Use direct person-to-person call to provider, not secretary or 
other intermediary. (A backup call to a nurse may also be 
advisable.)
• Develop a fail-safe plan for communicating CTR when ordering 
or covering provider cannot be contacted within the time frame.
• Ensure 100% acknowledgment for every test result on the list, i.e., 
that the sender has received confirmation from the responsible 
recipient that they have received the report. Caller must know that 
a responsible party has the information—for all three priorities.
 6. Establish a shared policy for uniform communication of all types of 
test results to all recipients:
• Use the same policy regarding definitions and time windows 
across all domains.
• Encourage and foster shared accountability and teamwork across 
and between clinical disciplines.
• Decide what information should be included in the report.
 7. How to design reliability into the system:
• Use forcing functions at point of ordering to identify the order-
ing provider.
• Use forcing functions at point of ordering to include a minimum 
of information to support the interpretation of results.
• Create tracking systems to assure timely and reliable 
communication.
 8. How to support and maintain systems:
• Partner with patients in the communication of test results.
• Provide orientation and ongoing education on procedures for 
communicating CTR to all health providers.
• Provide ongoing monitoring of the effectiveness of the sys-
tems—weekly failure rates, response times, etc.
Adapted from Ref [13], Table 3
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Chapter 9
When the IOM Speaks: IOM Quality 
of Care Committee and Report
On July 7, 1998, I received an invitation from the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) to become a member of the Committee on Quality of Health 
Care in America. The Committee, chaired by Bill Richardson of the 
Kellogg Foundation, was an outgrowth of an IOM Roundtable on 
Quality of Care, chaired by Mark Chassin and Robert Galvin.
I was initially reluctant. I had been on several IOM committees by 
then. Although the quality of their work was impressive, it took a lot 
of time, and few of the reports seemed to have wide circulation or 
impact. I called them “shelf research.” I wasn’t sure I wanted to par-
ticipate in another.
However, when the staff person calling, Molla Donaldson, told me 
who else was on the committee—a veritable who’s who of quality and 
policy leadership—I decided to join, if for no other reason than to get 
to know some people whom I admired. I didn’t realize at the time that 
medical error would be a key focus and that I was a key resource for 
that. And I certainly had no inkling how much of an impact our work 
would ultimately have. “Shelf research” indeed!
The IOM Committee on Quality of Health Care in America took its 
origin from a series of efforts over the previous decade that docu-
mented serious problems in healthcare quality. These included a 
steady stream of research from RAND showing major quality of care 
shortcomings, the report from the Presidential Advisory Commission 
on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry [1], 
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the findings of the IOM National Roundtable on Health Care Quality 
[2], and the Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly Review of evidence of 
poor quality of healthcare [3].
The Presidential Advisory Commission, appointed by the Clinton 
administration in 1997 and co-chaired by Donna Shalala, secretary of 
Health and Human Services, and Alexis Herman, secretary of the 
Department of Labor, had special weight. The president was con-
cerned about healthcare and especially about the quality implications 
of “managed care,” and he appointed a blue-ribbon committee that 
included consumers, representatives from business, labor, healthcare 
providers, health plans, state and local governments, and healthcare 
quality experts, to insure broad input.
The Advisory Commission’s 1998 report, “Quality First: Better 
Healthcare for All Americans,” brought together the evidence for 
quality problems and the broad consensus for reform [1]. It concluded 
that quality problems were pervasive and by no means confined to 
managed care systems. The report was aimed at Congress and policy-
makers in Washington and made clear recommendations, including a 
call for a “Patient Bill of Rights,” which the Clinton administration 
enacted. Otherwise, even though it got a lot of attention, the report 
resulted in little action.
Enter Steve Schroeder, president of the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation (RWJ). Deeply concerned about the quality of healthcare 
and anxious to capitalize on the growing pressure for action, Schroeder 
consulted with Ken Shine, president of the IOM, about moving ahead. 
Shine was enthusiastic. RWJ gave two million dollars to the IOM to 
establish the Quality of Care in America Committee. Shine took the 
unusual step of putting in additional funds from the IOM. Normally, 
IOM projects were commissioned and funded by Congress or an 
Executive Branch Agency.
To secure strong leadership, Shine reached out to Bill Richardson, 
president and CEO of the Kellogg Foundation, to serve as the chair 
and Janet Corrigan, executive director of the President’s Advisory 
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality (which was com-
ing to a close), to serve as the project director.
As the project was beginning to take shape, two issues became 
clear. First, it should “pick up the baton” from the earlier work. Toward 
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this end, the committee was populated with some of the experts who 
had served on the earlier IOM Roundtable and the President’s Advisory 
Commission.
Second, it would be important to obtain a much deeper understand-
ing of why earlier efforts had fallen on deaf ears and to identify ways 
to overcome what appeared to be communication barriers.
Accordingly, one of the first activities it undertook was to convene 
a workshop of people from print and broadcast media and pose the 
question of how to most effectively get public attention to quality 
information. Their advice was to keep it simple – things that people 
can understand – and to frame the issue in terms of a victim and a vil-
lain. The obvious candidate: patient safety. Just as plane accidents are 
understandable, so are medical mishaps. The victims are people just 
like us; and there was a villain: a defective health care system.
A focus on safety might also enlist the support of the medical pro-
fession, which had become defensive about efforts to improve quality. 
When challenged, doctors would typically counter with “My patients 
are different.” Perhaps shifting the focus to defective systems would 
bring them aboard.
Safety had another appeal: a movement to do something about it 
was already underway. The Annenberg Conference had been con-
vened 2 years earlier, sponsored by the AMA, The Joint Commission, 
and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The 
AMA had created the National Patient Safety Foundation, The Joint 
Commission had strengthened its sentinel events reporting system, 
and Don Berwick’s IHI had conducted a collaborative aimed at reduc-
ing medication errors.
a b c
(a) Steve Schroeder, (b) Ken Shine, and (c) Janet Corrigan. (All rights reserved)
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The safety problem had been defined, and efforts to change systems 
had begun. Despite this, most Americans, and most medical profes-
sionals, were still unaware and uninvolved. This was a big opportu-
nity to do something about that.
So it was decided that the Quality of Care in America Committee 
would focus on both quality and safety but lead with safety to get 
public and political attention. Two subcommittees were formed: one 
on the environment of healthcare (which focused on patient safety) 
and the other on structure (which David Lawrence, head of Kaiser 
Permanente, had nicknamed the “chassis”). The committees would 
meet separately and together. I was on the environment subcommit-
tee, chaired by Chris Bisgard, director, Health Services, Delta Air 
Lines, and Molly Joel Coye of the Lewin Group. Don Berwick chaired 
the “chassis” one. Don and Dave Lawrence were on both. The first 
meeting was September 28. Members of the committee are listed in 
Appendix 9.1.
At the January 1999 meeting of subcommittee on the environ-
ment, we focused on reporting of medical errors. Charles Billings, 
architect of the aviation reporting system, told us that reporting sys-
tems don’t work unless they are safe, simple, and productive. Safe: 
the reporter must not be at risk of losing their job or being disci-
plined for reporting a mistake they have made. Simple: people will 
not report if the process is too complicated (a long form) or takes 
too much time. Productive: reporting must lead to a response by the 
organization to address the issue reported. If nothing happens after 
people report, they lose interest and stop reporting. We would 
embrace these concepts in the final report’s recommendations for 
reporting.
At the February meeting of the whole committee, Don Berwick led 
a discussion of values. He presented six “Aims for Improvement” that 
he had proposed at an earlier “chassis” committee meeting in Woods 
Hole: that care should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, effi-
cient, and equitable. The aims resonated with all and were quickly 
embraced. They became the centerpiece of the recommendations in 
the final report, Crossing the Quality Chasm.
Berwick’s six aims have proved not only to be most memorable 
part of the report but also the most powerful. Easily understood, intui-
tively important, and actionable, they became the framework for 
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thinking about and acting on quality improvement that has motivated 
practice and research for more than 20 years.
At the March 18 joint meeting of the subcommittees, Berwick pre-
sented another organizing concept: the “Chain of Effect” model that 
shows the relationships among patient and community/microsystem/
organization/environment (policy). Don explained the microsystems 
concept: It is the level—hospital unit or office—where care is given.
Jim Reinertson, CEO of Minnesota HealthPartners, noted that doc-
tors often think they are held accountable as individuals for harm that 
is actually caused by systems failures. He urged that we not pit profes-
sionalism against systems but join them together. All agreed that com-
plexity is a big cause of errors.
We also agreed that we needed better definitions of safety and sys-
tems; many are too theoretical. Berwick noted that “standards” can 
mean three different things: performance standards (desired or 
expected results), process standards (the agreed way to do things), and 
measures (such as the “standard kilogram”). All are important, but we 
needed to explain and distinguish among them.
In April we held a communications workshop. This content-filled 
meeting was designed both to bring the committee up to date on tech-
nological advances and to get advice on how to communicate our 
findings. Bob Blendon reminded us that the best way to influence the 
public is to combine a personal case of harm with a villain and a 
solution.
We agreed that we had to get the public aroused to get the system 
to change. The definition of poor quality for many people was that 
your HMO is not letting you get the care you think you need. Some 
noted that the problem isn’t communication, but it is whether the 
institution responds or doesn’t. What is our overall strategy for 
improving quality? What is our media strategy for making that happen?
Other guest speakers talked about the role of new technologies, 
such as computerized physician order entry and computerized patient 
records. I will never forget Joe Scherger’s comments. Joe was a pri-
mary care doctor who was also associate dean for clinical affairs, at 
UC Irvine. He made a brief but powerful talk that he summarized by 
saying that there was one simple thing a physician could do that would 
simultaneously save time, improve communication, and improve 
patient satisfaction: “Give your patients your email address.” 
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Reflecting on this as a patient 20 years later, I am struck both with 
how true it is and how difficult it still seems to be for doctors to do it!
At the April meeting following the communications workshop, we 
developed the strategy for advancing our recommendations: (1) a 
broad-based communication strategy involving prominent figures, 
dissemination of credible data, and gaining access to policy-makers; 
(2) pressure for public-private-regulatory initiatives, such as quality 
of care forums, and (3) advocacy for building trust-building actions 
into healthcare, i.e., open communication when things go wrong.
I made the case for putting less emphasis on mandatory systems for 
reporting and greater emphasis on developing response systems, as 
recommended by Billings. For example, both USP and ISMP report-
ing systems identify risks related to naming, packaging, dosing, and 
use of medications, but the FDA and pharmaceutical industry are slow 
to respond or don’t so at all. State reporting systems are often 
“black holes.”
Don Berwick called for developing illustrative cases—how we do 
it now, how we should do it using the systems approach, and full root 
cause analysis. Chris Bisgard noted that the lack of a defibrillator in a 
single case of cardiac arrest on a Delta flight led airlines to install 
them on all planes, despite the fact that the cardiac arrest rate was 8 in 
50 million!
What policies do we want adopted? One person called for going 
after the 1% of doctors who are negligent by improving state board 
functioning. The Committee did not want to do that. We had an exten-
sive discussion about the advisability of having an FAA equivalent for 
healthcare. I came down strongly on the side of yes, but that proved to 
be a step too far for the committee. We did agree to press for a federal 
agency to oversee safety and to change the reimbursement system 
from pay for volume to pay for quality.
Our discussions were coming to a close. There would be two 
reports: one on safety and one on quality of care. The safety report 
would be aimed at a broad audience: both healthcare professionals 
and the general public. The report on quality (Crossing the Quality 
Chasm) would be targeted to healthcare professionals and would spell 
out the theoretical concepts and details of what was needed to improve 
quality of care overall, based on the six aims.
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The safety report would be published first since it would grab pub-
lic and professional attention with its shocking numbers and “victim, 
villain, solution.” Corrigan and her staff were nearing completion; 
drafts were circulated, and committee members made edits or rewrote 
substantial segments.
 To Err Is Human
The report was titled To Err Is Human [4]. It “made the case” for 
patient safety, explaining the science of error-making and the theoreti-
cal and practical evidence for human-factors-based systems changes. 
In many ways it was an expansion of the ideas set forth in my 1994 
paper, Error in Medicine, but it provided more detailed descriptions 
of methods and provided case studies to illustrate the points.
In addition to documenting the need for attention to the issue of 
patient safety, To Err Is Human explained the concept of using a sys-
tems approach based on human factors principles and proclaimed that 
application of this methodology could have a profound effect. It 
boldly called for a 50% reduction in medical harm in 5 years.
Specific recommendations were made to galvanize the healthcare 
industry into action to improve safety. The recommendations were 
nicely summarized in a later report of the Presidential Quality 
Interagency Task Force [5], excerpts from which I quote here, with 
my comments in italics:
Establish a Center for Patient Safety at the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) with responsibility for promoting the 
development of knowledge about errors and to encourage the sharing 
of strategies for reducing errors. The IOM committee recommends 
substantial budget increases over the next several years. (This was the 
most important recommendation. To move ahead in patient safety, we 
had to have central leadership and funding. Patient safety had to be a 
national priority.)
Promote voluntary and mandatory reporting of errors. First, the 
IOM recommends that voluntary reporting systems should focus on 
errors that result in little or no harm to patients and should be 
To Err Is Human
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encouraged by AHRQ. Second, a mandatory reporting system should 
be established to allow state governments to collect standardized 
information on adverse events resulting in death or serious harm. 
(Increased reporting was something everyone thought was important. 
I was not so sure. (See Chap. 17.) But the idea of having a voluntary 
system to spur improvement and a mandatory system for accountabil-
ity did make sense.)
Protect reporting systems from being used in litigation. The IOM 
urges Congress to pass legislation extending peer review protections 
to data related to patient safety and quality improvement that are col-
lected and analyzed by healthcare organizations for purposes of 
improving safety and quality. (We all agreed this was essential if we 
were ever to get people to talk about error in the current litigious 
environment.)
Make patient safety the focus of performance standards for health-
care organizations and professionals. Regulators and accreditors 
should require healthcare organizations to have meaningful patient 
safety programs. Purchasers are also encouraged to provide incentives 
for patient safety programs. The IOM suggests that professional 
licensing organizations periodically reexamine and relicense profes-
sionals based, in part, on their knowledge of patient safety.
Licensing organizations also need to develop more effective means 
of identifying unsafe practitioners and taking actions against them. It 
also suggests that professional societies should promote patient safety 
education. (This was our pitch that safety is everyone’s business. 
Healthcare organizations, professional societies, and regulators had 
to step up.)
Increase FDA attention to safety in pre- and post-market reviews of 
drugs. The IOM specifically suggests developing standards for safe 
packaging and labeling; testing of drug names to prevent sound-alike 
and look-alike errors; and working with doctors, pharmacists, and 
patients to identify and rectify problems in the post- marketing phase. 
(The failure of the FDA to do this was, we thought, unconscionable. 
They and the manufacturers knew these were problems and looked the 
other way. It was time to stop.)
Encourage healthcare organizations to make a commitment to 
improving patient safety and to implement safe medication practices. 
Healthcare organizations should develop a culture of safety and 
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implement nonpunitive systems for reporting and analyzing errors. 
These organizations should also follow recommendations for safe 
medication practices as published by professional and collaborative 
organizations interested in patient safety. (Of course! The culture had 
to change. Making that happen would turn out to be the major chal-
lenge, still unresolved (Chap. 23)).
Because the error report was expected to attract public interest and 
garner attention for the whole quality effort, chairman Richardson and 
staff director Corrigan decided that it should be released first, and the 
sooner the better. The report was scheduled to be released on 
Wednesday, December 1, 1999, so staff made an embargoed copy of 
the report available to elite media ahead of time and planned for a 
press conference on the 1st. Then things went awry.
On Monday afternoon, November 29, Don Berwick and I were 
called by IOM staff and asked to come to Washington immediately. A 
major television network had decided to break the embargo and go 
with the story on that night’s news. The other networks quickly found 
out, so all of them were going to be doing the story that evening. The 
IOM decided to release the report immediately but wanted Don and 
me to come down for interviews on these national networks that 
evening.
It was a bit of a circus. I was sent to one network and Don to another, 
and then we each went to a second. It was hot news, but fortunately 
the stories were reasonably faithful, and the interviews were on point 
and not over-sensationalized. What got attention was the estimate that 
there were up to 98,000 preventable deaths a year due to medical 
errors. That number also headlined the newspaper stories the next day. 
In all fairness, the news reports did note that these errors and deaths 
were due to systems failures, but most viewers and readers were so 
stunned by 98,000 that it was lost in the uproar.
The 98,000 number was actually a last minute extrapolation that 
Janet Corrigan made by updating to the present the number of pre-
ventable deaths estimated by the Medical Practice Study 9 years ear-
lier, which was over 120,000 [6]. In the interim, thanks to managed 
care and other cost-cutting measures, the number of patients hospital-
ized had dropped considerably. One could argue that these were sicker 
patients, so the number of injuries might not have dropped propor-
tionately, but no matter, 98,000 was shocking enough.
To Err Is Human
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The IOM had never seen anything like it. As I later noted in a NEJM 
editorial, “The speed and intensity with which the IOM report cap-
tured media, public, political, and professional attention surprised 
everyone. Neither the shocking statistics nor its central message, that 
errors are caused by faulty systems, was new, but the report forcefully 
brought them to public awareness.” [7] In talks about the report later I 
would parody a financial house ad, “When researchers speak, no one 
listens, when the IOM speaks, everyone listens.”
In truth, they hadn’t listened to the IOM much before, either, of 
course, but this was different. To Err Is Human was by far the most 
widely disseminated and commented on report ever issued by the 
IOM, a record that still stands 20 years later. A later survey showed 
that 51% of Americans were aware of the report, which was unprec-
edented. Skeptics have argued that we got so much coverage because 
it was a slow news day. While that may be true, it was also true that 
the message was powerful and touched everyone. If the timing was 
good luck, fine. The cause deserved it!
Within days, Congress scheduled hearings, and president Clinton 
formed the Quality Interagency Task Force—headed, fortunately, by 
John Eisenberg, administrator of the newly formed Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)—to analyze the report and 
make recommendations. The administration—the president, secretary 
Shalala, and Chris Jennings, the health policy advisor—all wanted to 
do something, so they acted quickly in response.
The formation of the Task Force was announced by the president at 
a press conference in the Rose Garden. A number of us were invited 
to attend. I remember well the tingle that went up my spine, and I gave 
a silent “Hooray!” when I heard the president of the USA mouth our 
mantra: “It’s not bad people, it’s bad systems.” Sixty days later, when 
the Task Force made its recommendations [5], the president called on 
all federal health agencies to implement the IOM recommendations. 
The IOM had accomplished an unprecedented act of agenda setting.
The report’s shocking numbers and the recognition that errors are 
caused by faulty systems came from our earlier work, but the IOM 
report brought them to public and policy-makers attention in a way 
that those of us devoted to patient safety had been unable to do. Of 
course I was delighted. As the patient safety expert member of the 
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IOM committee, it fell to me to be a lead spokesperson for the IOM 
and an unprecedented opportunity to influence public policy.
The Annenberg Conference in 1996 brought the research and advo-
cacy communities together for the first time to focus on patient safety, 
but it was the IOM report that brought it to the attention of the public 
and the medical profession.
The IOM report started the patient safety movement.
 Postscript
Fallout from the IOM report was not all positive. Predictably, many 
physicians took umbrage. They were insulted by what they saw as the 
implication they were not doing their job properly. A number began to 
question the numbers. I found this particularly ironic, since none of 
these objections had been raised 9 years earlier when we published 
the MPS results. In fact, we were very disappointed at the time with 
the paucity of reactions!
Over the next year or two, multiple papers were published “prov-
ing” our numbers were inflated. We knew, of course, that they were 
underestimates (see Chap. 1). In fact, ultimately a number of later 
studies corroborated that, revealing adverse event rates that were 2–4 
times what we found [8–11].
Several of the negative papers deserve comment. One from the VA 
“reanalyzed” our data (without consulting us) and claimed that most 
of the people who died would have died anyway [12]. Leaving aside 
the methodologic errors behind this conclusion, its moral repugnancy 
seemed to have escaped the authors: the implication that it’s all right 
to make fatal mistakes on seriously ill patients!
A more interesting assault came from Clem McDonald and col-
leagues at the University of Indiana who also “reanalyzed” our data—
again without consulting us—using our screening criteria as risk 
factors to calculate “excess mortality.” [13] The fallacy of this 
approach was so obvious that I was surprised that JAMA would pub-
lish it. To its credit, the editor asked me to comment and put the two 
papers in the “Controversies” section.
I explained why screening criteria cannot be used as risk factors: 
Risk factors are characteristics that increase the likelihood of a future 
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outcome; e.g., the presence of diabetes increases the likelihood of 
developing a myocardial infarct. Screening criteria are indicators of 
an outcome that has already occurred. A myocardial infarction indi-
cates that a patient could have diabetes, but it does not prove it or 
cause the diabetes. Risk factors look to the future, and screening fac-
tors examine the past [14].
Sadly, their paper also looked at “excess” mortality. I rebutted this 
directly with the analysis from our study that 86% of the preventable 
deaths occurred in patients who were not terminal and for whom the 
error was the major factor leading to their deaths.
An interesting sidebar to this discussion was that Katie Couric of 
NBC’s Today decided to interview the two of us on TV. I told her that 
I was on vacation in Vermont and could not come to New York. No 
problem: they sent the TV crew to us and interviewed me in our living 
room in Newfane, VT!
I took some delight in catching her and McDonald unawares by 
opening my remarks with praise for his work as a pioneer in the appli-
cation of computers to medicine. My compliment was sincere: Clem 
had made significant contributions. The look on Katie’s face was 
priceless. I then went on to say that in this case unfortunately he was 
wrong and explained the difference between risk factors and screen-
ing criteria. I don’t remember what Clem said, but I came away feel-
ing we won that one.
But the critique that hurt came from my colleague and co-author of 
the MPS, Troy Brennan. Troy was not enamored of my work on error, 
particularly disclosure. He firmly believed that it would lead to more 
malpractice suits. In a paper in The New England Journal of Medicine, 
he took aim at the IOM report’s preventability numbers, which were 
derived from our study! [15] He debunked our conclusions, asserting 
that we had not asked about error in the MPS, which was not true [16]. 
Whether this was intentional or an honest mistake, I don’t know. What 
saddened me, though, was that he never discussed it with me or gave 
me—his co-author on the study—an opportunity ahead of time to 
review his paper. I first learned about it when I read my copy of NEJM.
I spoke to the editor, Marcia Angell, about the fact that the paper 
included a falsehood and asked her to publish my rebuttal. She refused, 
suggesting instead that I submit a letter to the editor! Before doing so, 
I consulted with Bill Richardson, chair of the IOM committee, and we 
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agreed that I should write the response, but it would have greater 
impact coming from the committee. We pointed out the error and also 
why our estimate of the number of preventable injuries was not an 
exaggeration [17].
After this flurry of debunking reports in 2000, the academic chatter 
quieted down, and the serious effort to make healthcare safe began. 
The problem was, unhappily, worse than our numbers had indicated. 
But the IOM report got us moving.
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Chapter 10
The Government Responds: 
The Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality
When the IOM report started the patient safety movement by convert-
ing the safety interest of a few into the concern of the many, those who 
wished to enter this emerging field had little to work with: few mea-
sures, few proven safe practices, and few standards. For the patient 
safety movement to blossom in the ways envisioned by the IOM, a 
substantial amount of foundational work would be necessary. Only 
the government could provide the resources that were needed to 
accomplish this work.
Fortunately—amazingly, actually—the federal government was 
ready and willing to provide those resources, thanks to the recent 
work by John Eisenberg, director of the Agency for Healthcare Policy 
and Research (AHCPR) and his team. The Agency had been through 
a tough patch. Commissioned in 1989 to conduct health services 
research and develop practice guidelines, it did just that under it first 
director, Jarrett Clinton, a career PHS bureaucrat. But it lost many of 
its supporters in Congress in 1994 when the Republicans gained con-
trol of both the House and the Senate on a pledge to broadly reduce 
government: the Contract with America. The federal budget for FY 
1996 became the focus of an extraordinarily contentious battle 
between the administration and Congress.
The Agency was caught in the crosshairs. It was linked to the failed 
Clinton health reform initiative, to which it had supplied data, and its 
effort to develop practice guidelines was unpopular with many 
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physicians. Worse, its guidelines program had been criticized as being 
ineffective by the GAO, PPRC, and OTA.
The proverbial “straw” was when the Agency issued a guideline for 
spine surgery that concluded that there was no evidence to support 
spinal fusion to treat back pain. Their integrity and pocketbooks chal-
lenged, the orthopedists lobbied fiercely to curtail the agency. Enough 
Congressmen had had back operations or philosophically agreed that 
the government had no business dictating practice, that they set out to 
eliminate the agency by reducing its funding to zero.
The House Budget Committee under Rep. John Kasich (R-OH) 
made AHCPR a symbol of waste and put the agency’s name on its “hit 
list” of 140 discretionary programs to be eliminated [1]. Rep Sam 
Johnson of Texas mocked it as “the Agency for High Cost Publications 
and Research.” [2] The joint House-Senate committee conference 
report in June 1996 called for complete elimination of the agency’s 
funding.
By then, Donna Shalala, secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), had replaced Jarrett Clinton with Cliff Gaus, the highly 
respected former head of the Association for Health Services Research 
(AHSR). Gaus went on a campaign to save the Agency. He listened to 
insurers, hospitals, doctors, and consumers and reframed its agenda to 
dissemination of guidelines rather than development through a new 
National Guidelines Clearinghouse to coordinate private sector 
guidelines.
He partnered with clinical and professional leaders to create the 
Quality Measures Clearinghouse and enlisted the Health Insurance 
Association of America (HIAA), the AMA, the Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC), and the American Association 
of Health Plans (AAHP) to put their lobbyists to work on Congress 
for support [3].
The strategy worked, although at a price. In the final appropriations 
bill, the agency ended up with an appropriation of $125 million, a 21 
percent cut from FY 1995. The Agency was directed to stop develop-
ing practice guidelines, but it survived. By this time, Gaus had had 
enough. He believed it was time for a physician to direct the Agency. 
He recommended John Eisenberg to Shalala, noting that in addition to 
his superb professional qualifications, he was also her personal physi-
cian [3].
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Shalala agreed. She was determined to improve quality of care and 
realized that patient safety could be the wedge. Interest in safety was 
rising as the result of our research showing the high rate of prevent-
able harm and the efforts of the AAAS and the NPSF. She thought 
John was just the person to launch a new effort. And, indeed he was.
Eisenberg brought new stature and an impressive set of strengths to 
the job. He was a nationally known health services researcher who 
was chairman of the Department of Medicine and physician in chief 
at Georgetown University, an IOM member, and a former AHSR pres-
ident. Having chaired the Physician Payment Review Commission 
(PPRC) for several years, he had developed trusting relationships with 
key staff on both sides of the aisle. As a physician he brought increased 
legitimacy to the agency on matters pertaining to clinical care. He was 
by consensus both brilliant and politically skilled [3].
For John, it was a dream job. It would enable him to leverage his 
knowledge and skills on the national stage—if he could get 
Congressional support. Shalala promised to “have his back.” He set to 
work to rebuild the political stature of the Agency on the Hill, shoring 
up relationships with HHS and members of Congress on both sides of 
the aisle. He brought in Gregg Meyer to head up the Center for Quality 
Measurement and Improvement and Nancy Foster as coordinator.
John Eisenberg. (Picture courtesy 
of the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality. All rights 
reserved)     
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The battle for survival over, the stage was set for moving ahead. In 
early 1997, the president had established the Advisory Commission 
on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry and 
appointed Shalala and labor secretary Herman as co-chairs [4]. In 
response to its report in 1998, the president established an umbrella 
organization to coordinate administration efforts to improve quality: 
the Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QuIC), led by 
Eisenberg and co-chaired by Shalala and Herman. In addition to 
AHCPR, QuIC included HHS and the Departments of Labor, Veterans 
Affairs, Defense, and Commerce [5].
In 1998 the tide in Congress turned when Gingrich left the speaker-
ship in disgrace. Gaus’ efforts had persuaded Congress of the impor-
tance of patient safety and the need for its support. The Agency was 
working with Congress to change its name and mission before the 
IOM report came out. As a result, a week later, on December 6, 1999, 
Congress passed the Healthcare Research and Quality Act of 1999 [6] 
that amended Title IX of the Public Health Service Act to replace 
AHCPR with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
Not only did this act get rid of the hated 10-year-old AHCPR, but it 
greatly expanded the Agency’s role in patient safety, calling on it to 
“conduct and support research and build private-public partnerships 
to: 1) identify the causes of preventable health care errors and patient 
injury in health care delivery, 2) develop, demonstrate, and evaluate 
strategies for reducing errors and improving patient safety; and 3) dis-
seminate such effective strategies throughout the health care indus-
try.” [7] It was an incredibly farsighted mandate and a remarkable 
boon for the cause. In retrospect, it was extraordinary that Congress 
would designate an agency to focus on patient safety—and fund it.
 Response to the IOM Report
The IOM report in late 1999 changed everything. Within days of its 
release, president Clinton called on QuIC to analyze the report and 
make recommendations. Thanks to the amount of planning that John 
and his colleagues had done before the report came out, just 60 days 
later, in early 2000, the Task Force issued its report, Doing What 
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Counts for Patient Safety: Federal Actions to Reduce Medical Errors 
and their Impact, which made more than 100 recommendations for 
federal entities to address safety issues [8].
Doing What Counts was a blueprint for moving ahead in patient 
safety. Its recommendations were directed at all government depart-
ments. It called on AHRQ to take immediate action to establish the 
Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety (CQuIPS)9 and 
for AHRQ, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), and VA to cooperate on research on 
errors, reporting systems, and applied research on patient safety. 
CQuIPS was called on to build a national system of errors reporting, 
promote the development and dissemination of evidence-based patient 
safety practices, and develop patient safety questions for inclusion in 
the patient experience survey, Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (CAHPS).
The National Quality Forum (NQF) was asked to define within 
12 months a set of egregious errors that are preventable and should 
never occur. All federal agencies providing healthcare were directed 
to develop systems to identify and report and learn from errors. The 
Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA), which paid for Medicare, 
was called on to promote the use of error-reduction initiatives by 
healthcare institutions and to require hospitals participating in the 
Medicare Program to implement medical error reduction programs.
The FDA was to develop standards for proprietary drug names and 
for packaging and labels to prevent dosing and drug mix-ups. The VA 
was asked to invest $47.6 million to increase patient safety training 
for staff, and the Department of Defense (DoD) was directed to invest 
$64 million in FY 2001 to implement a new computerized medical 
record system.
The scope was breathtaking. Healthcare had never seen anything 
like it.
Shalala asked Eisenberg to brief the president on the report. When 
he did, he found that Clinton had not only read the entire report but 
understood it. He asked John whether it was possible, as the IOM 
report challenged, for healthcare to reduce preventable deaths by 50% 
in 5 years. John said yes, or even in 2 years or 1 year—because hospi-
tals would manipulate their measures to make it appear that happened. 
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Such a requirement would divert their attention from improvement to 
measures. The president saw the wisdom of his answer, publicly 
approved the report, and called on all federal health agencies to imple-
ment the Task Force recommendations.
Congress did its part and appropriated an additional $50 million to 
the Agency for patient safety research. This single act was crucial to 
building a cadre of researchers to perform the scientific studies needed 
to advance the field. It would help establish patient safety as an aca-
demic discipline with papers published in the leading journals. It did, 
in fact, have that effect. Within 2 years, 81 grants were awarded and 
100 s of researchers were working on patient safety issues. Without 
this federal support, research in patient safety would have been slow 
in coming and spotty at best. It was a foundational initiative.
John Eisenberg was the driving force behind this reinvigorated 
Agency. His vision of a safer future and how to get there attracted to 
the Agency an exceptional group of leaders: Gregg Meyer, Carolyn 
Clancy, and Nancy Foster, among others, who were motivated to get 
these programs going. Clancy had directed the Outcomes Center at 
AHCPR prior to the change. They and others who worked at or with 
AHRQ, or were funded by it, became the first generation of people 
who made safety their careers. More than any other person, John 
Eisenberg helped establish patient safety as a science, as a practice, 
and as an imperative.
Tragically, John could not see the effort through. He died from a 
brain tumor in early 2002, just as his efforts were beginning to pay 
off. To honor John’s memory, the NQF and The Joint Commission 
established the John M. Eisenberg annual awards in patient safety that 
recognize exceptional contributions by individuals and organizations 
to the advance of patient safety.
Carolyn Clancy took over as director and expanded AHRQ’s activi-
ties and influence as the major force advancing patient safety. She put 
emphasis on working strategically with multiple stakeholders—hos-
pitals, health plans, federal and private systems, and patients and fam-
ilies—to actually make changes to make healthcare safer. Patient 
advocates were added to the National Advisory Council. The CAHPS 
Hospital Survey (HCAHPS) was launched in collaboration with the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Proposals were 
10 The Government Responds: The Agency for Healthcare…
149
made to link malpractice reforms with improvement in disclosure, 
apology, and compensation.
The breadth and depth of AHRQ activities in patient safety are 
awesome. In addition to funding research, it carries out evaluations of 
evidence, develops and standardizes safety measures and indicators, 
develops and maintains surveys, trains patient safety specialists, edu-
cates the profession and the public, and provides tools for healthcare 
organizations to improve safety.
AHRQ has played a critical role in establishing the field of patient 
safety. A full description of all of AHRQ’s programs would require 
several volumes. What follows is a brief summary of its initial pro-
grams in patient safety. Much of this information comes from the 
AHRQ website, ahrq.gov, and AHRQ’s 10-year report, Advancing 
Patient Safety: A Decade of Evidence, Design and Implementation 
[7], also on the AHRQ website.
 AHRQ Programs
The Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety 
(CQuIPS) In 1998, prior to the post-IOM reorganization, AHCPR 
created a center for quality improvement to bring together agencies 
within HHS to collaborate on improving quality of care and coordi-
nate support for research. Eisenberg expanded this to include patient 
safety, renamed it, and brought in Gregg Meyer to organize it. Meyer 
hired Jim Battles to run the research grants program.
CQuIPS supports investigator-initiated research on patient safety, 
measurement, and reporting. It “develops and disseminates reports 
and information on health care quality measurement, reporting, and 
improvement, collaborates with stakeholders … to implement evi-
dence-based practices, accelerating and amplifying improvements in 
quality and safety for patients.” [9] CQuIPS is also responsible for 
CAHPS and WebM&M (see below). The Center has been the clearly 
identifiable part of government devoted to patient safety.
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
(CAHPS) This survey initiative began in 1995, before the Agency 
AHRQ Programs
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became involved in patient safety, in response to the recognition that 
quality of care issues that are important to consumers, such as com-
munication skills of providers and ease of access to healthcare, were 
often overlooked. The obvious way to find out about them was to ask 
patients. The Agency began to fund, oversee, and work closely with a 
consortium of research organizations to conduct research on patient 
experience and develop the survey.
The survey has since been expanded to ask patients to evaluate their 
experiences with health plans, providers, and healthcare facilities 
regarding care coordination, shared decision-making, and patient 
engagement. The survey is now widely used by healthcare organiza-
tions, health plans, purchasers, consumer groups, and accreditation 
organizations to evaluate providers and improve quality and safety of 
care. It has been a major factor in teaching clinicians and hospitals to 
be more aware of patient’s concerns and to engage them more mean-
ingfully in their care. It has magnified their voice.
Patient Safety Indicators (PSI) What everyone wants—CMS, pol-
icy-makers, hospitals, and the public—is an overall measure of safety. 
How bad is it? Are we getting better? But there was no such measure, 
nor even a set of standardized measures that the nation or a healthcare 
organization could use to identify its safety problems. However, CMS 
and other payers required hospitals to use ICD-9 billing codes for 
specific harmful events, such as infections, pressure ulcers, surgical 
complications, falls, CLABSI rates, etc. Why couldn’t hospitals use 
this “administrative” data to assess and improve their performance?
Under Gregg Meyer’s direction, AHRQ created a list of 20 patient 
safety indicators using billing codes. To develop an overall score, they 
calculated a weight for each based on national data on risk, reliability 
of the measure, and extent of harm. The hospital could monitor the 
rate of each indicator, multiply it by its weight, and sum the values to 
get an overall measure of safety in the institution. While incomplete—
all safety risks were not measured—it was better than nothing and 
would help hospitals know where to focus their safety efforts.
When the PSIs were released in 2001, AHRQ made it clear that the 
indicators were designed only for hospitals’ internal use for improve-
ment: to “provide information on potentially avoidable safety 
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events …that can be used to help hospitals assess the incidence of 
adverse events and identify issues that might need further study.” [7]
It was not to be. Despite these caveats, CMS and other payers began 
to use them not only to assess hospitals performance, but to reduce 
payments if they were deficient. Suddenly PSIs were viewed not as 
tools for improvement, but as instruments of punishment—a complete 
inversion of what we were trying to do in patient safety.
The patient safety community was appalled. Hospitals quickly 
directed their efforts away from improvement to coding of claims, 
“gaming” the data to minimize penalties. This was exactly what 
Eisenberg had told the president would happen if hospitals were 
required to reduce preventable mortality by 50% in 5 years. In the end 
PSIs may have done more harm than good over the years. Meyer 
agrees. He considers them “the worst thing I ever did” at AHRQ.
Evidence-Based Practices Even in these early days, there were a 
number of established safe practices available. Which should health-
care organizations use? Which safe practices were effective? The 
newly established standard setter, the National Quality Forum, needed 
to know, so it turned to AHRQ.  The Agency commissioned an 
Evidence-Based Practices group at the University of California at San 
Francisco (UCSF), led by Bob Wachter and Kaveh Shojania, to review 
the evidence and report in 6 months.
Many of us were looking forward to the report, so when it appeared, 
it was a shocker to find that only a small number of practices were 
found to have evidence of effectiveness, and most of those with the 
highest ratings were rarely used or fairly esoteric. These practices 
received high marks because someone had done a randomized con-
trolled trial (RCT) of their effectiveness. Most of the safe practices in 
widespread use were not on the list because they had not been sub-
jected to RCTs. The UCSF group had done what they were asked to 
do: follow the evidence. However, the evidence came from studies 
that individuals did because of their interest in a specific practice, not 
because it prevented many errors or was in widespread use [10].
David Bates, Don Berwick, and I were concerned that this would 
send the wrong message that practices without evidence should be 
abandoned, so we crafted a critique that was published in JAMA: 
What practices will most improve safety? Evidence-based medicine 
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meets patient safety [11]. JAMA published it together with the authors 
rebuttal: Safe but sound: patient safety meets evidence-based medi-
cine [12] as part of a point-counterpoint analysis to help readers 
understand the types of evidence needed to support use of a new 
practice.
Our major point was that the many accepted safe practices in cur-
rent use should not be abandoned just because they had never been 
subjected to a controlled trial, as required in the review. (The standing 
joke about RCTs is that no one had ever done a randomized trial of the 
effectiveness of parachutes!) Handwashing, read-back, site marking, 
and unit dosing, for example, were practices without evidence that 
were clearly of value and should not be abandoned.
The paper was written both to reassure those working on the “front 
lines” of safety in hospitals and to serve as a resource for the NQF 
Safe Practices Steering Committee. It seems to have been of some 
value to both. The Safe Practices criteria were expanded to include 
experiential evidence of effectiveness. The final NQF list included 34 
approved safe practices [13].
WebM&M To engage and inform physicians, AHRQ initiated 
WebM&M, using the familiar format of mortality and morbidity 
rounds to make available analysis of real-world medical error cases 
by experts, monthly. Edited by Bob Wachter, founder of the hospital-
ist specialty and later chair of the American Board of Internal 
Medicine, about a third of the cases are also developed as Spotlight 
Cases that are interactive learning modules for CME. This has proven 
to be one of the agencies most popular offerings.
Survey on Patient Safety Culture (SOPS) To support the develop-
ment of a culture of patient safety, AHRQ sponsored the development 
of patient safety culture assessment tools for hospitals, nursing homes, 
ambulatory outpatient medical offices, community pharmacies, and 
ambulatory surgery centers. These surveys enable healthcare organi-
zations to assess staff perceptions of various aspects of patient safety 
culture. They have played an important role in creating a culture 
of safety.
National Healthcare Quality and Disparities Report To justify 
funding, Congress wants to see results. Part of its 1999 mandate was 
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that AHRQ produce annual reports on healthcare quality and dispari-
ties. The quality reports present trends for access to care, affordable 
care, care coordination, effective treatment, healthy living, patient 
safety, and person-centered care. The disparities report provides com-
parative information according to race and ethnicity, income, and 
social determinants of health. These reports have helped keep patient 
safety on the agenda and motivate other agencies to work on safety.
Education and Training AHRQ has developed educational pro-
grams for practitioners in several areas. TeamSTEPPS® is a training 
program based on an evidence- based set of ready-to-use materials and 
curriculum to improve teamwork in healthcare organizations by teach-
ing communication and teamwork skills. The Patient Safety 
Improvement Corps (PSIC) is a partnership with the Department of 
Veterans Affairs to train midlevel professionals in investigation of 
medical errors and initiating improvements.
Advancing Pharmacy Health Literacy Practices Through Quality 
Improvement is a set of modules to help pharmacy faculty integrate 
health literacy and health literacy quality improvement into the educa-
tion of pharmacy students and residents.
Central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) were a 
serious cause of preventable injury and death. CLABSI Tools help care 
units implement evidence- based practices to eliminate central line-
associated bloodstream infections. The Comprehensive Unit-based 
a b c
(a) Carolyn Clancy, (b) Gregg Meyer, and (c) Bob Wachter. (All rights reserved) 
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Safety Program (CUSP) toolkit developed by Peter Pronovost’s team 
includes training tools to make care safer by improving the foundation 
of how physicians, nurses, and other clinical team members work 
together [14].
Several of these education and training programs have had substan-
tial impact. CLABSI Tools were used with the CUSP toolkit in a 
highly successful nationwide initiative led by Pronovost that dramati-
cally reduced CLABSI rates in more than 1000 hospitals across the 
country [15]. The Patient Safety Improvement Corps (PSIC) has 
trained teams in every state and has been a major force in disseminat-
ing patient safety knowledge throughout the country. TeamSTEPPS 
has trained 1000 master trainers who in turn train colleagues at their 
organizations. Almost every hospital now has a patient safety officer; 
many were trained in this program.
Patient Education AHRQ has published a number of guides for 
consumers, such as guides for what to do after leaving the hospital, 
use of blood thinners, diagnosis and treatment, and questions to ask 
your doctor.
Health Information Technology Suddenly, after only 3  years of 
supporting the full range of patient safety research, in 2003 Congress 
directed that AHRQ’s $50 million annual research funding be devoted 
to research in information technology. This was a shock because the 
unrestricted funding had been a powerful incentive for developing 
new knowledge and attracting new investigators to the field. Research 
is the coin of the realm in academia, and research gave our new field 
academic respectability. Our researchers’ papers were being pub-
lished and they were being promoted.
But the need for support of health IT was clear. Hospitals and doc-
tors were being required to implement electronic health records 
(EHRs) and were having serious problems. The funding resulted in 
hundreds of projects related to all aspects of implementation of health 
IT, and the staff made sure other projects were funded as well. In 
2004, AHRQ provided $139 million for more than 100 multi-year 
demonstration grants and contracts to promote the use of health infor-
mation technology.
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Patient Safety Network To enable healthcare providers and 
researchers, as well as administrators and patients, to keep up with 
and easily access the increasing “firehose” of data and patient safety 
information, AHRQ created a website, psnet.ahrq.gov, with the latest 
news, research, legislation, and tools for patient safety.
Healthcare-Associated Infections Network In 2008 Congress 
directed AHRQ to work with CDC and CMS to develop an action plan 
to reduce hospital-acquired infections (HAI). Several nonprofit orga-
nizations joined what became a major national effort and one of the 
most successful patient safety campaigns. The reductions in HAI as a 
result of this program account for a significant share of safety improve-
ment over the past 10 years.
Patient Safety Organizations From the beginning of the patient 
safety movement, one of the goals has been to develop national or 
regional reporting systems so hospitals could share medical error 
information and learn from each other’s mistakes. The IOM called for 
development of these voluntary systems, but it didn’t happen, in part 
because of hospitals’ fear that the information would be legally dis-
coverable and used to sue hospitals and doctors for malpractice.
To eliminate this liability and facilitate sharing of patient error data 
among hospitals, in 2005 Congress established Patient Safety 
Organizations (PSOs). Medical error information reported to PSO 
confidentially is protected from legal discovery. AHRQ also coordi-
nated the development of common definitions and reporting formats 
to standardize data collection. Since the law was passed, a number of 
PSOs have developed across the country. Their effectiveness varies, 
but some have been useful vehicles for sharing lessons learned.
 Impact of AHRQ Programs
As is obvious from the above, AHRQ has played an immense role in 
the development of all aspects of patient safety. It has given substance 
to “it’s not bad people, it’s bad systems”—in research, in practice, and 
in policy. It has been the main funder of patient safety research. It was 
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the prime mover developing a cadre of patient safety researchers and 
training hundreds of patient safety officers.
It furthered the development of measures and set standards for their 
use. It developed key surveys and large databases that provide the 
information upon which public policy and private improvement 
depend. It motivated other federal agencies, such as CMS and CDC, 
to become major players supporting patient safety.
To evaluate its national patient safety initiative in September 2002, 
AHRQ entered into a 4-year contract with the RAND Corporation. In 
2005 RAND published the first report [16]. It complimented the 
agency on “an impressive job in starting the patient safety initiative” 
that balanced research and translational and practice improvements. It 
specifically commended AHRQ for its work in support of epidemiol-
ogy research, development of effective practices and tools, building 
infrastructure, and achieving broader adoption of effective practices.
Given its crucial role—and incredible success—it is disturbing and 
puzzling that funding for AHRQ has always been somewhat precari-
ous. The support for research has never been adequate: large numbers 
of excellent proposals go unfunded each year. The sudden shift of 
research funding to IT mandated by Congress in the early years has 
been followed periodically by other requirements to target its efforts 
to areas of Congressional interest at the time.
As Gray observed, AHRQ’s political problems are three-dimen-
sional. Congress is willing to support basic research, as it does with 
NIH, only if it believes the long- term result will be new ways of pre-
venting or treating disease. AHRQ’s results so far have apparently not 
been sufficiently convincing. Second, when the Agency produces 
work that affects healthcare practice or policy, it attracts enemies who 
are vested in the status quo (recall the orthopedists and spine surgery). 
Third, the agency’s work is significant to many parties: policy-mak-
ers, decision-makers (providers, purchasers, patients), and research-
ers. They understandably have competing ideas about how the 
agency’s limited resources should be spent [3].
Thus, despite appeals from many health policy experts over the 
years to “billionize” the Agency, annual funding has remained in the 
$300–500 million range. Funding was gradually increased during the 
Obama years but then cut back by the current administration, which 
also discontinued several programs.
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To health policy experts, it seems obvious that AHRQ should 
become an institute as part of NIH, with annual funding at $1–2 bil-
lion level, which is less than that currently provided for several insti-
tutes for conditions that affect far fewer people and cause far fewer 
deaths. Surely, it is as important to fund research on how we deliver 
care as it is to fund research on what care we deliver. NIH has always 
enjoyed broad bipartisan and public support. If there were a National 
Institute for Quality and Safety, funding for patient safety would be 
adequate and secure. A reasonable hope.
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Chapter 11
Setting Standards: The National 
Quality Forum
When AHRQ assumed the responsibility from the Quality Interagency 
Coordination Task Force (QuIC) report, Doing What Counts for 
Patient Safety, to develop practice changes to reduce harm from medi-
cal errors, it faced two problems: there were few proven safe prac-
tices, and there was a dearth of standards by which to evaluate them. 
A standard setter was needed.
Fortuitously, a year earlier, the Advisory Commission on Consumer 
Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry had recommended 
an independent organization be created to standardize performance 
measures in healthcare by means of a public-private partnership. 
Under vice president Gore’s direction, QuIC advanced the idea of a 
national standard setter and took steps to establish the National Forum 
for Health Care Quality Measurement and Reporting, later renamed 
the “National Quality Forum” (NQF), “a broad-based, widely repre-
sentative private body that establishes standard quality measurement 
tools to help all purchasers, providers, and consumers of healthcare 
better evaluate and ensure the delivery of quality services.” [1]
The fledgling National Quality Forum flourished under the leader-
ship of Kenneth W. Kizer, once described by Don Berwick as “…prob-
ably the most effective leader in all of American healthcare.” Kizer 
was superbly well-equipped for the task. He was board certified in six 
medical specialties and had demonstrated his executive skills in sev-
eral important prior positions. An emergency physician who engi-
neered the statewide EMS system in California and a former US Navy 
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diver and diving medical officer, Kizer well understood systems and 
systems thinking. As an active outdoor sports enthusiast and founding 
member of the international Wilderness Medical Society, he also had 
a deep appreciation for safety and planning for the unexpected.
Earlier in his career, as director of the California Department of 
Health Services and the state’s top health official, Kizer orchestrated 
California’s response to the new HIV/AIDS epidemic, led a cigarette 
tax increase and smoking cessation program that reduced the rate of 
smoking in California three times faster than the rest of the nation, 
and pioneered Medicaid-managed care. In 1994, president Clinton 
appointed him undersecretary for health in the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) and chief executive officer of the VA healthcare system.
During his 5-year tenure at the helm of the VA healthcare system, 
Kizer radically transformed it, changing it from a hospital system to a 
truly integrated healthcare system that was rooted in primary care. He 
closed hospitals, reduced the total number of acute care hospital beds 
by some 55% (more than 29,000 beds), opened 300 new community-
based outpatient clinics, and hired the first healthcare system chief 
telehealth officer in the country. All well before the “medical home” 
concept had taken hold in the rest of healthcare.
He reorganized the whole VA healthcare system into 22 new 
regional “Veterans Integrated Service Networks” (VISNs) that typi-
cally consisted of 8–9 hospitals, 25–30 community-based outpatient 
clinics, 5–7 long-term care facilities, 10–15 counseling centers, and 1 
or 2 residential care facilities. Leaders of hospitals and clinics were 
proximately responsible to the network chiefs for providing quality 
care [2–4].
Kizer implemented multiple quality improvement changes that led 
to decreased death rates, a medication bar code system to check dose 
timings and reduce prescription errors, and a national formulary that 
resulted in savings of some $600 million annually. Customer service 
standards were implemented, and patient satisfaction surveys showed 
a growing percentage of veterans rated their quality of care as very 
good to excellent.
As a result of quality assurance measures, illness and death rates 
from high- volume surgical procedures declined. An observational 
study published in The New England Journal of Medicine found that 
the VA outscored Medicare’s fee for service program for the quality of 
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preventive, acute, and chronic care [5]. All while the number of veter-
ans served increased by 28% in 4 years. 
Despite these truly astonishing improvements in the quality and 
access to care for veterans that Kizer accomplished in an amazingly 
short time, political opposition developed, largely as the result of his 
hospital closings and downsizing. Congressional hearings for his 
reappointment were repeatedly delayed, although the Congress passed 
specific legislation extending his tenure at the end of his first term. 
Finally, after continuing political drama, Kizer had had enough, and 
motivated in large part by his wife’s serious and deteriorating health 
problems, he decided to leave VA.
After he resigned, BusinessWeek reported that the Veterans Affairs 
system provided “the best medical care in the US.” [6] It was a remark-
able transformation of a healthcare system that previously had often 
been regarded with distain by doctors and laymen alike. The Harvard 
Business Review characterized Kizer’s work at VA as the largest and 
most successful healthcare turnaround in US history.
But the Clinton administration was not about to let Kizer go. Vice 
president Gore’s office reached out to Kizer about leading the creation 
of a new organization that would become the NQF. It would be an 
independent, consensus-based, financially sustainable organization 
having equal representation from healthcare’s many and diverse 
Ken Kizer. (All rights reserved)      
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stakeholders that would establish a national healthcare quality 
improvement strategy that included performance measures to track 
progress toward achieving the strategy.
This was a momentous step. Thanks to the work of Berwick and 
others, people in healthcare were beginning to talk about quality 
improvement and patient safety, but standards of care and valid meth-
ods for measuring quality and safety were few. Moreover, as later 
noted by Kizer, “The concept of the National Quality Forum arose in 
response to the strong American sentiment against government regu-
lation and control of health care quality…. The (Advisory) commis-
sion envisioned that…the NQF would devise a national strategy for 
measuring and reporting health care quality that would advance the 
identified national aims.” [1]
Not everyone was enthusiastic, however. NCQA perceived it as a 
possible direct threat to what it had been doing for years and its busi-
ness model. The Joint Commission also had reservations, although 
they later came around. Kizer recalls that Gail Warden, the inaugural 
chairman of the NQF board, wondered if the organization would last 
even 3 years.
The National Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and 
Reporting was officially launched on September 1, 1999, with start-
up funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the California 
Health Care Foundation, the Horace W. Goldsmith Foundation, and 
the Commonwealth Fund.
Kizer saw the mission of the Forum as “to improve health care 
quality; that is, to promote delivery of care known to be effective; to 
achieve better health outcomes, greater patient functionality, and a 
higher level of patient safety; and to make health care easier to access 
and a more satisfying experience. The primary strategy…to accom-
plish this mission is to standardize the means by which health care 
quality is measured and reported and to make health care quality data 
widely available.” [1]
Kizer set the context for this enterprise by noting “This strategy is 
premised on the philosophy that health care quality data are a public 
good and, therefore, health care quality measurements should be pub-
licly disclosed. It is further based on the belief that making reliable, 
comparative data on health care quality publicly available will moti-
vate providers to improve the quality of care by providing 
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benchmarks; will facilitate competition on the basis of quality; will 
promote consumer choice on the basis of quality; and will inform 
public policy.” [1]
Five key strategic goals were initially identified: (1) developing and 
implementing a national agenda for measuring and reporting health-
care quality, (2) standardizing the measures used to report healthcare 
quality so that data collection is less arduous for healthcare providers 
and so that the reported data are of greater value, (3) building con-
sumer competence for making choices based on quality of care data, 
(4) enhancing the capability of healthcare providers to use quality-
related data, and (5) increasing the overall demand for healthcare 
quality data [1].
From the outset, it has been NQF policy that the organization itself 
does not develop or test performance measures, but instead uses a 
multistep consensus process to vet measures created by public and 
private entities, including, among others, NCQA, CMS, Physician 
Consortium for Performance Improvement, and medical specialty 
associations.
NQF endorses only those measures that meet the following criteria: 
[1] importance to measure and report; [2] scientific acceptability of 
measure properties, i.e., produces reliable and valid results; [3] feasi-
bility, i.e., require data that are readily available and create as little 
burden as possible; [4] usability and use, the extent to which they can 
be used for both accountability and performance improvement; and 
[5] comparison to related and competing measures to harmonize them 
or select the best measure [7].
NQF was to be different from any other organization, public or 
private, in several ways. Indeed, it was broadly viewed as a truly novel 
experiment in democracy. Membership was open to anyone, organiza-
tion or individual. Board membership represented a broad and diverse 
group of stakeholders, including federal agencies (e.g., CMS and 
AHRQ), state agencies, professional associations (e.g., AHA and 
AMA), private healthcare purchasers (e.g., GM), labor unions (e.g., 
AFL-CIO), and consumer groups (e.g., AARP).
Kizer saw the mission of the NQF as blending and balancing con-
sumer, purchaser, payer, and provider perspectives. All Board mem-
bers had an equal vote. Multiple professional associations initially 
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strongly objected to their vote having the same weight as consumer or 
purchaser organizations, but Kizer would not budge on this position. 
The Board’s decisions resulted from a consensus process derived 
from the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
(NTTAA) and principles formally espoused by the Office of 
Management and Budget in OMB Circular A-119. 23 A specially con-
vened Strategic Framework Board of experts supported the NQF’s 
nascent efforts by providing an intellectual architecture and principles 
to help guide measurement and reporting [8].
Kizer believed that ensuring patient safety should be the founda-
tion of healthcare quality. He decided to take advantage of the con-
temporary surge of interest in patient safety by having the inaugural 
NQF effort focus on a safety issue: the reporting of serious harmful 
events. Bolstered by a formal charge from CMS and AHRQ, he asked 
me and John Colmer, the program officer for the Milbank Fund 
(which was funding the project), to co-chair a Serious Reportable 
Events Steering Committee to develop a core set of serious prevent-
able adverse events to enable standardized data collection and report-
ing nationwide. The primary reason for identifying these measures 
was to facilitate public accountability through national mandatory 
reporting of these adverse events—an idea that president Clinton’s 
administration was open to, but which was summarily rejected by the 
subsequent Bush administration.
 Serious Reportable Events
The first charge to the Steering Committee was to develop a definition 
of “serious, avoidable adverse events.” We were then to apply a con-
sensus process to develop a set of these events. The final set would be 
voted on by the then 110 NQF member organizations and the Board 
of Directors. If approved, it would then be issued as a nationwide rec-
ommendation. In addition, we were to identify potential candidates 
for additional measures that needed more research, discuss issues 
relating to implementation, and develop a plan for dissemination of 
the measures.
The Steering Committee was composed of representatives from a 
cross section of healthcare providers, experts in quality and safety, 
public interest groups, regulators, and others. Broad representation of 
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stakeholders was to be a cardinal principle of operation for the NQF, 
so a serious attempt was made to make sure all stakeholder sectors 
were well represented for this first effort. (Appendix 11.1)
I could see several pitfalls ahead. Following the release of the IOM 
report, To Err Is Human, the most common reaction from the public 
and the press was to call for required reporting of adverse events. 
Many people seemed to think that if people just knew about them, 
they would be taken care of. Doctors and others would be shamed into 
doing something. Those of us working in safety knew there was much 
more to it than that. Reporting does not automatically or necessarily 
lead to change.
Safety experts and policy-makers identify two kinds of reporting: 
reporting for improvement and reporting for accountability.
Reporting systems for improvement are voluntary and based on 
frontline caregivers’ desire to prevent harm. As Charles Billings, 
architect of the aviation safety reporting system, has noted, voluntary 
reporting only works when it is safe (does not result in punishment), 
simple (the act of reporting only takes a few minutes), and productive 
(reporting results in positive changes) [9].
Creating a safe environment for reporting within hospitals has long 
been challenging. Despite national campaigns, 20 years after the IOM 
report, nearly half of nurses surveyed say they do not feel safe talking 
about errors. On the other hand, outside the hospital, national volun-
tary systems, such as those run by specialty societies, ISMP, and the 
National Nosocomial Infection Survey, rely on reports from caregiv-
ers and have been quite successful.
Reporting systems for accountability rely on reports from institu-
tions—in healthcare, primarily hospitals—and are mandatory. They 
are based on the concept that hospitals have a duty to prevent serious 
harm that we know how to prevent, such as amputation of the wrong 
leg or giving a blood transfusion to the wrong person. These events 
result from major system breakdowns, and it is the institution, not 
individual caregivers, that is in charge of the systems.
The public expects healthcare providers to ensure that care is safe, 
and it looks to the government to make sure that providers take the 
actions necessary to make care safe. The occurrence of a serious pre-
ventable adverse event suggests that a flaw exists in the healthcare 
organization’s efforts to safeguard patients. It is reasonable for the 
public to expect an oversight body to investigate such occurrences.
Serious Reportable Events
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These serious reportable events are healthcare’s equivalent of air-
plane or other public-transportation crashes. And most people think 
the public has a right to know about them when they occur [10]. If so, 
then not only reporting, but making the reports public should be 
mandatory.
Reporting is of little value if it doesn’t lead to improvement. The 
healthcare organization must also be required to investigate the event 
to determine the underlying system problems and/or failures (i.e., root 
cause analysis) and then correct the failures to prevent recurrence of 
the event. This information should be disseminated to other health-
care organizations so all can benefit from the lessons learned.
In the USA, the only mandatory systems for reporting of serious 
events are those run by the states. However, in 1999 only 15 states had 
such programs, and these varied considerably in what hospitals were 
required to report and what happened when they did. In most cases, 
nothing happened: no analysis and no feedback to the hospital—and 
no reporting of results to the public. The programs were typically 
understaffed, underfunded, and ineffective [10]. Perhaps providing a 
nationally accepted, industry-endorsed list of serious preventable 
adverse events would be an incentive for improvement.
My personal feeling was that it was important to focus on clearly 
defined adverse events, not on errors or vague things like “loss of 
function,” which appeared in some systems. I argued for events that 
were simple to define and “unfudgeable,” i.e., not susceptible to inter-
pretation or debate about whether it is or is not reportable. At the time, 
hospitals routinely gamed the system, going to great lengths to “prove” 
that an event was not preventable and therefore didn’t need to be 
reported. However, if certain events were by definition preventable, 
perhaps this charade could be curtailed.
The Steering Committee met for the first time on December 20, 
2000. We defined “serious, avoidable adverse events”  as patient 
harms that hospitals can reasonably be expected to prevent 100% of 
the time. We had interesting, thoughtful, and sometimes spirited dis-
cussions about the purpose of the list, preventive strategies, priorities, 
verifiability of reporting, and specificity of events. I suggested we 
eliminate “unanticipated” as being too difficult to define and too easy 
to weasel. More easily than I had expected, we agreed on the defini-
tions of an adverse event and a serious event, as well as the criteria for 
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inclusion on the list. We did a first pass, discussing a list of 25 candi-
dates for inclusion that the NQF staff had prepared.
Mandatory reporting is a contentious issue. Many have strong feel-
ings about the public’s right to know when these events occur, while 
hospitals are afraid of liability and loss of reputation from going pub-
lic with a mistake. Although some hospitals had gone public and 
found their honesty led people to trust them more, most still did not 
believe in this degree of transparency.
At the Steering Committee’s second meeting in February 2001, 
Kizer announced a special advisory panel of state health professionals 
to help us ensure our list would be relevant. We agreed on four criteria 
for selection of events for the list: events must be (1) serious, (2) 
clearly definable, (3) usually preventable, and (4) quantifiable (i.e., 
capable of being easily audited). In other words, they should be events 
that are serious and obvious to all observers when they occur (the 
“unfudgeable” part).
In April we approved the final report. However, the group did not 
agree with Ken’s interest in calling them “never events,” undoubtedly 
rooted in the firmly held doctrine in medicine that you cannot say that 
anything “never” happens. So it was decided that the list should be 
officially titled “Serious Reportable Events.” Nevertheless, they 
quickly began to be referred to as “never events.”
In the final version, 27 items were grouped into 6 categories: (1) 
surgical events (e.g., wrong site, retained foreign body), (2) device or 
product events (contamination, malfunction), (3) patient protection 
events (suicide, infant discharged to wrong person), (4) care manage-
ment events (death or disability from medication error, blood mis-
match, kernicterus), (5) environmental events (death or severe 
disability from electric shock, burn, falls, restraints), and (6) criminal 
events (sexual assault, impersonation) [11]. The full list is shown in 
Appendix 11.2. In 3 subsequent updates, the list has been expanded to 
29 events.
The Committee’s report was readily approved by the NQF Board, 
with only the American Hospital Association and one state hospital 
association voting against the report’s adoption, and it was published 
a few months later in early 2002. It was generally well received by the 
press and the public. It did, in fact, become the model for some state 
reporting systems. Later, CMS used the list to deny payments for 
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Medicare patients. This was not our intended use, and the matter was 
vigorously debated and discouraged during the Committee’s delibera-
tions. However, I personally felt it had merit. The best way to get 
hospitals’ attention is to hit them in the pocketbook.
All in all, this was an interesting and important initiative. We estab-
lished important definitions and expectations. Within 2  years, the 
number of states with mandatory reporting of serious events increased 
to 20, and by 2010, 27 states and the District of Columbia had enacted 
mandatory reporting systems, incorporating all or part of NQF’s list.
 Safe Practices for Better Healthcare
The reporting initiative got national attention and started the NQF on 
the way to Kizer’s goal of it becoming “the” trusted and respected 
national standard-setting organization. He then took on the second 
QuIC challenge, to “identify a set of patient safety practices critical to 
prevention of medical errors.” This initiative was more ambitious than 
the reporting project and destined to have far greater impact. It was to 
be a list and description of evidence-based and standardized care pro-
cesses that promote safety and reduce patient harm. The objective was 
to stimulate healthcare organizations to adopt a systems approach by 
providing effective processes that could be used “off the shelf,” saving 
the care team the effort of developing their own new practices and 
systems de novo.
To begin the initiative, NQF asked AHRQ to commission an inde-
pendent review of the evidence behind safe practices. As described in 
the previous chapter on AHRQ, this effort was led by Kaveh Shojania 
and Bob Wachter of UCSF [12]. But they found only 11 practices that 
met its criteria! As noted in the previous chapter. David Bates, Don 
Berwick, and I were concerned that the many accepted safe practices 
in current use would be suspect just because they had never been sub-
jected to a controlled trial. Our paper and a rebuttal by the authors 
were published in JAMA as part of a point-counterpoint analysis [13, 
14]. The Safe Practices Committee expanded its criteria to include 
experiential evidence of effectiveness.
Other sources of candidate practices were the Leapfrog Group, NQF 
member organizations, Steering Committee members themselves, and 
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an open call for candidate practices to more than 100 medical, nursing, 
and pharmacy specialty societies.
The final criteria for inclusion as a safe practice were:
 1. Specificity. The practice must be a clearly and precisely defined 
process or manner of providing a healthcare service.
 2. Benefit. Use of the practice will save lives endangered by health-
care delivery, reduce disability or other morbidity, or reduce the 
likelihood of a serious reportable event.
 3. Evidence of Effectiveness. There must be clear evidence that the 
practice would be effective in reducing patient safety events. This 
includes not just research studies, but broad expert agreement or 
professional consensus that the practice is “obviously beneficial” 
as well as experience from nonhealthcare industries transferable to 
healthcare (e.g., repeat-back of verbal orders or standardizing 
abbreviations).
 4. Generalizability. The safe practice must be able to be utilized in a 
variety of inpatient and/or outpatient settings and/or for multiple 
types of patients.
 5. Readiness. The necessary technology and appropriately skilled 
staff must be available to most healthcare organizations [15].
The practices were organized into five broad categories for improv-
ing patient safety: (1) creates a culture of safety, (2) matches health-
care needs with service- delivery capabilities, (3) facilitates information 
transfer and clear communication, (4) adopts safe practices in specific 
clinical settings or for specific processes of care, and (5) increases 
safe medication use.
The final list of 30 practices included both those with research evi-
dence of effectiveness and those that were already in wide use and 
well accepted. Some examples of the latter practices included the fol-
lowing: staffing of ICUs with critical care specialists (intensivists); 
“read-back” of orders; prohibited abbreviations; medication recon-
ciliation; hand hygiene; unit dosing; adoption of computerized patient 
order entry; the universal protocol for preventing wrong site, proce-
dure, and patient for all invasive procedures; and protocols for preven-
tion of central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI), 
surgical site infections, MRSA, and catheter- associated urinary tract 
infections [15]. (For the full list, see Appendix 11.3.) The list was 
formally approved by the NQF Board in late 2002.
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In April 2004, the Leapfrog Group adopted the full list of safe prac-
tices as their fourth safety “leap.” (Three of the safe practices were 
based on its first three safety leaps.) Also in 2004 several purchaser 
coalitions (e.g., Pacific Business Group on Health, The Employer 
Alliance Health Care Cooperative, Midwest Business Group on 
Health, among others) endorsed the safe practices.
Individual hospital adoption of the safe practices has varied greatly. 
Although now widely accepted as the standard toward which to strive, 
they are not easy to implement. (See Chapters 6 and 8.) Success 
requires strong support at the executive level, education and training 
of personnel, a “champion,” and teamwork. Physician buy-in is criti-
cal. Outside pressure, as from The Joint Commission, has helped.
NQF has periodically updated the safe practices in response to the 
development of new practices as patient safety matured. In the first 
update, in 2006, safe practices were added that addressed leadership 
and staffing, and the practices were harmonized with safety initiatives 
from other national groups such as the CMS, AHRQ, and The Joint 
Commission. In 2009, practices were added to address pediatric imag-
ing, organ donation, caring for caregivers, glycemic control, and pre-
vention of falls.
 Performance Measures
While the serious reportable events and safe practices were highly 
visible projects, multiple other projects were concomitantly under-
taken by NQF during its formative years. For example, performance 
measures were endorsed for, among other things, adult diabetes care, 
home healthcare, cardiac surgery, child healthcare, medication safety, 
hospital care, substance use disorders, and nursing care.
Likewise, a consensus framework for hospital care performance 
evaluation was developed, approved by the Board, and published, as 
were position papers or guidance documents on the role of hospital 
governing boards in promoting quality care, health information tech-
nology and electronic health records, health literacy, pay for perfor-
mance, and improving healthcare quality for minority populations.
The NQF also closely worked with the eHealth Initiative, CMS, 
AHRQ, and other groups to facilitate the adoption of health 
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information technology and new payment models that supported qual-
ity improvement. Kizer strongly lobbied HHS secretary Tommy 
Thompson to promote the adoption of electronic health records, and 
he worked closely with CMS administrator Scully to promote adop-
tion of public reporting of performance measurement data.
Throughout this time, a problem that plagued the NQF’s efforts 
was the lack of stable financing and especially not having funds to 
undertake projects that were “for the public good”—i.e., projects that 
were not linked to a specific healthcare constituency and its interests. 
Kizer spent a large amount of time finding and cobbling together 
funds to finance the many projects that NQF undertook in these 
early years.
 New Leadership
At the end of 2005, Kizer stepped down, and Janet Corrigan took over 
as president of the National Quality Forum. Corrigan was ideally 
suited to the role. An expert in health policy and management, she 
was highly respected for leading the staff at the Institute of Medicine 
that produced the legendary To Err Is Human. But most notably, 
Corrigan was the executive director of president Clinton’s Advisory 
Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality, which recom-
mended the creation of NQF.
Corrigan faced several challenges. Despite generous support from 
several foundations, the financial situation was precarious. Other reli-
able sources were needed. In addition, the endorsement process had 
become unruly. It needed to be put on more rigorous scientific foun-
dation. It needed to continue expanding the membership base, but 
more importantly it needs expanded public support. Corrigan brought 
in Helen Burstin from AHRQ to straighten it out.
Corrigan envisioned new opportunities for NQF. She believed that 
the NQF would be more effective if it focused more on measures 
needed to achieve national safety and quality goals. But what were 
the national priorities; what were the goals? And who set them? 
Well, it wasn’t clear. AHRQ had its priorities, as did CMS, IHI, and 




With support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, in 2007 
Corrigan persuaded HHS to ask NQF to establish the National Priorities 
Partnership (NPP) to provide input to the secretary for consideration as 
it developed priorities. Under the leadership of Helen Burstin, NPP 
was developed as a public-private partnership of 51 partner organiza-
tions that represent the diverse perspectives of consumers, purchasers, 
healthcare providers and professionals, community alliances, health 
plans, accreditation and certification bodies, and government agencies. 
NPP identified six national priorities that were embraced by many 
national organizations and health systems. 
As the debate around health reform heated up in 2009, NQF helped 
organize a coalition of quality leaders known as Stand for Quality to 
encourage legislators to provide stable and adequate support for the 
core measure activities recognizing that they are fundamental build-
ing blocks for virtually all approaches to payment and delivery system 
reform and for recognition of the important role of having a public-
private partnership to carry out this work.
The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 permitted 
the realization of these goals. Federal support of NQF’s work 
increased. ACA directed HHS to obtain multi-stakeholder input on 
setting priorities and selecting measures for use in various federal 
Helen Burstin. (All rights reserved)    
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programs. Significant support was provided for HHS to contract with 
a “voluntary consensus standard setting body” (aka NQF) to conduct 
much of this work.
In response and to complement its priority-setting NPP, NQF devel-
oped the Measure Applications Partnership (MAP) to advise the fed-
eral government and private sector payers on the optimal measures for 
use in payment and accountability programs. This closed the loop 
linking the endorsement process to measures needed to advance the 
goals established by the NPP. Under the leadership of Helen Burstin, 
the MAP built on the earlier efforts of the various “quality alliances” 
but provided for a more patient-centered, coordinated approach to 
measure selection across various providers, settings, and programs.
MAP has two overarching objectives: to focus accountability pro-
grams on achieving the NQS priorities and goals and to align mea-
surement across the public and private sectors and across settings and 
populations served. The MAP Coordinating Committee and work-
groups are composed of representatives from more than 60 private 
sector stakeholder organizations, 9 federal agencies, and 40 individual 
technical experts.
CMS found the recommendations of the MAP essential in 2012 
when it adopted value-based purchasing for Medicare and Medicaid 
services that linked hospitals’ payments to their success in achieving 
reductions in specific measured bad outcomes, such as catheter-asso-
ciated urinary tract infections and central line infections. Suddenly, 
the incentive for hospitals to implement safe practices increased dra-
matically. CMS contracted with the MAP for further measures to use 
in this program.
Through the MAP the NQF has advised the government on the selec-
tion of measures for use in more than 20 federal public reporting and 
pay-for-performance programs. About 300 NQF-endorsed measures 
are currently in use in federal, state, and private sector programs. Over 
90 percent of all Medicare payments are now performance-based.
The ACA placed responsibility for setting national priorities within 
CMS. NQF’s National Priorities Partnership provides input to CMS 
for this function and also plays a role in convening stakeholders to 
develop action plans to achieve the national priorities and goals.
ACA also charged HHS with developing a National Quality 
Strategy (NQS) to improve the delivery of healthcare services, patient 
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outcomes, and population health and required that the NQS be shaped 
by input from a broad range of stakeholders. HHS requested NQF to 
convene the NPP to provide input to the secretary for consideration as 
it developed this national body of work. In 2011 it established six 
priorities: healthy living, prevention of leading causes of mortality, 
patient safety, person and family engagement, communication and 
coordination, and affordable care.
NQF thus manages the “supply chain” for quality and safety priori-
ties, setting standards and applying them: the NPP, which sets priori-
ties and goals; measure stewards, who develop and test measures; the 
evaluation and endorsement consensus process; the MAP that advises 
on selection of measures for use in accountability applications; and 
public and private accountability efforts. It is the neutral convener of 
multi-stakeholder groups that provide the “bridge” between public 
and private sectors.
In addition to NPP and MAP, the NQF has a broad array of quality 
and safety programs. Its health IT initiatives support the complex 
move toward electronic measurement to facilitate data sharing 
between healthcare providers and their patients. NQF provides infor-
mation and tools to help healthcare decision-makers and has programs 
in person- and family-centered care, effective communication, pallia-
tive and end-of-life care, and disparities [16].
Many of these programs have been institutionalized by NQF into 
multi- stakeholder Standing Committees in topical areas. Standing 
Committees are charged to review and recommend submitted mea-
sures for endorsement to NQF’s Consensus Standards Approval 
Committee that considers all measures recommended for NQF 
endorsement.
 Conflict of Interest Scandal
In 2014, the patient safety movement was rocked by its first major 
scandal when Charles Denham reached an out-of-court settlement 
with the US Department of Justice for receiving over $11 million 
from a medical products company, CareFusion, to promote their prod-
ucts [17, 18]. Denham had served as co-chair of various NQF com-
mittees that produced safe practices reports dating back to 2003; he 
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was chair of the Leapfrog Group’s Safe Practices Committee and edi-
tor of the Journal of Patient Safety. Denham’s exposure was a blow to 
the entire patient safety community, but NQF by far suffered the 
greatest fallout.
The leadership of NQF was taken completely by surprise. Despite 
NQF’s strict conflict of interest policies, Denham had not disclosed 
his commercial ties. NQF immediately severed its ties to Denham and 
his foundation TMIT.
Denham had come under suspicion earlier at NQF in 2009 when 
concerns were raised by both staff and committee members when he 
lobbied the committee to insert a specific recommendation in Safe 
Practice 22 (surgical site infection prevention) to use chlorhexidine 
gluconate 2% and isopropyl alcohol solution as skin antiseptic prepa-
ration, i.e., CareFusion’s ChloraPrep. After investigation, the recom-
mendation was replaced with a more generic one, and Denham was 
removed from his co-chairmanship of the Safe Practices Committee, 
but no one knew he was being paid by CareFusion.
There was another problem. For years, Denham had been providing 
substantial financial support for NQF. Much of the staff work for the 
Safe Practices Committee was supplied gratis by Denham’s “non-
profit” company, Health Care Concepts. Between 2006 and 2009, this 
organization donated grants totaling $725,000 to NQF.
When the scandal broke, NQF officials said that Denham never 
reported his conflicts, despite a specific requirement for all members 
to do so. After his firing, NQF took immediate steps to strengthen its 
processes to ensure the integrity of quality measures and safe prac-
tices, and it reviewed all of the standards set by the committee Denham 
co-chaired. It also established a policy of not accepting money from 
funding organizations whose leaders are on its committees. Denham 
was also relieved of his editorship of the Journal of Patient Safety and 
his leadership of a committee of the Leapfrog Group.
 Conclusion
NQF is one of the few healthcare organizations defined as consen-
sus-based by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
part of the Department of Commerce. This status allows the federal 
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government to rely on NQF-defined measures or healthcare practices 
as the best, evidence-based approaches to improving care. Because 
they must meet rigorous criteria, NQF’s endorsed measures are trusted 
and used by the federal government, states, and private sector organi-
zations to evaluate performance and share information with patients 
and their families.
NQF’s prompt and transparent response to the Denham affair con-
firmed its legitimacy as standard setter. It has continued to expand its 
role as envisioned by Kizer to promote effective care, achieve better 
outcomes, improve patient safety, and improve access to care through 
rigorous measures and collection and analysis of data.
Working together, NQF and AHRQ became the institutional foun-
dation that permitted patient safety to advance both as a science and 
in practice. They represent the ideal of a public-private partnership 
where collaboration, commitment, leadership, and good will produce 
powerful and important change.
 Appendix 11.1: Serious Reportable Events Steering 
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AFL-CIO, Washington, DC
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Washington, DC
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Affairs), Falls Church, VA
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 Appendix 11.2: NQF Serious Reportable Events [11]
Event Additional specifications
1. Surgical events
A.  Surgery performed on the 
wrong body part
Defined as any surgery performed on a 
body part that is not consistent with the 
documented informed consent for that 
patient
Excludes emergent situations that occur in 
the course of surgery and/or whose 
exigency precludes obtaining informed 
consent
B.  Surgery performed on the 
wrong patient
Defined as any surgery on a patient that is 
not consistent with the documented 
informed consent for that patient
C.  Wrong surgical procedure 
performed on a patient
Defined as any procedure performed on a 
patient that is not consistent with the 
documented informed consent for that 
patient
Excludes emergent situations that occur in 
the course of surgery and/or whose 
exigency precludes obtaining informed 
consent
Surgery includes endoscopies and other 
invasive procedures
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Event Additional specifications
D.  Retention of a foreign object 
in a patient after surgery or 
other procedure
Excludes objects intentionally implanted 
as part of a planned intervention and 
objects present prior to surgery that were 
intentionally retained
E.   Intraoperative or immediately 
postoperative death in an ASA 
Class I patient
Includes all ASA Class I patient deaths in 
situations where anesthesia was 
administered; the planned surgical 
procedure may or may not have been 
carried out. Immediately postoperative 
means within 24 hours after induction of 
anesthesia (if surgery not completed), 
surgery, or other invasive procedure was 
completed
2. Product or device events
A.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with the 
use of contaminated drugs, 
devices, or biologics provided 
by the healthcare facility
Includes generally detectable contaminants 
in drugs, devices, or biologics regardless 
of the source of contamination and/or 
product
B.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with the 
use or function of a device in 
patient care, in which the 
device is used for functions 
other than as intended
Includes, but is not limited to, catheters, 
drains and other specialized tubes, infusion 
pumps, and ventilators
C.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with 
intravascular air embolism 
that occurs while being cared 
for in a healthcare facility
Excludes deaths associated with 
neurosurgical procedures known to be a 
high risk of intravascular air embolism
3. Patient protection events
A. Infant discharged to the wrong 
person
B.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with 
patient elopement 
(disappearance) for more than 
4 hours
Excludes events involving competent 
adults
C.  Patient suicide or attempted 
suicide resulting in serious 
disability, while being cared 
for in a healthcare facility
Defined as events that result from patient 
actions after admission to a healthcare 
facility
Excludes deaths resulting from self-
inflicted injuries that were the reason for 
admission to the healthcare facility
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Event Additional specifications
4. Care management events
A.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with a 
medication error (e.g., errors 
involving the wrong drug, 
wrong dose, wrong patient, 
wrong time, wrong rate, 
wrong preparation, or wrong 
route of administration)
Excludes reasonable differences in clinical 
judgment on drug selection and dose
B.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with a 
hemolytic reaction due to the 
administration of ABO- 
incompatible blood or blood 
products
C.  Maternal death or serious 
disability associated with 
labor or delivery in a low-risk 
pregnancy while being cared 
for in a healthcare facility
Includes events that occur within 42 days 
postdelivery
Excludes deaths from pulmonary or 
amniotic fluid embolism, acute fatty liver 
of pregnancy, or cardiomyopathy
D.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with 
hypoglycemia, the onset of 
which occurs while the patient 
is being cared for in a 
healthcare facility
E.  Death or serious disability 
(kernicterus) associated with 
failure to identify and treat 
hyperbilirubinemia in 
neonates
Hyperbilirubinemia is defined as bilirubin 
levels >30 mg/dl
Neonates refer to the first 28 days of life
F.   Stage 3 or 4 pressure ulcers 
acquired after admission to a 
healthcare facility
Excludes progression from Stage 2 to 
Stage 3 if Stage 2 was recognized upon 
admission
G.  Patient death or serious 
disability due to spinal 
manipulative therapy
5. Environmental event
A.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with an 
electric shock while being 
cared for in a healthcare 
facility
Excludes events involving planned 
treatments such as electric countershock
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Event Additional specifications
B.  Any incident in which a line 
designated for oxygen or other 
gas to be delivered to a patient 
contains the wrong gas or is 
contaminated by toxic 
substances
C.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with a 
burn incurred from any source 
while being cared for in a 
healthcare facility
D.  Patient death associated with 
a fall while being cared for in 
a healthcare facility
E.  Patient death or serious 
disability associated with the 
use of restraints or bedrails 
while being cared for in a 
healthcare facility
6. Criminal events
A.  Any instance of care ordered 
by or provided by someone 
impersonating a physician, 
nurse, pharmacist, or other 
licensed healthcare provider
B.  Abduction of a patient of any 
age
C.  Sexual assault on a patient 
within or on the grounds of 
the healthcare facility
D.  Death or significant injury of 
a patient or staff member 
resulting from a physical 
assault (i.e., battery) that 
occurs within or on the 
grounds of the healthcare 
facility
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 Appendix 11.3: NQF Safe Practices [15]
 1. Create a healthcare culture of safety
 2.  For designated high-risk, elective surgical procedures or other specified 
care, patients should be clearly informed of the likely reduced risk of an 
adverse outcome at treatment facilities that have demonstrated superior 
outcomes and should be referred to such facilities in accordance with the 
patient’s stated preference
 3.  Specify an explicit protocol to be used to ensure an adequate level of 
nursing based on the institution’s usual patient mix and the experience and 
training of its nursing staff
 4.  All patients in general intensive care units (both adult and pediatric) 
should be managed by physicians having specific training and certification 
in critical care medicine (“critical care certified”)
 5.  Pharmacists should actively participate in the medication-use process, 
including—at a minimum—being available for consultation with 
prescribers on medication ordering, interpretation and review of 
medication orders, preparation of medications, dispensing of medications, 
and administration and monitoring of medications
 6.  Verbal orders should be recorded whenever possible and immediately read 
back to the prescriber—i.e., a healthcare provider receiving a verbal order 
should read or repeat back the information that the prescriber conveys in 
order to verify the accuracy of what was heard
 7. Use only standardized abbreviations and dose designations
 8.  Patient care summaries or other similar records should be prepared with 
all source documents immediately at hand (i.e., they should not be 
prepared from memory)
 9.  Ensure that care information, especially changes in orders and new 
diagnostic information, is transmitted in a timely and clearly 
understandable form to all of the patient’s current healthcare providers 
who need that information to provide care
10.  Ask each patient or legal surrogate to recount what he or she has been told 
during the informed consent discussion
11.  Ensure that written documentation of the patient’s preference for life-
sustaining treatment is prominently displayed in his or her chart
12. Implement a computerized physician order entry system
13.  Implement a standardized protocol to prevent the mislabeling of 
radiographs
14.  Implement standardized protocols to prevent the occurrence of wrong-site 
procedures or wrong-patient procedures
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15.  Evaluate each patient undergoing elective surgery for his or her risk of an 
acute ischemic cardiac event during surgery, and provide prophylactic 
treatment of high-risk patients with beta-blockers
16.  Evaluate each patient upon admission, and regularly thereafter, for his or 
her risk of developing pressure ulcers. This evaluation should be repeated 
at regular intervals during care. Clinically appropriate preventive methods 
should be implemented consequent to the evaluation
17.  Evaluate each patient upon admission, and periodically thereafter, for the 
risk of developing deep vein thrombosis (DVT)/venous thromboembolism 
(VTE). Use clinically appropriate methods to prevent DVT/VTE
18.  Use dedicated antithrombotic (anticoagulation) services that facilitate 
coordinated care management
19.  Upon admission, and periodically thereafter, evaluate each patient for the 
risk of aspiration
20.  Adhere to effective methods of preventing central venous catheter-
associated bloodstream infections
21.  Evaluate each preoperative patient in light of his or her planned surgical 
procedure for his or her risk of surgical site infection (SSI), and 
implement appropriate antibiotic prophylaxis and other preventive 
measures based on that evaluation
22.  Use validated protocols to evaluate patients who are at risk for contrast 
media-induced renal failure, and use a clinically appropriate method for 
reducing risk of renal injury based on the patient’s kidney function 
evaluation
23.  Evaluate each patient upon admission, and periodically thereafter, for his 
or her risk of malnutrition. Employ clinically appropriate strategies to 
prevent malnutrition
24.  Whenever a pneumatic tourniquet is used, evaluate the patient for his or 
her risk of an ischemic and/or thrombotic complication, and use 
appropriate prophylactic measures
25.  Decontaminate hands with either a hygienic hand rub or by washing with 
a disinfectant soap prior to and after direct contact with the patient or 
objects immediately around the patient
26.  Vaccinate healthcare workers against influenza to protect both them and 
patients from influenza
27.  Keep workspaces where medications are prepared clean, orderly, well lit, 
and free of clutter, distraction, and noise
28. Standardize the methods for labeling, packaging, and storing medications
29.  Identify all “high-alert” drugs (e.g., intravenous adrenergic agonists and 
antagonists, chemotherapy agents, anticoagulants and antithrombotics, 
concentrated parenteral electrolytes, general anesthetics, neuromuscular 
blockers, insulin and oral hypoglycemics, narcotics, and opiates)
30.  Dispense medications in unit dose or, when appropriate, unit-of-use form, 
whenever possible
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Chapter 12
Enforcing Standards: The Joint 
Commission
On March 30, 1981, Ronald Reagan, president of the USA, was shot 
in an assassination attempt. During his lifesaving surgery at the 
George Washington Hospital, the nation was riveted by the clear and 
calm account of its progress by the hospital’s physician spokesman, 
Dennis O’Leary. Five years later, O’Leary became the head of the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
 History of the Joint Commission1 [1]
The Joint Commission has been for many years the principal driver of 
healthcare quality in hospitals and, in more recent decades, other 
types of healthcare organizations. Its roots go back to the early years 
of the twentieth century when medicine was undergoing rapid changes 
as the result of scientific advances in understanding the causes of dis-
eases, the use of antisepsis, and the development of x- rays. Over a 
short period, hospitals move from “pest houses” to essential resources 
and proliferated. But quality of care varied widely. A few people 
began to be concerned.
1 Most of  what follows of  the  early history of  The  Joint Commission comes 
from  its excellent 50-year anniversary report, Champions of  Quality 
in Health Care.
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One was Ernest Amory Codman, a surgeon at the MGH in Boston 
who developed the End Result Idea, a system for following up patients 
after surgery to determine their outcomes. The Idea was sufficiently 
unpopular with his colleagues at the MGH that he found it necessary 
to leave and found his own hospital in 1911. He kept meticulous 
records and later published his results in A Study in Hospital Efficiency 
[2]. Along the way, however, he went out of his way to publicly accuse 
surgeons and hospitals of being more interested in making money, for 
which he was widely ostracized.
At about the same time, in 1912, a prominent Chicago surgeon, 
Franklin H. Martin, and several others founded the American College 
of Surgeons (ACS). The purpose was to distinguish those who were 
trained in surgery from others, to establish the specialty. Their other 
concern was about the lamentable state of hospitals, which led them 
to call for “a system of standardization of hospital equipment and 
hospital work.” Ernest Codman was tapped to chair a Hospitalization 
Standardization Committee.
In 1918 the ACS initiated the standardization program. In its initial 
foray surveying hospitals of 100 beds or more, only 89 of 692 hospi-
tals surveyed met the minimum standards! Although that number was 
reported out to the college, the list of the names of the hospitals was 
burned to keep it from being obtained by the press! The hospital stan-
dards approval process was here to stay, however, and by 1950, half of 
all hospitals, 3290, were on the ACS approval list.
But the ACS was in financial trouble and unable to sustain the pro-
gram. It approached the American Hospital Association (AHA) about 
taking it over. The AHA was interested and willing to provide finan-
cial support. The American Medical Association (AMA) got wind of 
this and made a counteroffer. The AMA had an accreditation program 
for internships and residencies and disliked the idea of a program run 
by administrators, not doctors. After months of wrangling, the three 
parties, along with the American College of Physicians (ACP), worked 
out their differences and in 1951 founded the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).
In the early years, the JCAH carried on the ACS standards. Surveys 
focused only on the hospital environment, what Donabedian would 
later call “structure.” They examined physical aspects, such as proper 
use of autoclaves, function of clinical laboratories, medical staff 
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organization, and patient records. An early effort to include evaluation 
of clinical care was shot down by the AMA, who consistently claimed 
this to be the prerogative of physicians. They even threatened to 
absorb JCAH into the AMA if they did not get their way.
The enactment of Medicare in 1965 was a watershed moment for 
JCAH. The legislation gave it “deemed” status, meaning that hospi-
tals that were accredited by JCAH were deemed to have met the 
Medicare Conditions of Participation. This may have been of neces-
sity—the federal government had no capacity to inspect hospitals 
and the states were notoriously poor at it—but it had immense impact 
and dramatically enhanced the prestige and power of JCAH as a 
“quasi- public” licensing body. The flip side was that it exposed it to 
much greater public accountability.
The JCAH board saw the new status as an opportunity to elevate 
the standards and use the surveys to improve quality of care. By using 
lessons learned from the surveys, they could move standards from 
“minimum essential” to “optimum achievable.” They undertook a 
major project to elevate the standards over the next few years.
These were also the years of rising concerns about civil rights, 
however, and the JCAH soon found itself in the crosshairs of public 
interest groups that were concerned—justifiably—about poor condi-
tions in municipal hospitals in major cities. The Commission was 
pushed to deny accreditation to these hospitals in order to stimulate 
increased funding.
Not only would this be counterproductive, but closing the hospitals 
would deny care to indigent people, and most of these hospitals would 
be able to get certification from their state or the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW).  The JCAH stuck to provisional 
accreditation and consulting with hospitals on how to improve.
However, in 1971 the preamble in the new Accreditation Manual 
for Hospitals declared that patients were entitled to “equitable and 
humane treatment” and that “no person should be denied impartial 
access to treatment ... on the basis of such considerations as race, 
color, creed, national origin or the nature of the source of payment for 
his care.” The first patients’ bill of rights. It was not just a statement. 
Observance of patient rights would be a factor in the determination of 
accreditation.
 History of the Joint Commission 
188
The tension between the JCAH’s concept of its accreditation role as 
informing and stimulating hospitals to improve quality of care and the 
public’s desire for accountability came to a head a few years later 
when Congress passed legislation that gave HEW (now Health and 
Human Services (HHS)) authority to do “validation” studies of 
accredited hospitals in which they would conduct surveys in response 
to complaints alleging noncompliance with Medicare standards and to 
establish standards that exceeded those of the JCAH. The Commission 
was being pushed to be not just an accreditor, but a certifier, i.e., a 
regulator. It continued to resist but in some states it did begin to sur-
vey hospitals with state licensing teams.
It seemed to work. In 1979, a General Accounting Office (GAO) 
report endorsed The Joint Commission process as superior to that of 
HHS and later commended its cooperative relationships with states 
for licensure and accreditation. The Commission focused on improv-
ing its surveys.
 The Agenda for Change
In 1986, the course of The Joint Commission changed dramatically 
when Dennis O’Leary was appointed president. O’Leary was a board- 
certified internist and hematologist. He grew up in Kansas City, grad-
uated from Harvard and Cornell Medical School, and trained in 
internal medicine at the University of Minnesota and Strong Memorial 
Hospital in Rochester, NY.  He had been at George Washington 
University Medical Center since 1971 where he had taken on progres-
sively more administrative duties, including chairing the medical staff 
executive committee at the hospital and being the dean for clinical 
affairs at the medical center.
O’Leary had a clear idea of what he wanted to accomplish. He 
wanted The Joint Commission to change the focus of accreditation to 
performance improvement.
The time was ripe. In the 1960s, Avedis Donabedian at the University 
of Michigan had developed his classical definition of quality of care 
as encompassing three components, structure, process, and outcome, 
but his teachings had little impact except in academe. The Joint 
Commission focused on structure, and practicing physicians were too 
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busy in the 1960s and 1970s keeping up with the fast pace of scientific 
advances that were transforming medicine to give much thought to 
how their systems worked or to analyzing their results. (Codman redux!)
But costs were increasing almost exponentially. When Medicare 
was introduced in 1965, it was estimated that it would cost $275–325 
million a year [3]. The actual expenditure in 1966 was $1.8 billion, 
and by 1985 the expenditure was $71 billion and seemingly out of 
control [4, 5]. Questions began to arise for the first time about the 
effectiveness of care. What were we getting for our money?
In 1973, John Wennberg, a researcher from the Harvard Center for 
Community Health and Medical Care, added fuel to the fire when he 
published the results of his studies of geographic variation that showed 
two- to fourfold variations in the provision of common surgical pro-
cedures, such as tonsillectomy, hemorrhoidectomy, and prostatectomy 
[6]. Charles Lewis had previously shown three- to fourfold variation 
in the rates of performance of six surgical procedures in Kansas, 
including tonsillectomy, appendectomy, and herniorrhaphy [7]. These 
differences were not trivial, and the conclusion was inescapable: 
either too many patients were getting the service in one area or too 
few in the other. Did the doctors know what they were doing? Over 
the next few years, Wennberg expanded his studies to other regions, 
but the results were similar.
It took a while for people to take notice, but by the early 1990s, a 
movement was afoot in medicine to take a different approach to qual-
ity of care. Paul Batalden and Don Berwick had studied under Deming 
and began work on applying industrial continuous quality improve-
ment (CQI) concepts to healthcare [8]. Berwick had founded the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) (see Chap. 6).
O’Leary and his senior colleagues Jim Roberts and Paul Schyve 
could see that its applications in healthcare were the future. It was 
time to get The Joint Commission on board. Schyve was the director 
of standards at The Joint Commission from 1986 to 1989 and then 
vice president for research and standards. He would function as The 
Joint Commission’s quality and safety guru for the next two decades, 
representing it to the NQF and participating in NPSF and LLI 
initiatives.
There were other pressures as well: by this time The Joint 
Commission had 2600 standards! Hospitals and doctors wanted relief, 
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and they wanted accreditation to be more relevant to their work. Why 
not focus on quality of care?
 Changing Accreditation
O’Leary and his staff proposed that the Commission change the 
accreditation survey focus from standards for organizational structure 
to standards important to the provision of quality care. A steering 
committee of six board members plus Paul Griner, John Wennberg, 
Steven Shortell, and Lincoln Moses was formed to guide them.
Steven Shortell ended up leading the reorganization of the accredi-
tation manual to a series of chapters on clinical care functions and a 
series on management support functions. The hospital standards man-
ual shrunk from 2600 standards to less than 500. The Joint Commission 
was now talking about performance, not structure. The new standards 
had clearly moved the bar to a higher level.
Meanwhile, work was begun to develop clinical indicators—dis-
crete measures of outcomes and related processes—in selected areas 
such as the management of heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. 
Indicator data were then gathered from accredited hospitals and ana-
lyzed through an Indicator Measurement System. Integrating these 
data into the accreditation process was a challenge, however, since 
they were not standards against which to measure compliance, but 
more like a rifle shot that defined a narrow significant goal.
The Commission also changed its name to the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to reflect its 
a b
(a) Dennis O’Leary and (b) Paul Schyve. (All rights reserved)          
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increasing scope. It was already accrediting long- term care organiza-
tions, mental health institutions, and ambulatory surgery centers, 
among others; it now added home care. Five public members were 
added to the board. In 1990, JCAHO changed its mission statement to 
“improve the quality of healthcare provided to the public.”
Hospitals resisted the changes. External factors, such as the failed 
Clinton health plan and continuing increases in healthcare and survey 
costs, compounded the problem. The combination of anxiety over the 
new standards and potential public disclosure of performance led the 
AHA at one point to seek O’Leary’s ouster as The Joint Commission 
president and replace him with a senior AHA staff member who had 
previously been The Joint Commission surveyor. However, Board 
leaders, headed by incoming Board chair William Kridelbaugh of the 
American College of Surgeons, successfully deflected the assault.
In 1994 and 1995, the Commission piloted a new approach to 
accreditation: the Orion Project. The Orion Project tested several 
innovations in the survey process: changing surveys from announced 
to unannounced so hospitals had to be continuously ready, use of an 
integrated team of surveyors who were all on- site at the same time, 
use of laptop technology by surveyors, focus on the effectiveness of 
staffing, and including performance measures in the accreditation 
process.
After testing in several states and refining them, some of the inno-
vations were rolled out nationwide. These were major changes in the 
accreditation process, but the new approach was well- received. A sur-
vey of hospitals showed that 80% found new process “more interac-
tive, consultative, and valuable” than previous accreditation surveys. 
By 1995 accreditation included six new functional areas: patient rights 
and organizational ethics, care of patients, continuum of care, man-
agement of the environment of care, management of human resources, 
and surveillance and prevention of infection.
 Focus on Patient Safety: Sentinel Events
Something else was happening in 1995. Starting with the death of 
Betsy Lehman in Boston from an overdose of chemotherapy, a num-
ber of nationally reported cases of major medical mishaps were 
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reported in the press. These led the public and advocacy groups to 
raise questions about the effectiveness of The Joint Commission 
accreditation. If it was doing its job, how could these things happen?
O’Leary recalls that some years earlier, in 1990, I had visited The 
Joint Commission to suggest that, based on our experience with the 
medical practice study in New York, The Joint Commission should 
pay more attention to patient safety issues in accrediting hospitals. 
The discussion was cordial, but The Joint Commission had a substan-
tial development agenda on its plate and was not anxious to add more 
to its agenda. However, the seed had been planted.
The patient safety shocker that spring for The Joint Commission 
was when it learned that a surgeon in an accredited hospital had ampu-
tated the wrong leg of a diabetic patient with severe peripheral vascu-
lar disease. Wrong- site surgery? Who had ever heard of that? Nor 
were there any identifiable case reports in the medical literature. (It 
was not so rare, it turned out. In the ensuing years, The Joint 
Commission would typically learn of 50–75 new cases of wrong- site 
surgery each year.)
Reacting to this and the other major mishaps, The Joint Commission 
moved into action. Rick Croteau, a senior surveyor, former aerospace 
engineer and surgeon, was tasked with creating an entirely new policy 
framework for addressing what came to be known as sentinel events. 
His knowledge of systems thinking, analysis, and applications would 
stand him in good stead.
A sentinel event was defined as “a serious undesirable occurrence 
that results in the loss of patient life, limb, or function.” A new perfor-
mance improvement standard was added that required “intensive 
assessment of undesirable variation in performance,” i.e., root cause 
analysis (RCA) for each sentinel event, as well as the creation of a 
corrective action plan. A monograph describing a thorough RCA and 
how to perform one was also prepared and released by The Joint 
Commission. Hospitals experiencing a sentinel event were placed in 
Conditional Accreditation until they had submitted a thorough RCA 
and had it approved.
In early 1996, vice president for performance measurement Jerod 
Loeb conceived of holding a national conference on medical error. He 
persuaded the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS), the Annenberg Center, and the AMA to be co- conveners 
(Chap. 4). At the conference in the fall, the Commission announced 
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that in an effort to be less punitive, it was changing its policy regard-
ing sentinel events from “Conditional” Accreditation to 
“Accreditation Watch.”
It didn’t work. Although The Joint Commission leaders thought 
this was making their response to sentinel events less punitive, hospi-
tals saw it as a stigma—less threatening, perhaps, but punitive, 
nonetheless.
By 1997, antagonism between The Joint Commission and hospitals 
was again in full flower. Some of this related to the formal initiation 
of ORYX, a next iteration of efforts to integrate clinical indicators 
into the accreditation process. ORYX set requirements for the number 
and types of standardized measures each organization had to collect 
and report. To ease the burden for hospitals, The Joint Commission 
approved the use of commercial measurement systems to collect the 
data, audit its reliability, and transmit it to the Commission. But the 
process was expensive and labor- intensive.
Adding to the friction was the Commission’s decision to improve 
public transparency by introducing quality check on its website. 
Quality check was a directory of accredited organizations and their 
performance reports. The combination of these initiatives with the 
perceived threat of exposing their patient safety performance was 
almost too much for the hospital field to tolerate.
Hospitals would agree with doing an RCA in principle (how could 
they not?), but in practice they regarded this expectation as intru-
sive. A more collaborative approach was needed. Reporting of sen-
tinel events was made voluntary. Hospitals were “encouraged” to 
report sentinel events and to do RCAs. “Accreditation Watch” would 
only be assigned if a hospital failed to do an RCA for review by The 
Joint Commission or if it did not report a sentinel event that The 
Joint Commission learned of by other means, such as from a patient 
complaint or a story in the press.
Although their brief was with The Joint Commission, hospitals had 
many reasons for not wanting to report sentinel events in addition to 
resistance to performing RCAs. Their lawyers were concerned that 
despite all assurances of confidentiality, information might be revealed 
that would lead to a lawsuit. CEOs worried about damage to the repu-
tation of their hospitals if events became known. In addition, if the 
internal environment was punitive, as most still were, the CEO might 
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not even know an event had occurred. And, despite all the efforts of 
patient safety experts, many people clung to the idea that some inju-
ries are not preventable and therefore didn’t need to be reported.
 Sentinel Event Alerts
Since 1995, The Joint Commission had been steadily amassing details 
regarding sentinel events and their related RCAs and correction plans 
into a “Sentinel Event Database.” The Database now contained a great 
deal of useful information about the prevalence of serious hazards. 
Why not disseminate these “lessons learned” widely? To every hospi-
tal. The idea of a Sentinel Event Alert was born.
In 1998, the first “Sentinel Event Alert” was issued, describing 
patient deaths resulting from accidental infusion of concentrated 
potassium chloride (KCl). Nurses confused its vial with that of dilute 
sodium chloride, which was used to “flush” intravenous lines. This 
rarely occurred, but when it did, it was deadly.
The Alert recommended that concentrated KCl be removed from 
nursing units and that its use be restricted to the pharmacy, where it 
could be better controlled. This was a classic example of a “forcing 
function,” a powerful human factors technique for preventing error. It 
worked. Hospitals complied, and within a few years, deaths from 
accidental infusion of KCl virtually disappeared. Sentinel Event Alert 
was one of The Joint Commission’s most successful initiatives.
In 1999 O’Leary invited me to speak to the Board at their annual 
planning retreat. I urged them to take the lead in patient safety and to 
do three specific things: (1) define and require implementation (i.e., 
inspect for) of known safe practices, (2) replace scheduled triennial 
inspections with unannounced inspections, and (3) move their report-
ing system to a separate entity with confidentiality protection. I have 
no idea whether my entreaties helped, but unannounced surveys were 
later implemented, and in 2001 The Joint Commission defined 11 new 
safe practices that they began inspecting for in January 2003.
The Commission continued to push hospitals to focus on quality 
improvement, but in 1999, the IOM report, To Err Is Human, put the 
spotlight on safety. In that year, The Joint Commission rolled out a 
major new chapter on patient safety for its accreditation standards 
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manual and changed its mission statement to “. . . continuously 
improve the safety and quality of care provided to the public.” 
However, it needed to do more. It needed to motivate hospitals to 
implement safe practices.
 Patient Safety Goals
Sentinel Event Alerts gave hospitals an incentive to deal with patient 
safety issues, but many did not know how. Removing concentrated 
KCl from nursing units was simple: issue a decree (although it is 
interesting that some hospitals didn’t.) But few hazards could be dealt 
with that easily; most required changing a process. Thanks to IHI and 
others, some hospitals were beginning to learn how to do this, but it 
was difficult work, and most were still not engaged. By this time, 
however, the National Quality Forum (NQF) was identifying evidence- 
based safe practices that hospitals could adopt. Hospitals wouldn’t 
have to reinvent the wheel; they would just have to put it on.
The Joint Commission Sentinel Event Database was the treasure 
trove of information that made the Alerts possible. Why not take the 
next step and recommend safe practices to address the high- priority 
problems? In addition to The Joint Commission, the NQF, IHI, and 
others were developing safe practices.
In 2002, the Commission established a Sentinel Event Alert 
Advisory Group of nurses, physicians, pharmacists, risk managers, 
and engineers to formalize the work already being done to identify 
patient safety issues based on lessons learned from sentinel events—
the Alerts—as well as from accreditation surveys and recommenda-
tions from the NQF and other safety organizations. The Advisory 
Group analyzed potential remedies for practicality, cost- effectiveness, 
and evidence.
From this analysis, Patient Safety Goals were developed. Each goal 
had one or more specific recommendations—the practice changes to 
be implemented. Box 12.1 shows one of the early goals, reporting 
critical test results, that was informed by our work at the Massachusetts 
Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Error (Chap. 8) (Box 12.1).
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Box 12.1 Patient Safety Goal 2
Goal 2
Improve the effectiveness of communication among caregivers.
NPSG.02.03.01
Report critical results of tests and diagnostic procedures on a timely 
basis.
- - Rationale for NPSG.02.03.01- - 
Critical results of tests and diagnostic procedures fall significantly 
outside the normal range and may indicate a life- threatening situation. 
The objective is to provide the responsible licensed caregiver these 
results within an established time frame so that the patient can be 
promptly treated.
Elements of Performance for NPSG.02.03.01
1.  Develop written procedures for managing 
the critical results of tests and diagnostic 
procedures that address the following:
  The definition of critical results of tests and 
diagnostic procedures
  By whom and to whom critical results of 
tests and diagnostic procedures are reported
  The acceptable length of time between the 
availability and reporting of critical results of 
tests and diagnostic procedures
2.  Implement the procedures for managing the 
critical results of tests and diagnostic 
procedures.
3.  Evaluate the timeliness of reporting the 
critical results of tests and diagnostic 
procedures.
Reprinted by permission of the Joint Commission Resources. All rights 
reserved
Note that these were goals, not required practices. In line with the 
commission’s commitment to encourage voluntary improvement, the 
goals were to be aspirational statements of intent for organizations to 
pursue. Recommendations, not requirements. A hospital’s progress in 
implementing them would, however, be evaluated during accredita-
tion surveys, and performance expectations that followed each goal 
were surveyed and scored. Compliance data were aggregated and 
periodically published in Joint Commission Perspectives.
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The first set of six Patient Safety Goals was published in 
January 2003:
 1. Improve the accuracy of patient identification.
 2. Improve the effectiveness of communication among caregivers.
 3. Improve the safety of high- alert medications.
 4. Eliminate wrong- site, wrong- patient, and wrong- procedure surgery.
 5. Improve the safety of infusion pumps.
 6. Improve clinical alarm systems.
Each goal had two or more specific recommendations. More 
detailed processes for achieving the Goals were available for each 
safe practice from other sources such as IHI and the Massachusetts 
Coalition. At the time they were released, Rick Croteau noted: “These 
six Joint Commission National Patient Safety Goals and recommen-
dations provide a clearly defined, practical, and achievable approach 
to addressing…the most critical threats to patient safety.” [9]
The Advisory Group continually reviews the goals. It adds new goals 
annually and retires old ones as high compliance rates are achieved. In 
2004, Goals 1b (time- outs) and 4 were consolidated into a new “Universal 
Protocol” for the prevention of wrong- site, wrong- person, wrong- 
procedure surgery. A seventh goal was added to address healthcare- 
acquired infections, which included complying with CDC hand hygiene 
guidelines. By 2008, 16 goals had been issued, including the first call to 
involve patients in their care: Goal 13, Encourage Patients’ Active 
Involvement in Their Own Care as a Patient Safety Strategy.
The Goals were well accepted by hospitals. Follow- up data from 
surveys in 2005 showed high rates of implementation for a number of 
specific recommendations: 95% use of two identifiers for patient 
identification, 82% use of time- outs, 90% implementation of critical 
test result procedures, 99% removal of KCl, and 96% use of a wrong- 
site checklist. They have been an effective mechanism for motivating 
hospitals to improve patient safety.
 Core Measures
By 2000, The Joint Commission, working with expert panels, had 
expanded its original core measure sets for acute myocardial infarc-
tion (AMI), heart failure (HF), and pneumonia to a total of 14 
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individual measures. Box 12.2 shows the core measures for 
AMI. Hospitals began collecting measures July 1, 2002. (Box 12.2)
Responding to the pleas from hospitals to reduce duplication of 
effort, the Commission worked with the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) to create one common set known as the 
Specifications Manual for National Hospital Inpatient Quality 
Measures to be used by both organizations.
The measures worked. From 2002 to 2005, hospitals adherence 
improved: AMI 87 to 90%, pneumonia 72 to 81%, and CHF 60 to 
76%. Some improvements were dramatic. For example, hospitals pro-
vided smoking cessation advice to 92.1 percent of patients in 2005 
compared with 66.6 percent in 2002. More importantly, outcomes 
improved: the inpatient mortality rate for heart attack patients declined 
from 9.2% in 2002 to 8.5% in 2005, representing thousands of lives 
saved [10].
Currently, The Joint Commission’s ORYX initiative integrates per-
formance measurement data into the accreditation process. The mea-
sures are aligned as closely as possible with the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS), and chart- abstracted data are publicly 
reported on The Joint Commission’s Quality Check® website.
Box 12.2 AMI Core Measures
Aspirin within 24 hours of arrival
Aspirin prescribed at discharge
Beta- blocker within 24 hours of arrival
Beta- blocker prescribed at discharge




Adapted from Ref. [9]
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 Public Policy Initiative
In 2001, The Joint Commission launched a set of public policy initia-
tives to amplify its patient safety and quality improvement messaging. 
It convened a series of topic- oriented roundtables to frame relevant 
discussions and develop recommendations. Each roundtable had 
30–45 participants and met on 2–3 occasions. The Joint Commission 
staff used the input to draft a white paper. Each white paper was even-
tually 35–50 pages long and contained findings, recommendations, 
and accountabilities for seeing each recommendation through to 
fruition.
The first paper on the nurse staffing crisis struck a chord in the hos-
pital, nursing, and patient safety communities and was an immediate 
success, eventually being downloaded from The Joint Commission 
website almost two million times. The report of a roundtable on 
patient safety and tort reform was also a hit and was downloaded over 
300,000 times. A number of other roundtables were convened in the 
next few years.
 Accreditation Process Improvement
In 2000, The Joint Commission decided it had to do more to improve 
its accreditation process. The triennial inspections had been a tremen-
dous burden for hospitals. For several weeks beforehand, all work 
other than patient care stopped as hospital departments got their 
records in shape for the survey. Everyone dreaded them. Worse, they 
often failed to identify some serious performance problems.
O’Leary asked Russ Massaro, a seasoned surveyor who knew how 
the minds of healthcare organization leaders worked, to rethink the 
process. The result was the Shared Visions- New Pathways initiative 
that was launched in 2004. It completely changed the accreditation 
process in three fundamental ways.
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First, organizations were asked to periodically do their own in- 
depth self- assessments and share the results and their plans for 
improvement with The Joint Commission. From now on, surveys 
would concentrate on the findings from the self- assessments and 
hospital- reported data, such as from ORYX and sentinel events.
Second, and this was a biggie, on- site surveys from here on would 
be unannounced. Gone was the dreaded triannual ritual of stopping 
work to get ready for The Joint Commission. You would have to be at 
the top of your game at all times. Unannounced meant finding out that 
the survey would be tomorrow.
Finally, instead of focusing on records, the on- site reviews would 
focus on the care actually provided to patients. They would use a 
tracer methodology in which the care to individual patients in the hos-
pital at the time was evaluated by observing and interviewing the 
patients and hospital staff in real time. Patient care was reviewed for 
relevant standards compliance, such as medication management and 
nurse staffing.
It was a huge change. And it was very successful. The reviews 
engaged doctors, nurses, and other frontline staff. Suddenly, surveys 
made sense to them, while also giving them an opportunity to demon-
strate their skills. Hospitals welcomed the new accreditation process. 
This was now continuous engagement with The Joint Commission 
toward the mutual goal of continuous improvement.
 Conclusion
What do we make of all this? First and foremost, The Joint Commission 
has clearly been a leader in reducing harm in healthcare. Without its 
influence—and persistence—we would not have made the progress 
we have made in many areas and likely not made any at all in others. 
Deciding what to do for patient safety and how to do it has been an 
incredibly complicated business, and the Commission has navigated 
that thicket well.
From the beginning, the patient safety movement has had to con-
front the tension between those who call for the greater accountability 
and regulation that has worked so well in other hazardous industries 
such as transportation and nuclear power and those who believe that 
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making real change is voluntary and that our job is to motivate people 
and provide them with the tools to do it.
Your author has found himself squarely in the middle of this debate, 
embracing the need to change the culture and helping to teach profes-
sionals to change systems, but also of the mind that we need to do 
much more to hold the leaders of healthcare organizations publicly 
accountable for failure to prevent harm, particularly serious harm 
where the methods are known, such as serious reportable events.
The Commission has also found itself in the middle, and over the 
years it has experimented with one approach and another regarding 
reporting of sentinel events, collection and reporting of data, and how 
to respond to failures revealed by accreditation visits. All compounded 
by the ambiguities and vicissitudes that result from the fact that par-
ticipation by hospitals is voluntary and from changes in views about 
whether accreditation suffices for deemed status or state licensing.
Compounded also by pushback on all sides: consumer groups who 
want tougher oversight, hospitals and doctors who want less, and 
Congress who doesn’t know what it wants or changes what it wants 
according to external pressures. To say, “You can’t please everyone” 
is an understatement at best.
Despite all this, The Joint Commission has been a well- spring of 
innovations, a great many of which have measurably reduced harm 
and improved quality of care. More than any other organization, pub-
lic or private, it has consistently pursued a data- driven analytic 
approach to helping hospitals improve care. We can all sleep better 
knowing that it will continue to be a major force for improving patient 
safety in the future.
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Chapter 13
Partners in Progress: Patient Safety 
in the UK
In 1997, Britons were shocked by a report from the General Medical 
Council (GMC) of a series of deaths from bungled surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary. In response to parents’ complaints, the GMC 
had launched an investigation into the high mortality of cardiac sur-
gery of children at the Infirmary. It found that of 53 children who were 
operated on, 29 had died and 4 suffered severe brain damage. Three 
surgeons were found guilty of serious professional misconduct, and 
two were stricken from the medical register [1].
The public and the profession were shocked that this could happen 
in the National Health Service (NHS). Richard Smith, editor of the 
BMJ, wrote, “All changed, changed utterly. British medicine will be 
transformed by the Bristol case.” [2]
Transforming the NHS was already on the mind of Tony Blair and 
the Labour Party when they took over the government that same year. 
Britons were unhappy with the quality of care in the NHS, especially 
long wait times. A recent OECD report had shown that the UK was 
underperforming its competitors. Blair made improving quality of 
care and increased funding of the NHS a keystone of his campaign. 
The Bristol case added fuel to his fire.
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 A National Commitment
One of Blair’s first acts was to appoint Liam Donaldson chief medical 
officer (CMO) in 1998. Donaldson was a surgeon who had retrained 
in public health. He had been CEO of the country’s northern regional 
authority, where he received occasional notifications from hospitals of 
“accidents” in which patients had been harmed or died from a compli-
cation of medical care. As he read them, he recognized that the pur-
pose of the reports was not learning from the incident but to cover the 
hospitals’ leaders backs if the case became public.
These hospital reports were eye-opening for Donaldson, who was 
previously only dimly aware of the problem. Like your author, 
another surgeon converted to public health a few years earlier, he 
began to read about accidents in other industries. He discovered the 
work of James Reason and human factors experts and became excited 
about applying lessons from industry to medicine. He asked local 
managers to report all incidents and set up a database to learn more. 
He began to develop a list of safety measures that needed to be 
implemented.
When Blair was elected, Donaldson shared this information and his 
ideas with him. Shocked, Blair and his new health ministers also 
Liam Donaldson. (All rights reserved)       
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recognized that this was just what he needed politically. He appointed 
Donaldson as CMO and gave him his full support.
Although the government commitment was new, interest in patient 
safety in the UK went back at least to 1985 when Charles Vincent 
began work on avoidable mishaps in medicine, which he published in 
1986. Vincent later wrote an editorial in BMJ in 1989 about systems 
changes [3], followed by a book that he edited with Maeve Ennis and 
Bob Audley, Medical Accidents, in 1993, in which he introduced the 
concept of applying human factors principles and systems analysis to 
healthcare [4].
Vincent referenced the findings of the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study and called for more research into the causes of medical acci-
dents and the development of a comprehensive safety program. Two 
years later, in 1995, he further expanded these ideas in Clinical Risk 
Management [5]. Risk managers began to think about patient safety, 
but, as in the USA, the medical profession in general had little interest 
in these developments. They were fixated on the problem of malprac-
tice litigation and worried that investigation of errors would expose 
them to more risk. Not much happened.
 The Patient Safety Movement
Donaldson would change that. In early 2000, within months of the 
publication of the IOM report in the USA, he launched the patient 
safety movement in the UK by releasing his own report, An 
Organisation with a Memory [6].
The report was the product of a panel with a wide-ranging set of 
disciplines and expertise, including people from other industries. It 
coupled a comprehensive analysis of the quality and safety problems 
in the NHS with strong recommendations about what needed to be 
done. Based on another study done by Charles Vincent [7], it esti-
mated that 11% of hospitalized Britons suffered an adverse event each 
year, at a cost of one billion pounds for additional hospital stays alone.
An Organisation with a Memory echoed the IOM report in con-
demning the typical approach when things go wrong of blaming the 
individual and made the case for a systems approach. The report cited 
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the organizational culture and the lack of an effective reporting sys-
tem as major barriers. It also acknowledged that some of the existing 
systems in the UK did work well, especially the confidential inquiries 
and reporting systems for medical devices.
An Organisation with a Memory called for a fundamental rethink-
ing of the way the NHS approached the challenge of learning from 
adverse events (AEs). It called for four specific changes: a unified 
mechanism for reporting and analysis of AE, a more open culture 
where people can safely report and discuss errors, mechanisms for 
putting recommended changes in place, and wider appreciation of the 
systems approach.
About this time, at the urging of Donaldson and BMJ editor Richard 
Smith, the British Medical Association and the NHS hosted the first 
UK national symposium on medical error. It was timed to coincide 
with the publication of a special BMJ issue on patient safety that 
Smith had conceived of a year earlier and Don Berwick and I edited 
(Chap. 17). The conference drew a wide audience from Britain and 
European countries. For many, this was their introduction to the prob-
lem of medical errors. Beth Lilja, later the driving force behind the 
Danish patient safety movement, told me that it was a defining moment 
for her.
Donaldson came to the CMO job with a passion and an agenda. He 
recognized that what he had in mind for patient safety would not suc-
ceed if it were absorbed into the NHS bureaucracy. The effort needed 
a full-time commitment and independence. He persuaded the 
Department of Health to establish an independent Special Health 
Authority, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). Its mission 
was to improve patient safety by “encouraging voluntary reporting of 
medical errors, conducting analysis and initiating preventative mea-
sures.” [8]
It is worth noting to American readers that the British response to 
the error threat reflected the ability of the NHS to make changes rap-
idly and to implement them nationwide. It stands in stark contrast to 
the USA, where Congress has long been resistant to all forms of regu-
lation and grudging in its support of safety.
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 The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA)
The NPSA was designed to identify problems and recommended 
solutions, not to implement them. There were two major divisions: 
reporting and solutions. Two experienced administrators, Sue Osborn 
and Sue Williams, the “two Sues,” were given joint responsibility for 
leading the new agency.
The first priority was to establish the National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS). Like many others, Donaldson believed that 
a national reporting system was essential to making progress in patient 
safety. Reporting and analysis could not only lead to increased aware-
ness but also produce actionable recommendations. Getting the NRLS 
going was a massive information technology challenge that domi-
nated everything else at NPSA.
The NPSA declared its objective was “to promote an open and fair 
culture in hospitals and across the health service, encouraging doctors 
and other staff to report incidents and ‘near misses’.” It was made 
clear that the purpose of reporting was to enable healthcare providers 
to learn lessons from each other in order to improve safety—not to 
identify individuals to punish [9].
The system was set up to receive and analyze reports from all 
sources (including, later, the public) and to recommend changes. 
Reporting of adverse events was already well-established in the 
UK. Hospitals were required to report adverse events to their regional 
authorities. The NPSA required the reports to also be sent to a central 
authority, the NRLS, so that the whole NHS could learn from them. 
The system soon received hundreds of thousands reports, later over a 
million, annually.
Its success proved to be its undoing. The huge volume and the 
logistics of categorizing reports impaired its ability to do meaningful 
analysis as Donaldson had hoped. What the system could do, how-
ever, was identify problems requiring action. This information was 
passed on to the solutions division that then issued alerts with recom-
mendations for implementation of safe practices. NPSA later 
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established a national register to which hospitals were required to 
report what they did in response to the alerts and why.
Alerts covered the full range of safety issues. Warning alerts were 
issued in response to a new or under-recognized patient safety issue 
with the potential to cause death or severe harm and asked healthcare 
providers to coordinate an action plan to deal with them. Directive 
alerts concerned issues for which there were proven effective safe 
practices. Healthcare organizations were required to implement them. 
Examples included removal of concentrated potassium chloride (KCl) 
from nursing units, safe practices for vaccines, blood transfusion 
competencies, safer patient identification, and the surgical checklist.
The solutions division encouraged the creation of a “no-blame cul-
ture” through various publications and extensive educational pro-
grams, including training in root cause analysis and disclosure. In 
2004 it published Seven Steps to Patient Safety that NHS organiza-
tions should take to improve patient safety [10]. It emphasized policy 
measures aimed at removing the blame culture and encouraging the 
reporting of incidents and near misses without fear of reprimand. The 
NPSA also advanced safety by training patient safety workers in rapid 
process change, the just culture, and root cause analysis.
 Additional Safety Efforts
In 2001, while the NPSA was actively improving safety, Blair estab-
lished another arm of the government to address quality of care: the 
Modernisation Agency. It was challenged to make recommendations 
to improve quality of care. 
The Modernisation Agency appointed “czars” for key issues, such 
as waiting times, cardiovascular disease, orthopedics, and cancer. 
Regional strategic health authorities were established as the working 
arms to manage performance and implement health policy. Don 
Berwick was enlisted as the only non-UK member of the Modernisation 
Board to bring in further quality improvement expertise. Using les-
sons from IHI’s experience, clinician-led collaboratives were orga-
nized by specialty networks to address specific issues. With funding 
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from the Health Foundation, the Safer Patient Initiative included 20 
trusts; it was a large-scale collaborative that worked on five areas: 
ICU, perioperative care, general hospital care, medication safety, and 
leadership [11]. Berwick was later knighted by the Queen for his 
contributions.
A separate UK agency, the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), also plays an important role in patient safety by 
assessing the benefits and risks of treatments. It was established in 
1999 as an independent organization to produce guidance on public 
health, health technologies, and clinical practice, which it does by 
rigorous analysis of evidence. In addition to practice guidelines, it 
evaluates the safety and efficacy of procedures through its Centre for 
Health Technology Evaluation.
NICE and NPSA cooperated in risk assessment of new technology, 
monitoring safety incidents associated with procedures and providing 
solutions if adverse outcomes are reported. In addition, NICE and 
NPSA shared reporting in “confidential enquiries” including surgical 
mortality, maternal and infant deaths, childhood deaths to age 16, 
deaths in persons with mental illness, and perioperative and unex-
pected medical deaths.
Despite strong national leadership and extensive efforts to improve 
patient safety, local leaders were less engaged, and many of the 
changes were resisted by the medical profession. They roundly bashed 
the creation of the NRLS, for example, and later objected to the steady 
barrage of alerts and suggestions “telling us what to do.” Safe prac-
tices could be mandated, but enforcement was sometimes undermined 
by resistance and evasion. The public was more supportive but reluc-
tant to abandon the blame mode. When errors were made public, there 
were still calls for punishment of the individuals responsible.
Support for the NPSA gradually eroded, and in 2005 the two Sues 
departed and were replaced by Martin Fletcher (a World Health 
Organization safety leader). He reduced the scope of the agency to 
focus primarily on the reporting system. NPSA was given responsibil-
ity for safety aspects of hospital design and cleanliness and food, as 
well as safe research practices through the National Research Ethics 
Service. It took on performance of individual doctors and dentists 
through the National Clinical Assessment Service (NCAS).
Additional Safety Efforts
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 Patient Safety in Scotland
Ironically, in 2008, while the NPSA was under attack, patient safety 
in Scotland took a giant step forward. Under Derek Feeley’s leader-
ship, NHS Scotland launched the Scottish Patient Safety Programme 
(SPSP), a 5-year national initiative to reduce patient harm. This was 
the first attempt to implement a patient safety program across a whole 
healthcare system. Its stated aim was to reduce mortality by 15 per-
cent and adverse events by 30 percent across Scotland’s acute hospi-
tals by the end of 2012 [12].
In partnership with IHI, Jason Leitch led SPSP to focus on reducing 
adverse events in acute care hospitals. It was amazingly successful in 
reducing the number of cases of bloodstream infections associated 
with central lines, ventilator-acquired pneumonia, and the length of 
time patients were staying in intensive care [13, 14]. It also managed 
one of the most successful implementations of the surgical checklist.
SPSP was one of IHI’s most successful initiatives [15]. Don 
Berwick’s later praise was justifiably effusive: “The Scottish Patient 
Safety Programme, marks Scotland as a leader, second to no nation on 
earth, in its commitment to reducing harm to patients, dramatically 
and continually.” [12]
 Reorganization
Back in England, in 2010, as Liam Donaldson was stepping down 
after 12 years as CMO, major changes were underway. The Labour 
Government led by Tony Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, lost a gen-
eral election, and the Conservative Party took over control. As part of 
its vaunted commitment to smaller government, it directed each min-
istry to reduce the number of agencies.
The NPSA was completely abolished for reasons entirely unrelated 
to its performance or value. Its key functions were transferred to a 
new division called NHS Improvement; later it became integrated into 
the central body running the entire health system, NHS England [16]. 
Safety was relegated to a new agency, the Healthcare Safety 
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Investigative Branch under NHS Improvement. It conducts indepen-
dent investigations of patient safety concerns through two programs, 
national and maternity. It investigates up to 30 incidents a year and 
makes recommendations to improve healthcare systems and processes.
The NRLS was temporarily managed by a London teaching hospi-
tal before itself being absorbed into NHS Improvement. The solutions 
division of the old NPSA was given to NICE.
The chaos of an NHS reorganization that its CEO said was so big 
that “It could be seen from space” made patient safety an “also ran” in 
NHS priorities. Under Donaldson’s leadership, the UK was one of the 
few countries to make a meaningful national commitment to safety 
and back it up with structural changes and funding. His strong com-
mitment gave safety visibility and stature. This was lost with the abo-
lition of the NPSA and the redesign of the CMO post to no longer 
have responsibility for quality and patient safety in the NHS.
But all was not lost. The arrival of a new health secretary, Jeremy 
Hunt, in 2012 brought a new passion and concern for patient safety at 
the political level. Hunt reached out to high-profile victims of harm, 
righting serious injustices, and stimulated new policies in patient 
safety in the NHS. He also promoted action at the global level by ini-
tiating a series of global ministerial summits. Patient safety is still on 
the agenda even though pursued with less vigor than in the past.
 Conclusion
Managing patient safety, like all of healthcare in the UK, was a politi-
cal process. While this made rapid implementation of changes possi-
ble, the downside was that it needed to be owned by the leadership 
and frontline staff in the NHS. Thus, patient safety had rapid ups and 
downs according to the motives and values of the political party in 
power and the healthcare workforce’s perceptions of it. It could not 
live up to one of Deming’s fundamental tenets for success: “constancy 
of purpose for improvement.” When governments changed, it was 
buffeted and tangled up by the dead hand of bureaucratic change. In 
spite of all this, the progress in patient safety in Britain was impres-
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Chapter 14
Going Global: The World Health 
Organization
Where was the World Health Organization on patient safety? Patient 
safety was taking off in the USA and the UK, and there were stirrings 
in Canada, Australia, Denmark, Spain, and a few other European 
countries, but what about the rest of the world? What about develop-
ing countries? With fewer resources, their needs for attention to medi-
cal harm might well be even greater.
Enter Liam Donaldson. After establishing the National Patient 
Safety Agency in the UK, Liam turned his attention and considerable 
skills to the rest of the world, to the WHO.
He was well-positioned for the task. As Chief Medical Officer of 
the NHS, he represented the UK to the WHO and was on the executive 
body. He persuaded them to put patient safety on the agenda for the 
2002 World Health Assembly. He made his proposal compelling by 
pledging annual support of $25 million from the UK.
By good fortune, the Presidency of the European Union around that 
time was on rotation to the UK. Liam also persuaded the UK govern-
ment to make patient safety a priority for its Presidency. This meant 
that the European Commission established and funded a program of 
work that stretched forward into the future.
It worked. The World Health Assembly passed resolution 
WHA55.18, which urged countries to pay attention to patient safety 
and directed the Director-General of the WHO to carry out a series of 
actions to promote patient safety: development of global norms and 
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standards, promotion of evidenced-based policies, and encourage-
ment of research in patient safety [1]. The resolution made the drive 
for safer health care a worldwide endeavor.
In November 2003, at Liam’s urging, the WHO collaborated with 
the UK to convene a meeting of senior policy makers and interna-
tional experts from all WHO regions to discuss future international 
collaboration on patient safety. At the meeting Donaldson proposed 
the establishment of the World Alliance for Patient Safety.
 The World Alliance for Patient Safety
A year later, the World Alliance for Patient Safety was formally inau-
gurated on October 27, 2004, by the Director-General of the WHO, 
Dr. Lee Jong-Wook, in Washington, DC, at an event hosted by the Pan 
American Health Organization. The event was remarkable in that it 
was the first time that heads of agencies, health policy makers, repre-
sentatives of patients’ groups from multiple nations, and the WHO 
came together to address the problem of unsafe health care. Donaldson 
and Carolyn Clancy, Director of the US Agency for Health Research 
and Quality, gave keynote addresses.
The World Alliance was Liam Donaldson’s baby. He envisioned it, 
he funded it, and he led it for the first 5 years.
The Alliance goals were ambitious: to develop standards for patient 
safety and assist UN Member States in improving the safety of health 
care by “raising awareness and political commitment to improve 
safety and facilitate the development of patient safety policy and prac-
tice in all WHO Member States” [2]. The program focused on six 
areas of action:
 1. Global patient safety challenge
 2. Patient and consumer involvement
 3. Developing a patient safety taxonomy
 4. Research in patient safety
 5. Solutions that improve safety
 6. Reporting and learning to improve patient safety
Before the year was out, the Alliance moved ahead on two initia-
tives that I was privileged to be involved in: reporting and learning 
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and the global patient safety challenge. These initiatives illustrate the 
scope and power of the WHO to influence change.
 Guidelines for Adverse Event Reporting 
and Learning Systems
In the USA, the most common reaction to the IOM report was to call 
for more reporting of errors and adverse events. The same was true 
internationally. By the time the Alliance was formed 4 years later, 38 
countries had indicated to the WHO their interest in developing report-
ing systems. Indeed, there seemed to be a fixation on reporting as the 
solution to the patient safety problem. But no country had a system 
they were satisfied with.
Accordingly, it was reasonable that reporting was one of the six 
areas of action called for in the Alliance prospectus: “The Alliance 
will develop best-practice guidelines that can be used to facilitate the 
development of new reporting systems to improve patient safety and 
to improve existing reporting systems.” The statement that followed 
of core principles to underlie the guideline development quoted almost 
verbatim from the paper on reporting systems that I wrote in 2002 for 
the New England Journal of Medicine [3] as part of our series of 
patient safety topics. (See Chap. 17.)
So I was not totally surprised when Pauline Phillip called from the 
WHO and asked me to write the reporting guideline. I was not eager 
to take on another project at that time and had some reservations about 
working with the WHO because of its reputation for being excessively 
bureaucratic, but I was very excited about what Liam was doing with 
the World Alliance and anxious to help it succeed.
It was also another opportunity to bring some balance and reality to 
the thinking about reporting. So many people thought reporting was 
the solution to medical errors: “Just make them report their mistakes 
and they will be more careful,” the thinking went. Not only was it not 
true—there was no evidence that reporting made people more care-
ful—it also was not the solution to the safety problem. The problem 
was bad systems, not careless people.
Beyond the conceptual fallacy, the logistics of establishing and 
managing a reporting system were formidable. The costs were 
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daunting for rich countries and far beyond consideration for develop-
ing or middle-income countries. We could provide a reality check.
I agreed to write the guideline on the condition that I share the proj-
ect with a co- author, who would be paid. I had someone in mind: 
Susan Abookire, a former student of mine and physician who was 
currently working in safety at Brigham and Women’s Hospital. Indeed, 
when I approached her, Susan was interested and willingly took on 
the huge task of digging out the historical information on what already 
was being done worldwide. We wrote the monograph and shepherded 
it through the labyrinth of WHO approval. We succeeded despite the 
resistance of an internal reviewer who considered herself much better 
qualified to write it and at one point suggested it all be redone!
The document was comprehensive. It described and compared the 
many types of systems in use worldwide. We spelled out in detail the 
key components of a reporting system and described the requirements 
for making it work. Controversial issues such as accountability, public 
disclosure, and confidentiality were addressed [4].
We reiterated the earlier admonition that the fundamental role of a 
reporting system is to enhance safety by learning from failures. 
Reporting must be safe—individuals who report must not be punished 
or suffer other consequences. Reporting is of little value unless it 
leads to a constructive response. At a minimum, this requires data 
analysis to identify hazards. But for significant impact, to justify the 
effort and expense, the system must include root cause analysis of 
incidents to uncover the contributing factors and lead to recommenda-
tions for systems changes.
We described alternatives to reporting for gaining useful informa-
tion to improve patient safety, such as WalkRounds, focus groups, 
focused review on specific problems, failure modes and effects analy-
sis, and analysis of malpractice claims data. Existing data sources, 
such as that generated by the voluntary National Nosocomial Infections 
Surveillance System and the US National Surgical Quality 
Improvement Program, can be used to identify hazards. We described 
the characteristics of successful systems and provided a checklist for 
developing a reporting system
The monograph was published the following year, as “draft” guide-
lines [4]. I never got an explanation of why they weren’t given the full 
WHO endorsement, which suggests it was political. The realistic tone 
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of the document—you need experts, it is expensive, and it isn’t worth 
doing if you are unable to respond to the reports with analysis and 
system changes—undoubtedly was not what many wanted to hear, 
both within the WHO and among Member States!
The requirements we laid out for establishing a reporting system 
were indeed formidable; it was unlikely that many governments would 
be willing to provide the funds to do it right. At this time in the USA, 
we had no national system, none of the state mandatory systems were 
effective, and all of them were underfunded.
A few years later, Pennsylvania implemented a comprehensive 
reporting and analysis system, wisely funded by a tax on hospitals. It 
has yielded valuable information and stimulated change. Other states 
have improved their systems with variable results. Britain, on the 
other hand, had already made a substantial investment in a national 
reporting system when they established the National Patient 
Safety Agency.
The majority of members of the WHO are low- and middle-income 
countries. If they took the Guidelines seriously, they would quickly 
recognize that there were better ways to deploy their limited resources. 
That, of course, was the lesson that was implied: there are more effec-
tive ways to improve patient safety for far less. Perhaps not exactly 
what the WHO had in mind when it conceived the project. Nonetheless, 
the “draft” guidelines are still the WHO publication on reporting 
15 years later.
 Patient and Consumer Involvement—Patients 
for Patient Safety (P4PS)
Liam Donaldson’s passion for patient safety was rooted in his deep 
concern for the victims—the injured patients. He was moved by his 
personal experience as a physician, as well as the writings of Charles 
Vincent, one of the first to call attention to the psychological impact 
of unanticipated harm on the patient [5]. On the various occasions 
when I had the opportunity to hear Donaldson speak, I was impressed 
that he started every talk on patient safety with a story of a patient. 
That was the point, that was why we were here.
Patient and Consumer Involvement—Patients for Patient Safety (P4PS)
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The Alliance’s second major early initiative, Patients for Patient 
Safety, was his mechanism for involving patients in the solution. 
Launched in 2004, it was based on the recognition that the patient 
and family have unique information because they are the only ones 
present through the entire continuum of care, which may have 
involved care from multiple providers at different institutions. Those 
who have experienced harm have special insights concerning sys-
tems failures. It would seem obvious that they should play a central 
role in efforts to improve the quality and safety of health care around 
the world. Patients for Patient Safety (P4PS) would tap that resource.
Founding leaders included Margaret Murphy from Ireland, who 
also advised the UK National Institute for Healthcare Research, 
Stephanie Newall from Australia, and Sue Sheridan and Helen Haskell 
from the USA. All of them had lost children or a spouse as the result 
of medical errors, and all were, and still are, active and effective lead-
ers in changing policy in their local and national environments. They 
were motivated to give meaning to their tragedies by sharing their 
experiences and advocating for change.
The WHO convened the first Patients for Patient Safety workshop 
in London in 2005. Participants developed the “London Declaration” 
that enunciated the common vision and commitment for positive 
engagement of patients in their care. It called for honesty, openness, 
and transparency, making reduction of health-care errors a basic 
human right, and for promoting programs for patient safety and patient 
empowerment by dialogue with all partners (Appendix 14.1).
At this meeting, P4PS created a global network of patients, con-
sumers, caregivers, and consumer organizations to support patient 
involvement in patient safety programs, both within countries and in 
the global programs of the World Alliance for Patient Safety [6].
The Patients for Patient Safety network has continued to grow. By 
2012 it had 250 members in 52 countries. They are champions for 
patient engagement and empowerment on hospital boards, medical 
school councils, governmental policy groups, and professional con-
ferences around the world. The patient’s voice is being heard.
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 Support of Patient Safety Research
At the outset the Alliance wanted to create a proper evidence base for 
patient safety, an entirely new field of health services research. David 
Bates of Harvard University was charged with setting out research 
priorities in the WHO’s three bands of countries: high-, middle-, and 
low-income [7].
The Alliance’s first major research initiative was an ambitious proj-
ect to estimate the extent of medical harm in developing countries. 
The WHO recognized that to convince people in the developing world 
that medical errors were a serious problem, they would need to show 
them the extent of the problem in their own countries. Data from 
advanced western countries would not do it.
Many of us thought this would be an exercise in futility. The most 
serious limitation in the MPS—the factor that raised the most ques-
tions about its validity—was that much of the data came from poor 
medical records, those with few progress notes. In the USA, this was 
especially a problem in small rural hospitals. The records in hospitals 
in developing countries would surely be worse.
And the logistics! Imagine getting cooperation from such a diverse 
group. Well, the WHO was undaunted, and Ross Wilson of Australia 
agreed to take it on and attempt to recreate the MPS in these unprom-
ising environments.
The objectives of the study were to assess the frequency and nature 
of adverse events in patients in developing or transitional economies 
and to determine whether the established method for review of records 
would work in resource poor health- care systems in which medical 
records might be less comprehensive.
Ten Ministries of Health initially volunteered, but two later with-
drew in the face of objections from hospital leaders who feared dam-
age to their reputations. The eight countries that participated were 
Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, South Africa, and 
Yemen. The WHO appropriated $30,000 for each country to conduct 
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the study, a retrospective review of randomly selected medical records 
from hospital admissions during 2005 in a convenience sample of 26 
hospitals. These Middle Eastern and African countries had a com-
bined population of nearly 265 million, about a third of whom lived 
below the poverty line. The average health expenditure was $133 
per person.
The research team used the Medical Practice Study approach in 
which records are screened using 18 explicit criteria, followed by 
review of those records that screened positive by a senior physician 
who would determine if there were an adverse event and evaluate its 
preventability and resulting disability.
Of the 15,548 records reviewed, 8.2% showed at least 1 adverse 
event (range 2.5—18.4% by country), of which 83% were judged to 
be preventable and 30% were associated with death of the patient. 
About 34% of these adverse events were from therapeutic errors in 
relatively non-complex clinical situation [8].
Disturbing as these results were, they were undoubtedly underesti-
mates because of poor record keeping in the hospitals. Nursing notes, 
pathology reports, and procedure notes were not available in some 
countries. Many hospitals started a new record each time a patient 
presented, so earlier clinical information was not available, limiting 
the rate of positives in the primary review.
Further, because the results came from a “convenience sample,” 
i.e., hospitals that volunteered to participate, not ones that were ran-
domly chosen, the data cannot be used to estimate national rates for 
the studied countries. In addition, research teams noted that some of 
the hospitals that volunteered were those that were generally regarded 
as providing some of the best care in that country. Thus, the overall 
national injury rates were undoubtedly higher.
Like their American predecessors years before in the Medical 
Practice Study, reviewers had difficulty recognizing systems prob-
lems such as lack of availability of information or equipment, bad 
protocols, poor hand hygiene, etc. Most events were attributed to 
inadequate training and supervision of clinical staff or to the failure to 
follow policies or protocols.
Nonetheless, some important conclusions could be drawn. The 
authors concluded that the problem of unnecessary harm “will not be 
solved only by providing more staff and equipment, even if that were 
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immediately possible. Basic clinical processes of diagnosis and treat-
ment need broad attention, aided by the provision of clinical policies 
and protocols standardized on best practice and supervised in their 
implementation.” [8]
Despite its limitations, the study accomplished its objective of 
arousing awareness of the extent of medical harm. It undoubtedly 
made them more receptive to doing something about it. For that, the 
Alliance had a plan: a global patient safety challenge.
 The Global Patient Safety Challenge
Liam Donaldson’s purpose in setting up the World Alliance was to 
advance patient safety globally, to get all countries involved. The 
Global Patient Safety Challenge was the action area to make that hap-
pen. The idea was to identify a significant universal safety problem 
and then catalyze worldwide commitment by policy makers, health-
care workers, and patients to implement a safe practice that would 
address that problem and significantly reduce harm.
It was, to say the least, ambitious! There were only two criteria for 
selecting the practice, but they were formidable: it had to be a practice 
that would have a measurable impact on safety, and it must be possi-
ble to implement the practice worldwide—in all environments, from 
rural clinics in developing countries to sophisticated modern aca-
demic medical centers in Western cities.
The first Global Patient Safety Challenge fits the bill. It focused on 
preventing health-care-associated infections. It was led by Didier 
Pettit, an epidemiologist from the University of Geneva. The cam-
paign was launched at WHO Headquarters in Geneva Switzerland in 
October 2005 and titled “Clean Care is Safer Care.” Ministers of 
health from all WHO Member States were called on “to make a for-
mal statement pledging to tackle health care-associated infection 
within their country.” [9] To “catalyse and sustain strong and visible 
leadership and stewardship by government, health authorities and 
professionals, and minimize complacency” [10].
They were asked to do that by improving hand hygiene (washing or 
disinfecting your hands before touching a patient). Pettit had brought 
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together over 200 leading specialists in infection prevention and 
patient safety. They decided that improving hand hygiene could be a 
powerful and feasible intervention. They developed the safe practice, 
Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Health Care [11], and a plan for 
worldwide adoption.
Expert task forces addressed critical implementation topics, such as 
strategies to promote greater patient involvement and global imple-
mentation of the disinfectant. They developed indications for glove 
use and reuse and addressed the religious, cultural, and behavioral 
aspects of hand hygiene [12].
Then the specialists took the crucial step that would make hand 
disinfection possible in low-resource environments: they found an 
inexpensive way to make a disinfectant for dipping hands which could 
be readily produced anywhere.
In 2007 and 2008, the Challenge team pilot tested the new hand 
hygiene guidelines at 6 pilot sites involving 43 hospitals in Costa 
Rica, Italy, Mali, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia [13]. Compliance 
increased overall from 51.0% before the intervention to 67.2% after.
Significant improvement of hand-hygiene compliance was seen in 
all sites, across all professional categories, and for all indications for 
hand hygiene. It was greater in low-income and middle-income coun-
tries, which had lower compliance rates before the study. Improvement 
was sustained: 2 years after the intervention, all sites reported 
Didier Pettit. (All rights reserved)      
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continuing or further improvement, including in some cases national 
scale-up.
Subsequently, over 50 countries ran successful hand hygiene 
national campaigns, and almost 20,000 health facilities in 177 coun-
tries eventually joined the campaign. The need for supporting infec-
tion prevention and control improvement was clear. Clean Care is 
Safer Care generated so much momentum and so great a sense of soli-
darity across the world that it led the WHO to institute a new, formal-
ized infection prevention and control global unit. That unit is still 
active 10 years after the launch, renewing engagement of thousands of 
health workers around hand hygiene every year on May 5.
The Alliance Challenge also motivated health organizations in the 
West. The nationwide movement to improve hand hygiene in American 
hospitals has been the most successful patient safety initiative. 
Compliance rates now approach 100% in many hospitals.
The first Global Patient Safety Challenge represented a proven 
change model that mobilized the world around infection prevention 
through: (a) awareness-raising about the burden of the problem to 
engage stakeholders, (b) an approach to engage nations through 
demonstrable commitment, and (c) the availability of evidence- based 
guidance and implementation tools to drive improvement.
The second Global Patient Safety Challenge also had a big impact. 
It tackled surgical safety and resulted in the development of the surgi-
cal checklist. That is a more complicated story and is told in the next 
chapter.
 Later Years
Despite the considerable success of these programs, by 2008 the 
World Alliance was merged into the WHO’s mainstream management 
structure. While this strengthened its authority in relation to Member 
States and their health systems, the free- thinking and freewheeling 
style of the World Alliance was lost. This slowed its pace and meant 
that ideas and actions were subjected to scrutiny within the WHO’s 
governance structure that sometimes had a stultifying effect. In addi-
tion, not unlike within the NHS in Britain, there were periods of reor-




Fortunately, Donaldson remained in his external advisory role as 
WHO Patient Safety Envoy and helped to build a powerful second 
phase to the global patient safety program. This included starting a 
third WHO Global Patient Safety Challenge, currently underway, 
Medication Without Harm, to address the widespread systems prob-
lems in medication processes everywhere [14].
Medication Without Harm asks all WHO Member States and pro-
fessional bodies to commit to reducing severe avoidable medication-
related harm by 50% globally within 5  years by taking action to 
manage medication safety in three areas: high-risk situations, poly-
pharmacy, and transitions of care [15]. Hopefully, it will have an effect 
similar to its highly successful predecessors.
In 2019, the World Health Assembly adopted a fresh resolution on 
patient safety: WHA 72.6, Global Action on Patient Safety. This 
secured the future of patient safety as a global health priority for the 
next 10 years, ensuring that it would not succumb to further organiza-
tional change or the whim of new leadership [16].
 Conclusion
The World Alliance for Patient Safety had a huge impact on reduc-
ing medical harm worldwide. It represented the WHO at its best: a 
catalyst for change that also provides practical expertise and finan-
cial support for those in need. The Global Patient Safety Challenges 
have saved millions of lives, not just in developing countries but also 
in Western countries with sophisticated health-care systems. They 
have stimulated other efforts such as practices to reduce maternal 
mortality in childbirth.
The Alliance and WHO’s continuing programs in patient safety 
have also “changed the conversation” worldwide. Victims of health-
care harm and their families now have a voice and are being heard. 
Preventing harm by changing systems is not just a theory, it saves 
lives. Even in situations with very limited resources, it is possible to 
make changes that make a difference. The patient safety experience 
provides insight into what the United Nations can do when nations 
pull together. An important lesson in these troubled times.
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 Appendix 14.1: The London Declaration
We, Patients for Patient Safety, envision a different world in which 
health-care errors are not harming people. We are partners in the effort 
to prevent all avoidable harm in health care. Risk and uncertainty are 
constant companions. So we come together in dialogue, participating 
in care with providers. We unite our strength as advocates for care 
without harm in the developing as well as the developed world.
We are committed to spread the word from person to person, town 
to town, country to country. There is a right to safe health care, and we 
will not let the current culture of error and denial continue. We call for 
honesty, openness, and transparency. We will make the reduction of 
health-care errors a basic human right that preserves life around 
the world.
We, Patients for Patient Safety, will be the voice for all people, but 
especially those who are now unheard. Together as partners, we will 
collaborate in:
• Devising and promoting programs for patient safety and patient 
empowerment
• Developing and driving a constructive dialogue with all partners 
concerned with patient safety
• Establishing systems for reporting and dealing with health-care 
harm on a worldwide basis
• Defining best practices in dealing with health-care harm of all kinds 
and promoting those practices throughout the world
In honor of those who have died, those left disabled, our loved 
ones today, and the world’s children yet to be born, we will strive 
for excellence, so that all those involved in health care are as safe 
as possible as soon as possible. This is our pledge of partnership.
References
 1. World Health Assembly. WHA55.18 quality of care: patient safety. Geneva: 
World Health Organization; 2002.
 2. WHO welcomes key United Kingdom support for global patient safety 
Spress release]. London/Geneva: World Health Organization; 2005.
References
228
 3. Leape LL. Reporting of adverse events. N Engl J Med. 2002;347(20):1633–8.
 4. Leape LL, Abookire SWHO. Draft guidelines for adverse event reporting 
and learning systems: from information to action. Geneva: World Health 
Organization; 2005.
 5. Vincent C, Pincus T, Scurr J. Patients’ experience of surgical accidents. Qual 
Health Care. 1993;2:77–82.
 6. Patients for Patient Safety: What’s New? World Health Organization. https://
www.who.int/patientsafety/patients_for_patient/en/. Accessed 19 Apr 2020.
 7. Bates DW, Larizgoitia I, Prasopa-Plaizier N, Jha AK. Global priorities for 
patient safety research. BMJ. 2009;338:b1775.
 8. Wilson R, Michel P, Olsen S, et al. Patient safety in developing countries: 
retrospective estimation of scale and nature of harm to patients in hospital. 
BMJ. 2012;344:e832.
 9. Support from WHO Member States and autonomous areas: pledges to com-
bat health care- associated infections. World Health Organization. https://
www.who.int/gpsc/statements/en/. Accessed 19 Apr 2020.
 10. World Health Alliance for Patient Safety. Global patient safety challenge: 
2005–2006. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2005.
 11. WHO Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Health Care: First Global Patient 
Safety Challenge, Clean Care is Safer Care. Geneva: World Health 
Organization;2009.
 12. Pittet D, Allegranzi B, Sax H, et al. Evidence-based model for hand trans-
mission during patient care and the role of improved practices. Lancet Infect 
Dis. 2006;6(10):641–52.
 13. Allegranzi B, Storr J, Dziekan G, Leotsakos A, Donaldson L, Pittet D. The 
first global patient safety challenge “clean care is safer care”: from launch to 
current progress and achievements. J Hosp Infect. 2007;65(Suppl 2):115–23.
 14. Donaldson LJ, Kelley ET, Dhingra-Kumar N, Kieny M-P, Sheikh 
A. Medication without harm: WHO’s third global patient safety challenge. 
Lancet. 2017;389(10080):1680–1.
 15. The Third WHO Global Patient Safety Challenge: Medication Without 
Harm. World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/patientsafety/
medication- safety/en/. Accessed 21 Apr 2020.
 16. World Health Assembly. WHA72.6 global action on patient safety. Geneva: 
World Health Organization; 2019.
14 Going Global: The World Health Organization
229
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and repro-
duction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
References
231© The Author(s) 2021
L. L. Leape, Making Healthcare Safe, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71123-8_15
Chapter 15
Just Do It: The Surgical Checklist
For the second Global Patient Safety Challenge, the WHO chose mak-
ing surgery safer. My involvement was minor. One day, a year or so 
after the hand hygiene program started, I received a call from Pauline 
Kelly, my friend from the Reporting Guidelines project. The World 
Alliance leaders had decided to do a Patient Safety Challenge on a 
surgical topic. This made good sense, since surgical mishaps were 
well recognized as a major cause of mortality worldwide. Nearly half 
of all AEs discovered in the Medical Practice Study were related to a 
surgical operation. She asked me if I thought Atul Gawande would be 
willing to lead it.
My immediate reaction was that it was unlikely. By then, by virtue 
of his insightful New Yorker articles and his first highly successful 
books Complications and Better, Atul was already a celebrity and 
very much in demand. In addition, he was establishing a center for 
patient safety research and still practicing surgery. He was a very busy 
man. But, no harm in asking him, I said. If he would do it, it would be 
a very successful project.
The topic, safe surgery, was certainly an appropriate global public 
health problem. Nearly 300 million surgical operations are performed 
annually around the world. In industrialized countries the rate of 
major complications has been estimated at 3–16% of surgical proce-
dures, with a death rate of 0.4–0.8% [1, 2].
Studies in developing countries suggest a much higher death rate of 
5–10%. This translates to an estimate that 7 million surgical patients 
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suffer significant complications each year and 1 million die. 
Approximately half of these appear to be avoidable [1]. Surgical mor-
tality is 10–100 times higher than maternal mortality from childbirth.
A week or so after my phone call from the WHO, Atul walked into 
my office. “WHO wants me to do a Global Patient Safety Challenge 
on a surgical problem. What do you think?” (This is encouraging, I 
thought: he is willing to consider it!) Well, I said, recalling the report-
ing guidelines experience, the WHO is very bureaucratic, so working 
with them can be frustrating at times. On the other hand, they are seri-
ous about safety, and if you succeeded in developing an effective 
intervention it could improve the care of millions of patients around 
the globe. If you can put up with the grief, you could make an impor-
tant contribution. He said he would think it over.
To WHO’s and my delight, and the world’s benefit, Atul decided to 
take it on. In January 2007, the Safe Surgery Saves Lives initiative 
began. Atul assembled a team that compiled a background document 
of safety practices with known benefits to surgical patients. The docu-
ment established targets for improvement and the specific practices 
necessary to achieve these targets [3].
An international group of nearly 100 experts was then convened to 
review the background document and suggest additional topics to be 
considered. This group included surgeons, anesthesiologists, nurses, 
Atul Gawande. (All rights reserved)     
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patients, experts in infectious disease, engineers, and organizational 
leaders who represented the range of practice environments around 
the world, from primitive developing countries, such as Ghana and 
Mongolia, to Western democracies, such as New Zealand and the USA.
They identified four areas of potential improvement in surgical 
safety: surgical site infection prevention, safe anesthesia, safe surgical 
teams, and measurement of surgical services. They decided to imple-
ment a surgical checklist.
The idea of using a checklist to reduce harm was not new. 
Commercial aviation had used them for years, and Peter Pronovost 
had recently brought the term to national attention with his pathbreak-
ing work eliminating central line infections [4]. Nor was the concept 
of a surgical checklist unprecedented. It had been tried with some 
success at Columbus Children’s Hospital, the University of Toronto, 
Johns Hopkins, and by Kaiser hospitals in southern California [5] and 
in Australia [6].
The checklist built on another idea that was catching on in the USA 
to avoid wrong-site and wrong-patient errors: a “time out” at begin-
ning of an operation. In 2004, the Joint Commission launched its 
Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, 
Wrong Person Surgery. It comprised three sets of steps: preoperative 
verifications, marking the operative site, and a “time out” immedi-
ately before the operation.
As the Safe Surgery Saves Lives checklist was developed, each 
potential step was carefully considered by the international group, 
and each draft checklist was subjected to a trial by a clinical team. 
Issues with logistics, timing, and team interactions were worked out, 
and confusing language was clarified. It was then trialled in a variety 
of other settings.
Expert working groups were also created to review the available 
scientific evidence and write a supporting document, Guidelines for 
Safe Surgery, which the WHO issued in 2009 [7]. It focused on criti-
cal steps that should be universally followed, such as making sure it is 
the right patient, having blood available if needed, and briefing the 
team. And, consistent with the WHO mandate, these were practices 
that could be implemented in any operating room regardless of the 
sophistication of the environment.
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It’s not that simple, of course. The “checklist” they devised is a 
series of steps to be taken at three critical junctures in care: before 
anesthesia is administered, immediately before incision, and before 
the patient is taken out of the operating room. Success at implement-
ing these steps depends on full participation of every member of the 
team, especially the surgeon.
Before induction of anesthesia, members of the team orally confirm 
the surgical site and procedure and that the patient has verified his or 
her identity and has given consent. The team confirms that the surgi-
cal site is marked, the pulse oximeter is on, and that all members of 
the team are aware of the patient’s allergies. If there is a risk of blood 
loss of 500 ml or more, appropriate access and fluids are available.
Before skin incision, the entire team (nurses, surgeons, anesthesia 
professionals, and all others participating in the care of the patient) 
orally confirms that all team members have been introduced by name 
and role and reconfirms the patient’s identity, surgical site, and proce-
dure. The surgeon reviews critical and unexpected steps, operative 
duration, and anticipated blood loss. The anesthesia staff reviews con-
cerns specific to the patient and confirms that prophylactic antibiotics 
have been administered if indicated. The nursing staff reviews confir-
mation of sterility, equipment availability, and other concerns. The 
team confirms that all essential imaging results for the correct patient 
are displayed in the operating room.
Finally, in the third stage, before the patient leaves the operating 
room, the nurse reviews aloud with the team the name of the proce-
dure; that the needle, sponge, and instrument counts are complete; 
that any specimen is correctly labeled; and whether there are any 
issues with equipment to be addressed. The surgeon, nurse, and anes-
thetist review aloud the key concerns for the recovery and care of the 
patient.
The use of the checklist was tested in eight hospitals in eight cities 
(Toronto, Canada; New Delhi, India; Amman, Jordan; Auckland, New 
Zealand; Manila, Philippines; Ifakara, Tanzania; London, England; 
and Seattle, WA) chosen to represent a range of economic circum-
stances and diverse populations. Data was collected from 3733 
patients before and 3955 patients after the implementation of the 
checklist [8].
The results showed that the rate of any complication at all sites 
dropped by 36%, from 11.0% at baseline to 7.0% after 
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introduction of the checklist; the total in- hospital mortality dropped 
47%, from 1.5% to 0.8%. The overall rates of surgical- site infec-
tion and unplanned reoperation also declined significantly. 
Interestingly, ensuring the correct identity of the patient and site 
through preoperative site marking and oral confirmation was new 
to most of the study hospitals.
The results made headlines. To the average person it just made 
sense. Of course, you would want to be sure you were operating on 
the right person and doing the right operation. Of course, you would 
introduce yourself to all the members of the team. If use of the check-
list can reduce surgical mortality by 47%, then why wouldn’t all hos-
pitals start using it immediately?
The WHO agreed. On January 14, 2009, the checklist was made 
public, and the WHO launched the Second Global Patient Safety 
Challenge: Safe Surgery Saves Lives with the aim of persuading hos-
pitals everywhere to adopt the checklist. Its use was mandated or 
strongly encouraged by several governments, including those of the 
UK and the Netherlands [9]. By the end of 2009, the surgical checklist 
was being used in 10% of American hospitals and over 2000 hospitals 
worldwide [5]. In 2017, the WHO reported that the checklist was 
being used by a majority of surgical service providers around the 
world [10].
Reports appeared documenting the results of implementing the 
checklist. There were some impressive successes [11–15]. The 
Veterans Health Administration provided extensive training and 
staged implementation and demonstrated an 18% decrease in mortal-
ity after 1 year [12]. In the Netherlands, six high-performing hospitals 
showed reductions of 39% in complications and 48% in mortality 
[11]. In the UK, results were mixed, but generally positive [16]. A 
2013 meta-analysis of seven controlled studies of checklist imple-
mentation showed a 41% reduction in complications and a 23% 
decrease in mortality [17].
But some studies showed little or no effect. Strangely, the point of 
some reports seemed to be to prove that it was a bad idea [18]. 
Compliance was a problem everywhere, especially by surgeons. Use 
of the checklist was not turning out to have the impact that the initial 
study indicated was possible.
The reasons were not obscure. Implementing the surgical checklist 
is not nearly as simple as it seems on the surface. The issue is not the 
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technical challenge of getting people to tick off boxes on a list, but the 
social challenge of changing human behavior [9]. And the checklist 
represented a major change in how everyone in the operating room 
functioned. The successful implementation by Peter Pronovost of a 
checklist to prevent CLABSI was far simpler. It dealt with a single 
established procedure and far fewer participants, but even doing that 
was difficult [19].
As quality improvement specialists know, the crucial element in 
implementing a new safe practice is teamwork. All stakeholders have 
to be involved in the process change for it to work. Unfortunately, this 
was still a relatively foreign concept among physicians, especially 
surgeons, whose definition of a good team was often having assistants 
who knew what to do and did what they were told to do.
Getting people to be good team players has been the biggest chal-
lenge for improving patient safety overall. The surgical checklist put 
that idea front and center. Successful hospitals implemented it in the 
way it was intended: as a set of reminders carried out by a team that 
worked together to prevent errors. They had the will to succeed and 
leadership at the top and at the team level.
In a 2015 retrospective analysis, Haynes et al. noted several other 
elements that were crucial to success [20]. First, the checklist must be 
modified by the local team to meet its needs. Although the authors 
stressed this in the initial report, it was typically ignored by teams that 
failed. They didn’t make it their checklist. They didn’t take ownership 
of the checklist. As a result, they felt that it was something they had to 
do, not something they wanted to do.
Second, because the changes called for are extensive, implementa-
tion of a checklist should be started on a small scale to work out 
remaining kinks in the process. This pilot process also uncovers 
“champions,” the respected local surgeons who are key to success of 
the full rollout.
Third, training sessions are required for all participants to enable 
them to understand and become comfortable with the new ways. 
Successful programs typically devoted months to training prior to 
beginning the implementation. Fourth, the implementation team regu-
larly observed the use of the checklist in practice and provided and 
received feedback from the clinicians [20].
Most hospitals need help to implement the checklist. They lack the 
resources and expertise to lead the effort and build teams. As shown 
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by the experience with the Massachusetts Coalition implementation 
of reconciling medications and communicating critical test results 
(see Chap. 8) and Peter Pronovost’s work implementing a checklist to 
eliminate central line infections, statewide or system-wide collabora-
tives are effective ways to provide local teams with direction, coach-
ing, and the opportunity to learn from each other [9].
The barriers to implementation of the checklist—the causes of fail-
ure—are largely social. The most common has been resistance by sur-
geons who were loath to give up their hallowed role as “captain of the 
ship.” Most thought they already had a good team and were not keen 
about involving others. Some felt that use of memory aids is an admis-
sion of weakness or lack of skill or knowledge, others that standard-
ization is a limit to their clinical judgment [21]. Some gave dismissive 
answers to queries and complained that the process delayed the opera-
tion (although the checklist can be completed in 2 minutes); some just 
refused to participate [22].
Self-introductions were awkward for surgeons, and for other mem-
bers of the surgical team, as was speaking up. In a system with a long 
tradition of steep interpersonal hierarchy, it was contrary to their con-
cepts of their roles and what they had been taught. So, when surgeons 
pushed back, few resisted. Some had a fear of legal responsibility if a 
complication occurred after they had signed a form. But the biggest 
change required was in the surgeon’s behavior.
A year or two after the checklist was in use, I asked Atul how it was 
going. He was pleased with the national uptake, he said, although he 
was concerned that in too many operating rooms surgeons still weren’t 
on board. Too often it was left to the nurse to check the boxes, just one 
more thing they were required to do.
“Do you know what part of the checklist surgeons find hardest to 
do?” he said. “Asking all the member of the team to introduce them-
selves.” This step is crucial to the fundamental point of the checklist: 
converting the many participants in the operating room into a team 
that worked well together, supported one another, and in which each 
individual felt personal responsibility for the patient and making sure 
everything went right.
I was not surprised. In my 27-year surgical career, I had never done 
that. Nor had any other surgeon I knew. I thought I had a great team: 
my scrub nurse and circulating nurse had been with me for years, and 
we worked well together and enjoyed each other. Our several 
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pediatric anesthetists were good friends of mine, and we worked well 
together with few conflicts. But I never paid any attention to those 
other people in the operating room who were assisting the nurses or 
anesthetists, running for blood, getting more instruments, etc.
The idea of involving them in the operation, much less expecting 
others to take responsibility for my doing the right operation on the 
right patient, never occurred to me, nor to any of my colleagues. If the 
idea had come up, we would have rejected it. We were, after all, the 
“captain of the ship,” and it was everyone else’s job to do our bidding.
For example, over my years as a pediatric surgeon I performed hun-
dreds of inguinal hernia repairs in children. I was sure that one day I 
would operate on the wrong side. I really worried about that. It never 
occurred to me to share that worry with others of the team or ask them 
to help me make sure it didn’t happen. It never did happen, but that 
was just good luck.
The surgical checklist changed all of that. If the team took it seri-
ously, if they could indeed function as a team, then everything that 
takes place in the operating room is everyone’s responsibility. Clearly, 
having many eyes on the question of right patient, right operation, 
right site makes a difference. It takes a team to make care safe. The 
checklist is a tool that can make that happen.
 Conclusion
The surgical checklist story is in many ways the story of patient safety. 
It is built on a practice borrowed from other industries, notably avia-
tion, where its effectiveness in preventing errors is well-established. It 
derives its power from its theoretical basis—the human factor princi-
ple of avoiding reliance on memory—and from its practical effect: 
reinforcing teamwork that is essential for safe practice. Thanks to the 
work of Gawande and others, it has been successfully adapted for use 
in health care. When used properly, as in the VA, the Netherlands, and 
Scotland, the surgical checklist is a powerful tool for reducing harm 
and mortality.
But using the surgical checklist properly has been an immense 
challenge. Requiring that it be used has not generally been a success-
ful strategy. The system is too easily gamed. If the surgeon is not on 
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board, it is easy to go through the motions and have the nurse ensure 
that all the boxes are ticked. The larger point of the checklist—to 
encourage a conversation about important practices and empower all 
members of the team to take responsibility—is lost.
Teamwork is the heart of successful voluntary adoption of the sur-
gical checklist. Developing meaningful teams is also arguably the 
most fundamental culture change needed overall to make health care 
safe. As noted in earlier chapters, major efforts in team training and 
reinforcement of teamwork in collaboratives have yielded impressive 
improvements, including the implementation of the surgical checklist, 
but we still have a long way to go. For now, the surgical checklist, like 
all of patient safety, is still a work in progress.
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Chapter 16
Spreading the Word: The Salzburg 
Seminar
Salzburg! The name conjures up images of the annual world-famous 
Salzburg Festival and The Sound of Music, with its magnificent castle 
and the glorious singing of Julie Andrews. The birthplace of the 
divine Mozart.
What is less well known about this charming city is that it is also 
the home of The Salzburg Global Seminars, the “home to change 
makers” since 1947. Founded to bring participants together from 
around the world for weeklong meetings to explore a single subject, 
the Salzburg Global Seminar is an independent not-for-profit organi-
zation. (See Appendix 16.1 for the intriguing history of how the semi-
nars came into being in the years immediately following WWII.)
The seminars are a mix of lectures, discussions, workshops, papers, 
and presentations held at Schloss Leopoldskron—the “Sound of 
Music” palace—an idyllic and secluded spot conducive to thought 
and insight.
In April of 2001, the Salzburg Seminar, Patient Safety and Medical 
Error, Session 386, became a reference point in the history of patient 
safety through the seminar on medical error.
This chapter is brief, but it illustrates how a single event—a week-
long intensive interaction on a single subject—can raise people’s con-
sciousness, alter their beliefs, and, in some cases, change their careers. 
All that happened at Salzburg in 2001 as the patient safety movement 
was getting underway.
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As with many things in quality and safety, having a Salzburg 
Seminar on medical error was Don Berwick’s idea. He had attended 
an earlier one in 1998 organized by Tom Delbanco, Through the 
Patient’s Eyes: Collaboration between Patients and Health Care 
Professionals, and thought it would be an ideal way to move thinking 
ahead in patient safety. I thought it was a splendid idea! Fortunately, 
others did too, and we were able to secure funding and attract a stellar 
faculty to plan the event.
Our announcement for the session was ambitious:
The Seminar is “intended to provide a forum for an exploration of possi-
ble scenarios for making medical facilities safer places for work and for 
care. To this end, the session will examine the causes, consequences, and 
methods of improvement of patient safety, with particular emphasis on the 
American and European experience.
Among the issues to be addressed: the sociologic and technical charac-
teristics of medical care, and the systems that allow them to function as 
high reliability organizations; the role of effective cooperation, communi-
cation, and mutual support among the healthcare providers, the role of the 
patient in the healthcare process; the influence of individual human factors 
in healthcare delivery, such as professional training, psychological and 
physical stress, and principles of designing systems for safety.
The session will seek to bring together a diverse group of individuals 
involved in various aspects of the medical process, including administra-
tors, healthcare workers, representatives from regulatory agencies, as well 
as specialists in the field of safety.”
Schloss Leopoldskron. (Reprinted with permission 
from Salzburg Global Seminar. All rights reserved)
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The timing proved to be felicitous. The BMJ special edition on 
medical error the previous year got worldwide attention, bringing the 
issue to the forefront for the first time for many people. We attracted 
62 participants (“Fellows”) from 28 countries, including more than a 
third from non-western countries: Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, 
China, Egypt, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Malta, Mexico, Palestine, 
Philippines, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey, and 
Zimbabwe (Appendix 16.2).
The Fellows varied widely in their knowledge and experience. The 
environments from which they came and to which they would return 
spanned the spectrum of awareness and opportunity. But we all had 
one thing in common: in all countries, the response to an error was to 
blame the individual. That was a common language we all understood, 
and that was what we wanted to change.
Our faculty was from “central casting”: the recognized thought 
leaders Jim Reason and Charles Vincent from the UK, safety guru 
Rene Amalberti from France, Tom Nolan from Associates in Process 
Improvement, Maureen Bisognano from IHI, Richard Cook from the 
University of Chicago, Don, and I. We took turns giving talks in the 
mornings followed by plenary discussions. The major work occurred 
in four working groups to which participants were assigned. They met 
in the afternoons for discussions moderated by the faculty.
The four working groups took on separate major challenges to 
making health care safe: Leadership and Culture Change; Education, 
Training and Supervision; Personal and Organizational Accountability; 
a b c
(a) Rene Amalberti, (b) Maureen Bisognano, and (c) Tom Nolan. (All rights 
reserved)
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and Design of Process and Systems. Interspersed in the afternoon ses-
sions were occasional breaks, but we worked most of most days and 
continued discussions informally in the evenings.
Another important feature of the Seminar was a series of informal 
presentations by Fellows on subjects for which they had special exper-
tise or experience. Eleven in all, these included regulation, working 
with consumer advocates, partnering with patients, sleep deprivation 
and working hours, reporting systems, improving safety in resource-
constrained environments, and national funding of safety research.
On the first day, Richard Cook suggested to the faculty that we 
stimulate the workshop conversations by giving participants a simula-
tion exercise in the form of a “news flash” about a serious situation: a 
tragic preventable death in their hospital that was published in a local 
paper’s headline above the fold. The Working Groups were instructed 
to take on the role of C-Suite and Board to discuss their response.
The “news flash” came in the evening. The next day the teams were 
to make decisions about how they would respond, what their roles 
were, what they would say, and who would be the best spokesperson 
within the organization and to the public. Each evening, Richard would 
tighten the constraint by issuing ongoing press releases of more sensa-
tional and damaging speculations and actual findings about the event.
The simulation surfaced a number of issues: just how difficult it 
was to talk about failure, the state of transparency, accountability, fear 
of litigation, defensiveness of organizational reputation and assets, 
the role of the media and the public’s right to know, responsibility to 
the patient’s family, and the relationships between family, care team, 
and hospital.
For some Fellows, this proved to be overwhelming. The simulation 
succeeded in getting them to begin to understand the complexities of 
responding to disastrous errors, but how to respond was beyond the 
capacity of the majority of this diverse group of participants. Most of 
them were just beginning to think about patient safety and had no 
experience in dealing with complex issues or failures. For them, it was 
too intense and emotionally charged. It pushed them into a zone of 
discomfort and distracted them from what they came to the seminar to 
accomplish. We stopped the exercise on the third day.
The Working Groups benefited greatly from the diversity of the 
backgrounds of the participants. Some were experienced and had 
worked for some time in quality improvement and safety. For others, 
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it was all new. For all, the discussions were deeper—and longer—
than any they had previously experienced. The insights and lessons 
learned were shared with the entire group in the final session of the 
week when each of the working groups presented their conclusions.
The Seminar had a substantial impact. In large measure it accom-
plished our objectives of expanding the understanding of patient 
safety and motivating leaders to advance the cause. It was an incredi-
bly rich and mind-stretching experience in which everyone, faculty 
and students, learned a great deal and were motivated to work harder—
and smarter—to reduce harm.
For many Fellows, it was a generative experience: they left with 
new lenses through which to view medical error, new ideas for change, 
and, for many, new commitment to the cause. They began to envision 
a world in which we stop blaming people for making mistakes and 
focus on designing sustainable systems to prevent medical error from 
harming patients.
A number of Fellows, such as Beth Pedersen Lilja of Denmark, 
Kristoff Viet of Germany, and Julie Morath, Tejal Gandhi, Allan 
Frankel, and Peter Pronovost of the USA, went on to become leaders 
who had a significant impact on patient safety. The Salzburg Seminar 
proved to be a defining experience, referred to years later with much 
affection.
 Appendix 16.1: History of the Salzburg 
Global Seminars
The Seminar was the brainchild of Clemens Heller, a native Austrian 
attending graduate school at Harvard, who, in aftermath of World War 
II in 1946, “envisioned a cultural bridge spanning the Atlantic not 
only by introducing the demoralized Europeans to all sorts of 
American cultural achievements, but also by stimulating a fruitful 
exchange between European national cultures and America.”
Harvard was unwilling to support the project, but Heller and sev-
eral friends convinced the Harvard Student Council to be the official 
sponsor of the Seminar, raised the majority of funds, and obtained 
permission from the State Department for entrance into Allied 
Occupied Austria.
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By great good fortune, Heller shortly afterward bumped into a 
friend of his parents, Helene Thimig, the widow of theater producer 
Max Reinhardt, who owned a summer home in Salzburg named 
Schloss Leopoldskron. Thimig agreed to rent them the Schloss for the 
purpose of a summer school.
The Schloss was built in 1736 by Count Leopold von Firmian, 
Prince-Archbishop of Salzburg. It remained in the possession of the 
Firmian family until 1837 and then passed through several owners 
until it was bought in 1918 by Reinhardt, who cofounded the Salzburg 
Festival. During World War II, the Schloss was confiscated as Jewish 
property, but after the war it was returned to the Reinhardt Estate.
The first session, officially called “The Harvard Student Council’s 
Salzburg Seminar in American Civilization,” lasted 6  weeks in the 
summer of 1947 and brought together men and women from 18 coun-
tries, including countries from behind the Iron Curtain. Faculty 
included anthropologist, Margaret Mead, economists Walt Rostow 
and Wassily Leontief, writer and literary critic Alfred Kazin, 
and others.
The Seminar was formally incorporated on April 20, 1950, by 
which time it had developed into more than a summer school, and ses-
sion topics were expanded beyond American Studies. It acquired 
Schloss Leopoldskron in 1959 [1].
 Appendix 16.2: Participants in Salzburg Seminar 386 
Patient Safety and Medical Error
Working Group A 
LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE CHANGE
(Maureen Bisognano and René Amalberti)
• Ross Baker (Canada)
• James Battles (USA)
• Ahmed Bayoumi (Sudan)
• Jocelyn Cornwell (UK)
• Sally Goebel (USA)
• Erik Jylling (Denmark)
• Harold Kaplan (USA)
• Mariana Lerner (Israel)
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• Raymond Mayewski (USA)
• Nagui Mikhail (Egypt)
• Leonard Miron (Romania)
• Julianne Morath (USA)
• Norman Nyazema (Zimbabwe)
• Beth Pedersen (Denmark)
• Peter Pronovost (USA)
• Robert Wells (Australia)
• Alma Yearwood-Dixon (USA)
Working Group B
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND SUPERVISION
(Donald Berwick and Richard Cook)
• DeWitt Baldwin (USA)
• Norberto Barrera (Argentina)
• Guttorm Bratteboe (Norway)
• Allan Frankel (USA)
• Tejal Gandhi (USA)
• Lidia Georgieva (Bulgaria)
• Sandra Huddleston (USA)
• Mauricio Lopez Ramos (Mexico)
• Karine Martirosyan (Armenia)
• Patricia Ogle (South Africa)
• Yasemin Oguz (Turkey)
• Abdalla Shehata (Egypt)
• Richard Smallwood (Australia)
• Lourdes Tejero (Philippines)
• Helfried Waleczek (Germany)
Working Group C
PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
(Lucian Leape and Charles Vincent)
• Choi Chuen Ha (China)
• Dmitri Elioutine (Russia)
• Michael Fiene (Germany)
• Andrea Gerlin (USA)
• Sven Öhman (Sweden)
• Synnöve Ödegard (Sweden)
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• Amos Otedo (Kenya)
• Gajendra Singh (India)
• Anthony So (USA)
• Marianne Sørensen (Denmark)
• David Swankin (USA)
• Kathryn Townsend (USA)
• Joanne Turnbull (USA)
Working Group D
DESIGN OF PROCESS AND SYSTEMS
(Thomas Nolan and James Reason)
• Susan Abookire (USA)
• Nancy Conrad (USA)
• Douglas Eby (USA)
• Kaj Essinger (Sweden)
• Martin Fischmeister (Austria)
• Carol Haraden (USA)
• Yuichi Imanaka (Japan)
• Avi Israeli (Israel)
• Peter Kennedy (Australia)
• Ronald Kirshner (USA)
• Liu Xiaohong (China)
• Mohammed Massoud (Palestinian
• Authority)
• Vin McLoughlin (Australia)
• Josephine Sollano (USA)
• Carina Svensson (Sweden)
• Christian Thomeczek (Germany)
• Josanne Vassallo (Malta)
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Chapter 17
Publish or Perish: British Medical 
Journal Theme Issue, New England 
Journal of Medicine Series
“Publish or perish!” The governing principle of academia. Trite 
though it may be, true it also is. At any research university—and that 
is where medical schools are and where those who do research in 
patient safety work—you do not get promoted if you don’t publish.
Medical journals publish science, or at least they try to. Was this 
new patient safety stuff science? There were those who did not think 
so. It was “soft stuff”—not as bad as psychiatry, perhaps—but “touchy-
feely” interpersonal stuff. It didn’t seem to fit the mold of medical 
practice that many doctors embraced of treatment based on scientific 
evidence. This may have been part of the reason that the results of the 
Medical Practice Study were ignored when they came out, as were the 
recommendations in Error in Medicine a few years later.
In the “great awakening” of patient safety, in the post-Annenberg 
and pre-IOM days of patient safety when the NPSF was being formed, 
the Executive Session was underway, and IHI was establishing its 
breakthrough collaboratives, leaders of the movement were concerned 
that young investigators would not be able to get their work in the new 
science of patient safety published in leading journals where it needed 
to be for their academic advancement. Lacking that access would sti-
fle innovation.
Leading American journals, NEJM and JAMA, had published the 
foundational papers, but little since. They and other journals still did 
not seem to regard this new field of patient safety as “science.” NPSF 
had begun to fund research projects. Would the results be published?
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The breakthrough came, interestingly, from Britain. This was not 
altogether surprising: the two foremost thought leaders in patient 
safety, James Reason and Charles Vincent, were from the UK. Reason 
had been a featured speaker at Annenberg. The NHS Chief Medical 
Officer, Liam Donaldson, was beginning his work to bring patient 
safety to the fore. But it was Richard Smith, editor of the British 
Medical Journal (BMJ), who got it moving.
It was Richard Smith, you will remember, who in 1998 wrote in 
response to the Bristol Inquiry, “All changed, changed utterly. British 
medicine will be transformed by the Bristol case” [1]. Richard was a 
great fan of Don Berwick and had supported the NHS’s involving Don 
in quality improvement. Smith was intrigued by the rising interest in 
patient safety.
In February 1999, he invited Don and me to edit a special theme 
issue of BMJ on medical error. We thought it was a terrific idea!
This was big stuff. Annenberg had been exciting, but it did not lead 
to much movement other than the founding of the NPSF. The public 
and the medical profession were still largely unaware of the extent of 
the problem of medical error or of efforts to implement systems 
changes. AHRQ hadn’t yet been born. Don and I were on the IOM 
Quality Committee, but it had not issued “The Report.” Publication of 
patient safety papers in BMJ would get doctors’ attention. We were 
excited.
Richard gave us full latitude to select the topics and solicit papers. 
He asked us to commission five articles and five editorials and issue 
an open solicitation for an additional four original papers and several 
brief reports. This was going to be a far bigger publishing effort than 
anything Don or I had ever been involved in.
We wrote a call for papers—an editorial in BMJ—that laid out the 
problem and asked for submission of papers. We provided a substan-
tial list of potential topics and indicated that we were interested in 
innovative topics, as well as authors from industry and other fields in 
addition to health care. The editorial was published on July 17, 
1999 [2].
We then wrote to those we had selected to write commissioned 
papers. As we anticipated, all accepted. The papers were due by 
November, and our chosen authors produced them in record time. As 
we reviewed them, it became clear that this single issue of the journal 
would give an impressively comprehensive look at this new field of 
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patient safety by the people who were making it happen. It would be 
a reference issue.
The BMJ special issue was published on March 18, 2000 [3], just 
months after the release of the IOM Report. Publication was timed to 
coincide with the first UK national symposium on medical error orga-
nized by the British Medical Association and the National Health 
Service, at which Don and I also spoke.
The papers were awesome: Jim Reason (error management) [4], 
Saul Weingart (epidemiology) [5], Bob Helmreich (lessons from avia-
tion) [6], David Gaba (anesthesia as a model) [7], David Bates (IT and 
medication errors) [8], and Tom Nolan (systems changes) [9].
In addition to the commissioned papers and editorials by Dennis 
O’Leary (accreditation) [10], Jim Reinertsen [11] (disclosure), 
Michael Cohen (voluntary reporting) [12], and Albert Wu (second 
victim) [13], the final issue included 13 original papers and reports.
This was the first time that a major medical journal brought together 
in a single- issue works by international authorities on the major con-
cepts in patient safety and results from empirical studies. Smith gave 
it a real boot by putting a photograph of a crashed airliner on the cover 
of that issue of the staid old BMJ!
It had an enormous impact. BMJ is the primary medical journal for 
all of Europe and is read by many around the world. The special issue 
put safety on the screen for the first time for many people. At least one 
of my safety friends, Beth Pedersen Lilja from Copenhagen, later told 
me that it did that for her—and led her and others to come to the 
Salzburg Seminar the next year.
 NEJM Series on Patient Safety
Later that year, in the fall of 2000, I drafted a letter to the editor of the 
New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) asking whether they 
would be willing to consider publishing a series of essays on issues in 
patient safety. I showed it to my department chairman, Arnie Epstein, 
who was an Associate Editor at the NEJM. He was supportive, but he 
thought a more successful approach might be for him to sound out the 
editor in chief and the other editors and try to persuade them to take it 
on. The fact that a major rival, the BMJ, had devoted a special issue to 
patient safety might have sparked some interest.
 NEJM Series on Patient Safety
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I really wanted them to do this. Having your paper published in the 
NEJM is the official stamp of quality in academic medicine. The 
Journal has the largest circulation of any medical journal in the world 
and is trusted by physicians and health policy people as the most reli-
able source of medical information. As a result, it attracts reports of 
leading-edge medical research and “breakthroughs.”
The IOM report brought national attention to patient safety, but it 
was a book, and most doctors don’t have time to read books. They do 
read journals, though, and in the USA, the NEJM is at the top of the 
pile. The American readers of the BMJ Special Issue were mostly 
academics. This would be an opportunity to reach a broad range of 
doctors and policy makers and increase their awareness and under-
standing of the major issues in patient safety. If we did it right, patient 
safety papers published in the NEJM might make them more likely to 
accept the changes we were proposing and motivate some to join in 
the work. It would also, of course, spread the word around the world.
About 8 months after that conversation, I finally got the call. They 
were interested. Arnie and I met with Jeff Drazen, the Editor in Chief, 
to negotiate the deal—what the series would consist of, who decided, 
and how to proceed. It was a bit complicated, but we worked it out, 
and the Deputy Editor, Robert Steinbrook, was assigned to work with 
me and Arnie to come up with a proposal.
We agreed that the purpose of the series would be to explain key 
issues in patient safety and to stimulate interest and debate that would 
influence health policy. We would choose topics that were central to 
safety and provide fresh analysis, showing how new approaches could 
provide remedies. The series would include up to 12 papers, published 
monthly. The proposal was accepted.
The process was much more complicated than it had been with the 
BMJ, where Don Berwick and I were given carte blanche to pick the 
subjects and authors and were able to do it quickly. With the NEJM, 
we had to convince the editors of the worth of each subject and the 
competence of our chosen author to deliver. The papers would be sub-
ject to the usual lengthy review process.
I developed a list of 14 potential topics and wrote a brief on each 
one, outlining the issues of interest and the questions to be addressed 
by the paper. These would also be the instructions for the authors. 
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Arnie, Robert, and I had extensive discussions about whom to invite 
to write the papers. We read previous papers written by candidates 
and consulted widely with colleagues about their suitability. If the 
papers were to be definitive statements of the current state of the art, 
the authors needed to be unquestioned experts.
We recommended 12 topics to the editors. After some discussion 
they decided to start with 6 and later consider expanding that number. 
I was disappointed, but “half a loaf….” We narrowed it to six and gave 
the editors a brief on each one with the proposed author. They were 
accepted, and I invited the authors to write the papers. Fortunately, we 
did ultimately get 12 papers published.
The process took a year, but the series finally began in October 2002 
with a bang: five papers in one issue of the Journal. The editors decided 
to take advantage of the recently aroused interest in a specific safety 
issue, resident work hours. The Accreditation Council on Graduate 
Medical Education (ACGME) had announced they would be requiring 
an 80 hours per week limitation of resident work hours as of July 1, 
2003. The rule had sparked a vigorous and sometimes acrimonious 
debate within the profession. The editors decided to focus on that issue, 
which, interestingly, had not received much attention in the IOM report.
a b
(a) Richard Smith, and (b) Arnie Epstein. (All rights reserved)
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So, in addition to our overview editorial about the series and David 
Gaba and John Howard’s commissioned paper on physician fatigue, 
the issue contained an editorial on rethinking medical training by 
Drazen and Epstein, a Sounding Board article on duty hours by Debra 
Weinstein, and a Health Policy Report on the debate over resident’s 
hours by Steinbrook.
Gaba and Howard’s paper, Fatigue among Physicians and the 
Safety of Patients, reviewed the scientific evidence of the effects of 
fatigue on performance and the efforts to limit MD hours [14]. They 
analyzed the new ACGME regulations and their consequences. Drazen 
and Epstein’s Rethinking Medical Training – The Critical Work Ahead 
emphasized the enormous importance of the issue and that it was an 
opportunity to rethink residency training. The measure of success will 
be whether it is improved [15].
Debra Weinstein’s Duty Hours for Resident Physicians explored 
the consequences of hour reduction and the need to reengineer the 
system of care [16]. Steinbrook’s The Debate Over Resident’s Work 
Hours provided facts about residency numbers, reviewed the argu-
ments for and against the change, and examined the details of the 
requirements and problems in implementation [17].
Having multiple papers on the same subject might seem like over-
kill, but it was not. The overlapping messages presented in different 
contexts reinforced the impact. The overall message was clear: limits 
to work hours were here to stay, and the consequences would be sub-
stantial and difficult to cope with.
The Journal then featured one safety paper each month. The one in 
November was my paper on reporting [18]. This was the issue in the 
IOM report that had attracted the most interest—and misunderstand-
ing. Immodestly, I saw this as an opportunity to write the definitive 
work on the subject!
 Reporting of Adverse Events
A year before the IOM report, in October 1998, I sent a memo to the 
key thinkers, Don Berwick, Richard Cook, David Woods, David 
Bates, David Gaba, David Cullen, and Jeff Cooper, asking whether 
we should work on developing a proposal for a national medical 
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adverse event reporting system. I extolled the virtues of the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System that we were all familiar with and asked if 
we should have something like it.
They agreed to consider it. There was an obvious problem with this 
idea: the Aviation Safety Reporting System gets 30,000 reports a year 
at a cost of $two million. Extrapolation from our incident studies sug-
gested we could have as many as three million. Do the arithmetic!
In lieu of such a national system, we considered the alternative of 
hospital level reporting. To succeed would require major efforts by 
CEOs to create an environment where nurses and others felt safe 
reporting. Even if it were limited to sentinel events or sampling events 
one day a month, it would yield more reports than they could handle. 
A confidential system reporting near misses would face similar barri-
ers. We decided not to pursue it further.
Writing my paper for the NEJM did not go well. Because their 
whole process around producing the papers was so controlling, I 
was unsure of whether what I was writing was appropriate, so I sent 
a draft to Jeff Drazen for his suggestions before finalizing the paper. 
Was it what he wanted? To my dismay, we miscommunicated, and 
rather than giving me advice, he sent the draft out for reviews! It 
was not ready, and by the time I found out it was too late to call 
it back.
One of the reviewers was the former editor of the Journal, Arnold 
(Bud) Relman. We were old friends, but that didn’t inhibit his profes-
sionalism. He chopped away at it. He was particularly offended that I 
made a reference to something he had said or written without giving 
citation credit. I had planned to do that, of course, but this was a draft. 
I called him, explained that the paper was a draft, and apologized. His 
review, of course, was very helpful. I rewrote the paper, and it sur-
vived the final round of reviews.
The paper, Reporting of Adverse Events, analyzed the objectives, 
potential, practices, success, and limitations of current reporting sys-
tems, both voluntary and mandatory [18]. It analyzed the characteris-
tics of successful reporting systems. I noted that a national voluntary 
reporting program that provides meaningful analysis of events and 
feedback of useful information (such as the aviation reporting system) 
would be quite expensive and, therefore, unlikely to be developed. 
Existing state mandatory reporting systems had limited value for the 
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same reason. On the other hand, numerous voluntary specialty-based 
and system-wide reporting systems were developing and seemed to 
be quite successful.
At the time of the report, 20 states had mandatory reporting systems 
that varied widely in requirements. The publication of the list of “Never 
Events” by the NQF the previous year led some states to standardize 
mandatory reporting around clearly defined and non-debatable events. 
It also stimulated others to create reporting systems. By 2010, 27 states 
and the District of Columbia had mandatory reporting systems.
In December, the NEJM published a survey they had commissioned 
from Bob Blendon: Views Of Practicing Physicians And The Public 
On Medical Errors [19]. In January 2003, the series resumed on a 
monthly basis with Atul Gawande’s Risk Factors for Retained 
Instruments and Sponges after Surgery [20], John Burke’s Infection 
Control  – A Problem for Patient Safety [21], Charles Vincent’s 
Understanding and Responding to Adverse Events [22], and David 
Bates and Gawande’s Improving Safety with Information Technology 
[23]. The commissioned paper on malpractice did not survive the 
review process; it was replaced by a paper by Tejal Gandhi, Adverse 
Drug Events in Ambulatory Care [24].
The Journal decided this was enough for now. I was disappointed 
because I thought several other subjects deserved airing: Organizational 
Change, Nursing, Institutional and Professional Oversight, Regulation, 
and the VA as a case study. However, the papers published in the series 
were excellent: informative, provocative, and authoritative. I think 
they made a difference.
 Patient Safety and Quality Journals
The embrace of patient safety by the premier medical journals did 
indeed seem to have the desired effect of providing academic respect-
ability for the new field of patient safety. Other mainstream journals 
and specialty journals began to publish more safety-related articles. 
Junior faculty could now get their papers published.
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It is important to note, however, that within the quality and safety 
community, there were several major outlets that had been publishing 
research papers for some time. Three deserve comment: the Joint 
Commission Journal on Quality and Safety, BMJ’s Quality in Health 
Care, and the Journal of Patient Safety.
 Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 
and Safety
The Joint Commission was an early leader in the quality improve-
ment movement. In 1974 it created one of the first journals dedicated 
to quality improvement, the Quality Review Bulletin (QRB). The 
name was changed to the Joint Commission Journal on Quality 
Improvement in 1993, and then, as the patient safety movement got 
under way, to the Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 
and Safety in 2003. Published monthly, the Journal has been the 
major venue for publication of actual protocols and safety practices, 
such as the two from the Massachusetts Coalition on Reconciling 
Medications and Communication of Critical Test Results [25, 26].
 BMJ’s Quality and Safety in Health Care
In 1992, 8  years before the BMJ special issue, its editor, Richard 
Smith, decided to give greater emphasis to the burgeoning field of 
quality improvement and created a subsidiary journal, Quality in 
Health Care. It soon became a major journal for publication of quality 
of care research, rivaling or surpassing the Joint Commission’s 
journal.
The journal added patient safety to its remit in 2011 when it changed 
its name to Quality and Safety in Health Care and hired Kaveh 
Shojania as editor. Currently, it publishes more articles than any other 
quality or safety journal and is a major voice for patient safety 
research.
 BMJ’s Quality and Safety in Health Care
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 The Journal of Patient Safety
The latest entry to the field, the Journal of Patient Safety, was created 
as the official journal of the National Patient Safety Foundation in 
2005 under the leadership of Nancy Dickey, former Chairman of the 
Board of the AMA. As a new journal, it had trouble attracting papers 
from researchers because of low readership, but it was gaining impact 
until the Denham scandal (Chap. 5). He had published a number of his 
own papers, later review of which showed numerous conflicts of 
interest.
In 2014, David Bates took over as editor. Under his leadership, the 
Journal has prospered. Although it is a quarterly journal, it now pub-
lishes a large number of papers in each issue and has proven to be a 
valuable patient safety resource.
 Conclusion
Academic journals are the lifeblood of research. “If it isn’t published, 
it didn’t happen” may be a bit of an exaggeration, but not much. New 
ideas have to be communicated to get traction; word of mouth and 
Kaveh Shojania. (All rights 
reserved)
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presentations at meetings are not enough to do the job. Most impor-
tantly, the peer-review process filters out most (not all) bad research; 
good studies prompt others to replicate them and often inspire new 
ideas. All of these journals—the prestigious and the patient safety-
oriented—have, in fact, established patient safety as a discipline that 
is here to stay.
References
 1. Smith R. All changed, changed utterly. BMJ. 1998;316(7149):1917–8.
 2. Berwick DM, Leape LL.  Reducing errors in medicine [editorial]. 
BMJ. 1999;319(7203):136–7.
 3. Leape LL, Berwick DM. Reducing error, improving safety [special issue]. 
BMJ. 2000;320(7237):725–814.
 4. Reason J. Human error: models and management. BMJ. 2000;320(7237):768–70.
 5. Weingart S, Wilson R, Gibberd R, Harrison B. Epidemiology of medical error. 
BMJ. 2000;320(7237):774–7.
 6. Helmreich RL.  On error management: lessons from aviation. 
BMJ. 2000;320(7237):781–5.
 7. Gaba D.  Anaesthesiology as a model for patient safety in health care. 
BMJ. 2000;320(7237):785–91.
 8. Bates DW. Using information technology to reduce rates of medication errors 
in hospitals. BMJ. 2000;320(7237):788–91.
 9. Nolan TW.  System changes to improve patient safety. BMJ. 
2000;320(7237):771–3.
 10. O’Leary D.  Accreditation’s role in reducing medical errors. BMJ. 
2000;320(7237):727–8.
 11. Reinertsen J. Let’s talk about error. BMJ. 2000;320(7237):730.
 12. Cohen MR.  Why error reporting systems should be voluntary. BMJ. 
2000;320(7237):728–9.
 13. Wu A. Medical error: the second victim. BMJ. 2000;320(7237):726–7.
 14. Gaba DM, Howard SK. Fatigue among clinicians and the safety of patients. N 
Engl J Med. 2002;347(16):1249–55.
 15. Drazen JM, Epstein AM.  Rethinking medical training--the critical work 
ahead. N Engl J Med. 2002;347(16):1271–2.
 16. Weinstein DF. Duty hours for resident physicians--tough choices for teaching 
hospitals. N Engl J Med. 2002;347(16):1275–8.
 17. Steinbrook R.  The debate over residents’ work hours. N Engl J Med. 
2002;347(16):1296–302.
 18. Leape LL. Reporting of adverse events. N Engl J Med. 2002;347(20):1633–8.
References
264
 19. Blendon RJ, DesRoches CM, Brodie M, et al. Views of practicing physicians 
and the public on medical errors. N Engl J Med. 2002;347(24):1933–40.
 20. Gawande AA, Studdert DM, Orav EJ, Brennan TA, Zinner MJ. Risk fac-
tors for retained instruments and sponges after surgery. N Engl J Med. 
2003;348(3):229–35.
 21. Burke JP. Patient safety: infection control - a problem for patient safety. N 
Engl J Med. 2003;348(7):651–6.
 22. Vincent C. Understanding and responding to adverse events. N Engl J Med. 
2003;348(11):1051–6.
 23. Bates DW, Gawande AA. Improving safety with information technology. N 
Engl J Med. 2003;348(25):2526–34.
 24. Gandhi T, Weingart SN, Borus J, et al. Adverse drug events in ambulatory 
care. N Engl J Med. 2003;348:1556–64.
 25. Rogers G, Alper E, Brunelle D, et al. Reconciling medications at admission: 
safe practice recommendations and implementation strategies. Jt Comm J 
Qual Patient Saf. 2006;32:37–50.
 26. Hanna D, Griswold P, Leape L, Bates D.  Communicating critical test 
results: safe practice recommendations 2005. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 
2005;31:68–80.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and repro-
duction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
17 Publish or Perish: British Medical Journal Theme Issue, New…
Part III
Getting to Work: Key Issues and How 
They were Dealt with
267© The Author(s) 2021
L. L. Leape, Making Healthcare Safe, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71123-8_18
Chapter 18
Sleepy Doctors: Work Hours 
and the Accreditation Council 
for Graduate Medical Education
On March 5, 1984, Bennington College freshman Libby Zion died at 
New  York Hospital. She had been admitted the night before with 
vague symptoms and strange jerking motions. After consulting with 
her family physician, the residents on call gave her intravenous solu-
tions for possible dehydration and prescribed meperidine to control 
her jerking motions. They then left to take care of other patients. Luise 
Weinstein, the first-year resident, was responsible for 40 other patients. 
No sleep for her.
Libby Zion did not improve; she became more agitated. Weinstein 
ordered restraints, which Zion fought against. Finally, she went to 
sleep. But her temperature rose, and by 6:30  AM it reached 
107 °F. Weinstein took measures to cool her down, but she quickly 
deteriorated, had a cardiac arrest, and could not be resuscitated.
Her father, Sidney Zion, a lawyer and a writer for the New York 
Times, was furious. He was convinced her death was due to inade-
quate care by poorly supervised, overworked residents. In a New York 
Times op-ed piece, he wrote: “You don’t need kindergarten to know 
that a resident working a 36-hour shift is in no condition to make any 
kind of judgment call—forget about life-and-death.” He decried the 
lack of supervision of the residents and accused the doctors of murder. 
He launched an unremitting public campaign for justice [1].
A full investigation later concluded that the probable cause of death 
was a reaction between the prescribed meperidine and an antidepres-
sant she was taking, phenelzine. This interaction was not well-known, 
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and, in fact, at a hearing 2 years later several chairmen of departments 
of medicine at prominent medical schools stated they had never heard 
of the interaction prior to this case.
Sidney Zion pursued the legal challenge, however, and in 1986 a 
grand jury charged the residents with negligence. However, after mul-
tiple reviews and conflicting findings by state regulatory bodies over 
several years, an appeals court in 1991 cleared them of all charges [2]. 
Zion then filed a civil suit which in 1995 concluded with a judgment 
that the primary care physician and the residents pay Zion $375,000 [2].
 Residency Training
The system for training doctors goes back to the 1890s, when William 
Stewart Halsted, the professor of surgery at the Johns Hopkins 
Hospital, formalized the training of surgeons. Halsted believed that 
total immersion in the care of patients was the best way to learn about 
disease and treatment and to develop a sense of commitment to the 
patient.
After completing medical school, surgical trainees at Hopkins were 
required to literally live at the hospital—the origin of the term “resi-
dent”—and were discouraged from marrying. Supervised by senior 
physicians called “Attending Physicians,” they were responsible for 
all aspects of care, including menial tasks such as drawing blood for 
tests, changing dressings, and transporting patients for tests. It was a 
long process: up to 10 years for some.
Other specialties adopted the residency concept, gradually modify-
ing it to require 30 hours in-hospital on alternate days, the custom at 
the time of the Libby Zion case. Surgical training typically required 5 
years, medical specialties, three. Residents (also called “house offi-
cers”) were not paid for their services—after all, they were getting a 
free education—but they got free uniforms and room and board while 
in the hospital.
Although they were budding professionals, hospitals often treated 
them like military academy plebes. An apocryphal story that I heard 
while a surgical resident at the Massachusetts General Hospital many 
years later was that a former hospital director was so incensed with 
residents standing around with their hands in their pockets that he had 
the pockets of their uniforms sewn shut!
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The number of residencies increased as the number of specialties 
expanded dramatically in the mid-twentieth century. In addition to 
supervised clinical experience and bedside teaching, programs pro-
vided teaching conferences. Few residents were paid anything until 
the 1960s, when they began to receive a meager “stipend” to meet 
personal expenses—nothing for living expenses outside the hospital, 
such as food and rent. Hospitals found it convenient to ignore the real-
ity that now most residents were married, and some had children.
Forty years later, in 2001, the mean salary for residents was $40,000 
a year, an average of $9.61 an hour for the typical 80-hour week [3]. 
Residents’ expertise, skills, and dedication enable faculty at teaching 
hospitals to take care of very sick and complicated patients without 
hiring help or needing to be present all the time. The “purpose” of 
residency training may be education, but its practical effect—and 
attraction for the hospital and its doctors—is the 24/7 service doctors 
in training provide at below minimum wages.
The sleep deprivation and high workloads of busy acute clinical 
care practice pose a threat to patient safety for any physician, but 
especially for residents during training. It has been demonstrated, and 
we all know from personal experience, that judgment and perfor-
mance suffer when we are up all night or are excessively fatigued 
from overwork. There is no reason to believe that physicians have 
some special immunity to these effects. Other critical industries such 
as commercial aviation and nuclear power recognize the effects of 
sleep deprivation and strictly limit work hours. Why should medicine 
be different? The Zion case forced the public and the profession to 
confront these issues.
 Early History—What Happened After Zion
Following the grand jury indictment in 1986, Health Commissioner 
David Axelrod (the same person who later funded the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study) established a blue-ribbon committee headed by 
Bertrand Bell, the “Bell Commission,” to investigate the training and 
supervision of doctors. It recommended limiting resident work hours 
and improving supervision [4].
In 1989 New York State adopted the Commission’s recommenda-
tions and legislated that residents could not work more than 80 hours 
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a week or more than 24 consecutive hours. It also required that they 
have round-the-clock supervision by attending physicians. Two hun-
dred million dollars was appropriated to hire additional ancillary help 
and board-certified physicians to assist New York hospitals in compli-
ance [5, 6].
It is worth noting that although it is broadly accepted, the 80-hour 
limit was not at the time evidence-based. Later studies showed, how-
ever, that working more than 80 hours was linked to increased depres-
sion, suicide, and needlestick injuries of residents.
On the national level, the professional organization responsible for 
oversight of most residency and fellowship training programs, the 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), 
took notice. The ACGME is a private, not- for- profit organization that 
sets standards for US graduate medical training (residency and fel-
lowship) programs and accredits training programs based on compli-
ance with these standards. A resident must successfully complete 
training in an accredited institution to be eligible for certification in 
their specialty and licensure to practice.
Within ACGME, resident duty hour standards are set across all spe-
cialties by the Board of Directors in concert with the chairs of the 30 
specialty review committees in the common program requirements. 
Additional specific and more detailed standards are proposed by the 
individual Residency Review Committees for each specialty. In addi-
tion, there are many subspecialties (such as gastroenterology, nephrol-
ogy, and cardiology in Internal Medicine) that propose their own 
standards. In 2018, there were approximately 830 ACGME-accredited 
institutions sponsoring approximately 11,200 residency and fellow-
ship programs in 180 specialties and subspecialties [7].
In 1988, ACGME spoke up with whispered voice to suggest limit-
ing call to every third night and to permit—not require—its individual 
specialty Residency Review Committees to incorporate requirements 
related to work hours in their standards. It did not mandate, as part of 
the shared requirements, that all specialties adopt a common standard. 
Not surprisingly, its general request had limited effect. Over the next 
2  years, only six specialties—none of them surgical—instituted a 
limit of 80 hours per week.
New York State did little better. With over 100 teaching hospitals, 
its hospitals train 15% of the resident physicians in the USA, but it did 
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not initially vigorously enforce its 1989 regulations. This led New York 
City Public Advocate, Mark Green, in 1994 and 1997 to investigate 
compliance and report widespread violations. A Department of Health 
survey in 1998 of 12 hospitals in New York City found that 37% of 
residents worked more than allowed and 77% of surgical residents 
worked more than 95 hours per week [8]. The state fined four hospi-
tals $20,000 each and increased the maximum fine to $50,000. Two 
years later, the state funded and issued a contract for monitoring hos-
pitals and fining them for noncompliance [9].
The pressure for reform continued to build. In April 2001, the NYC 
residents’ union, the Committee of Interns and Residents of the SEIU 
(CIR), the Public Citizen Health Research Group, the American 
Medical Student Association, and Dr. Bertrand Bell, petitioned the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to establish and 
enforce a federal work hour standard for residents [10]. It didn’t happen.
In November 2001, a bill was introduced in the House of 
Representatives to limit work hours of residents to 80 hours a week 
and to provide for federal enforcement [11]. Meanwhile, the 
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) issued a policy 
statement recommending limits on work hours. The ACGME became 
more active in enforcement; in 2002 it withdrew accreditation of the 
general surgery program at Yale-New Haven Medical Center because 
of excessive work hours [12]. Finally, seeking to forestall the pending 
federal regulation, the ACGME decided it was time to act.
 2003 ACGME Regulations
In 2002 the ACGME announced new regulations of resident hours 
and workloads, to take effect July 1, 2003 [13]. Although most people 
had seen it coming, it still aroused great consternation. The ACGME 
had already gradually stiffened requirements, limiting overnight on-
call duty to every third night and requiring residents to have 1 day off 
every 7 days worked. A number of non-surgical specialties had 
imposed an 80-hour work week limit.
The surgeons, however, had rejected the hour limits. The Residency 
Review Committee for Surgery gave hospital surgical program direc-
tors responsibility for “appropriate” duty hours. They stressed that 
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continuity of care must take precedence without regard to time of day, 
call schedules, or number of hours already worked. Work weeks of 
100–120 hours were still common [14, 15].
The new regulations made the 80-hour week mandatory for all spe-
cialties and added a 24-hour limit for on-call duty. Hospitals were 
required to monitor work hours and reduce residents’ responsibility 
for patient care support services of no educational value, such as 
drawing blood for tests, starting intravenous lines, and transporting 
patients [16]. The ACGME would monitor compliance.
These stronger standards, however, fell short of the AMA and 
AAMC recommendations for shorter on-call hours, or those in the 
legislation proposed by Congress. Nonetheless, both the AMA and 
the AAMC endorsed the changes. The new rules were met with skep-
ticism from CIR, Public Citizen, and the New York Times [17]. They 
also aroused strong feels within the profession—pro and con—the 
latter especially among the surgeons.
 The Duty Hours Debate
The arguments for hour and workload limitations are basically two: 
that it will reduce injuries and that it will improve residents’ mental 
health and well-being. The evidence of the potential harm to patients 
from sleep deprivation is abundant. Many studies over the years of its 
effects on various populations have shown the risk of sleep depriva-
tion [18, 19], including a memorable study that demonstrated that 
impairment of performance after 24 hours of sustained wakefulness is 
equivalent to having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% [20].
Specific studies of medical residents’ performance also confirm its 
ill effects [21]. One controlled study of first year residents showed 
that those with 24-hour sleep deprivation made 36% more serious 
errors than those who worked 16 hour days, and they made over 5 
times as many serious diagnostic errors [22]. Other studies showed 
residents made twice as many mistakes detecting cardiac arrhythmias 
when sleep deprived and twice as many technical errors in simulated 
laparoscopic surgery [23].
A survey of residents showed that 41% reported fatigue as a cause 
of serious mistakes; of those, 31% were fatal [22]. A meta-analysis of 
18 Sleepy Doctors: Work Hours and the Accreditation Council…
273
studies by the ACGME found that after 24–30 hours of sleep depriva-
tion, clinical performance of residents dropped from the 50th to the 
7th percentile of performance when rested [24].
Sleep deprivation is also hazardous to the residents themselves. 
During night call, they are twice as likely to suffer a needlestick injury 
[25]. Driving home after an “all-nighter,” the chance they will sustain 
a motor vehicle crash that injures the resident or others is increased by 
168% [26], and the risk that the accident will be fatal is also increased.
The second argument in favor of shorter hours is that resident well-
being is enhanced. Learning is improved by the fact that residents are 
sufficiently awake and alert to benefit both from clinical experience 
and from formal educational activities. It was a common experience 
for residents to fall asleep during conferences or sometimes even 
while standing on rounds. (Your author remembers having this 
experience.)
Mood is also improved. Fatigue increases depression, anxiety, con-
fusion, and anger that lead to detachment and lack of compassion for 
patients [21]. With adequate rest, attitudes and overall mental health 
improve. Finally, more humane hours permit the resident to maintain 
a balance between personal and professional lives, which would give 
them a better attitude toward their work and their patients.
The arguments against the proposed limits came largely from the 
general surgeons and surgical specialists, who raised issues of learn-
ing and responsibility. They were concerned that disruption of conti-
nuity of care by shorter work hours and more frequent shifts would 
deprive the trainee of the opportunity to see a clinical episode evolve 
and participate in all aspects of care [27]. Residents would miss 
important learning opportunities. They would not participate in 
enough operations to develop the needed skills and judgment.
They held out the specter of a surgical resident being forced to drop 
out of an operation because his time was up. They decried “shift med-
icine.” They worried that young surgeons wouldn’t develop a sense of 
responsibility for their patients. Following the patient through the 
night and when fatigued was, they maintained, essential to the incul-
cation of accountability and professionalism [27]. Others agreed: 
these are critical issues; their fears were justified.
Surgical residents also agreed. They live for the operating room. As 
we used to joke when I was a surgical resident, “The only problem 
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with being on every other night is that you miss half of the good 
cases.” It is difficult for the public or non- surgical physicians to fully 
appreciate the nature of surgical residency or its allure for residents. 
Participating in a surgical operation is an exhilarating experience. You 
see inside the human body, handle its organs, and restore its integrity 
by removing disease or repairing an injury. There is nothing like it in 
the world.
Surgical residents want to be able to do it themselves, and they can 
see they need to practice—a lot. They become almost obsessive about 
“doing more cases.” Like all doctors, they want to do a good job, to 
become competent. They are willing to pay the price in high work-
loads and long hours, although they worry about its effect on their 
ability to give good care. A surgical resident once shared her feelings 
with me, “The thing wrong with having too many patients is that it 
keeps me from giving them the best care possible.”
Years later, surgeons still have strong feelings about their residency 
years. They look back with nostalgia at the long hours, midnight oper-
ations, and heroic efforts to save the life of a badly injured trauma 
victim. They learned by doing, and it was exciting. In retrospect, some 
may resent the time it took away from their families, but they have no 
question it was worth it. These experiences reinforce their mindset 
about training. As we see daily on the political scene, once estab-
lished, mindsets are hard to change. Evidence, facts, and even com-
pelling contradictory data don’t do it.
Other concerns were that the residents would not have time for 
reading and reflecting on what they were learning from their clinical 
experience and that shorter shifts would require more frequent hand-
offs of care to another doctor, which would cause more errors [27]. 
These were all important issues that needed to be addressed.
Interestingly, in the debate that followed, no one brought up the fact 
that most countries in the European Union follow its recommenda-
tions of a maximum of 48 hours per week and 13 hours maximum 
shifts. Are European surgeons poorly trained? Do they have poorer 
outcomes? There is no evidence they do.
But implementing the new rules would require substantial adjust-
ments by hospitals. The purpose of residency training may be educa-
tion, but residents also provide many services for the hospital that are 
of no educational value that can be performed by those with far less 
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training. Eliminating these non-educational services was now essen-
tial—and long overdue. Filling the gap by hiring more residents was 
not an option since CMS would not likely fund it. The choices were to 
increase the workloads of the attendings or to hire more doctors and 
physician’s assistants. A 1994 study estimated that the national cost of 
these changes would be $1.4–1.8 billion [28].
Some, however, saw that redesigning the system of care to shift 
resident responsibilities to others would provide an opportunity to 
better align clinical responsibilities with other educational needs and 
to rethink the nature of the workplace. The burgeoning patient safety 
movement was making clear that health-care organizations badly 
needed to reform their work practices and change their attitudes 
toward work. It was time to recognize exhaustion not as a sign of 
dedication but as a risk to patient safety [21].
Regarding responsibility and dedication, Jeff Drazen, editor of the 
NEJM pointed out, “The role models that trainees see and the integ-
rity of the environment in which they work appear to be far more 
important for instilling the professional ethos than the duration of the 
on-call schedules.” [27]
 What Happened: 2003–2008
Sadly, few surgical training programs and hospitals saw it that way. 
Most did not see the requirements as an opportunity to improve grad-
uate medical education, but as a threat to the status quo. They refused 
to change. However, the ACGME required programs to report compli-
ance based on regular reports by the residents of the hours they worked.
The residents were in a bind two ways. If they reported longer hours 
than permitted, they would incur the ire of their supervisors, jeopar-
dizing both their clinical experience and recommendations for posi-
tions after training. And if the program was found in violation, it could 
lose its accreditation, making the resident ineligible to become board-
certified. Program directors made it clear that they expected the reports 
to show compliance. So residents falsified their reports.
The extent of this deception came to light in 2006, when the Harvard 
Work Hours Study Group published the results of a confidential study 
of reporting by first year residents in 700 programs. It showed gross 
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discrepancies: 83.6% reported work hours that were in violation of the 
ACGME standards. Working shifts greater than 30 consecutive hours 
was reported by 67.4%, working more than 80  hours a week was 
reported by 43%, and 43.7% reported not having 1 day in 7 off duty [29].
The ACGME, however, relying on the “official” reports from the 
program directors reported near-universal compliance with the 
ACGME standards during the same reporting period, maintaining that 
only 5.0% of programs were not compliant and that only 3.3% of resi-
dents reported violations of the 80-hour rule [29].
Apparently, the leaders of some Residency Review Committees 
were concerned about responsibility, continuity, and dedication, but it 
was okay for program directors to force residents to lie. The new rules 
weren’t being observed, and everyone knew it.
 The IOM Panel
Other forces were at work. As noted, a series of research studies had 
emerged that documented the effects of sleep deprivation on errors 
and harm to patients [26] and harm to residents [25, 26]. Other studies 
showed that shorter work hours reduced serious medical errors [22, 
30, 31] and improved residents’ health and education [32]. The CIR 
continued to press for enforcement. Congress again took notice. In 
2007, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, responding to 
the evidence linking medical errors to sleep deprivation and overwork 
and noncompliance with hour limits, requested the IOM to conduct a 
study and make recommendations.
The IOM convened a distinguished panel of patient safety and qual-
ity experts, policy makers, consumer representatives, physicians, 
nurses, and program directors, who deliberated and had hearings over 
an 18-month period. In December 2008 it issued its report, Resident 
duty hours: Enhancing sleep, supervision and safety [33]. The IOM 
called for new measures that would (1) focus not just on the number 
of hours worked, but on alleviating fatigue and loss of sleep, (2) 
increase supervision by senior physicians, (3) improve processes for 
transferring responsibilities from physicians going off duty to those 
coming on, and (4) stiffen enforcement by initiating federal oversight 
of the ACGME regulations [33].
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It also called on programs not to reduce hours without putting suf-
ficient funding and resources in place to allow for the reduction of 
hours without overburdening those residents left behind in the hospi-
tal. It estimated the total additional cost at $1.7 billion per year.
The IOM Committee took special aim at violations of current duty 
hour rules, noting that non-adherence to duty hours “is substantial and 
underreported, and that more intensified monitoring is necessary 
immediately.” It noted “residents fail to accurately report their duty 
hours for multiple reasons, including fear of repercussions from their 
supervisors or, at the extreme, fear of causing a training program to 
lose its accreditation.”
It called on the ACGME to address this issue by making unan-
nounced audits of duty hour compliance and implementing protection 
for whistleblowers. It called on CMS to conduct periodic reviews of 
ACGME’s duty hour monitoring and on the Joint Commission to 
include adherence data in its surveys and accreditation process.
The IOM’s specific recommendations were built on the existing 
regulations and were consistent with the lessons learned from sleep 
research and recent studies of residents’ work. It called for a maxi-
mum of 80 hours duty a week, no more than 16 hours without sleep, 
maximum on-call duty one night in 3, one full day off each week and 
48 hours off once a month, 12 hours off after a night shift, and 48 hours 
off after 3 or 4 consecutive nights.
The IOM had spoken. The report was hailed not just for the duty 
hours standards but also for its emphasis on supervision of residents 
and external oversight of the ACGME. In addition to the IOM panel 
recommendations, there was mounting public pressure to do some-
thing. People were concerned about being harmed by a sleep-deprived 
doctor. How would the ACGME respond?
 ACGME Duty Hour Task Force
We would soon see. When the ACGME implemented its first set of 
regulations in 2003, it promised a 5-year review. That time had come, 
and, with the IOM report and the continuing threat of Federal regula-
tion, the ACGME needed to act. In 2008, it commissioned a 16-mem-
ber Duty Hours Task Force composed of its members, trustees, 
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medical educators, and a consumer, to review relevant research, hear 
testimony, and draft new standards.
There was concern that limited hours had created a “shift mental-
ity” that conflicted with the physician’s moral and professional 
responsibility to the patient, that programs’ focus on duty hours 
diverted their attention from making needed changes in the learning 
environment, and that residents were conflicted about leaving patients 
to comply with the rules [34].
The Task Force discussed the need for enhanced supervision and 
faculty oversight, improving handovers, and the need to increase 
attention to patient safety. Research showed that the 2003 regulations 
had not led to increased hours of sleep. It also showed that reduced 
hours had no effect on mortality.
Regarding hours, would they heed the IOM recommendations? The 
leadership was ready to move. The Council of Review Committee 
Chairs was not so sure. The early signs were not encouraging. At the 
ACGME June 2009 Congress devoted to duty hours, many represen-
tatives of specialty societies spoke out against implementing the IOM 
recommendations.
 Harvard Conference on Duty Hours
Meanwhile, many safety leaders thought the IOM recommendations 
deserved a broader review, with input not just from leaders of gradu-
ate medical education but also from those most affected: patients and 
residents, nurses, hospitals, and training directors, as well as policy 
makers and others. The changes proposed by the IOM would affect 
hundreds of thousands of physicians and residents, over 1000 hospi-
tals, and have a global budget in the billions [35]. Implementing them 
would be a huge challenge.
The organized voice of residents, the CIR/SEIU, representing 
13,000 residents in New York, was particularly concerned about what 
the ACGME would do. To put pressure on hospitals to implement the 
IOM recommendations regardless of what the ACGME required, they 
thought a persuasive strategy would be to provide advice from experts 
and evidence from those who had successfully implemented hours 
and workload changes.
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At CIR’s behest and funding, the leaders of sleep science and resi-
dent hours research, Chuck Czeisler and Chris Landrigan, and I con-
vened a 2-day work hours conference at Harvard Medical School in 
June 2010, “Enhancing sleep, supervision and safety: What will it 
take to implement the Institute of Medicine recommendations?”
Attendees included quality improvement experts, medical educa-
tors, hospital administrators, consumers, regulators, sleep scientists, 
patient advocates, policy makers, a resident, a medical student, and 
two members of the IOM committee that produced the report. We also 
had representatives from AHRQ, JCAHO, CMS, and AHA, as well as 
training directors who had successfully implemented changes in their 
training programs to meet the 2003 requirements.
A recent survey had shown the disconnect between public percep-
tion and reality. The vast majority of the public had no idea that doc-
tors worked 24 hours or more without sleep. When informed of this, 
only 1% supported it. Eighty percent supported a limit of 16 hours. 
Importantly, 81% believed that the patient should be informed if the 
doctor treating them had been working for more than 24 hours: 80% 
would want a different doctor. Ninety one percent favored strict rules 
to assure direct on-site supervision by attendings [36].
Roundtable discussions were held on eight topics: workload and 
supervision, work hours, moonlighting, physician safety, handovers 
and quality improvement, monitoring and oversight of the ACGME, 
financial support for implementation, and future research. The head of 
ACGME, Tom Nasca, himself a supporter of more humane working 
conditions, addressed the group.
The most memorable feature of the conference was the presenta-
tion of three case studies by training directors of programs in internal 
medicine, obstetrics, and surgery who had successfully developed 
new programs that functioned well within the hour limits. They 
showed that the objectives of training could be met and that residents 
attended more conferences and had higher morale. Both residents and 
faculty at these institutions were pleased with the results.
In its report, Implementing the 2009 Institute of Medicine 
Recommendations on Resident Physician Work Hours, Supervision, 
and Safety, the conference made 27 recommendations of necessary 
and practical steps that are needed to make the new limits work [35]. 
It concluded that innovators had demonstrated that hours and 
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workloads can be reduced without compromising clinical experience 
or inhibiting the learning of responsibility, but regulation and finan-
cial incentives were needed to facilitate spread.
 The ACGME Response
Just a week after the conference, on June 23, 2010, the ACGME Duty 
Hours Task Force issued its recommendations. It rejected most of the 
IOM duty hour recommendations except for a maximum duty period 
of 16 hours for first-year residents (only) and on-site supervision of 
first-year residents by faculty [34].
The 80-hour work week was retained, as well as limiting on-call 
duty to every third day (except for “night floats,” who were limited to 
six consecutive nights), and 24 hours off duty every 7 days. However, 
there was a loophole: programs could apply to be more “flexible” in 
integrating service with teaching, which could include increasing 
work hours to 88 hours a week.
The recommendations of the Task Force were accepted by the 
Council of Review Committee Chairs, and in September 2010 the 
ACGME Board of Directors approved new rules that would go into 
effect July 1, 2011.
The patient safety community was disappointed. The reaction 
focused on duty hours. Most didn’t believe the ACGME was making 
a commitment to ensure adequate supervision and a better learning 
environment.
In fact, the major thrust of the ACGME report was not about duty 
hours; it was about the learning environment. The Task Force was 
explicit: “The goal of the ACGME’s new approach to duty hours is to 
foster a humanistic environment for graduate medical education that 
supports learning and the provision of excellent and safe patient care. 
The graduate medical education community has a moral responsibil-
ity to prepare residents to practice medicine outside the learning envi-
ronment, where they will be unsupervised, must think independently, 
and must function when fatigued” [34].
“Paramount is an environment characterized by supervision cus-
tomized to residents’ level of competence, faculty modeling of fitness 
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for duty, and the provision of high-quality care in a team setting and 
an institutional culture of safety.” The new standards reflected this 
commitment.
The seriousness of the commitment of the ACGME to changing the 
learning environment was made clear by the significant expansion of 
its role. It would establish a new program of annual site visits of spon-
soring institutions that would be separate from accreditation and 
would not focus just on duty hour compliance but also on supervision 
and the provision of a safe and effective environment for care and 
learning.
This was a big change, and it should have a major impact on resi-
dency training and patient safety. It is what Sidney Zion called for 
25 years earlier.
The recommendation of the Duty Hours Task Force for evaluating 
the learning environment did not arise de novo. Ten years earlier 
there had been discussions at ACGME about how to improve the 
design of residency and fellowship programs through the use of a 
developmental framework and move the accreditation system to a 
focus on outcomes using a continuous quality improvement philoso-
phy [37].
In 2009, ACGME CEO Tom Nasca convened a group of health-
care quality and patient safety experts, chaired by Carolyn Clancy, 
director of AHRQ, and Timothy Flynn, the chair of the ACGME 
Board of Directors, to make recommendations on how residency pro-
grams could be motivated to do a better job in training residents in 
patient safety.
One of the problems was that Graduate Medical Education pro-
grams were often managed at the department level, while quality 
and safety efforts were carried out at the hospital level from which 
the residents were not commonly included. How could they be 
integrated?
The group recommended that ACGME conduct an additional type 
of on-site visit, separate from and unrelated to accreditation visits. 
These visits would evaluate the learning environment, the residents’ 
progress in achieving competencies, how they were integrated into the 
quality and safety activities of the hospital, and how programs were 
dealing with concerns about disparities and transitions in care.
 The ACGME Response
282
 CLER
To implement this ambitious program, Nasca brought Kevin Weiss, a 
member of the quality and safety workgroup and an immediate past 
CEO and president of the American Board of Medical Specialties into 
ACGME to develop the program. ACGME labeled it Clinical Learning 
Environment Review (CLER).
The core of the CLER Program is a commitment to formative 
assessment and feedback regarding a residency training program’s 
engagement in six focus areas: patient safety; health-care quality; 
care transitions; supervision; fatigue management, mitigation, and 
duty hours; and professionalism. The CLER Program required 
biannual formative assessment by each accredited sponsor of 
graduate medical education. It was designed to provide direct 
feedback to teaching hospitals and health-care organizations and 
to inform the ACGME accreditation process on issues in the six 
focus areas [38].
Training programs were now labeled Clinical Learning 
Environments (CLEs). Through periodic site visits that involve the 
program directors, residents, and the CEOs, the program aims to 
a b
(a) Tom Nasca and (b) Kevin Weiss
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stimulate conversations and motivate CLEs to build upon their 
strengths and internally address opportunities for improvement.
Visits focus on six areas of concern: (1) the engagement and demon-
stration of meaningful participation of residents in the patient safety 
programs of the institution; (2) the engagement and demonstration of 
meaningful participation of residents in the institutional quality of care 
activities and participation in programs related to reduction of dispari-
ties in clinical care conducted by the institution; (3) the establishment 
and oversight of institutional supervision policies; (4) the effectiveness 
of institutional oversight of transitions of care; (5) the effectiveness of 
duty hours and fatigue mitigation policies; and (6) activities addressing 
the professionalism of the educational environment [39].
 Milestones
In addition to the CLER program, ACGME established the milestone 
program. ACGME standards require residency and fellowship pro-
gram directors to periodically assess each individual resident and fel-
low. These assessments use a variety of tools, including direct 
observations; global evaluation; audits and review of clinical perfor-
mance data; multisource feedback from peers, nurses, patients, and 
family, simulation; self-assessment; and in-service training examina-
tions [40].
ACGME requires semi-annual assessment of each resident and fel-
low on their progress in achieving milestones in the six domains of 
clinical competency that had been described as relevant for all medi-
cal practice by the ACGME and the ABMS in 1999. (See Chap. 20 for 
a discussion of the six competencies.)
Residency programs had for some time been required to configure 
curricula and evaluation processes in the framework of the six compe-
tencies under the Outcome Project, launched in 2001. Achieving the 
competencies was, in fact, the purpose of the programs. Under the 
ACGME, the training programs would ensure achievement of the six 
competencies. Certification programs, under the ABMS, would ensure 
that physicians maintained them.
 Milestones
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Implementing outcome-based, i.e., competency-based, education 
into residency training was a big challenge for programs. Program 
directors and faculty had struggled since the launch of the Outcome 
Project to understand what competencies meant and what they 
looked like in practice [39]. They had different ideas of how to do it 
and different sets of skills for making the changes. There was wide 
variation between specialties and between programs within a 
specialty.
The concept of developmental milestones grew out of this need to 
move the outcomes project forward and deal with these variations. 
Milestones use narratives to describe the educational and profes-
sional trajectories of residents from the beginning of their education 
through the achievement of competency and the ability to enter into 
the unsupervised practice of medicine [40]. They define the stages in 
achieving competency for each of the six domains (Boxes 18.1 
and 18.2).
Box 18.1 Milestone template
Milestone description: template
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
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“Simply stated, the Milestones describe performance levels resi-
dents and fellows are expected to demonstrate for skills, knowledge, 
and behaviors in the six clinical competency domains. They lay out a 
Box 18.2 Milestones for systems-based practice 1: patient 
safety and quality improvement
SBP1: Patient safety and quality improvement
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framework of observable behaviors and other attributes associated 
with a resident’s or fellow’s development as a physician. The 
Milestones’ primary purpose is to drive improvement in training pro-
grams and enhance the resident and fellow educational experi-
ence.” [39]
Milestones were officially launched in 2013 in seven core special-
ties (emergency medicine, internal medicine, neurological surgery, 
orthopedic surgery, pediatrics, diagnostic radiology, and urology) as a 
component of the new accreditation system. The remaining core dis-
ciplines and the majority of subspecialties implemented the mile-
stones a year later.
The CLER program and the Milestones have transformed residency 
training from an apprentice system—“do what I do”—measured by 
time served, into an educational system measured by competency 
achieved through planned experiences that include not only technical 
competency and knowledge, but experience in quality and safety and 
systems improvement.
 Duty Hours
What happened about duty hours? Opposition to the 80-hour limit 
died a quiet death as evidence piled up against it. The ACGME 
funded two randomized trials that compared programs that strictly 
adhered to the rules to those with the flexible ones. The results 
showed that violations of 80-hour rules were linked to increased 
depression, suicide, and harm, such as needlestick injuries [25]. 
They also showed no differences in outcomes among surgery pro-
grams, leading to the conclusion that they should be bound by the 
same hour limits [41].
The other bit of evidence that the 80-hour limit was not harmful 
came from New  York. The state had been strictly enforcing the 
80-hour limit, with substantial fines, for a long time. No one could 
prove that physicians trained in New  York were less competent. 
Skeptics began to come around. At the 2015 ACGME conference of 
Review Committees and others interested in graduate medical educa-
tion, every medical organization agreed on the 80-hour limit. Shortly 
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afterward it was adopted as a standard. The ACGME now cites pro-
grams if more than one resident in a program has violated the 
80-hour limit.
Is the issue of duty hours settled, then? Hardly. Why is an 80-hour 
work week acceptable? Why is 13 hours a day, 6 days a week, with 1 
weekend off a month considered humane given the damage it does to 
residents’ well-being and family life? Talk about “normalizing 
deviance”!
Why do we turn a blind eye to the experience of the rest of the 
Western world—the EU limits that show competent and caring doc-
tors can be trained in 48 hours a week? Forty-eight versus eighty! A 
world of difference. Could we train good—excellent—doctors in 
48 hours a week, or at most 60? Of course we could.
They might even be better doctors. One of the major lessons in 
patient safety is that you can’t expect health-care workers to care 
about patients’ safety when you don’t care about worker safety. Why 
do we think that treating doctors inhumanely will lead them to be kind 
and caring for their patients? Perhaps patients’ complaints about how 
they are treated by their physician stem from how we treat the doctors 
during their formative training years.
 Conclusion
What do we make of all this? The conflict over duty hours subsided 
with the “victory” of the 80-hour work week. On the other hand, the 
aggressive stance of the ACGME regarding the learning environ-
ment has been a welcome change and the CLER program has had 
an impact.
The implications for patient safety are also profound. A major 
stumbling block in advancing patient safety has been the lack of buy-
in by most physicians; they don’t “own” it. As Kevin Weiss points out, 
the profession doesn’t “own” anything until it makes it an expectation 
of training and builds it into the training standards for the profession. 
That is where we agree on the definition of what the next generation 
must know and be able to do. Where we agree on who we are. The 
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requirements for accreditation are therefore essential to how the pro-
fession is able to establish professional identity for all those who enter 
the profession (Kevin B. Weiss, MD, personal communication, May 
20, 2020).
The groundwork was laid when the ABMS and ACGME agreed 
on the six domains of competency that included systems-based 
practice. The turning point was when ACGME expectations for 
training programs based on the six competencies became require-
ments. After evidence showed that programs were falling woefully 
short, the first CLER report outlined the needs for learning in qual-
ity and safety. These were later cut and pasted as requirements for 
accreditation.
Thanks to Tom Nasca and the ACGME, residency training has 
changed more in the past 20 years than in all of the previous 100. It is 
finally beginning to become more about education than service, about 
creating good physicians, not exploiting them. We now aspire to edu-
cate the whole physician, one who is skilled and expert, works well 
with others in teams, and communicates well with patients and 
colleagues.
The duty hours issue still needs work. We still have sleepy doctors. 
It’s time to say good-bye to the 80-hour  week and create a more 
humane environment. But we’ve made immense progress, and we are 
almost certainly turning out better doctors.
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Chapter 19
A Conspiracy of Silence: Disclosure, 
Apology, and Restitution
When patients are harmed by their treatment, they want three things 
from their doctor: they want the doctor to tell them what happened, 
say they are sorry, and tell them what will be done to keep it from hap-
pening to someone else. “What happened” is an acknowledgment that 
something went wrong, followed by an explanation of why it hap-
pened, and some guidance on what the future holds. If they have addi-
tional medical expenses or a disability, they also want compensation. 
Sadly, none of this happens most of the time [1].
The psychological harm following injury can be devastating. 
Feelings of fear, betrayal, anxiety about the future, and anger are com-
mon. Yet this aspect of patient safety was scarcely mentioned in the 
medical literature or in discussions prior to the patient safety move-
ment. An exception was the work of Charles Vincent, who wrote in 
1994 about why patients sue doctors. He described the mix of feelings 
of fear, loss of trust, and not knowing what happened [2]. In fact, for 
the patient the psychological trauma often exceeds the physical. It is 
those feelings, not pain or a long convalescence, that they remember 
years later.
In 2003, Gallagher conducted focus groups of patients to learn 
about their experiences and opinions about disclosure. They corrobo-
rated Vincent’s findings. He found that becoming aware of an error in 
their care made patients “sad, anxious, depressed, or traumatized.” 
Patients feared additional errors, were angry that their recovery had 
been prolonged, and were frustrated that the error was preventable 
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[3]. Patients said they would be less upset if the doctor disclosed the 
error compassionately and apologized.
While medicine seemed to pay little attention to patients’ feelings, 
there was a continuing thread in the medical literature over the years 
about the effects that errors had on the physician. Perhaps the most 
powerful was by David Hilfiker, who in 1984 wrote a poignant piece 
in the New England Journal of Medicine, “Facing Our Mistakes,” that 
described his personal anguish dealing with his patients and his own 
feelings after harming a patient by his error [4]. In 1985 and in 1988, 
Vincent reported on the devastating effect that making an error has on 
physicians [5]. In 1991, Albert Wu wrote of the problems house offi-
cers had in talking about mistakes and coined the term “second vic-
tim,“ [6] and in 1992, Christensen wrote of the profound effects of 
their errors on physicians [7].
The second victim’s emotional state is potentially harmful to the 
patient as well. It clouds the physician’s judgment, increasing the risk 
of committing a second error. It makes empathetic communication 
difficult at just the time when it is most important.
But neither of these powerful forces—the devastating effects of 
unexpected harm on patients and on their physicians—was much in 
the discussion about communicating with patients after an error, either 
before or after the IOM report. Instead, the arguments tended to be 
a b
(a) Charles Vincent and (b) Tom Gallagher. All rights reserved
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framed in terms of duty: honest disclosure is the “right thing to do,” it 
is the “ethical” thing to do, “we have a professional obligation to be 
honest with our patients,” etc.
Not that it is the kind thing to do, the healing thing to do, the human 
thing to do. Nor that effective and empathetic communication is the 
necessary thing to do, that it is the appropriate medical treatment—
effective and science-based—for this second injury we had caused.
And, although principles were declared and practices for disclosure 
were recommended by elite medical organizations, including the 
AMA and the Joint Commission, they lacked force; open and honest 
communication following medical harm remained the exception, not 
the rule.
As noted previously, the most powerful—and most remembered—
event at the very first patient safety meeting, the 1996 Annenberg 
Conference, was the presentation of the case of Ben Kolb, a boy who 
died from a medication mix-up in the operating room. What was 
memorable to the audience was that the hospital was open and trans-
parent about it from the beginning, admitting error and apologizing. It 
was memorable because it was so rare. Few medical people in the 
audience thought such a case would be handled that way in their 
institution.
The very word used to describe these conversations, disclosure, 
tells much about the problem. It clearly implies ownership and choice. 
Information about the details of what happened and possible wrong-
doing is deemed to belong to the physician, not the patient; it is the 
physician’s choice whether, and how much of, this secret information 
should be disclosed to the patient. The high-flown rhetoric about hon-
esty, honor, and professionalism and the duty to disclose reinforce the 
concept that the information belongs to the physician.
Not surprisingly, this idea is totally rejected by patient advocate 
groups, who reasonably ask, “Whose body is it anyway?”
Important as these concerns are, they have traditionally had little 
bearing on what actually happens. Rationality, empathy, logic, duty, 
and, sadly, even ethics play a distant second fiddle to the real reasons 
that doctors are not open and honest with their patients: shame and 
fear. Shame silences doctors, but fear drives the debate: the fear of 
being sued for malpractice.
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 Malpractice
It is not an irrational fear. The conventional wisdom for decades was 
that you made mistakes because you weren’t careful enough. It was 
your fault, doctor. This thinking was reinforced by the lawyers and the 
courts, who took the position that an error is by definition a failure to 
meet the standard of care; failure to meet the standard of care in turn 
is the definition of negligence, of malpractice.
This is not true, of course. Making a mistake is not negligence, it is 
part of normal human behavior. That is the point of the patient safety 
movement. But the lawyers didn’t believe that. They would have us 
believe that if you admit to making a mistake, or even if you acknowl-
edge that something went wrong, you are asking to be sued for 
malpractice.
Defense lawyers—those who worked for hospitals and doctors—
saw their responsibility as protecting the doctor or hospital from being 
sued regardless of whether there was negligence. The way they sought 
to do that was to get the doctors to “stonewall” from the beginning: 
tell the patient nothing, don’t admit error, and, by all means, never 
apologize. Liability insurers, anxious to minimize losses, reinforced 
this message. Many even told physicians that if they admitted error, 
their insurance would not cover them.
Doctors went along. Admitting error, especially an error that has 
hurt your patient who trusted you, is painfully difficult. Being told by 
an authority not to admit anything gave them cover for not doing 
something they really didn’t want to do. If the lawyers recommended 
it, then perhaps it was all right, even though it did violate their code of 
professionalism and even though deep down they knew it was wrong.
A word about malpractice suits. When a claim is filed, a protracted 
period of several years or more follows during which the physician 
must go back over the case in minute detail in multiple interviews 
with lawyers and depositions from the opposing side, while constantly 
dreading the trial itself. Often, the physician does not believe he did 
anything wrong. In fact, he may not even have made a mistake, or if 
he did, it was no worse than anyone else’s, and he certainly didn’t 
intend harm. But intent has nothing to do with it in tort law. (If the 
injury were intended, it would be criminal assault.)
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Nor does the fact that we now know that almost all errors result 
from multiple systemic factors. In addition, in the USA, the focus of 
medical liability has long been on the physician, so that is who insur-
ance policies cover. That is where the money is, so that is who the 
malpractice lawyer goes after. Medical negligence is about the indi-
vidual not meeting the standard of care, defined as “what a reasonably 
prudent specialist should do under the same or similar 
circumstances.”
Although safety experts hold that in most cases it is the hospital 
that should be held liable since it is responsible for the systems that 
fail and cause harm, that is a relatively new concept and still not 
widely accepted. Moreover, most hospitals were, until recently, chari-
table organizations for which states have traditionally provided immu-
nity or very limited liability.
In a malpractice trial, the plaintiff’s lawyer’s task is to convince the 
jury not only that the doctor’s action harmed the patient, but that the 
physician was careless, even reckless. The trial is an exercise in public 
humiliation, drawn out over a week or more: not only did the doctor 
do a bad thing, he or she is a bad person. No wonder doctors dread it 
and do whatever they can to avoid it.
Medicine is the only profession consistently subjected to this type 
of humiliation. Not just a few, but most physicians are sued at least 
once in their professional career, and some, especially those in the 
high-risk specialties such as vascular surgery and neurosurgery, are 
sued multiple times. The average neurosurgeon is said to spend 25% 
of their time in malpractice litigation.
In addition to fear of being sued for malpractice, doctors had other 
reasons to perpetuate a “conspiracy of silence.” Admitting a mistake, 
most believed, would undermine their patient’s trust of the physician. 
Colleagues would think less of them. Both their professional and their 
public reputations would be tarnished, perhaps irrevocably damaged. 
Referring relationships might be diminished and their income suffer.
But the most powerful deterrent to open communication is shame. 
The roots are deep within the physician’s psyche, the product of the 
high-achieving personalities that are attracted to medicine. It is 
enhanced by an educational system that sets perfect performance as 
the standard and of a cultural environment that reinforces it. 
Admitting—to yourself or to others—that you have made a serious 
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error is admitting that you have failed to live up to your own standard 
of perfect performance to prevent harm to your patient.
For the physician, making a serious error is not just a practice fail-
ure, it is a character failure. The shame can be overwhelming. With 
their self-esteem so at risk, it is not surprising that physicians develop 
defense mechanisms, such as denial that an error occurred or displace-
ment of blame to an underling. Failing that, they desperately want to 
keep it a secret.
When I first began to comprehend the power of approaching medi-
cal errors as systems failures in the early 1990s, it seemed to me that 
a systems approach would not only reduce harm to patients, it would 
immensely benefit physicians. If doctors bought into the concept that 
errors are caused by systems failures, not personal failures, the burden 
of shame and guilt would be lifted from their shoulders, enabling 
them to be open and honest with their patients. While this is attractive 
in theory, in practice it has yet to happen on any significant scale.
Not only have malpractice concerns totally dominated the thinking 
about disclosure, some have argued that full disclosure would signifi-
cantly increase the number of liability suits and total costs. Their rea-
soning held that if all patients were informed about an error, a 
significant number of patients who otherwise would not have known 
would be added to the pool of patients who might sue [8].
 The Contrarians
The first chink in the wall of silence appeared in 1999, about the time 
To Err Is Human came out. Steve Kraman and Ginny Hamm pub-
lished the experience from the Veterans Administration Hospital in 
Lexington, Kentucky, which in 1987 had instituted a policy of full 
disclosure and compensation following harm from a negligent medi-
cal error. A review of 88 cases from 1990 to 1996 revealed total hos-
pital annual payments were less than half the rate in previous years [9].
Unfortunately, although the entire VHA adopted a disclosure pol-
icy that patients be informed of unintended outcomes, it did not extend 
Kraman’s program to the entire system. VHA continued the practice 
of not explaining why things went wrong and not apologizing.
In Colorado, COPIC, the state’s largest liability insurer, in 2000 
developed the “3Rs” (recognize, respond, resolve) program of 
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“no-fault” compensation to forestall litigation. It provides patients up 
to $30,000 for out-of-pocket health-care expenses and lost work time. 
They do not offer explanations or apologies and make the offer only 
in cases where the patient has not filed a claim. It is a structured ser-
vice recovery operation, in effect an expansion of long-standing insur-
ance practices aimed at loss control. It has been effective in reducing 
litigation, however. In one reported 5-year period, it handled over 
3000 cases and reduced payouts and lawsuits dramatically [10, 11].
The real breakthrough came a few years later when Rick Boothman, 
Chief Risk Officer of University of Michigan Health System, reported 
their experience with a program he instituted in 2001 of responding to 
claims by admitting fault and offering compensation if internal inves-
tigation revealed “that the injury resulted from care that fell below 
expectations.” The program was not limited to disclosure but linked to 
quality and safety efforts and expanded to identify injuries by various 
means. If an error was found, fault was admitted, and compensation 
was given for lifelong medical expenses, lost wages, and other costs—
all without the patient needing to file a claim.
Analysis of results over a 5-year period following full implementa-
tion of the program showed a reduction of suits by 65% and decreases 
in legal costs and payouts to patients by more than 50% each. Total 
liability costs per year dropped from $3 million to $1 million [12].
Boothman emphasizes that the more important impact was on the 
culture. Full disclosure after unplanned clinical outcomes became the 
leading edge of changing the culture within the organization to 
increase transparency. Transparency is the key to a learning culture 
that facilitates internal reporting of adverse events and dealing with 
disruptive behavior and other performance problems. Full and open 
case investigations are necessary if we are to learn from our mistakes 
and advance the systems thinking that safety requires [13]. Boothman 
observed that in those organizations in which open disclosure failed, 
leadership did not connect it to their core mission and did not actively 
support adoption against the skeptics [13].
So, the arguments against full disclosure and apology were wrong: 
patients weren’t more likely to sue, they were less likely to sue. And 
the costs went down not up. Trust depends on honesty, so it is not 
surprising that patients’ trust in their physicians is enhanced, not 
diminished, by the doctor’s forthright admission of failure and taking 
responsibility for it. Being honest is not only the morally and ethically 
right thing to do, it is the smart thing to do.
The Contrarians
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An interesting sidebar: at a lawyers’ conference on malpractice that 
I attended about this time, a prominent Houston plaintiff’s lawyer 
boasted about the number of patients who came to him to sue their 
doctor and then said, “Ninety percent of them wouldn’t be there if the 
doctor had just told them what happened and said he was sorry!”
Physicians agreed in principle but had trouble doing it. They were 
cautious about how much to tell patients and believed that apology 
would be used as evidence of liability. They chose their words care-
fully, sometimes acknowledging the harm but not disclosing the error, 
why it happened, or what would be done to prevent recurrences. They 
were unlikely to discuss minor errors or near misses [3].
But things were beginning to change. At about this time, Gallagher 
issued a call for action by physicians, hospitals, certifying boards, 
accrediting bodies, medical societies, and medical educators to 
develop policies for disclosure, train physicians in communication, 
and provide support for patients and doctors [14].
Also in 2005, two senators, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, 
introduced the National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation 
(MEDiC) Act that emphasized open disclosure, apology, early com-
pensation, and analysis of the event. It was offered as a means of 
addressing both patient safety and the problems with the liability sys-
tem. Although it never passed, it put the issue on the national agenda [15].
 Doing It Right
Responding appropriately after a serious harmful event is not as sim-
ple as it may seem to those who have never had to do it. It is a highly 
emotionally charged moment for the patient and the physician. The 
patient is frightened, and if the harm resulted from an error the physi-
cian may be overwhelmed with feelings of shame and guilt. It is not a 
situation conducive to thoughtful supportive communication. The 
patient needs immediate reassurance from their doctor, primarily that 
they will be all right, and an explanation of what happened, but the 
initial talk is not the time to speculate on causes or details of what 
happened. They need to know what happened, not yet why it happened.
The physician should be honest and transparent, acknowledge that 
something has gone wrong, and explain what happened and what is 
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being done to counter its effects. They should express regret—“I’m 
sorry this happened to you”—but avoid commenting on the cause of 
the event or apologizing, because investigation may reveal informa-
tion that contradicts the initial assumptions of culpability. The patient 
should be told that an investigation will be carried out and the results 
will be given to them as soon as it is completed.
If investigation reveals that the injury was caused by an error, the 
physician needs to apologize. As the person responsible for the 
patient’s care, the doctor in charge is the one to apologize, even if 
the error was made by a resident, a nurse, the pathologist, or someone 
else. The patient looks to their personal physician to make sure care is 
safe. The other person should accompany the physician if appropriate.
The CEO or other high-ranking administrator should also be there 
to apologize for the failure of the hospital’s systems to prevent the 
injury. Although the patient understandably holds the person who 
made the error responsible, since errors result from systems failures, 
it is important for the patient to hear that from someone other than the 
physician, from whom it would seem self-serving.
A meaningful apology must include three elements: remorse, 
accountability, and amends. The physician must communicate their 
genuine deep feelings of sorrow, “I feel terrible about what happened.” 
They must also take responsibility, “We let you down, it should not 
have occurred.” The exact words are not critical, but it must come 
from the heart. Mere words, however “correct,” will not do.
Meaningful apology also includes making every possible effort to 
make up for the injury. This means financial compensation for all 
expenses related to the injury, present and future. In addition to medi-
cal expenses, these include lost wages, extra household costs, and 
long-term effects of disability. Without restitution, apology is a gesture.
These are difficult conversations, and they will not occur unless 
there is serious advance planning. Physicians need to be trained in 
disclosure—which is not easy since it is so painful for them—and 
they need support in the moment. They need help in apologizing. 
Fortunately, for most physicians these conversations occur rarely, but 
that means they need coaching and support when they do.
This is where the hospital comes in. Ideally, the risk management 
department has shifted its focus from limiting liability to limiting 
(emotional) harm to both the patient and the doctor and is integrated 
with the quality and safety programs and nursing and physician 
Doing It Right
302
administration. If not, a team needs to be developed in the quality and 
safety group. A training program is essential for teaching physicians 
how to communicate in this difficult situation, and it should be 
required for all physicians, who will find it difficult and painful.
Hospitals must also have support systems for both the patient and 
the doctor, as well as the nurse and support staff. Open, honest disclo-
sure diminishes the patient’s fears and anxiety, but it doesn’t take it 
away. The patient needs comforting and understanding. So does the 
doctor. Even if they succeed at communicating with the patient after a 
serious event as a result of their training and excellent coaching, the 
shame and guilt don’t go away. A colleague’s arm around the shoulder 
and a reassuring word can go a long way, but more is needed. A sys-
tem is needed to make sure both patients and doctors get emotional 
support in these first traumatic days.
Some years ago, a seriously injured patient in Boston, Linda Kenney, 
began to create that system. From her own experience, Linda recog-
nized that the best support would come from a peer – someone who 
had been through a similar experience. With Rick VanPelt, the anes-
thesiologist involved in her episode, she founded Medically Induced 
Trauma Support Services (MITSS) to help hospitals develop peer sup-
port systems both for patients and families and for clinicians and staff. 
Thousands of people have been trained by this program, which is now 
a division of the Betsy Lehman Center for Patient Safety [16] .
a b
(a) Rick Boothman and (b) Linda Kenney. All rights reserved
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Truly effective support requires changing the institution’s culture 
away from punishment to learning—the basic challenge of the safety 
movement. Away from the hushed comment and pointed fingers, from 
“Isn’t it too bad about Charlie” or “We all make mistakes” to a culture 
that really does look at an adverse event as a “treasure,” an opportu-
nity to learn how the system failed—and fixes it. A culture that recog-
nizes that, with rare exceptions, the physician is not the cause of the 
error but the victim of it.
 When Things Go Wrong—The Disclosure Project
Gallagher’s work and Kraman’s and Boothman’s experiences changed 
the discussion in the patient safety world but seemed to have little 
impact on the practice in hospitals. Most of the principle players: hos-
pitals, doctors, defense lawyers, and liability insurers were skeptical. 
The VA and Michigan were “different.” Too risky to take a chance—
although, of course, it was “the right thing to do.”
Harvard hospitals were no exception. The ones that I was close to 
were not changing their policies or practices. CRICO, the Harvard 
hospitals’ umbrella liability insurance company that funded our early 
error research, was proud of its record defending doctors and saw no 
need to change. Despite my entreaties and those of others, they and 
the hospitals were loath to take a chance. They gave lip service to full 
disclosure but did little to facilitate it. I stewed about this for some 
time. I would teach my students about the importance of honesty, 
communication, and apology, but I knew it wasn’t happening.
How to get it moving? Perhaps if it were possible to get the leader-
ship of all of the Harvard hospitals to agree on a uniform policy of full 
disclosure, apology, and restitution, it would stimulate their staff to 
actually do it. And if Harvard hospitals had success, perhaps that 
might persuade others that it was feasible and safe.
To see if this idea had any traction, I ran it by some of my frontline 
colleagues and friends: the safety leaders at the five major Harvard 
teaching hospitals. I asked them whether they were interested in 
exploring the issues about disclosure and apology. All responded 
enthusiastically.
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The first meeting of what became the Disclosure Working Group 
was on May 10, 2004. Quality and safety leaders from the five hospi-
tals were joined by two representatives from the Risk Management 
Foundation (RMF) of CRICO, and one from the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI):
• Janet Barnes, nurse and risk manager at Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital (BWH)
• Maureen Connor, risk manager at Dana-Farber Cancer 
Institute (DFCI)
• Connie Crowley-Ganser, vice president for quality at Boston 
Children’s Hospital
• Frank Federico, pharmacist and quality leader at IHI
• Bob Hanscom and Luke Sato from CRICO/RMF
• Cy Hopkins, a quality and safety leader at Massachusetts General 
Hospital
• Hans Kim, quality specialist at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Review of their current institutional policies revealed that only 
three of the five hospitals had a written disclosure policy, and only one 
had a training program for physicians regarding disclosure. Clearly, 
we had work to do. Perhaps if we could spell out in detail what was 
needed and show how to do it, we would get buy-in.
At the second meeting a month later, we were joined by three new 
members, all physicians, Arnold Freedman, from DFCI, David 
Roberson from Children’s, and Rick Van Pelt from BWH. John Ryan, 
the key CRICO/RMF lawyer, would join us at the next meeting. At 
this meeting, we made an important decision: in keeping with the sys-
tems concept, the policy should not focus on errors, but on 
adverse events.
At the July meeting, we made an even more important decision. 
Rather than limit our efforts to disclosure policy, we would craft a 
comprehensive document that addressed all aspects of responding to 
unanticipated events. No such statement existed; there were major 
assertions about disclosure (ASHRM, Minnesota Children’s Hospital, 
etc.), and papers written about supporting patients and physicians, but 
no statements, policies, or recommendations that embraced all of the 
issues. Such a statement could have a major educational impact within 
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our institutions at all levels. Much of the information and the rationale 
behind it would be new for many physicians.
The organizing principle, setting the “tone” of the statement, would 
be, “What is the right thing to do?” We defined the “right thing” as the 
institution taking responsibility to make things right by being open, 
informative, supportive, and restorative. We would try to break the 
mold of hospitals and doctors thinking about what is in their best 
interest to what is in the best interest of the patient.
We also agreed that the document needed to start off with the moral/
conceptual justification for this work. We are talking about much 
more than just disclosure or dealing with malpractice or the “business 
case.” It is about hospitals meeting their obligation to respect patient’s 
integrity, be sensitive to their needs, and earn their trust. This is the 
“do the right thing” part. Something like, “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all patients are entitled to ... ” (though not quite so 
grand—nor stolen!).
A bit late, but fortunately not too late, we suddenly realized that our 
group was missing the key stakeholder: the patient! To our great good 
fortune, Mary Dana Gershanoff and Gary Jernegan, co-chairs of the 
Dana-Farber Pediatric Patient & Family Advisory Council, were 
pleased to join us. When I told Tom Delbanco, an old friend and 
nationally respected physician patient advocate at BIDMC, about 
what we were doing, he expressed strong interest, so we asked him to 
join us as well. I was delighted, for his contributions were bound to be 
significant.
By March, we had a consensus document that we were happy with. 
We framed it in three parts: The Patient and Family Experience, The 
Caregiver Experience, and Management of the Event, with chapters 
on relevant issues. Each topic was organized into three sections: what 
should be done, why (the reasoning and evidence), and the specific 
recommendations. Following Tom Delbanco’s recommendation, we 
titled it When Things Go Wrong [17].
When Things Go Wrong—The Disclosure Project
306
 When Things Go Wrong
 The Patient and Family Experience
Three issues were addressed: communicating with the patient, sup-
port of the patient and family, and follow-up care of the patient 
and family.
The initial communication should occur promptly, within 24 hours. 
Patients have a right to be fully and promptly informed of any incident 
as soon as it is recognized. The physician responsible for the patient’s 
care should acknowledge the event, take responsibility for it, express 
regret, and explain what happened. When results of the investigation 
are available, they should be communicated by the responsible physi-
cian and involve the CEO or CMO in serious cases. If an error was 
found, the physician apologizes.
Support of the patient and family addresses their psychological, 
social, and financial needs. Patients should be asked about their feel-
ings, provided with psychological support, and given attention to their 
continuing medical care. Immediate financial assistance should be 
given if needed. Hospitals should consider paying for all future 
expenses due to permanent disability and continuing medical 
treatment.
Follow-up care after discharge from the hospital requires the care 
team to provide continuing psychological and social support by main-
taining communication through scheduled follow-up visits and tele-
phone calls.
 The Caregiver Experience
Like patients and families, caregivers are significantly impacted, emo-
tionally and functionally, following an adverse event. They need sup-
port to recover and to communicate appropriately with the injured 
patient. Hospitals need to have training programs in communication 
with patients when things go wrong, and how to deal with their own 
feelings. They also need “just in time” coaching when events occur 
and training in supporting colleagues when in need.
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 Management of the Event
The hospital needs to have an incident policy that sets expectations 
and provides guidance for the staff to improve patient safety by learn-
ing from adverse events and changing systems.
The elements of the policy are a commitment to open and honest 
communication, provision of just-in-time guidance, education of 
caregivers in empathetic communicating, provision of emotional sup-
port, and systems of documentation and reporting.
The initial response is first to stabilize the patient and eliminate any 
remaining threat, to secure implicated drugs and equipment, and to 
provide a substitute provider if needed. The care team must be 
promptly briefed to ensure consistent communication with the patient 
and family. The person to communicate with the patient and family is 
decided upon. An investigation should be done quickly while memo-
ries are fresh. The event is reported to the appropriate hospital 
authority.
Analysis of the event is essential for several reasons: to prevent, if 
possible, a recurrence in a future patient, to satisfy the patient’s right 
to know what the causes were and what is being done to remedy them, 
and to disseminate the learnings to other health-care organizations. 
Analyses should be multidisciplinary and nonjudgmental. The objec-
tive is to uncover the multiple factors that contributed to the event and, 
where possible, develop systems changes to make it less likely that 
the event will recur.
Documentation of the event is essential, as is reporting. The report-
ing policy should define the process for responding, identify who is to 
be notified, how, and by whom. Reporting must be safe for the care-
giver and should lead to investigation and corrective action. When 
required, file reports with regulators.
We were pleased with our product. Nothing like this had been done 
before. We hoped it would motivate all of the Harvard hospitals, and 
others, to make major changes in how they handle patient harms. We 
made it clear up front that this was a call to action. Now to find out if 




I went on a major selling job. RMF arranged a meeting with the Chief 
Medical Officers of all 14 Harvard-affiliated hospitals. I asked them to 
read the draft; discuss it with their local physicians, nurses, administra-
tive leaders, and hospital counsel; and circulate it widely among staff. 
We asked them to tell us if this was an appropriate approach and to tell 
us how to make it better—within a month. They did—and we received 
a deluge of comments from many people in many of the hospitals. We 
were pleased that all were supportive of the effort, and we got a lot of 
good advice. This was the first step in building stakeholder support.
John Ryan, our legal representative from RMF, arranged for me to 
meet with the risk management lawyers from the major hospitals to 
get their input. At the meeting, I was pleased, and frankly a bit sur-
prised, to find they had no problems with what we had written. That 
was a good sign!
However, they did have a concern that some doctors might apolo-
gize right away for something that was found on investigation to not 
be due to an error. Coming back to the patient later with a different 
story would be difficult. We changed the document to emphasize that 
the initial communication should be an expression of regret about the 
event. Apologizing would take place later if appropriate.
The committee member from each institution and I then met with 
all of the hospital CEOs and their key leaders, such as the CMO, CNO, 
and COO to discuss the paper and ask for their endorsement. We 
found them overall quite receptive. The CEOs of two of them, BWH 
and Children’s Hospital sent me letters of support.
In July, an unfortunate thing happened. Liz Kowalczyk, a health 
reporter for the Boston Globe contacted me. She got wind of our proj-
ect—hardly a surprise, since by now probably over 100 people had 
seen the draft—but she had not seen the draft. I told her that we would 
welcome an article on the final version, after the hospitals had 
approved it, but because of the sensitivity of the subject, they would 
have a negative reaction to anything coming out before all issues had 
been settled. It would make it harder to get them to sign on. I asked 
her to hold off for now. Despite that, she went ahead and published a 
substantial article on July 24.
As predicted, there were some strong reactions—particularly the 
MGH. Their CEO, Peter Slavin, was furious. I met with him and 
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assured him that we had released no information and would not until 
everyone was signed on.
By September, we had incorporated many suggestions and had the 
revised, final version of the report. I then sent it to the CEOs with the 
request that “your institution endorse the principles and concepts in 
the document and commit to implementing them in your hospital.” 
Recognizing that this would require approval at various levels, from 
medical executive committee to the Trustees, we asked for a response 
by December 1.
By November 15, we had a letter of endorsement signed by all seven 
of the Partners hospitals’ CMOs! By mid-December, we knew we would 
get letters from all the rest, so we made plans to publish in the spring.
After getting the endorsement from the hospitals, I went to Harvard 
Medical School to see if we could also get them to endorse it and be 
the organization to publish it. I thought the combination would be 
very powerful—a statement coming from the school and all of its 
teaching hospitals.
They requested I provide letters from all of the hospital CMOs, 
which was easily done, and present it to the Academic Council. The 
meeting went well, there were no difficult questions, and I left think-
ing they were supportive. In the end, however, they decided not to 
endorse it. Having “jumped through all the hoops,” I was very disap-
pointed. It was yet another example of how difficult it is to navigate 
the political aspects of this sensitive subject.
Fortunately, their refusal did not hold us back nor have any long-
term impact. Paula Griswold of the Massachusetts Coalition for the 
Prevention of Medical Errors Coalition was delighted to publish it. 
RMF agreed to pay for printing and mailing costs.
When the printed copies arrived, I went for maximum distribution. 
Copies were sent to the leaders of all of the hospitals, members of the 
Coalition, CRICO/RMF, IHI, NPSF, BCBS, as well as the head of 
every national organization with a stake in patient safety (AMA, 
ANA, AONE, Leapfrog, CAPS, advocacy groups, etc.) and to every 
person I knew in patient safety anywhere in the world.
It was well received. As we hoped, this comprehensive statement 
by an authoritative source gave those working in patient safety what 
they needed to start making disclosure and apology work in their hos-
pitals. We hoped we had kick-started the process. Later feedback and 




 National Progress in Communication and Resolution
While we were working to move communication and resolution 
ahead, the National Quality Forum (NQF) also had a committee work-
ing on it, although none of us were aware of it. Eight months after we 
published our report, the NQF issued a new Safe Practice on disclo-
sure. The key elements were that the patient should be provided the 
facts about the event: whether there was an error and the results of 
event analysis, the physician should express regret and give formal 
apology if the outcome was caused by error or system failure. 
Institutions were to integrate disclosure, patient-safety, and risk-man-
agement activities and establish a support system with coaching and 
emotional support for patients and staff [18].
The NQF action changed the ballgame. The NQF cannot require 
any institution to implement its Safe Practices, but it is the respected 
source that regulators and overseers, such as the Joint Commission 
[19], AHRQ, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services look 
to for establishing standards. Activity picked up.
In 2007, Stanford University Medical Network launched a claims 
management process called Process for Early Assessment, Resolution 
and Learning (PEARL). Although, like COPIC, it was not a full pro-
gram that included apology and appropriate compensation for all 
injured patients, it did reduce suits and costs. They reported that in the 
first 3.5 years after implementation, claim frequency dropped 36%, 
with a cost savings of $3.2 million per fiscal year.
At the University of Illinois Medical Center at Chicago (UIMCC), 
Tim McDonald and David Mayer developed the “Seven Pillars” pro-
gram derived from work done at Michigan to integrate communica-
tion with system improvement [20]. Mayer was Associate Dean for 
Education who had a deep interest in patient safety. In 2005 he started 
the Academy for Emerging Leaders in Patient Safety, a week-long 
program on patient safety at Telluride for medical students. There 
were 20 students. The program has since been expanded to include 
residents and is now given in four locations to over 150 a year.
In the Seven Pillars program, quality improvement efforts were 
directed to define or improve systems for all seven stages of the pro-
cess: reporting, investigation, communication and disclosure, apology 
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and remediation, system improvement, data tracking and analysis, 
and education and training.
They later reported that from 2002 to 2013, the intervention at 
UIMCC nearly doubled the number of incident reports, reduced the 
number of claims by 42%, reduced legal fees and costs by 51%, and 
reduced the number of lawsuits by 47% [21, 22].
In 2009, at the direction of President Obama, the US Department of 
Health and Human Services authorized AHRQ to launch a demon-
stration project on communication and resolution programs under its 
$23 million Patient Safety and Medical Liability grant. UIMCC and 
the University of Washington (UW) were among four health systems 
piloting chosen. UIMCC’s demonstration project demonstrated that it 
was possible to package training and tools to disseminate the Seven 
Pillars approach to DRP to community hospitals settings. The UW 
intervention trained 1300 health-care providers in teaching skills in 
disclosure and apology [22].
But the full application of Boothman’s work did not take off until 
Alan Woodward, an emergency physician and past president of 
Massachusetts Medical Society who was passionate about medical 
liability reform, and Kenneth Sands, chief quality officer of Beth 
Israel Deaconess Medical Center, developed a plan for getting wide-
spread adoption of programs by involving all stakeholders.
They obtained a 1-year planning grant from AHRQ to create a 
roadmap for implementing a statewide Communication and Resolution 
Program (CRP) model. They interviewed dozens of key stakeholders 
in the medical liability arena and identified 12 significant obstacles to 
implementation and developed strategies to overcome each. The road-
map provided a guide for action [23].
Woodward then did something quite remarkable to assure success: 
he brought the lawyers on board. He persuaded the Massachusetts Bar 
Association and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial attorneys to join 
the Massachusetts Medical Society to promote CRP programs state-
wide. Not just to participate but to join in leading the new effort. This 
was not to be just a doctors’ patient safety project.
Their first task was to create a more supportive legal environ-
ment. They developed consensus language for legislation that man-
dated sharing of all pertinent medical records, a 6 month 
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pre-litigation resolution period, strong apology protections, and the 
obligation of hospitals to disclose any significant adverse outcome 
[24]. Given the support of the key parties, the legislature accepted 
their language without change as part of the 2012 comprehensive 
medical reform act, setting the stage for moving ahead with the new 
approach.
To implement the roadmap, the group formed the Massachusetts 
Alliance for Communication and Resolution following Medical Injury 
(MACRMI) with representation from statewide organizations with a 
stake in the medical liability process: physicians, hospitals, patient 
advocates, insurers, and attorneys.
MACRMI’s goal was to develop, implement, and pilot a rigorous 
Communication, Apology, and Resolution Program (which it calls 
CARe), collect comprehensive data to assess its impact, and assist its 
dissemination. Modeled after the University of Michigan Health 
System’s program, CARe promotes early resolution in cases of avoid-
able medical injury. When unanticipated adverse outcomes occur, 
patients and their families are provided full explanation of what hap-
pened, what it means for the patient medically, what will be done to 
prevent the error from happening again, and, where appropriate, a sin-
cere apology and adequate and an offer of fair and timely 
compensation.
To achieve this goal, MACRMI developed an implementation guide 
with comprehensive resources, including best practices, algorithms, 
policies and procedures, teaching materials, and tracking tools (all 
available free on their website: www.macrmi.info). It then tested 
CARe and the toolkit in a pilot program in 6 hospitals over 3 years, 
collecting settlement data on nearly 1000 cases as well as patient 
experience and provider satisfaction survey information.
Data from the study showed that claims and costs did not increase, 
and more patients were compensated. The median compensation for 
these cases was $75,000, a number too low for a typical plaintiff’s 
attorney to take the case. Of cases that reached the resolution stage, 
41% gave rise to a safety measure that was or was likely to be imple-
mented by the hospital. These included new labeling for high-risk 
medications, color-coded socks for patients at risk for falls, and a 
multidisciplinary checklist for breech deliveries [25, 26].
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As a result of MACRMI’s efforts, 12 health-care institutions in 
Massachusetts are now using CARe, and a number of others are mov-
ing toward it. In addition, several entities in other states are in the 
process of implementing programs [27].
But the impact of MACRMI is much greater than the early adop-
tion numbers signify. What we are witnessing is the beginning of a 
culture change in the way we think about and respond to those we 
harm. A change in thinking not just in a group of hospitals and a phy-
sicians’ group and a carrier, but in the governor’s office, in the legis-
lature, in the plaintiff’s bar, in the defense bar and even in the courts. 
Patient safety—their welfare—and honesty are what CRP programs 
are about, not reducing losses in malpractice suits.
From the experience of those in Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Washington, and others around the country, AHRQ developed the 
CANDOR (Communication and Optimal Resolution) initiative to 
proactively engage health-care providers, patients, and their family in 
preventable harm communications. It combines early event reporting, 
analysis, prompt, supportive and compassionate ongoing 
a b
(a) David Mayer and (b) Alan Woodward. All rights reserved
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communication to the patient, fast, fair resolution where warranted, 
and applying lessons learned to change systems [28, 29].
AHRQ developed a CANDOR toolkit with input from those facili-
ties awarded grants and other experts to help hospitals implement 
CRPs quickly and promoted its adoption. Several large health-care 
systems, including CentraCare and MedStar Health, have made com-
mitments to its implementation, and the Medical Professional Liability 
Association and the Doctors Company have given it strong sup-
port [30].
 Conclusion
The extensive activity on all fronts over the past two decades has dra-
matically changed the landscape for communication and resolution 
programs, increasing awareness of the urgency for change and provid-
ing an array of mechanisms to help health-care organizations imple-
ment new systems and provide the training and support that are needed.
But the challenges are immense. Implementing an effective system 
of communication, apology, and resolution is the cutting edge of the 
larger issue of transparency. Openness and honesty in communicating 
with patients is difficult in an institution that is not transparent in other 
ways, such as freedom to discuss errors and a willingness to go public 
with its mistakes. Creating transparency requires strong leadership.
CRP is also about another crucial aspect of a safety culture that is 
too often overlooked in the emphasis on reducing blame: accountabil-
ity. The mindset of doctors and hospital leaders has to change to put-
ting accountability ahead of fears of litigation and loss of reputation. 
To do this, strong leadership is required. CEOs have to stand up to the 
lawyers and insurers and insist they play their roles in that mission.
Even with strong leadership and a skilled team, teaching physicians 
to communicate effectively and empathetically after a serious pre-
ventable event is difficult. Unfortunately, lip service to CRP often out-
strips true implementation. Needing to fulfill oversight demands, 
some hospitals initiate program improvements that focus selectively 
on claims resolution rather than on comprehensive programs of full 
communication, apology, and restitution that prioritize patient sup-
port and opportunities for improving quality and safety. While some 
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patients are helped, many are not, and there is little learning or system 
change. The culture really doesn’t change [31].
For all these reasons, it is not surprising that progress has been 
slow. From an historical perspective, however, a great deal has hap-
pened in a relatively short time. The vice grip of the dishonest and 
futile legal approach of deny and defend has been broken. Open com-
munication and support are now at least part of the conversation in 
health-care organizations as the key organizations overseeing their 
behavior, AHRQ, NQF, TJC, CMS, ABMS, and ACGME, have incor-
porated it into their standards. The pace has accelerated. A better 
future is in sight for our patients and their doctors.
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Chapter 20
Who Can I Trust? Ensuring Physician 
Competence
Gwyneth Vives, a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New 
Mexico, suffered a complication and bled to death 3 hours after giving 
birth to a healthy boy in 2001. It was 4 days before Christmas. Vives 
suffered a vaginal tear and other lacerations during the delivery that 
caused profuse bleeding. Her obstetrician, Pamela Johnson, was sued 
for failure to order a blood transfusion for Vives as well as abandon-
ment since she had turned over repair of the vaginal tear to a midwife. 
Two other patients also sued Johnson. Jean Challacombe alleged that 
Johnson tore her bowel and uterus while doing a dilation and curet-
tage the same day Vives died. Tanya Lewis accused Johnson of doing 
an unnecessary hysterectomy.
Johnson had been forced to leave a previous job at Duke University 
Medical Center in North Carolina because of a “high surgical compli-
cation rate” and the “worst QA (quality assurance) file of anyone at 
Duke.” At least three patients had filed claims against Johnson for 
malpractice. Later, Johnson lied to get her New Mexico license, say-
ing she had never lost hospital privileges, according to an order of the 
New Mexico Medical Board [1].
“It’s not bad people, it’s bad systems,” we said. But it has been a 
hard sell. When something bad happens, the natural reaction is to 
blame, to point the finger at the person who made the mistake, the bad 
doctor. We now know that this is both wrong and ineffective. Most 
harm, most errors—probably 95% or more—do, in fact, result from 
bad systems that lead good people to do bad things. That concept has 
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been the main driver of patient safety: to get people to think of errors 
and harm as the result of faulty systems, not faulty people.
But there are some “faulty” people—doctors whose incompetence 
or negligence harms and kills patients. “That’s not a systems problem,” 
people would say. Ah, but it is. Our doctors are educated and trained by 
a system, certified by a system, monitored by a system, and disciplined 
by a system. What are those systems? And do they identify doctors 
when they begin to fail, assess them, and do something about it—
before they hurt someone? A prevention system, or at least an early 
warning system. A reasonable question. Indeed, a vital question.
 The System We Have
The system we have for producing a competent physician is com-
posed of several interdependent systems. We have a rigorous educa-
tional system for medicine. Everyone knows that medical education is 
very difficult, intense, detailed, and challenging. Medical school is 
hard to get into, the bar is high, and graduates are well- equipped with 
scientific knowledge when they emerge. This is followed by 3–5 years 
of residency training and additional years of subspecialty fellowship 
training, essentially an in-hospital graded experience organized by 
specialty and culminating in examination and certification of compe-
tence by the specialty board (“Board certification”).
The system for ensuring the continuing competence of the practic-
ing physician also has several parts. The main responsibility falls to 
the individual specialty boards, who, in conjunction with their asso-
ciation, the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), attempt 
to ensure continuing competence for the 85% of physicians who are 
certified by repeated assessments of their diplomates (the word for 
those certified) through maintenance of certification programs.
State licensing boards exercise responsibility for continuing com-
petence of physicians through periodic relicensing. All but two rely 
largely on physicians certifying that they have completed a required 
number of continuing education courses and truthfully answering 
relicensing application questions about such things as malpractice 
claims, other civil lawsuits, criminal charges, illness and substance 
use, and even whether they have paid their taxes.
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At the hospital or practice plan level, the system for ensuring con-
tinuing competence is credentialing, a process that determines 
whether a physician has admitting privileges to the hospital (or prac-
tice in a group) for their patients. Privileges are conferred annually or 
biannually by a committee of physician peers based on the recom-
mendation of the department chair.
 What’s the Problem?
The problem is that these systems are not coordinated, and they don’t 
work very well. Despite the many layers of responsibility and the array 
of mechanisms for ensuring safe and competent care, too many physi-
cians fall short, and too many patients are harmed. Let’s look at the facts.
Direct measures of physician performance are hard to come by. 
There is no nationally standardized system for routine measurement 
of outcomes of physicians’ treatments. An indirect measure of incom-
petence is malpractice claims, but only claims that result in a payment 
to the patient are recorded, about a fifth of claims [2]. In 2019, 8378 
payments were made for claims against physicians, down signifi-
cantly from 16,116  in 2001 [3]. (Perhaps as the result of improved 
disclosure policies?—see Chap. 19.)
Another indirect measure is disciplinary actions by state medical 
boards. In 2017, 4081 physicians were disciplined by state medical 
board, including 1147 reprimanded (i.e., censured), 1343 restricted, 
and 264 who had their licenses revoked [4].
Malpractice claims and disciplinary actions by state boards capture 
only the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Most negligence is not reported, 
and few patients sue (see Chap. 1). For each of these cases, there are 
dozens that are not reported and many more instances of substandard 
care that results in patient harm.
More information is available about behavioral problems. Studies 
of disruptive behavior are disturbing. These include angry outbursts, 
verbal threats, shouting, swearing, degrading and demeaning com-
ments, and threats of physical force, as well as shaming and sexual 
harassment [5].
Surveys of nurses show that more than 90% report experiencing 
such abuse [6], many of them repeatedly. Abuse of medical students is 
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also common. Annual surveys of graduating medical students by the 
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) show that 
12–20% report abuse [7], although other data suggest it is much more 
common [8, 9]. In one survey of students from twenty-four different 
medical schools, 64% reported at least one incident of mistreatment 
by faculty, 76% by residents [10].
Residents in training are also victims. Half of 1791 residents in 1 
survey reported being subjected to bullying, belittling, and humiliation 
[11]. A meta-analysis of 52 studies of residents showed that the preva-
lence of intimidation, harassment and discrimination was 64% [12].
Patients are also targets of abuse. Surveys show that 13–27% of 
patients report problems with doctor communication [13]. Patient 
interviews show the percentage is closer to 50% [14].
 Why Doctors Fail
Why? Why do physicians who have successfully completed medical 
school and a rigorous residency training fail to maintain their compe-
tence or develop patterns of disruptive and unsafe behavior that com-
promise their ability to give high-quality, competent care? There are 
many reasons. Some succumb to the urge to establish a large practice 
to fulfill monetary needs or underlying feelings of inadequacy and 
then find its demands more than they can cope with. Others become 
overconfident and become unable to acknowledge shortcomings. 
Some are lazy and just don’t keep up.
But for most, the causes are more mundane. Like everyone else, 
physicians have mental and physical health issues. Major depressive 
disorders occur in 16% of the public. The extent among physicians is 
unknown, but higher suicide rates—40% higher than the public for 
male physicians and 100% higher for female physicians—suggest 
depression is also probably more common [15].
The extent of physical illness among physicians is also unknown, 
but a reasonable estimate is that at least 10% of doctors must restrict 
their practices for several months or more at some time in their 40-year 
careers because of disabling illness [15]. Nor are physicians exempt 
from cognitive decline as they age, although we have no data. 
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Approximately 10–12% of physicians will develop a substance abuse 
problem at some time in their careers. About half of these are alcohol 
dependence, the rest, opioids and other drugs [16].
Stress is another factor. Physicians are subjected to unique stresses 
that can lead to dysfunctional behavior. Overwork, sleep deprivation, 
decreasing reimbursement, and pressure to see more patients are com-
mon. In recent years, the fraction of physicians exhibiting burnout has 
skyrocketed [17]. Young physicians worry about achieving a work/
family balance and paying off their educational debts, which in 2018 
averaged $196,520 at graduation. Stress leads to isolation and mal-
adaptive coping strategies, such as alcohol or drug abuse.
Putting this all together, the conclusion is stunning. As John 
Fromson and I wrote in Problem Doctors: Is There a Systems-Level 
Solution?: “When all conditions are considered, at least one third of 
all physicians will experience, at some time in their career, a 
period during which they have a condition that impairs their abil-
ity to practice medicine safely” [15].
The question is: What do we do about it?
 Who Is Responsible for Ensuring Physician 
Competence and Safety?
Who is responsible for making sure that physicians are competent and 
safe? The answer is disarmingly simple: physicians. Society has given 
physicians an implicit contract: it grants them incredible powers to 
cross otherwise sacrosanct boundaries—to learn our most intimate 
thoughts and invade our bodies and our psyches—in return for the 
pledge that the profession will use its knowledge and skills for the 
good of society. It grants the profession substantial autonomy to deter-
mine its own educational standards and the right of self-regulation.
The essence of medicine’s contract with society is professionalism, 
the commitment of the physician to place the interests of the patient 
above their own, to maintain their skills, and to ensure that their col-
leagues do so as well [18].
One way physicians have met this obligation is through specialty 
societies, the AMA, and state medical societies, which from their 
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origins have considered improving the quality of practice of their 
members their first priority—their purpose, really. The American 
College of Surgeons (ACS), for example, was the first to set standards 
for hospitals, leading ultimately to the formation of the Joint 
Commission.
Specialty society annual meetings are largely devoted to learning, 
both from formal instruction and from research presentations. Larger 
societies, such as the American College of Physicians, American 
Association of Family Practitioners, and American Society of 
Anesthesiologists, have extensive extramural continuing education 
programs and online resources. State medical societies also sponsor 
educational programs. These programs assist physicians in accruing 
specific hours of medical education that are required for relicensure 
by their state boards of medicine.
Physicians have also met their obligation by developing profes-
sional organizations that set standards and exercise oversight. The pri-
mary responsibility for ensuring physician competence in the USA 
rests with two national organizations: the American Board of Medical 
Specialties (ABMS), whose specialty boards examine and certify 
practicing physicians, and the Accreditation Council for Graduate 
Medical Education (ACGME), which sets standards and oversees 
physician residency education.
 American Board of Medical Specialties
Specialty board certification is the essential badge of quality for phy-
sicians. For decades, becoming certified required only that the physi-
cian pass a rigorous written and oral examination at the conclusion of 
residency. You were certified for life. That began to change in 1969 
when the newly formed Board of Family Medicine required that dip-
lomates be reexamined every 10 years to maintain certified status. The 
process of recertification gradually spread to other specialties.
By the late 1990s, just as the patient safety movement was begin-
ning to gain momentum, the leadership of the ABMS realized they 
needed to do much more to ensure their diplomates were competent 
and to assure the public that was so.
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In a rather remarkable joint effort, ABMS and ACGME came 
together in 1999 to explicitly define physician competence. They 
described six domains of clinical competency that physicians would 
be expected to achieve and maintain [19] (Box 20.1). The six compe-
tencies were adopted by the individual specialty boards as the basis 
for assessments of physicians. The ACGME adopted them as the 
framework for progressive training in a specialty.
Box 20.1 Six Domains of Competency
• Practice-based learning and improvement: show an ability to 
investigate and evaluate patient care practices, appraise and 
assimilate scientific evidence, and improve the practice of 
medicine.
• Patient care and procedural skills: provide care that is com-
passionate, appropriate, and effective treatment for health 
problems and to promote health.
• Systems-based practice: demonstrate awareness of and respon-
sibility to the larger context and systems of health care. Be 
able to call on system resources to provide optimal care (e.g., 
coordinating care across sites or serving as the primary case 
manager when care involves multiple specialties, professions. 
or sites).
• Medical knowledge: demonstrate knowledge about established 
and evolving biomedical, clinical, and cognate sciences and 
their application in patient care.
• Interpersonal and communication skills: demonstrate skills 
that result in effective information exchange and teaming with 
patients, their families, and professional associates (e.g., fos-
tering a therapeutic relationship that is ethically sound, using 
effective listening skills with nonverbal and verbal communi-
cation, working as both a team member and at times as a 
leader).
• Professionalism: demonstrate a commitment to carrying out 
professional responsibilities, adherence to ethical principles, 
and sensitivity to diverse patient populations.
Adapted from Ref. [19]
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In addition, the periodic recertification examinations would be 
replaced by continuing maintenance of certification (MOC), which 
required the physician to demonstrate a commitment to lifelong learn-
ing, self-evaluation, and improving their practice and to prove it 
through periodic assessments.
Each specialty board devised its own MOC program, tailoring the 
six competencies to its individual needs and defining how to meet the 
requirements. The certifying board would then “continually” deter-
mine whether or not the physician is in compliance with its MOC 
requirements. Finally, there was an answer to the patient’s concern, “I 
know he was competent when he was certified, but is he compe-
tent now?”
Boards differed greatly in how they assessed compliance. For most, 
physicians were required to periodically document that they had 
maintained the core six competencies. A four-part assessment was 
designed to test their medical knowledge, clinical competence, com-
munication skills, and quality of care. Approaches have included 
patient registries, audits, peer review, and comparison to national 
benchmarks. Another is to give credit for participating in hospital 
quality improvement projects.
Physicians pushed back. Naturally skeptical, they had to be con-
vinced that the process was relevant to their practices and would 
improve quality of care at a time when they felt overworked and 
underpaid. However, by 2012 about half of all certified specialists had 
complied [20].
Older physicians who had been exempted from the 10-year reli-
censing requirement when it began also sat this one out. As of 2012, 
of the 66,689 diplomates of the American Board of Internal Medicine 
who held only the old time-unlimited certificates, only 1% chose to 
become recertified through MOC [20].
The concept of the six competencies was truly brilliant. Its explicit 
definitions made it possible to measure competence for the first time. 
The ACGME incorporated them in standards for residency training. 
Medical schools adopted them to structure curricula, and the Joint 
Commission made them requirements for hospital evaluation of their 
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physicians. CMS gave physicians a bonus on their Medicare reim-
bursement if they participated in its Physician Quality Reporting 
System and MOC.
 Accreditation Council for Graduate 
Medical Education
The other professional organization responsible for ensuring com-
petence of physicians is the Accreditation Council for Graduate 
Medical Education (ACGME) . Not unlike the Joint Commission, 
the ACGME accreditation process had for years focused on struc-
tural aspects of training programs, such as qualifications of the pro-
gram director and number of teaching cases, plus a few outcomes, 
especially the percentage of graduates who passed certifying 
examinations.
Following the development of the six competencies, ACGME in 
2001 launched the Outcome Project, which requires residency train-
ing programs to configure curricula and evaluation processes in the 
framework of the six competencies.
In 2011, in conjunction with changes in duty hour limits, a major 
emphasis was begun to improve supervision and providing a safe and 
effective environment for care and learning: the Clinical Learning 
Environment Review (CLER) Program.
Through frequent site visits independent of the accreditation pro-
cess, CLER focuses on the resident experience and progress in six 
areas: patient safety; health- care quality and reduction in health-care 
disparities; care transitions; supervision; fatigue management, miti-
gation, and duty hours; and professionalism [21]. “Milestones” were 
developed that describe the skills, knowledge, and behaviors in the 
six areas that residents are expected to reach at each level as they 
progress through their training.
These ACGME programs are described in greater detail in Chap. 18.
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 The Joint Commission
The Joint Commission plays an important role in enabling and 
ensuring physician competence through its oversight role with 
hospitals. Not only does it require hospitals to have systems and 
programs that foster quality and safety, which of necessity involve 
physicians, hospitals are also required to have programs to over-
see and enhance physician performance. See Chap. 12 for more 
details.
 State Licensing Boards
An interesting aspect of self-regulation is state regulation. While that 
sounds like an oxymoron, it is not. State medical licensing boards 
have legal authority to hold physicians accountable for competent 
practice, but for many years they were composed entirely of physi-
cians, who were deemed the only ones qualified to judge other doc-
tors. In recent years lay members have been added in some states, but 
physicians still dominate.
State boards exercise their authority primarily through licensing. 
Initial licensing for American medical school graduates requires pass-
ing three examinations taken in medical school and the first year of 
residency. Subsequently, physicians are required to complete a certain 
number of hours of continuing education annually and pay a fee to 
renew their licenses. State boards can also require physicians to 
undergo evaluations to ascertain knowledge and skill and require edu-
cational remediation and/or rehabilitation of physicians who have 
physical, mental, or substance use disorders.
Oversight is typically passive. Rather than actively monitoring or 
auditing performance of doctors in practice, boards tend to function in 
a reactive mode, responding to malpractice suits, patient complaints, 
and the occasional problem physician referred by a health-care 
organization.
State boards can place physicians on probation, censure, ask them 
to sign a letter of agreement to change behavior, restrict practice, or 
remove their license to practice. But they are reluctant to do so. 
Physicians on boards are very sympathetic to their colleagues, in part 
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because they are aware of their own vulnerability. Of the nearly 
600,000 physicians in practice in 2017, only 4081 (0.7%) were disci-
plined by their state boards [4].
Boards are particularly reluctant to take away licenses because 
doing so is an existential threat to the physician, rendering them 
unable to practice. As a result, it rarely happens. Licenses were sus-
pended or revoked for 904 physicians (0.15%) in 2017 [4].
Boards also have a long history of being very forgiving of those 
with psychoactive substance use disorders. (William Halsted, legend-
ary surgeon at Johns Hopkins Hospital and founder of the residency 
system, was a known cocaine addict.) Physicians with a substance use 
problem that interferes with their ability to practice medicine are usu-
ally required to enter into a 3–5-year monitoring agreement that 
includes mandatory random urine testing, workplace monitoring by 
peers and supervisors, attendance at meetings like A.A. or N.A., and 
seeing a therapist or alcohol/drug counselor. If they fail to follow 
through, they may have their license to practice suspended until a 
significant period of being clean and sober is once again documented.
While these practices accord with current thinking that addiction is 
a disease and not a moral failing, the difference from other fields, of 
course, is that impaired physicians put patients at risk. Forgiveness 
can be carried to extremes. For example, a Virginia psychiatrist was in 
drug rehabilitation 9 times and relapsed at least 12 times during a 
10-year period before the medical board took away her license [22]. 
In a five-year period, only 1400 physicians across the country were 
disciplined for substance abuse and reported to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank [23].
The National Practitioner Data Bank was established by Congress 
in 1986 to stop doctors from escaping troubled histories by having a 
central location where any sanctions or malpractice verdicts could be 
recorded. Names are not made public, but they are available to state 
licensing boards, hospitals, and other health-care entities, including 
federal agencies, who are required to consult NPDB prior to hiring.
Nevertheless, hospitals and boards have dragged their feet on com-
plying, reluctant to tarnish a physician’s reputation or restrict their 
ability to practice. Various tactics are employed to circumvent the 
requirement to report physicians, most commonly the hospital rather 
than the physician paying the settlement in a malpractice case.
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Nearly 54 percent of all hospitals have never reported a disciplinary 
action to the data bank. For example, in the Vives case mentioned 
above, no one told the data bank that Pamela Johnson had been forced 
to leave her job at Duke. Enforcement is no better: no fine or penalty 
has ever been levied according to the federal Department of Health 
and Human Services, which oversees the system.
 Federation of State Medical Boards
The national voice for state boards is the Federation of State Medical 
Boards (FSMB). All 71 state medical and osteopathic boards are 
members. The FSMB is the spokesperson for issues related to regula-
tion and discipline. It proposes policy changes and facilitates collab-
orative efforts of state boards and other entities. With the National 
Board of Medical Examiners (NBME), it sponsors the US Medical 
Licensing Examination that is required of all medical school gradu-
ates for medical licensure.
FSMB recommends standards, but it has no enforcement power. In 
2004, it promoted a radically new policy—“State medical boards have 
a responsibility to the public to ensure the ongoing competence of 
physicians seeking re-licensure”—i.e., meaningful maintenance of 
licensure like the maintenance of certification programs that were 
being developed [24].
In 2010, FSMB expanded this to declare that as a condition of 
license renewal, physicians provide evidence of participation in a pro-
gram of professional development and lifelong learning based on the 
six ABMS competencies [25].
It then took the step that quality and safety experts had long called 
for to align licensing and certification: participation in the MOC pro-
cess of their specialty board would satisfy the standards for relicen-
sure [26].
FSMB also plays a key role in the assessment and rehabilitation of 
problem doctors. While many state medical societies have monitoring 
programs for doctors with alcohol and substance use disorders, fewer 
address knowledge and skill deficits, personality disorders, technical 
and cognitive deficiencies, or disruptive behavior.
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A joint program of FSMB and NBME, the Post-Licensure 
Assessment System (PLAS), administers a standardized examination 
of clinical knowledge to physicians referred by state medical boards 
or by themselves. If results are unsatisfactory, the physician may 
undergo an additional assessment and then choose (or be required) to 
participate in a remediation program [27].
Alternatively, physicians may be evaluated by the Physician 
Assessment and Clinical Education (PACE) Program, founded in 
1966 at UC San Diego School of Medicine long before FSMB took on 
this responsibility. The program assesses physicians referred by state 
boards as a condition of maintaining their licenses. It conducts a rig-
orous evaluation of a physician’s ability to safely practice medicine. 
They undergo an oral clinical examination, clinical observation, and 
physical and mental health screening. PACE offers remedial courses 
in anger management, communication, professional boundaries, pre-
scribing, and medical record keeping [28].
A number of other programs have been developed in recent years 
for doctors and other professionals with problems. For all, the goal is 
to enable dyscompetent professionals to undergo remediation and 
training so that they can remain in practice.
Unfortunately, there are many barriers to physicians’ participation 
in these programs. Foremost are financial. In our fee-for-service 
health-care system, the physician is in a triple bind. Not only do they 
lose income while undergoing rehabilitation, they often have to pay a 
substantial fee for it, and if they are absent for more than a few weeks, 
their practice deteriorates as patients find other doctors. In a more 
rational system, their employer would maintain their salary and pay 
the costs of rehabilitation.
Another problem is that if residency retraining is needed, it is dif-
ficult to find programs that are willing and able to add the physician to 
their roster of residents, even for a short time. Similarly, their col-
leagues and hospital may be reluctant to take on responsibility or 
potential liability for supervising their practice. Doctors are uncom-
fortable supervising their peers.
Experience shows that performance problems can be solved or sig-
nificantly ameliorated for the vast majority of physicians. Few need to 
be, nor should be, removed from practice. We know what to do. 
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Making it happen is another matter. Rehabilitation and remediation 
are still very much a work in progress.
 New York Cardiac Advisory Committee
Perhaps the most effective—and unique—instrument of state regula-
tion is the New York Cardiac Advisory Committee. In the 1950s, long 
before there was national interest in improving quality or safety, the 
Health Department of New York convened a group of respected car-
diac surgeons and cardiologists to oversee the newly developing field 
of cardiac surgery. The committee was an outgrowth of the state cer-
tificate of need program that regulated which hospitals could establish 
new programs. It had the power to limit the number of hospitals per-
forming cardiac surgery. Its responsibility was to establish and main-
tain high-quality programs geographically distributed to meet the 
needs of the state’s population.
In 1989, responding to the concern that its comparisons of mortal-
ity among hospitals were not valid because they were not adjusted for 
risk, and recognizing the need for a data-based approach, the CAC 
established the Cardiac Surgical Reporting System (CSRS) to develop 
risk-adjusted measures and collect data on outcomes of coronary 
artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. For the first time, the adjusted 
outcomes of all cardiac surgeons and all hospitals performing cardiac 
surgery were measured and reported publicly.
The initial findings showed wide variations in 30-day operative 
mortality with low-volume surgeons and low-volume hospitals faring 
the worst. High-outlier hospitals were put on probation. The responses 
were prompt. The survival of their programs at risk, most of them 
undertook a variety of actions to improve their programs: establishing 
full-time chiefs, replacing chiefs and poor-performing surgeons, add-
ing cardiac anesthesiologists and nurse specialists, etc. The results 
were dramatic. Within 3  years, mortality dropped 41%, giving 
New  York the lowest CABG mortality of any state, a status it has 
maintained [29].
The reports attracted intense media attention in the early years, 
causing concern about shaming and government interference. 
Mortality for hospitals and surgeons were reported in the newspapers. 
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Was that appropriate? Certainly, the public has a right to know. This 
notion, now well-accepted and enshrined in Hospital Compare and 
other public data, was a radical idea at the time and hotly debated. 
There is little question, however, that the public release of the infor-
mation was a key motivator for change.
As the CAC began to measure risk-adjusted outcomes of CABG 
surgery in 1989, they approached our team at RAND to do an appro-
priateness study of CABG, angioplasty, and coronary angiography. 
Our earlier work had shown high rates of inappropriate use of these 
procedures. The CAC and the state health department wanted to know 
if their efforts resulted in lower rates in New York. With their collabo-
ration we were able to get funding for the study, which we carried out 
over the next 2 years.
The results confirmed the higher quality of cardiac surgical care in 
New York. The inappropriate rate for CABG was 2.4%, far lower than 
the 14% found in a previous study in several other states. Mortality 
was also low, 2.0%, far lower than the national average of 5.5%. The 
inappropriate use rate for angioplasty was also low: 4%. These added 
to the evidence that close oversight and the feedback of risk- adjusted 
data are powerful motivators for quality [30–32].
The CAC program has continued to be successful. It is a superb 
example of the power of intelligent, well-managed regulation to 
ensure quality and safety of health care. Unlike other states, in 
New York the health commissioner has the authority to require report-
ing, to carry out audits to verify data quality, and to establish the over-
sight committee and the power to shut programs down.
Involving the state’s leading cardiac surgeons and cardiologists in 
the advisory committee gave credibility to its decisions and accept-
ability to the cardiac surgical community. The focus on objective evi-
dence provided a powerful incentive for poor performers to improve 
[29]. The program is a model of effective regulation.
 The Civil Justice System—Malpractice Litigation
Finally, when all else fails, the legal system steps in. Doctors can be 
sued and forced to pay substantial compensation if their performance 
can be proven to be negligent. The legal definition of negligence is 
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quite simple: failure to meet the standard of care. Proving that is 
another matter. In the end, relatively few patients are compensated. 
The Harvard Medical Practice Study found that fewer than 10% of 
patients harmed by negligent care ever sued [33]. National studies 
show that fewer than half of malpractice suits result in a payment to 
the patient [2, 34].
But negligent care is only responsible for a small fraction of serious 
medical injury. The vast majority of injured patients have no recourse 
to the legal system. Malpractice litigation also fails to achieve its other 
purported objective: deterring bad behavior in the future. There is no 
evidence this happens. Physicians see cases as one off, bad luck, and 
unjustified. They often don’t believe they have done anything wrong. 
The process of being sued is devastating for physicians, however, as is 
discussed in more detail in Chap. 19.
A serious defect of the current system is that malpractice settle-
ments are usually sealed, prohibiting any party from making the infor-
mation accessible. Not only does this cloak of secrecy prevent the 
medical team from learning from the event and fixing the faulty sys-
tems, it keeps vital information away from state boards and future 
patients.
Overall, malpractice litigation is an ineffective tool for ensuring or 
improving physician competence. Interestingly, fewer patients are 
suing. Malpractice payments dropped from 16,116 in 2001 to 8378 in 
2019 [3]. It is tempting to attribute this to a reduction in patient inju-
ries or to improved disclosure practices, but there is little evidence 
for either.
A far better legal approach would be enterprise liability, in which 
the institution, not the physician, is responsible for compensating 
patients for the costs of harm. Hospitals and health-care organizations 
would be sued instead. It makes sense. If, as we maintain, harm results 
from failed systems (including systems for ensuring physician com-
petence), then it is the party responsible for the systems—the organi-
zation—that should be held accountable for their failures. Indeed, if 
we were really serious about this, we would require hospitals to com-
pensate patients for all costs of the harm we have caused, even when 
no error is identified: no-fault compensation—as was recommended 
by the Harvard Medical Practice Study 30 years ago.
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 Hospital Responsibility for Physician Performance
As in politics, all quality is local. Medical specialty boards set stan-
dards, examine, and certify; states license and discipline; but mean-
ingful oversight of physician performance, what happens in everyday 
practice, takes place where care is delivered. For 80% of physicians, 
that is the hospital. For others it can be their large multispecialty 
group. But for practitioners in solo or small group practice, such as 
primary care, psychiatry, and dermatology, oversight is often quite lax.
Hospital oversight is through credentialing committees, groups of 
physicians appointed by the medical staff who annually or biannually 
decide on admitting privileges and what procedures a doctor may per-
form. It is awesome power, second only to state licensing. If they are 
unable to admit patients to a hospital, most physicians cannot prac-
tice. They are professionally dead. Every hospital has a credentialing 
committee. Medical specialty boards are the carrot, credentialing 
committees are the stick.
The process that most credentialing committees use for carrying 
out this responsibility is quite simple: they rely on the recommenda-
tion from the specialty department chair. Typically, this is a pro forma 
process unless the department chair recommends against it. Then it 
can get very messy.
So, where “the rubber hits the road,” where the action takes place to 
ensure physician competence, is the department. The department 
chair is ultimately responsible for assessing the competence of every 
member of the department. How do they do it?
Until very recently, assessment has been informal, especially in 
smaller private hospitals where the chair has little authority. The chair 
relied on personal knowledge about the physician and feedback from 
peers. Absent serious complaints from patients or staff about the phy-
sician’s conduct, approval was routine.
Few department chairs actually reviewed patient outcomes or con-
ducted peer assessment of performance. Annual physical examina-
tions are still not required. Random drug testing is rare and hotly 
resisted by many physicians as an affront to their professionalism. 
Cognitive testing is almost nonexistent.
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The good news is that methods for monitoring clinical performance 
have improved greatly in recent years. To be objective, evaluation 
must be based on data: compliance with standard practices and out-
comes, how well patients do. While measuring outcomes is easiest 
with surgical patients, many “medical” outcomes are now also col-
lected routinely. Individual results can then be compared with national 
and local norms to identify outliers who need attention.
The Joint Commission now requires that physicians currently on 
staff have an annual Ongoing Professional Practice Evaluation 
(OPPE). This is a summary of ongoing data collected for the purpose 
of assessing a practitioner’s clinical competence and professional 
behavior. Newly hired physicians and those already on staff found to 
have competency issues on their OPPE are required to have a Focused 
Professional Practice Evaluation in which the medical staff evaluates 
the privilege- specific competence of the practitioner [35].
Psychosocial aspects of physician competence—communication 
skills, interpersonal relations, and ability to collaborate—have long 
been considered unquantifiable. They have traditionally been assessed 
informally through conversations with peers and coworkers. 
Personality or interest tests and the like have been tried and found not 
to be reliable. But one method of evaluation does produce data that is 
reliable and has proven to be quite useful: multisource feedback, pop-
ularly called “360” evaluations.
 Multisource Feedback
Multisource feedback (MSF) is a formalized method of obtaining 
feedback about an individual’s performance from those with whom 
they interact. Since the late 1990s, it has been used to assess physi-
cians by Lockyer in the Physician Achievement Review (PAR) pro-
gram in Alberta, Canada [36], but is now being increasingly used in 
US hospitals. The PACE program in California has used it for some 
time to evaluate physicians referred for problem behavior.
The process begins by having the physician and their peers, nurses, 
residents, and patients complete a questionnaire of 10–40 items that 
assess clinical behaviors, such as communication, collaboration, pro-
fessionalism, interpersonal, and management skills. Typically, 7–15 
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individuals in each of these groups complete the questionnaire, rating 
the physician on a five-point scale. The results are tabulated by group, 
and mean scores are compared to the physician’s self-assessment for 
each item. The department chairman then reviews the data with the 
physician to identify areas for improvement. Studies have shown that 
MSF has high reliability, validity, and feasibility [37].
The impact of the 360 review can be very powerful. In a pilot study 
some years ago in one department in a Boston hospital, we found that, 
as in Lake Wobegon, all physicians rated themselves above average 
for almost all questions. Peers tended to agree, but resident and nurse 
ratings were sometimes quite a bit lower, especially regarding inter-
personal relations. Feedback of this information to the physician was 
always a surprise and sometimes emotionally very disturbing. Several 
were reduced to tears. It was a powerful motivation for change.
MSF is increasingly being used in the USA. ABMS now recom-
mends that specialty boards use MSF to assess professionalism and 
knowledge, and ACGME requires training programs to use multiple 
evaluators to provide objective performance evaluation of residents. 
The Pulse 360 Program creates and sells 360 feedback tools and train-
ing programs for health care. It is used in over 200 hospitals [38].
 Support of Physicians with Problems
With the demands of MOC, methods for evaluation and support are 
improving. Specialty boards, especially the ABIM, have become more 
engaged with hospitals in providing continuing education, translating 
standards into practice, and collecting outcome data to measure per-
formance. Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, CIGNA HealthCare, 
Humana, and Wellpoint have incorporated them in their quality recog-
nition programs.
But serious behavioral problems are often managed poorly. 
Department chairs may lack the training and skills to deal with them. 
Many fear confrontation and avoid it if possible. Peers are reluctant to 
be involved, valuing their own independence and respecting that 
of others.
A major barrier is that disciplinary action will often be vigorously 
resisted by the offending physician, who may even sue the department 
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or the hospital. This leads to bad publicity in the newspapers and 
requires a number of doctors to spend many hours in depositions or 
hearings—a messy business, indeed. No wonder doctors shy away 
from judging their peers.
 How Should it Work? The Ideal System
There must be a better way to ensure physician competence and 
improve quality of care. There is. It is for the hospital (or practice) to 
perform a meaningful evaluation of every physician every year using 
a routine, formal, proactive system of monitoring with validated mea-
sures, followed by action to remedy shortcomings when they are dis-
covered. Some years ago, John Fromson and I proposed that the 
system must have three characteristics [15]:
• First, it must be objective, i.e., assessment must be based on data: 
patient outcomes data and compliance with performance standards, 
not on subjective judgments of personality or motivation.
• Second, it must be fair. All physicians in the organization must be 
evaluated by the same system, not just suspect individuals.
• Third, it must be responsive. When problems are identified, they 
must be treated promptly. There is no point in evaluation if nothing 
comes of it. Most physicians with problems will only need feed-
back. They can and will self-correct. Others may need counseling. 
Some may require referral to an outside program for assessment. 
Retraining may be needed.
An effective system is proactive. It is based on the notion that sub-
par performance can be objectively defined, routine monitoring can 
detect problems early, and the responses to deficiencies will be prompt 
and constructive.
The point is not to identify “bad apples” and throw them out, but 
to detect deficiencies early and correct them before patients are 
harmed, to enable good doctors with minor problems to become bet-
ter, and to help those with more serious problems to overcome them 
if possible.
In the ideal system, the department adopts explicit standards, 
requires compliance, monitors performance, and responds to 
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deficiencies. The department chair reviews performance data with 
each physician annually, and together they work out a plan for 
improvement as needed. In some cases, this may require external test-
ing and remediation.
A similar oversight process should be required of larger medical 
groups and employed physicians. The remaining small number of 
physicians in solo or small practice might then be required by licens-
ing authorities to take advantage of some mechanism like PACE or 
CPEP in order to maintain licensure.
Fortunately, as we have seen, the ABMS and specialty boards have 
worked hard in recent years to develop national standards of compe-
tence and behavior and to integrate them into the process of continu-
ing certification. Closer coordination of this oversight with local 
review and response would lead to greater accountability and improved 
performance.
 Nonregulatory Approaches to Improving Competence
Independent of the impressive changes to improve accountability by 
the establishment organizations described above, a number of inde-
pendent voluntary initiatives have taken place over the years to 
improve the process of physician assessment and improvement. 
Several deserve special mention.
 National Surgical Quality Improvement Program
In 1986, responding to a series of newspaper articles about poor care 
in Veterans Health Administration (VHA) hospitals, Congress man-
dated that VHA report risk- adjusted surgical outcomes annually and 
compare them to national averages. There was a problem, though: 
there were no known national averages and no known risk adjust-
ment models!
But the VA was uniquely suited to develop them for its population. 
The VHA is the largest health-care provider in the USA, serving sev-
eral million veterans and performing surgery in 128 of its 159 Veterans 
Administration Medical Centers (VAMCs). At the behest of their 
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surgical leadership, a research group at the Brockton/West Roxbury 
VA Medical Center in Massachusetts led by Shukri Khuri, Chief of 
Surgery, and Jennifer Daley, an experienced quality-of-care researcher, 
carried out the National VA Surgical Risk Study from 1991 to 1993. 
Using data collected from 117,000 major operations in 44 VAMCs, 
they developed risk adjustment models for 30-day mortality and mor-
bidity rates for noncardiac surgery [39].
They then turned their attention to measurement of surgical out-
comes. Surgery is uniquely suitable for measurement of outcomes 
since there is a clearly defined expected outcome for every operation. 
Using this validated model for risk adjustment, outcomes could now 
be measured with some confidence in their validity.
In 1994 the VHA established the National VA Surgical Quality 
Improvement Program (NSQIP), a reporting and managerial struc-
ture for the continuous monitoring and enhancement of the quality of 
surgical care, under an executive committee led by Khuri and 
Daley [40].
Surgical clinical nurse reviewers (SCNRs) were trained in the accu-
rate collection and timely transmission of risk adjustment data, con-
sisting of 45 presurgical variables, 17 surgical variables, and 33 
outcomes. Logistic regression analysis was used to calculate a pre-
dicted probability of 30-day mortality and complications. Risk- 
adjusted observed versus expected (O/E) outcome ratios were 
calculated for all types of procedures at the surgical service of each 
VAMC and overall.
Feedback of these procedure-specific O/E ratios is provided annu-
ally to the chief of surgery, director, and chief of staff of each VAMC, 
and the CMO of each Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), 
as well as results for all participating hospitals, by code. Hospital 
leaders know only the code for their hospital.
The executive committee produces an annual assessment of high 
and low outliers and communicates levels of concern about high out-
lier status to hospital and VISN, as well as praise and rewards to low 
outliers. Persistent high outliers are subject to internal and external 
reviews.
NSQIP also develops and disseminates self-assessment tools to 
providers and managers and, at the request of a VAMC, organizes 
consultative site visits to assess data quality and performance. 
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NSQIP provides management (directors and CMOs of VISN) 
with advice and expertise in conducting external reviews and site 
visits and disseminates best practices reported by low O/E 
hospitals.
The first assessment of results showed that during the period from 
1991 to 1997 30-day mortality decreased from 3.1 to 2.8 and morbid-
ity decreased from 17.4 to 10.3. By 2006, postoperative mortality had 
dropped by 47% and morbidity rates by 43% [41].
The program was well-accepted by the chiefs of surgery who val-
ued the feedback and learned to find and improve deficiencies. From 
the beginning, NSQIP has been about quality improvement, not judg-
ment. The emphasis is on systems not providers. No individual pro-
vider-specific data is transmitted to the central data base.
Several aspects of NSQIP accounted for its success. Most impor-
tant was the fact that VHA had in place a universal computerized 
record system, VISTA, that made clinical and laboratory data avail-
able for risk analysis. It also had access to the operating room log in 
every VAMC, so all procedures were automatically and reliably 
identified.
Second, for data entry it relied exclusively on trained surgical clini-
cal nurse reviewers (SCNRs) who were experienced in practice, data 
collection, and quality assurance. This gave high levels of credibility, 
reliability, and validity to the data. Third, inclusion of surgical leaders 
from the field in the design of the program and oversight led to sup-
port by VAMC senior surgeons, administrators, VISN directors, 
and CMOs.
The private sector took notice. Why not use NSQIP for non-VA 
surgical departments? Within months of the first report, in 1999, a 
pilot program was begun in three academic surgical centers, 
University of Michigan, Emory University, and the University of 
Kentucky, to determine if the risk adjustment models would work for 
the more heterogeneous private sector patient populations. They did. 
Comparison of findings in 2747 patients at these centers with con-
temporary results in 41,360 patients in the VHA showed no differ-
ences in risk-adjusted mortality between the non-VA and VA 
cohorts [42].
Following this success, the American College of Surgeons (ACS) 
in 2001 sponsored a pilot program funded by AHRQ in18 private sec-
tor hospitals that showed that NSQIP also led to reduced morbidity 
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and mortality in private sector hospitals. In 2004, ACS began enroll-
ing additional private sector hospitals into ACS NSQIP. Within a year, 
41 hospitals had joined. By 2018, participants included 568 hospitals 
in the USA, 96 in Canada, and 38 overseas. Nine of the top 10 hospi-
tals ranked as America’s Best Hospitals by U.S. News & World Report 
in 2018 participated in ACS NSQIP [41].
Meanwhile, NSQIP continues to work on improving. More spe-
cialty variables were incorporated; additional outcome measurements, 
such as functional status, quality of life, and patient satisfaction, were 
developed and incorporated; and structure and process measures were 
added [43].
 Analysis of Patient Complaints
In the early 1990s, Gerald Hickson, Associate Dean for Clinical 
Affairs at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, and his colleagues 
found that analysis of written complaints by patients to the hospital 
was a useful tool for identifying physicians with interpersonal prob-
lems. About 2/3 of complaints were about a hospital or practice ser-
vice or system issue; 1/3 were about a named physician.
While patients often complain about their doctors, it is unusual for 
them to make a formal complaint in writing [44]; most physicians 
receive none or only one or two over their entire professional career. 
But some have more. Hickson wondered if there was a relationship 
between the number of complaints and the likelihood of the physician 
being sued. (“Claims” in risk management parlance.)
Indeed, there was. In a six-year period, he found no claims for 81% 
of doctors who had only one or no complaints. The majority of those 
with 2–6 complaints also had no claims. But physicians with 4 or 
more complaints over this period were 16 times more likely to have 2 
or more claims than physicians with no complaints. Those with 25 
claims or more had a 95% chance of being sued [45].
Hickson realized that patient reports could serve as the basis of an 
“early warning system” to more rapidly identify and engage with phy-
sicians before harm occurred and suits began to accumulate. They 
could then be helped to overcome their deficiencies. He developed a 
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tiered intervention program, the Promoting Professionalism Pyramid, 
that defined a process that started with a conversation with a colleague 
and escalated if needed to formal evaluation and required behav-
ioral change.
Following the first complaint, a colleague would have a “cup of 
coffee conversation” in which the complaint is shared with the physi-
cian in a nonjudgmental way and they are asked to reflect on the event. 
Often the physician has not recognized the bad behavior and justifies 
it because of the situation. The colleague makes no judgment, merely 
delivering the news. But for many, that is all that is necessary: their 
behavior changes.
At the second level, when there have been additional reports that 
suggest a pattern of inappropriate behavior, an awareness intervention 
is called for. A respected colleague presents the data to the individual 
showing how their complaint history compares to that of their peers 
and gives them the opportunity to respond. Again, in most cases this 
is all that is needed to lead the physician to change behavior.
For those that do not respond to the awareness intervention, the 
response moves to the next level. The department chair steps in and 
makes it clear that the individual must change their behavior. Chairs 
are trained to work with the physician to define an improvement plan 
that may range from coaching and counseling to formal outside evalu-
ation and retraining.
If the physician is unwilling to undergo assessment and take respon-
sibility for improving, or if these measures fail, then disciplinary 
action is required, which can include revoking admitting privileges or 
reporting to the state medical board [46]. Fewer than 1% fall into this 
category.
Hickson also developed a comprehensive program at Vanderbilt to 
reduce disruptive behavior by teaching interpersonal skills and pro-
fessionalism at all levels: medical students, residents, and physicians. 
Physician leaders also receive skills training for conducting interven-
tions [46].
He also developed a Comprehensive Assessment Program for 
Professionals to provide medical and psychological evaluation and 
treatment planning. Group classes were developed for disruptive 
behavior, prescribing problems and crossing sexual boundaries [47].
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 National Alliance for Physician Competence
This was one of the most unusual and exciting ventures I was ever part 
of, both for its goal, which was to set standards for good medical prac-
tice, and for those who participated, who were leaders of the national 
groups that could make it happen—in education, regulation, profes-
sional societies, and others. It was also one of the most frustrating.
The Alliance was organized by James Thompson, President and 
CEO of the FSMB, an ENT physician and former Dean at Wake Forest 
School of Medicine. Moved by the IOM reports, To Err is Human and 
Crossing the Quality Chasm, Thompson recognized when he took 
over FSMB that state medical licensing boards needed better methods 
for determining physician competence, both for licensing and for dis-
ciplinary actions. ACGME and ABMS had defined the six competen-
cies, and the ABMS was moving to maintenance of certification. 
Shouldn’t state boards do likewise?
Thompson encouraged the Federation to issue a statement on the 
need for maintenance of licensure, but much more was needed to 
make it a reality. He conferred with experts he knew as a former Dean: 
Donald Melnick, President and CEO of the National Board of Medical 
Examiners (NBME); James Hallock, CEO of the Educational 
Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG); and David 
Leach, CEO of ACGME. They supported his effort but felt that a com-
prehensive strategy linking licensure to education and specialty certi-
fication was needed. The time had come to begin a dialogue about the 
future of physician education and self-regulation.
On March 24, 2005, they brought together more than 60 leaders 
and representatives from organized medicine, academic medicine, 
hospitals, regulatory agencies, the insurance industry, accrediting 
organizations, payers, and the public in Fort Worth, Texas, for the 
first “Summit” on Physician Accountability for Physician 
Competence (PA4PC) (Table 20.1). The goals were to determine (1) 
how to define a competent physician, (2) how to measure compe-
tency, and (3) how medical organizations would assure the public 
that physicians are maintaining competence throughout the lifetime 
of their practice [26].
With help from Innovation Labs, and financial support from the 
NBME, the meeting explored the context within which physicians 
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would be expected to demonstrate accountability in the year 2020. 
What should the system look like? The group was energized and 
quickly found common ground on the big issues.
In subsequent meetings, other relevant stakeholders, such as 
patients and content experts like myself, were added to the group. 
Over the next 2  years, in a series of semi-annual meetings PA4PC 
drafted detailed definitions of competence and the content for a docu-
ment, Good Medical Practice, that described the behaviors and values 
one should expect of a competent physician. A task force worked on 
simplifying physicians’ access to credentialing information for 
Table 20.1 Institutional 
members of the National 
Alliance for Physician 
Competence
The Association of American Medical 
Colleges
AARP
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical 
Education
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education
American Board of Internal Medicine 
Foundation
American Board of Medical Specialties
American Medical Association
American Osteopathic Association
American Osteopathic Board of Emergency 
Medicine
Association of American Medical Colleges
Association for Hospital Medical Education
Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association
Christiana Care
Council of Medical Specialty Societies
Crozer-Keystone Health System
Educational Commission for Foreign Medical 
Graduates
The Federation of State Medical Boards
Iowa Board of Medical Examiners
Michigan Board of Medicine
National Board of Medical Examiners
National Board of Osteopathic Medical 
Examiners
Oregon Board of Medical Examiners
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Texas A&M Health Science Center
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multiple purposes such as licensing and board certification. The group 
renamed itself the National Alliance on Physician Competence.
The good practice document was our central focus. It was based on 
the work of the General Medical Council in the UK but reframed in 
terms of the six domains of competency defined by ABMS and 
ACGME. There were great debates about terminology. Should the 
document say doctors “should” do such and such or “must” do it? 
Ultimately, both were rejected. This would be a statement of who we 
are and what we do—who we aspire to be—not because it is required, 
but because of our values and commitment to our professionalism. We 
would use simple declarative sentences: “We respect each patient’s 
dignity and individuality”; “We promptly modify our practice to 
incorporate evidence-based care”; “We apologize promptly to a 
patient when an error has occurred.”
As it came into focus, we realized that the document should begin 
with The Patient’s Perspective: a comprehensive statement of what 
patients have a right to expect from doctors regarding medical knowl-
edge and skills, communication and interpersonal skills, shared deci-
sion-making, access and availability, and ethical integrity. This is the 
lens through which we see our role, our duty. The purpose of compe-
tence is to provide optimal patient care.
We finished the first draft, Version 0.1, of Good Medical Practice – 
USA, on August 15, 2007. It described the behaviors expected of all 
doctors who are permitted to practice medicine. The Patient’s 
Perspective was followed by Duties of the Doctor consisting of one 
chapter for each of the six domains of competency. It was incredibly 
detailed, 200 statements in all, providing guidance on every aspect of 
practice, especially those that are difficult, such as knowing one’s lim-
its, giving bad news, dealing with problem colleagues, etc. Simple 
declarative statements of what good doctors do.
We called on medical educators and regulators to incorporate these 
principles in everything they do and challenged all physicians to take 
personal responsibility for making it happen.
The Alliance grappled with the relationship between mainte-
nance of licensure and maintenance of certification and how to 
engage the practicing community and the public in the effort. To 
facilitate the licensing and certification processes, it developed a 
standardized, comprehensive “Trusted Agent/Portfolio System” 
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that would enable physicians to retrieve all needed credentials 
from a single source.
The Alliance examined how a “continuum of competence” could 
be established: a system that would start in medical school and con-
tinue through residency programs, licensure, specialty certification, 
hospital credentialing and privileging, and the accreditation of institu-
tions. How would the use of Good Medical Practice and the Trusted 
Agent/Portfolio System impact long-term maintenance of compe-
tency throughout a physician’s career?
The last meeting of the National Alliance for Physician Competence 
Summit was held on July 7–9, 2008. The goal was to prepare to go 
public. Small groups synthesized and polished models to shift the 
paradigm for competence. These were then rolled into a single model 
of 14 components. Others focused on finalizing the renamed Guide to 
Good Medical Practice. Plans were made to “go live” with it in 
September, when Alliance participants would distribute the docu-
ment. A draft Alliance website was created. A revised Alliance 
Participant Agreement was approved.
Then it all fell apart. From the beginning, the AMA had been a 
reluctant participant. It traditionally opposed anyone telling doc-
tors how to practice and was against giving state boards more 
power. It declared opposition to the Guide even before it was 
a b c
(a) Jennifer Daley, (b) Jerry Hickson, and (c) Jim Thompson. (All rights 
reserved)
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written, maintaining that medicine is full of gray areas that are too 
difficult to measure. It opposed the concept of maintenance of 
certification.
At the last two meetings, it sought to undermine the process of the 
meetings by sending a large number of delegates who raised objec-
tions in all the working sessions. Although most of these were rejected 
by the majority, they disrupted the collaborative process.
Finally, at the last session the AMA withdrew its support. And, 
much to my surprise, despite the fact that it was the convener, so 
did the FSMB. It was proving to be too much for the individual 
state licensing boards. They were reluctant to take on this level of 
responsibility, and they saw no way to obtain the resources that 
would be required. The ABMS did not fight for it. It was having 
enough trouble figuring out how to implement the six competen-
cies. The Alliance was finished. Our “brief shining moment,” our 
Camelot, was over.
 The Coalition for Physician Accountability
But Don Melnick, Jim Hallock, and Darrell Kirsch, CEO of the AAMC, 
were not going to let the concept die. The next year, they formed the 
Coalition for Physician Accountability to continue the discussion and 
further the cause. Its membership includes the stakeholders who have 
direct responsibility for assessment, accreditation, licensure, and certi-
fication along the continuum of medical education and practice.
The Coalition provides a forum for dialogue about ways to “pro-
mote professional accountability by improving the quality, efficiency, 
and continuity of the education, training and assessment of physi-
cians” [48]. The Coalition meets twice yearly to analyze critical issues 
related to the regulation of physician education and practice and to 
develop consensus on actions to address them.
It functions through its member’s endorsement of consensus state-
ments about a diverse group of topics: regulation, innovation in medical 
school curricula, graduate medical education accreditation, interprofes-
sional education, medical student and physician burnout, use of health 
information technology, opioid epidemic mitigation, interstate licen-
sure, and a framework for professional competence and lifelong 
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learning. It developed a consensus letter that was sent to Congress 
regarding maintaining Medicare support of GME, and it sent a letter to 
the National Coordinator outlining the commitment of Coalition mem-
bers to promoting the use of health information technology.
 Conclusion
Ensuring physician competence is a complex and difficult business. 
Despite the huge amount of work done by many diverse parties, it is 
still very much a work in progress. Oversight bodies, the state licens-
ing boards and, especially, the specialty boards, have made substantial 
improvements in how they function, but the results still fall far short 
of achieving their objectives.
Why? Why doesn’t the system work better? Why don’t ABMS and 
the specialty boards make it work better and require, audit, and enforce 
adherence to the impressive and innovative processes they developed 
for maintenance of certification based on the six competencies?
Undoubtedly, there are many reasons, but I suggest that the funda-
mental reason, the “root cause” if you will, is that it is contrary to 
human nature for any group to police itself. We have not asked that of 
the other major industries where safety is critical: aviation and nuclear 
power. They are closely regulated by specific government agencies.
Do we need a federal agency to regulate quality and safety in health 
care? I have long believed we do [49]. The federal agencies regulating 
aviation and nuclear power are good models. The government exercises 
strict oversight of compliance with its rules, but those rules were devel-
oped in collaboration with the industry. Participation leads to buy-in and 
higher likelihood of compliance. (Recall the New York Cardiac Advisory 
Committee.) An agency developing regulations for doctors should col-
laborate with the specialty boards and state boards as well as representa-
tives from professional societies and health-care organizations.
Hospitals should be held accountable for their physicians’ perfor-
mance. They should participate in developing regulations that ensure 
they are accountable to the public, such as required reporting of 
adverse events. The Joint Commission should be a partner in this pro-




We have made tremendous progress in recent years in defining 
competence and measuring it. What was formerly implicit and casual 
can now be defined in an explicit and formal manner. We now know 
how to enable physicians to realize their full potential and by so doing 
immensely improve the quality and safety of patient care. The time 
has come to make it happen.
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Chapter 21
Everyone Counts: Building a Culture 
of Respect
“The doctor treats me like an idiot.” “He doesn’t like people who ask 
questions.” “He makes me feel like I’m wasting his time.” (from a 
patient)
“When did you get your MD degree?” “When I want your advice, 
I’ll ask for it.” (doctor to a nurse)
“Is that what they teach you in medical school these days?” “Don’t 
you know anything about renal anatomy?” (doctor to a medical 
student)
What is this all about? How can the noblest of professions, made up 
of intelligent, hard-working, dedicated people, have within its ranks 
some who treat others badly in their time of need? Why doesn’t “pro-
fessionalism” for all health-care professionals extend to ensuring that 
they live up to standards of decency and civility? As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, the reasons are complex, and disrespectful 
behavior is but one of many potential failings that doctors may suffer. 
But its influence is profound.
As the patient safety movement entered its second decade, experi-
ence with attempts to change systems led safety leaders to recognize 
that major progress could not occur without a supportive culture. And 
it became apparent that the major barrier to creating that culture, the 
core of the problem, was inappropriate physician behavior. This was, 
of course, the focus of our work on disclosure and apology: getting 
physicians to respect the patient’s need for, and right to, full informa-
tion on what went wrong when they were harmed by their care.
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Physician behavior was also the focus of the attempts to reform 
medical education. The first LLI white paper, Unmet Needs: Teaching 
physicians to provide safe patient care, documented the alarming fre-
quency of demeaning and dehumanizing treatment by faculty that 
medical students experienced. It came down with a strong recommen-
dation that medical school deans and teaching hospital CEOs adopt a 
zero-tolerance policy for disrespectful or abusive behavior [1].
What is the patient experience? In my course on quality and patient 
safety at the Harvard School of Public Health, I collected disturbing 
data about the patient experience from my graduate students. Each 
year, at the beginning of the course, to ground their approach to qual-
ity improvement in real-world experience, I asked students to inter-
view someone who had a serious medical problem. The students were 
to ask just two questions: What is it like living with this condition? 
What has been your experience with medical care? Consistently, over 
10 years, nearly half of patients recounted episodes where they were 
treated in a demeaning or disrespectful way by their doctors, leaving 
memories that were often still vivid years later.
Even more than patients and students, nurses are on the receiving 
end of disrespectful treatment by physicians. Almost all nurses can 
tell stories of disruptive behavior and humiliation. Most of the physi-
cians they work with treat them well, but it occurs frequently enough 
to poison the atmosphere and cause some to leave nursing.
Although available evidence does indicate that the percentage of 
doctors who engage in grossly disruptive behavior is small, many 
more engage in less flagrant types of disrespectful behavior. Dismissive 
put-downs of patients and nurses and “education by humiliation” or 
“pimping” of students are widely experienced. This had to change if 
we were to create the learning and supportive culture that is essential 
to safety. I became convinced that pervasive disrespect was the core of 
the culture problem. What could we do about it?
 A Group of Leaders
Perhaps if Harvard took the lead, others would follow. If our staid, 
old, conservative hospitals could come to grips with the problem, oth-
ers could as well. I raised the question to a number of knowledgeable, 
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respected leaders who I knew at Harvard Medical School (HMS) and 
its hospitals. To my delight, but not surprise, they were all interested 
in taking it on. They knew disrespectful conduct was a serious prob-
lem, and they responded to the opportunity to do something about it.
In September 2010, I brought them together for dinner at the 
Harvard Faculty Club for the first meeting:
• Ron Arky, Professor of Medicine
• Jules Dienstag, Dean for Medical Education
• Susan Edgman-Levitan, Executive Director, Stoeckle Center, MGH
• Dan Federman, former Dean for Medical Education
• Ed Hundert, Director, Center for Teaching and Learning
• Jeannette Ives-Erickson, Vice President for Nursing, MGH
• Gerry Healy, Professor of Otology and Laryngology
• Bob Mayer, Professor of Medicine
• Gregg Meyer, Senior Vice President for Quality and Safety, MGH
• Miles Shore, Bullard Professor of Psychiatry and Chair, HMS 
Promotions and Review Board
• Richard Schwartzstein, Professor of Medicine, Director of the 
Academy, HMS
• Andy Whittemore, Professor of Surgery and Chief Medical 
Officer, BWH
I welcomed the group with a blunt statement that the purpose of the 
meeting was not to talk about unprofessional behavior, but to deter-
mine if we wanted to do something about it. I laid out the scope: dis-
ruptive behavior, humiliation of students and nurses, disrespectful 
treatment of patients, and passive resistance and non- participation in 
quality improvement. I gave them statistics from surveys of nurses 
and medical students and read quotes from my students’ papers 
describing episodes of dismissive and demeaning treatment of patients 
by their doctors.
A great discussion followed: we tolerate disrespect, it is a leader-
ship issue, reform has to come from the top; we have actually rewarded 
bad behavior, we need a system to deal with it, we should do “360” 
evaluations of everyone, etc. Members recounted examples of bad 
conduct and poor support of students and nurses; it was more than just 
a problem of individual professionalism, as so often described, it was 
the culture.
 A Group of Leaders
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We agreed that it was time for action and that a statement from 
HMS would be powerful. We would meet again.
At the second meeting, we found broad agreement that the problem 
was severe and prevalent, that leadership is necessary to address the 
issue, and that we needed a different structure for responding to bad 
behavior. Our goal would be to develop an institution-wide (all HMS 
teaching hospitals) program. We would identify structures and processes 
that need to be put in place to identify and deal with disrespectful con-
duct of all kinds: i.e., the specifics of what we wanted hospitals to do. We 
decided to write a white paper laying out the problem and our recom-
mendations and try to get HMS leadership and hospital CEOs on board.
 “Champions”
I also convened a second group: frontline safety leaders at each of the 
teaching hospitals who could advise us on implementation. I dubbed 
this group of key safety people “Champions” from our QI jargon, i.e., 
clinical leaders who make things happen. I saw the two groups as 
symbiotic: the senior, professionalism working group would develop 
theory and policy, and the frontline leaders would work on the ground-
level implementation.
This Champions group, all of whom I knew, and all physicians, 
included:
• Bob Truog, Children’s Hospital
• Sigall Bell, Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital
• John Herman, Mass General Hospital
• Craig Bunnell, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
• Jo Shapiro, Brigham and Women’s Hospital
• Elizabeth Gaufberg, Cambridge Health Alliance
• Mitch Rein, North Shore Hospital
• Les Selbovitz, Newton Wellesley Hospital
• Susan Abookire, Mt Auburn Hospital
• Luke Sato, CRICO
As with the senior group, all were eager to participate. I explained 
the different functions of the two groups: the senior group’s mission 
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was to motivate the Dean and the hospital CEOs to develop and imple-
ment more effective policies and processes for dealing with disre-
spectful behavior; we were writing a white paper for that. The 
Champions’ group would develop strategies and plans for implemen-
tation. An obvious place for them to start was the current situation 
regarding codes of conduct. So, in preparation for the first meeting, I 
asked each of them to send me their hospital’s code for dealing with 
disrespectful behavior.
The Champions first convened in January. The codes were all over 
the map! Several hospitals didn’t even have a code! I thought this 
would be a great opportunity: we could work together to come up 
with a universal code that all Harvard hospitals could agree to.
But the group had little interest in that. They weren’t sure just what 
they were interested in, but my various suggestions fell on deaf ears. 
We spent the first meeting with each person talking about what they 
were doing in their institutions and agreed to meet again. We met sev-
eral times over the next year but could never really agree on proceed-
ing in a clear direction. To my great disappointment, in the end the 
group had no positive impact. But, as we shall see, it did have an 
unfortunate negative effect.
Meanwhile, the senior working group met monthly over the period 
of a year and were very active. We wanted the medical school to take 
the lead here, but that would not be easy. Because of the unusual 
structure of HMS in which all of the teaching hospitals are fairly 
autonomous, the Dean was sensitive to their strong sense of indepen-
dence and not anxious to tell them what to do. We gathered informa-
tion on codes and practices and outlined the paper. We added several 
people to the group: deans Maureen Connelly and Gretchen Brodnicki; 
the Chairman of Faculty Discipline, Paul Russell; and Luke Sato from 
CRICO, our liability insurer.
Miles Shore and I went to work drafting a white paper that would 
lay out the various aspects of disrespect, defining the types of behav-
ior and the varied situations where it occurred. We had learned a great 
deal from our research; the problem was far worse than we had sus-
pected. There was ample evidence: studies documenting the extent to 
which nurses, students, and doctors were treated badly, plus the trove 




Disruptive behavior was what brought us together, and it was the situ-
ation crying out most loudly for solution. As noted, most nurses expe-
rience shouting, demeaning comments, or humiliation by a physician 
at some time, many frequently. Similarly, while most of their encoun-
ters with physicians are positive, many patients have had a bad experi-
ence. Almost all medical students can recount humiliating treatment 
by their teaching attendings in hospitals.
The most disturbing finding from our review of the literature and 
pooled experience, however, was not about disruptive behavior, but 
that lesser types of disrespectful behavior are pervasive and not lim-
ited to physicians. While only a few “bad apples” engaged in obvious 
egregious disruptive behavior, lesser degrees of disrespectful conduct 
were common.
Passive aggressive behavior is a pervasive form of disrespect, but it 
is seldom commented on. For example, many physicians have not 
been enthusiastic about patient safety—they claim to not see the prob-
lem in their own practices, and they are too busy to participate in 
hospital-organized “quality improvement” projects. When asked or 
required to participate, they act out their resistance passively—by 
missing or coming late to meetings, by not offering ideas or doing the 
work, by being slow to carry out their tasks.
Another pervasive aspect of disrespect that is not even recognized 
by those affected is systemic or institutionalized disrespect. This is 
the disrespect embedded in many of the well-accepted practices that 
are part of everyday care in hospitals. The most obvious example is 
working conditions. Research evidence is clear that long hours, sleep 
deprivation, and excessive workloads cause increased errors. Yet, long 
hours and heavy workloads are standard operating procedures in 
health care, especially in teaching hospitals.
If you stop and think about it, requiring doctors and nurses to work 
under these conditions is the ultimate in disrespect. Not only are you 
treating them badly, you are knowingly putting them in a position 
where they are more likely to harm their patients. For hospital leaders, 
administrative or clinical, to do so is unconscionable, yet it is the norm 
almost everywhere.
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A more subtle form of institutionalized disrespect is waiting times. 
Millions of hours are lost every day in the USA by patients waiting for 
care. We say, in effect, your time is worth less than my time. We ignore 
the immense costs, social and fiscal, of keeping people out of work 
and children out of school. Patients bear the brunt of this form of dis-
respect, but the inefficiency also exacts its toll from the physicians 
and employees who also wait.
And it is unnecessary. Operational research has developed methods 
for “queuing” and task management that virtually eliminate waiting 
and are well-known; they just need to be implemented. Some hospi-
tals have done that and even eliminated waiting rooms [2]. All hospi-
tals and doctors’ offices should.
The evidence of pervasive disrespect in health care is clear, but the 
literature was remarkably shy of insight into the causes of disrespect. 
For this we had to rely on the insights about general human behavior 
gathered over the years by psychologists. We did find examples of 
some very well-thought-out policies and procedures for dealing with 
egregious behavior, particularly the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Ontario’s Guidebook for Managing Disruptive Physician 
Behavior [3].
 A Culture of Respect
By March we had completed a first draft, and various members were 
working on revisions. Jeff Flier, Dean of HMS, had indicated that he 
would welcome a proposal for a policy on respectful behavior. 
However, in the end he preferred that we distribute the white paper to 
Harvard hospitals and not to colleagues on the quad, the formal 
HMS campus.
The group thought it should also be published in the medical litera-
ture, so Miles Shore and I worked with several other members to fin-
ish the paper, and in July 2011 we submitted it to Academic Medicine. 
I was dubious that such a long paper would be published by a journal. 
Fortunately, the editor recognized its value and accepted it with the 
proviso that we break it into two papers that were published in the 
same issue:
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 A Culture of Respect, Part 1: The Nature and Causes 
of Disrespectful Behavior by Physicians [4]
The first paper described the dimensions and the extent of the problem 
of disrespectful behavior.
The numbers are arresting: 95% of nurses have witnessed or 
received abuse, and 64% reported an episode of verbal abuse at least 
every 2–3 months. But the number of doctors responsible is small: 
5.7% [5]. More than a third of nurses believe disruptive behavior is a 
cause of nurses leaving an institution [6].
As noted in Chap. 20, abuse of medical students is also common. 
Dismissive comments or humiliation is experienced by two thirds 
of students [1, 7, 8]. More than half show signs of burnout, and 14% 
have symptoms of serious depression. Half of residents are victims 
of bullying, belittling, and humiliation [9]. Patient surveys show 
that 13–27% of patients report problems with doctor communica-
tion [10]. Patient interviews show the percentage is closer to 
50% [11].
The paper then defined the types of disrespectful behavior and their 
effects and explored the causes of disrespect. We proposed that the 
slow progress in patient safety results from the dysfunctional culture 
of health-care institutions, and the root cause of that dysfunctional 
culture is disrespectful behavior.
Six different forms of disrespect were identified as common in 
health-care organizations:
 1. Disruptive behavior, such as angry outbursts, threats, bullying, and 
the use of profane and abusive language
 2. Humiliating and demeaning treatment of nurses, residents, and 
students
 3. Passive-aggressive behavior, such as blaming others for your fail-
ures and making frequent negative comments about the hospital or 
colleagues
 4. Passive disrespect, such as being chronically late to meetings, delay 
in dictating charts, and resistance to following safe practices, such 
as hand washing
 5. Dismissive treatment of patients
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 6. Systemic disrespect: practices that are taken for granted, such as 
long hours and excessive workloads for nurses and residents, long 
waiting times for patients, and not disclosing and apologizing after 
harm caused by an error
All of these forms of disrespect create barriers to communication 
among all parties—doctors, nurses, residents, and patients. Disrespect 
is a major barrier to efforts to improve patient safety. It undermines 
the teamwork that is essential to changing systems to improve safety; 
it saps meaning and satisfaction from work, leading to burnout and 
low morale. It is particularly damaging to students and patients, espe-
cially when they are harmed by a medical error.
We identified both internal (individual) and external (environmen-
tal) causes of disrespectful behavior. Internal causes include personal 
feelings of insecurity and anxiety, depression, narcissism, aggressive-
ness, and prior victimization. The extent to which these antecedent 
problems result in disrespectful behavior, however, is largely deter-
mined by the external environment.
Key environmental factors that foster disrespect are the hierarchical 
nature of health-care organizations and a blaming culture. But also 
important are the long hours, heavy workloads, and “production pres-
sure” to deliver quality care.
 A Culture of Respect, Part 2: Creating a Culture 
of Respect [12]
The main theme of the second paper is that creating a culture of 
respect is the core of the broader cultural transformation that is needed 
to create a culture of safety in health care. The responsibility for creat-
ing a culture of respect falls squarely on the shoulders of the organiza-
tion’s leader “because only he or she can set the tone and initiate the 
processes that lead to change.”
We challenged health-care organization CEOs to accomplish five 
major tasks:
 1. To motivate and inspire others to take action “and to create a sense 
of urgency around doing so”
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 2. To establish preconditions for a culture of respect by showing con-
cern for the well-being of faculty and staff by addressing issues of 
hours and workloads and physical hazards
 3. To establish policies regarding disrespectful behavior, i.e., codes 
of conduct
 4. To facilitate engagement of frontline workers by addressing sys-
temic stressors
 5. To create a learning environment by modeling professional behav-
ior and valuing the learner
The paper then provided extensive and explicit recommendations 
on creating a code of conduct, drawing on experience from various 
sources, especially the College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Ontario’s Guidebook for Managing Disruptive Physician Behavior 
[13]. We emphasized the importance of developing effective means of 
implementing and enforcing such a code, including enabling safe 
reporting and responding promptly.
The final section dealt with prevention, which includes education at 
all levels, the design and use of appropriate performance evaluations, 
and support of individuals at all levels who work to create a safe envi-
ronment. Creating transparency, breaking down authoritarianism, 
learning to work in teams, and creating a “just culture” are all part of 
the challenge of creating a respectful culture.
 A Strange Twist
When we submitted the papers to Academic Medicine in July 2011, I 
sent a copy to each member of the Champions group knowing they 
would be interested in what we had learned. To my great surprise, 
several were upset that they hadn’t been included as authors! I thought 
this was a bit weird, because 6 months earlier I had sent them a draft 
so they would know what we were doing (presumably the foundation 
for their work), and we discussed the findings at a Champions meet-
ing. Only one person sent me any comments about it, and no one sug-
gested any edits. Given this prior behavior, it was a mystery to me 
why any of them would now think they were entitled to authorship.
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Clearly, however, there was a major miscommunication that even in 
retrospect neither Miles nor I nor any of the authors were able to 
understand. We spent a great deal of time trying to mollify the 
Champions and resolve differences. Several disagreed substantially 
with the emphasis of the paper on consequences and response rather 
than on a supportive culture. They were upset about being left out of 
a major paper on this subject coming from Harvard—despite the fact 
they had contributed nothing to it!
Meanwhile, the paper was provisionally accepted, with the usual 
request that we respond to reviewers’ comments. We saw this as an 
opportunity to ask several of the disaffected to write an additional sec-
tion in response to the reviewers, in which they could weave in some 
of their ideas and be legitimately added as authors. I thought this was 
a good solution.
However, despite the general angst, only two of them volunteered 
to do this. Unfortunately, instead of writing an additional section, they 
set about rewriting the whole paper! This would obviously not be 
acceptable to the editors, but they were insistent. So the whole effort 
ended in naught. I felt very bad about it—especially since a number of 
the group were old friends and associates.
 Response
The two papers came out in the Annals of Internal Medicine in July 
2012 and were well received. The earliest most obvious impact in our 
hospitals was that several tightened up their procedures and fired some 
of their most outrageous offenders, physicians whom colleagues had 
complained about for years.
A more impressive tangible result was that Virginia Mason Medical 
Center (VMMC) took the papers to heart. Nationally recognized as 
the leader in reducing errors and creating a culture of safety, VMMC 
was a fertile field in which this seed could germinate. Not only did 
VMMC upgrade their standards and processes for dealing with disre-
spectful behavior, they developed a comprehensive continuing educa-
tion course on respect and required all 5000 of their staff and employees 
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to take it. The course has subsequently been marketed to hundreds of 
other hospitals worldwide.
It is hard to measure the impact of the papers nationally, but I 
noticed that the word “respect” began to appear in conversations and 
writings about quality and safety. More specifically, medical schools 
and residency programs now routinely survey students and residents 
about receiving abusive behavior. Questions about how their doctors 
treated them were added to the post- hospitalization questionnaires 
that were sent to patients to evaluate their care. The feedback from 
those surveys puts immense pressure on hospitals, which, perhaps 
more than anything else, is slowly leading to a more respectful 
environment.
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Chapter 22
Make No Little Plans: The Lucian 
Leape Institute
Despite encouraging progress in the early years of the patient safety 
movement, it soon became evident that there were deeper issues that 
needed to be addressed. We realized that we were not going to make 
health care safe by making process changes one by one, even power-
ful changes such as eliminating CLABSI or implementing the surgi-
cal checklist.
We needed to fundamentally reimagine the way we think about 
delivery of health care. Health care needed not just to be improved but 
to be transformed. A sustainable strategy—probably several strate-
gies—was needed to enable us to deal with the fundamental systemic 
and behavioral issues that drive unsafe behavior.
Fortunately, as noted in Chap. 5, in 2007 the National Patient Safety 
Foundation created a mechanism to do that, the Lucian Leape Institute, 
a “think tank” of experts whose leadership roles had given them expe-
rience and insights that would enable them to identify the issues and 
make authoritative recommendations for changes.
The charge to the Institute was to “define strategic paths and calls 
to action for the field of patient safety and provide vision and context 
for the many efforts underway within the health care system. Through 
its Roundtables, it will issue reports that will guide the work of the 
field and challenge the system to address the issues critical to making 
the system safer.”
372
I chaired the Institute. The other initial members were:
• Don Berwick, founder and CEO of the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement, who brought quality improvement to health care
• Carolyn Clancy, Director, Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, who spearheaded its early work on safety
• Jim Conway, Senior VP, Institute for Healthcare Improvement and 
previous COO of Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, who led its reorga-
nization for safety
• David Lawrence, CEO of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, former 
Executive Session member, who brought patient safety to 
Kaiser-Permanente
• Julianne Morath, Chief Quality and Safety Officer, Vanderbilt 
University Medical Center, who led Allina Health’s entry into 
patient safety
• Dennis O’Leary, President of the Joint Commission, also a former 
Executive Session member, who focused the Commission on 
patient safety
• Paul Gluck, immediate past chair of NPSF Board of Directors
• Diane Pinakiewicz, President of NPSF
At the first meeting of the Lucian Leape Institute, we had a lively 
discussion about our purpose and how to most effectively go about 
strategic planning. After surfacing dozens of ideas, we decided to 
focus our efforts on core concepts that we believed were foundational 
to achieving meaningful improvement in patient safety.
They were obviously not the only thing needed, but we believed 
they were essential. Without embracing these concepts, health-care 
a b c
(a) Julie Morath, (b) Jim Conway, and (c) Paul Gluck. (All rights reserved)
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organizations could not mobilize the resources and motivate their 
workforce to achieve safe care. We identified five concepts: Reforming 
Medical Education, Integrating Care, Finding Joy and Meaning in 
Work, Patient Engagement, and Transparency. We called them 
Transforming Concepts.
Each concept requires a change of consciousness to move thinking 
beyond traditional boundaries, and each implies profound behavioral 
changes. We wrote a paper, Transforming health care: a safety imper-
ative, that explained the transforming concepts, summarized the 
importance of each, and defined the issues to be resolved [1]. Then we 
set to work.
Over the next several years, LLI convened a roundtable of national 
experts and stakeholders, including patient advocates, for each of the 
five concepts to explore the critical issues, understand them better, 
and make recommendations for transformative change. To stimulate 
buy-in and ownership, we made a special effort to include on each 
panel leaders of organizations for which the issue was especially rel-
evant and who could implement the recommendations. LLI members 
chaired the roundtables.
The typical roundtable had 25–30 participants and met twice in 
two-day sessions. We had no trouble recruiting members for each 
topic; the relevant thought leaders shared our interest and were eager 
to participate. Prior to convening, we provided participants with a 
comprehensive literature review on the topic. The discussions were 
spirited and wide-ranging and concluded with recommendations for 
health-care organizations and their leaders.
Following each roundtable, the leaders wrote a white paper that 
combined facts and insights from the literature with the results of the 
panel discussions to provide a comprehensive account of the topic 
with specific recommendations for action by health-care providers, 
leaders, and policy makers. These white papers are available, free of 
charge from IHI at IHI.org.
The five white papers are summarized below, including for each 
also a review of progress made since the paper was published and a 
discussion of remaining challenges. These are verbatim combinations 
of text taken from two summaries later published by LLI: Transforming 
Health Care: A Compendium of Reports from the National Patient 
Safety Foundation’s Lucian Leape Institute, IHI, 2016 [2], and 
Transforming concepts in patient safety: a progress report. BMJ 
Quality & Safety, 2018 [3].
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 Unmet Needs [4]
 Teaching Physicians to Provide Safe Patient Care
 Workshop Leaders: Dennis O’Leary and Lucian Leape
Health-care delivery continues to be unsafe despite major patient safety 
improvement efforts over the past decade. The roundtable concluded that 
substantive improvements in patient safety will be difficult to achieve 
without major medical education reform at the medical school and resi-
dency training program levels. Medical schools must assure that future 
physicians not only have the requisite knowledge, skills, behaviors, and 
attitudes to practice competently but also are prepared to play active roles 
in identifying and resolving patient safety problems. These competencies 
should become fully developed during the residency training period.
Medical schools today focus principally on providing students with 
the knowledge and skills they need for the technical practice of medicine 
but often pay inadequate attention to the shaping of student skills, atti-
tudes, and behaviors that will permit them to function safely and as 
architects of patient safety improvement in the future. Specifically, med-
ical schools are not doing an adequate job of facilitating student under-
standing of basic knowledge and the development of skills required for 
the provision of safe patient care, to wit: systems thinking, problem 
analysis, application of human factors science, communication skills, 
patient-centered care, teaming concepts and skills, and dealing with 
feelings of doubt, fear, and uncertainty with respect to medical errors.
In addition, medical students all too often suffer demeaning experi-
ences at the hands of faculty and residents, a phenomenon that appears 
to reflect serious shortcomings in the medical school and teaching 
hospital cultures. Behaviors like these that are disruptive to profes-
sional relationships have adverse effects upon students, residents, 
nurses, colleagues, and even patients. Students frequently tend to 
emulate these behaviors as they become residents and practicing cli-
nicians, which perpetuates work environments and cultures that are 
antithetical to the delivery of safe, patient-centered care.
Summary of Recommendations (Table 22.1)
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Table 22.1 Key recommendations from Unmet Needs: Teaching Physicians to 






Place the highest priority on creating a learning culture that 
emphasizes patient safety, professionalism, transparency, 
and valuing the individual learner
Eliminate hierarchical and authority gradients
Emphasize that professionalism includes demonstrating 
mutual respect and non-tolerance of abusive or demeaning 
behavior
Declare and enforce a zero-tolerance policy for confirmed 
egregious disrespectful behavior by faculty, staff, or 
residents
Promote the development of interpersonal skills, 
leadership, teamwork, and collaboration among faculty and 
staff
Provide incentives and resources to enhance faculty 
capabilities to teach and practice patient safety and to be 
effective role models
The selection process for admission to medical schools 
should emphasize attributes that reflect professionalism and 
orientation to patient safety, such as compassion, empathy, 
and collaboration
Medical schools Treat patient safety as a science that encompasses human 
factors, systems theory, and open communication
Emphasize the shaping of desired skills, attitudes, and 
behaviors as set forth in the core competencies defined by 
the IOM, the American Board of Medical Specialties, and 
the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
The educational experience should be coherent, continuing, 
and flexible throughout undergraduate medical education, 




Amend medical school accreditation requirements and 
residency program requirements to include expectations for 
the creation of learning cultures and the development of 
patient safety-related behavioral traits.
Survey medical schools to evaluate education priorities for 
patient safety and the creation of school and hospital 




In recent years, medical school curricula have increasingly included 
patient safety and safety science, and these concepts have also become 
more common in education for other clinicians and frontline staff. For 
example, the American Medical Association’s Accelerating Change 
in Medical Education Consortium brought medical schools together 
to innovate, develop curricula, and share best practices, including 
those addressing quality and safety.
The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education Clinical 
Learning Environment Review (ACGME CLER) program requires 
medical resident participation in quality and safety learning. Recently, 
the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) initiated a 
program to create a shared understanding of Quality Improvement 
and Patient Safety (QIPS) competencies across the full continuum 
from medical school to continuing practice.
Other clinical disciplines, particularly nursing, have often pio-
neered educational pathways, and a concerted effort is underway to 
emphasize the importance of interprofessional teams. The Quality 
and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN) program has focused on 
enhancing education around safety science in nursing schools for 
more than a decade. More recently, the National Collaborative for 
Improving the Clinical Learning Environment (NCICLE) highlighted 
the “patient safety gap” in the education and training of all clinicians 
and provided clear recommendations for improvement [3].
To assist health-care students and professionals in building core 
skills in improvement, safety, and leadership, the Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI) developed a web-based interactive 
educational program called the Open School. More than 650,000 
learners have enrolled in the Open School since it opened its virtual 
doors in 2008.
To address the need for training in postgraduate medical education, 
in 2012 the NPSF created a course in patient safety and safety science 
that more than 7000 learners of diverse disciplines have utilized. 
Several universities have developed graduate education and fellow-
ships in quality and safety, and clinicians, risk managers, pharmacists, 
executives, and others have pursued these as well as certificate pro-
grams and professional certification in patient safety.
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Remaining Challenges
Still, opportunity lies ahead for greater consistency in how health pro-
fessionals learn about patient safety. A 2016 report from ACGME 
CLER reveals gaps in areas such as feedback on safety reporting and 
experiential learning, lack of awareness of the range of patient safety 
issues, and shortage of opportunities for interprofessional system-
based improvement efforts. Contributing to this learning gap is a 
shortage of academic faculty with safety and quality improvement 
expertise.
Continuing education requirements for attending physicians are 
highly variable. While some medical specialties require continuing 
education in patient safety, the American Board of Internal Medicine 
recently removed it as a requirement from Maintenance of Certification. 
Health-care organizations would benefit from encouraging study of 
safety science by all team members, including board members, and 
operationalizing ways to achieve continuous learning as safety sci-
ence expands.
As these and other activities gain momentum, the core agenda 
remains consistent, clear, and urgent: to mainstream the preparation 
of health professionals’ awareness, skills, commitment, and practical 
training about the scientific pursuit of safer care. Embracing the 
science of safety in medical education is crucial to the future health 
and well-being of patients, families, and communities.
 Order from Chaos [5]
 Accelerating Care Integration
 Workshop Leaders: David Lawrence and Richard Bohmer
Lack of care coordination and integration was identified as a major 
contributor to the frequency of avoidable errors in patient care in the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report To Err Is Human (1999). Care 
integration was presented as the cornerstone for achieving high qual-
ity in the subsequent IOM report Crossing the Quality Chasm (2001). 
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has 
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included care integration and patient safety in its scope of work since 
early in this decade. Federal government administration arguments 
for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 included 
numerous references to this issue.
Modern care delivery is extraordinarily complex. To protect the 
patient and avoid errors require a planned, coordinated, and fully inte-
grated approach to care. In addition to the complexity inherent in 
modern treatment for patients with difficult and often multiple condi-
tions, complexity is found throughout the care experience: in the 
number of physicians involved, the number of professionals and sup-
port personnel required, the multiple venues where care is provided, 
and the diverse requirements and expectations of patients. As a conse-
quence, the risks of harm also rise unless careful attention is given to 
the way care is organized and delivered, that is, to the system of care 
delivery itself. The system must be designed to protect the patient 
while ensuring that he or she receives the full benefits of the remark-
able advances that have occurred over the past century.
And here we arrive at care integration, the planned, thoughtful 
design of the care process for the benefit and protection of the patient. 
Unfortunately, physicians and leaders of delivery systems (with nota-
ble exceptions such as those at the Mayo Clinic, Geisinger Health 
System, and Kaiser-Permanente) have been unwilling or unable to 
embrace greater care integration. As described in Crossing the Quality 
Chasm, most patient care is fragmented and uncoordinated. Where 
integration has occurred, it is most often structural: assembling piece 
parts under a single governance umbrella while leaving the underly-
ing care delivery processes largely untouched.
The care delivery system is struggling to escape the straitjacket of 
physician autonomy and economic independence, a payment system 
that reinforces fragmentation and independent decision-making, and 
a regulatory framework that places legal responsibility on the indi-
vidual professional without corresponding accountability of the team 
or the system within which that professional works. The medical edu-
cation system reinforces these expectations and does little to prepare 
new physicians for the team-based, interdependent work that is 
required to achieve high- quality and safe care.
Summary of Recommendations (Table 22.2)
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Progress
With an increased call for improved coordination of care and focus on 
patient safety across the care continuum, methods for improving 
handoffs and communication among teams, providers, and patients 
are gaining traction. Today the focus on population health and market-
specific shifts in payment models serve as incentives for greater care 
integration and coordination.
Progress has been made to develop systems and structures to 
encourage and incentivize care integration. Accountable care organi-
zations (ACOs) have brought together groups of health providers to 
incentivize better quality care at a lower cost. Likewise, the develop-
ment of the patient-centered medical home (PCMH) aims to reorga-
nize and reinvigorate primary care, and early evidence shows promise 
in achieving lower costs, improved patient experience, and better care 
quality.
Table 22.2 Key recommendations from Order from Chaos: Accelerating Care 
Integration
Target of recommendation Recommendation
All stakeholders: federal 
and state governmental 
agencies, consumer groups
Create mechanisms for developing a shared 
understanding among public and private 
stakeholders regarding the link between care 
integration and patient safety
Utilize working groups and public forums, best 
practices, and patient stories to be catalogued 
and disseminated
Health-care leaders and 
practitioners, public
Patients and families must become active 
participants in process improvement and design 
and redesign efforts and review organizational 
performance
Regulatory and accrediting 
bodies
Create methods of measuring care integration, 
along with robust assessment and evaluation 





Provide education and training for executives, 
boards, clinicians, and medical students that 
focus on patient safety and care integration
Researchers, industry Develop the technology and infrastructure to 
allow for national spread of organizational and 
operational expertise to support care integration
 Order from Chaos
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Other encouraging examples of improved care integration include 
Project Re-Engineered Discharge (Project RED), the PCORI-funded 
Project ACHIEVE (Achieving Patient-Centered Care and Optimized 
Health In Care Transitions by Evaluating the Value of Evidence), and 
the Johns Hopkins School of Nursing–led Community Aging in Place: 
Advancing Better Living for Elders (CAPABLE). For example, 
Project RED developed strategies to improve the hospital discharge 
process to promote patient safety and has been proven to reduce 
rehospitalizations and yield high rates of patient satisfaction.
Finally, the increase in employed physicians and continued refine-
ment of the electronic health record have accelerated care integration. 
Improving interoperability of health information technology has been 
a major initiative at the federal level to improve information flow 
across the entire care continuum.
Remaining Challenges
Despite incremental improvement, coordination and integration of 
care remain difficult, particularly for patients with multiple chronic 
conditions. Even with a national push toward more integrated care 
models (perhaps most focused on the development of ACOs), so far 
results toward safer, more coordinated care have been mixed. 
Furthermore, care integration issues are compounded for older adults. 
One study found that the average Medicare beneficiary spent about 
17 days in contact with the health-care system through an average of 
3.4 different clinicians. Only 55% of these individuals coordinated 
their care principally with a single primary care physician.
Structural changes alone will not ensure optimal care integration. 
Strong clinician leadership and patient engagement will be required to 
further improve care coordination. Involving patients and families in 
the codesign of care, especially around coordination and care deliv-
ered in the home, will help identify unmet needs and educational 
deficits.
Care integration remains perhaps the most challenging of the trans-
forming concepts because of the fragmentation of the US health-care 
system. When Americans are asked to reflect on the integration of 
care from their own experiences, some refer to the term “health-care 
system” as an oxymoron.
22 Make No Little Plans: The Lucian Leape Institute
381
Individuals responsible for coordinating care and helping patients 
navigate the care system include primary care physicians, specialists, 
nurses, pharmacists, social workers, and care managers, as well as 
health plan and delivery system personnel. As care becomes more 
complex and shared among more providers, it is essential to improve 
both processes (e.g., teamwork, communication, and patient engage-
ment) and technologies (e.g., EHRs) for patients and providers.
 Through the Eyes of the Workforce [6]
 Creating Joy, Meaning, and Safer Health Care
 Workshop Leaders: Julie Morath and Paul O’Neill
The health-care workforce is composed of well-intentioned, well-pre-
pared people in a variety of roles and clinical disciplines who do their 
best every day to ensure that patients are well cared for. It is from this 
mission of caring for people in times of their greatest vulnerability 
and need that health-care workers find meaning in their work, as well 
as their experience of joy.
Yet many health-care workers suffer harm—emotional and physi-
cal—in the course of providing care. Many are subjected to being 
bullied, harassed, demeaned, ignored, and, in the most extreme cases, 
physically assaulted. They are also physically injured by working in 
conditions of known and preventable environmental risk. In addition, 
production and cost pressures have reduced complex, intimate, care-
giving relationships into a series of demanding tasks performed under 
severe time constraints. Under these conditions, it is difficult for care-
givers to find purpose and joy in their work or to meet the challenge 
of making health care safe for patients they serve.
Vulnerable Workplaces
The basic precondition of a safe workplace is protection of the physi-
cal and psychological safety of the workforce. Both are conspicuously 
absent or considered optional in many care delivery organizations. 
The prevalence of physical harm experienced by the health-care 
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workforce is striking, much higher than in other industries. Up to a 
third of nurses experience back or musculoskeletal injuries in a year, 
and many have unprotected contact with blood-borne pathogens.
Psychological harm is also common. In many health-care organiza-
tions, staff are not treated with respect—or, worse yet, they are rou-
tinely treated with disrespect. Emotional abuse, bullying, and even 
threats of physical assault and learning by humiliation are all often 
accepted as “normal” conditions of the health-care workplace, creating 
a culture of fear and intimidation that saps joy and meaning from work.
The absence of cultural norms that create the preconditions of psy-
chological and physical safety obscures meaning of work and drains 
motivation. The costs of burnout, litigation, lost work hours, employee 
turnover, and the inability to attract newcomers to caring professions 
are wasteful and add to the burden of illness. Disrespectful treatment 
of workers increases the risk of patient injury.
What Can Be Done?
An environment of mutual respect is critical if the workforce is to find 
joy and meaning in work. In modern health care, teamwork is essen-
tial for safe practice, and teamwork is impossible in the absence of 
mutual respect.
Former CEO of Alcoa Paul O’Neill advises that, to find joy and 
meaning in their daily work, each person in the workforce must be 
able to answer affirmatively three questions each day:
 1. Am I treated with dignity and respect by everyone?
 2. Do I have what I need so I can make a contribution that gives mean-
ing to my life?
 3. Am I recognized and thanked for what I do?
Developing Effective Organizations
To create a safe and supportive work environment, health-care organi-
zations must become effective, high-reliability organizations, charac-
terized by continuous learning, improvement, teamwork, and 
transparency. Effective organizations care for their employees and 
continuously meet preconditions not subject to annual priority and 
budget setting. The most fundamental precondition is workforce 
22 Make No Little Plans: The Lucian Leape Institute
383
safety, physical and psychological. The workforce needs to know that 
their safety is an enduring and non-negotiable priority for the govern-
ing board, CEO, and organization.
Knowing that their well-being is a priority enables the workforce to 
be meaningfully engaged in their work, to be more satisfied, less likely 
to experience burnout, and to deliver more effective and safer care.
Achieving this vision requires leadership. The governing board, 
CEO, and organizational leaders create the cultural norms and condi-
tions that produce workforce safety, meaning, and joy. Effective lead-
ers shape safety culture through management practices that 
demonstrate a priority to safety and compassionately engage the 
workforce to speak about and report errors, mistakes, and hazards that 
threaten safety—their own or their patients’. Joy and meaning will be 
created when the workforce feels valued, safe from harm, and part of 
the solutions for change.
Summary of Recommendations (Table 22.3)
Table 22.3 Key recommendations from Through the Eyes of the Workforce: 







Develop and embody shared core values of mutual 
respect and civility; transparency and truth telling; 
safety of all workers and patients; and alignment and 






Adopt the explicit aim to eliminate harm to workforce 
and patients
Recognize and celebrate the work and 
accomplishments of the work force, regularly and 
with high visibility
Hospital and health-
care leaders, board 
members, managers
Commit to creating a high-reliability organization 
(HRO) and demonstrate the discipline to achieve 
highly reliable performance This will require creating 
a learning and improvement system and adopting 
evidence-based management skills for reliability
Hospital and health-
care leaders
Establish data capture, database, and performance 
metrics for improvement and accountability
Government and 
nonprofit funders
Support industry-wide research to explore issues and 
conditions in health care that are harming our 
workforce and patients
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Progress
Multiple initiatives are underway to increase awareness of the impor-
tance of joy and meaning in work and workforce safety. The National 
Academy of Medicine and several health-care professional groups 
and insurers, such as the American Association of Critical-Care 
Nurses (AACN), the American Nurses Association (ANA Enterprise), 
the American Medical Association (AMA), and the Harvard Risk 
Management Foundation are addressing the issue of resilience and 
burnout.
IHI has developed a framework for increasing joy in work that rec-
ommends domains such as reward and recognition, choice and auton-
omy, camaraderie and teamwork, and physical and psychological 
safety. Some have observed that the widely accepted Triple Aim 
should be expanded to include workforce safety and joy and meaning 
in work—the Quadruple Aim.
Regarding health-care workforce physical safety, noteworthy 
efforts are proceeding. With the support of the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS), the US Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration recently launched an initiative to encourage hospitals 
and health-care facilities to implement safety and health management 
systems to prevent injuries among their workforce and patients. 
Similarly, the Joint Commission has provided detailed reports and 
tools for improving workforce safety and reducing workplace 
violence.
Remaining Challenges
Despite these efforts, according to one recent study, more than half of 
US physicians suffer from burnout. Among critical-care nurses, 
25%–33% have symptoms of severe burnout syndrome. Not only do 
physicians have higher rates of burnout than the general public, but 
they also suffer higher rates of depression and suicide. The Covid 
pandemic has substantially increased all of these problems. The 
effects of psychological, emotional, and physical harm to the work-
force surface in the form of litigation, lost work hours, employee turn-
over, and inability to attract newcomers to caring professions. With 
health-care reform, pay-for-performance, the introduction of 
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electronic health records, and other innovations, health-care workers 
spend less time directly caring for patients—further draining energy, 
meaning, and joy.
Compounding the issue, a recent survey found that only 23% of 
hospital boards review workplace safety dashboards. Our health-care 
workforce is endangered, and without a healthy, engaged, and sup-
ported workforce, safer patient care will remain elusive.
 Safety Is Personal [7]
 Partnering with Patients and Families 
for the Safest Care
 Workshop Leaders: Susan Edgman-Levitan 
and James Conway
Receiving safe care is definitely a personal experience. The harm to 
patients resulting from medical errors at the most vulnerable moments 
of their lives is a profoundly intimate experience for everyone 
involved. Clinicians and staff are also deeply affected when they are 
involved in an adverse event and frequently suffer shame, guilt, fear, 
and long-lasting depression.
But ensuring safety can also be shared and rewarding. The insights 
and perspectives of both those who experience care at its best and 
those who experience it at its worst can help health-care leaders, clini-
cians, and staff at every level make the improvements needed to create 
a safer and more patient-centered system.
Engaging patients and families in improving health-care safety 
means creating effective partnerships between those who provide care 
and those who receive it—at every level, including individual clinical 
encounters, safety committees, executive suites, boardrooms, research 
teams, and national policy-setting bodies. Increasing engagement 
through effective partnerships can yield many benefits, both in the 
form of improved health and outcomes for individuals and in safer 
and more productive work environments for health-care 
professionals.
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Patients, families, and their advocates increasingly understand the 
wisdom of this partnership. Too often, standing in the way is the 
health-care system itself—whether by intention or not—because of 
its fragmentation, paternalistic professional culture, abundance of 
poor process design, and lack of experience on the part of health-care 
leaders and clinicians with practical methods of engaging patients in 
the safety enterprise.
While patients and families can play a critical role in preventing 
medical errors and reducing harm, the responsibility for safe care lies 
primarily with the leaders of health-care organizations and the clini-
cians and staff who deliver care. Many of the barriers to engagement 
faced by patients and families—such as lack of access to their health 
records, intimidation, fear of retribution, and lack of easy-to-under-
stand tools and checklists for enhancing safe care—can only be over-
come if leaders and clinicians support patients and families to become 
more confident and effective in their interactions with health-care pro-
viders. Many of the tools necessary to do this already exist, but the 
system must also provide the education and training needed by pro-
fessionals and patients alike to become more effective partners.
Summary of Recommendations (Table 22.4)
Progress
With the increasing use of decision aids, patient portals, OpenNotes, 
care engagement plans, and the spread of Patient and Family Advisory 
Councils (PFACs), health-care leaders and clinicians are beginning to 
understand the power of engaging patients and families as integral 
partners. The OpenNotes program has demonstrated that patients can 
contribute to preventing or mitigating errors.
Patient experience data is being used more widely and effectively. 
Mandates from CMS, the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA), and other payers for use and improvement of Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) patient 
experience survey data are linked to improved performance and 
outcomes.
Health-care systems, hospitals, and ambulatory practices are also 
beginning to incorporate patient preferences into care design by 
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including patients and their families as active participants in codesign 
and research studies funded by the Patient-Centered Outcomes 
Research Institute (PCORI). The internationally observed “What 
Matters to You?” Day aims to encourage meaningful conversations 
between patients, families, and providers.
Patient and family perspectives are valuable in many arenas, from 
design of the physical environment and care coordination plans to 
reporting safety concerns and participation in root cause analyses. 
Patient engagement should be authentic and take place across the con-
tinuum of care from the bedside to the boardroom to national policy 
committees. The newly established Patient Experience Policy Forum 
Table 22.4 Key recommendations from Safety Is Personal: Partnering with 
Patients and Families for the Safest Care
Target of 
recommendation Recommendation
Leaders of health 
systems
Establish patient and family engagement as a core value 
by involving patients and families as equal partners in all 
organizational activities. Educate and train clinicians and 
staff to be effective partners; and partner with patient 
advocacy groups and community organizations to increase 




Support patients and families to engage effectively in their 
own care by providing the information, training, and tools 
they need to manage their health conditions according to 
their expressed wishes
Engage patients as equal partners in safety improvements 
and care design
Support patients and families when things go wrong
Health-care policy 
makers
Involve patients in all policy-making committees and 
programs
Develop, implement, and report safety metrics that foster 
accountability and transparency
Engage patients in setting and implementing the research 
agenda
Patients and 
families and the 
public
Ask questions about their care and understand their 
medicines and care plans. They should also be instructed 
in basic safety steps: repeating back instructions and 
information to clinicians in their own words; bringing a 
friend or family member to all appointments; and 
understanding who is in charge of their care
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affiliated with the Beryl Institute is advocating for patient and family 
partnerships in codesign and policy making nationally.
Remaining Challenges
While some exemplary organizations are fully engaging patients in 
the care process, ample opportunities for improvement remain. Many 
organizations lack effective PFACs and have not devoted resources to 
train staff in shared decision-making practices or to offer evidence-
based decision aids. The current fee-for-service payment system does 
not encourage clinicians to spend the time needed to communicate 
with patients nor to elicit their preferences.
Many organizations still lack process improvement skills to sup-
port integrating better communication into clinical workflows. As 
care shifts from inpatient to ambulatory and home care settings, 
patients and families are becoming more responsible for delivering 
their own care. However, they may not be well equipped to manage 
complicated medication regimens, activities of daily living, medical 
devices, or infection control procedures.
Overwhelming evidence indicates that collecting patient feedback 
and including patients as equal partners in their care support improve-
ment in both patient experience of care and clinical outcomes. 
Opportunities remain to partner with patients, families, and commu-
nities to accelerate improvement in education, patient satisfaction, 
and quality of care.
 Shining a Light [8]
 Safer Health Care Through Transparency
 Workshop Leaders: Gary Kaplan and Robert Wachter
During the course of health care’s patient safety and quality move-
ments, the impact of transparency—the free, uninhibited flow of 
information that is open to the scrutiny of others—has been far more 
positive than many had anticipated, and the harms of transparency 
have been far fewer than many had feared. Yet important obstacles to 
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transparency remain, ranging from concerns that individuals and 
organizations will be treated unfairly after being transparent to more 
practical matters related to identifying appropriate measures on which 
to be transparent and creating an infrastructure for reporting and dis-
seminating the lessons learned from others’ data.
To address the issue of transparency in the context of patient safety, 
the National Patient Safety Foundation’s Lucian Leape Institute held 
two roundtable discussions involving a wide variety of stakeholders 
representing myriad perspectives. In the discussions and in this report, 
the choice was made to focus on four domains of transparency:
• Transparency between clinicians and patients (illustrated by disclo-
sure after medical errors)
• Transparency among clinicians themselves (illustrated by peer 
review and other mechanisms to share information within health-
care delivery organizations)
• Transparency of health-care organizations with one another (illus-
trated by regional or national collaboratives)
• Transparency of both clinicians and organizations with the public 
(illustrated by public reporting of quality and safety data)
One key insight was the degree to which these four domains are 
interrelated. For example, creating environments in which clinicians 
are open and honest with each other about their errors within organi-
zations (which can lead to important system changes to prevent future 
errors) can be thwarted if these clinicians believe they will be treated 
unfairly should the same errors be publicly disclosed. These tensions 
cannot be wished away; instead, they must be forthrightly addressed 
by institutional and policy leaders.
In this report, the NPSF Lucian Leape Institute comes down 
strongly on the side of transparency in all four domains. The consen-
sus of the roundtable discussants and the Institute is that the evidence 
supports the premise that greater transparency throughout the system 
is not only ethically correct but will lead to improved outcomes, fewer 
errors, more satisfied patients, and lower costs. The mechanisms for 
these improvements are several and include the ability of transpar-
ency to support accountability, stimulate improvements in quality and 
safety, promote trust and ethical behavior, and facilitate patient choice.
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In the report, more than three dozen specific recommendations are 
offered to individual clinicians, leaders of health-care delivery organi-
zations (e.g., CEOs, board members), and policy makers.
If transparency were a medication, it would be a blockbuster, with 
billions of dollars in sales and accolades the world over. While it is 
crucial to be mindful of the obstacles to transparency and the ten-
sions—and the fact that many stakeholders benefit from our current 
largely nontransparent system—our review convinces us that a health-
care system that embraces transparency across the four domains will 
be one that produces safer care, better outcomes, and more trust 
among all of the involved parties. Notwithstanding the potential 
rewards, making this happen will depend on powerful, courageous 
leadership and an underlying culture of safety.
Summary of Recommendations (Table 22.5)
Progress
Today, the call for greater transparency in health care is growing 
louder. Consumers have begun to post reviews of their physicians, 
care teams, and health-care organizations on online review plat-
forms. Moreover, some health-care systems are now collecting and 
posting information from patient experience surveys at the service 
or physician level. Recently, several health systems have begun to 
provide forums for free-response comments online, often with posi-
tive results.
The 2005 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act and the rise 
of patient safety organizations (PSOs) have facilitated increased 
transparency among clinicians and health-care organizations. 
Additionally, collaboratives like Solutions for Patient Safety (SPS), a 
network of more than 130 children’s hospitals working together to 
eliminate serious harm, have shown compelling evidence that sharing 
data, successes, and failures can markedly accelerate learning and 
improvement.
Health care is also seeing greater transparency between patients 
and clinicians in the aftermath of adverse events. A growing number 
of communication and resolution programs have been established, 
fueled by growing evidence that prompt disclosure, honesty, and 
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All stakeholders Ensure disclosure of conflicts of interest, and provide 
patients with reliable information in a form that is 
useful to them
Create organizational cultures that support 
transparency, shared learning, and core competencies 
regarding communication with patients and families, 
other clinicians, and the public
Leaders and boards Prioritize transparency and safety, and frequently 
review comprehensive safety performance data
Link hiring, firing, promotion, and compensation to 
results in cultural transformation and transparency
Governmental 
agencies
Develop data sources for collection of safety data, 
improve standards and training materials for core 
competencies, and develop an all-payer database and 
robust medical device registries
Clinicians Inform patients of clinician’s experience, conflicts of 
interest, and role in care, and provide patients with a 
full description of all the alternatives for tests and 
treatments and the pros and cons for each
Provide patients with full information about all 
planned tests and treatments
Hospitals and health 
systems
Provide patients with full access to their medical 
records, and include patients and family members in 
interdisciplinary bedside rounds
Hospitals and health 
systems, health 
professionals
Provide patients and families with full information 
about any harm resulting from treatment, followed by 
apology and fair resolution
Provide patients and clinicians support when they are 
involved in an incident. Include patients/family 
members in event reporting and in root cause analysis
Hospital and health 
leaders
Create a safe, supportive culture for caregivers to be 
transparent and accountable to each other
Create multidisciplinary processes and forms for 
reporting, analyzing, and sharing data
Create processes to hold individuals accountable for 




Have clear mechanisms for sharing and adopting best 




Report and publicly display measures used to monitor 




apology following patient injury can decrease medical malpractice 
liability and improve the satisfaction of all parties. Toolkits are now 
available to promote such programs.
Remaining Challenges
Many challenges to achieving full transparency remain. A recent sur-
vey found that less than 40% of quality and safety leaders rated their 
board’s understanding of disclosure and apology as “high,” and even 
fewer felt their boards had a comprehensive understanding of safety 
concepts related to transparency about error and harm. Transparency 
within organizations and between providers requires creating an envi-
ronment of trust as well as improving technology and processes to 
ensure they are efficient and effective and promote regular open and 
honest communication and data sharing.
Transparency with the public is equally challenging. Hospital and 
clinician concerns about litigation; reputational costs; and the accu-
racy, interpretability, and comprehensiveness of safety metrics need to 
be addressed. Additionally, national rating systems and websites, 
including Leapfrog and U.S. News & World Report, share few com-
mon scores and often generate more confusion than clarity. For exam-
ple, as of 2015 no hospital was rated as a high performer by all four 
major national US rating systems. In the future, data must be under-
standable and actionable for both patients and provider 
organizations.
As more organizations publicly share their quality, safety, and 
patient experience data, transparency will be increasingly demanded 
by all stakeholders. To benefit patients as well as care providers, orga-
nizations will need to prepare their boards, clinicians, and staff for a 
more transparent health-care system. Transparency at these levels will 
eventually facilitate decision-making about where to receive care and 
where to work, but a long road lies ahead to make this comparable and 
uniform across all health entities.
The last of the five white papers was published in 2015. Printed 
copies of all of them were circulated widely to CEOs and patient 
safety leaders of schools and health-care organizations, patient safety 
specialists, and members of the roundtables, who you will recall 
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included individuals and leaders of organizations that could imple-
ment the recommendations.
While all of the reports were well-received, it is impossible to know 
their impact. Implementing the recommendations requires strong 
leadership and major cultural changes. Stimulating those changes, of 
course, is what we were trying to do with the white papers by provid-
ing the evidence, the arguments, and the tools for change. Some minds 
were undoubtedly changed. The foundation was laid for the transfor-
mations needed to make health care safe.
Transforming Health Care: A Compendium
While the white papers got good reviews and wide circulation, we 
were well aware that their lengths would be barriers to reading them 
for many who would benefit from them. So, when the last of the five 
white papers was finished in 2015, we wrote a compendium that 
brought together the executive summary and recommendations for 
each of the five topics, plus additional recommendations for getting 
started on making the changes: Transforming Health Care: A 
Compendium of Reports from the National Patient Safety Foundation’s 
Lucian Leape Institute [2].
Our hope was that this 30-page document would not only make 
some of the many lessons and critical insights we had gathered more 
accessible, but that it would also stimulate readers to read the original 
monographs. Like the white papers, Transforming Health Care: A 
Compendium is available free on the IHI website.
Members
Since its inception, the membership of the Institute has changed as 
new members were added and others retired. Early on, we invited 
patient advocate Susan Edgman- Levitan, Executive Director of the 
John D. Stoeckle Center for Primary Care Innovation at the MGH to 
join us. To bring in outside perspectives, we were fortunate to attract 
Paul O’Neill, former CEO of Alcoa and 72nd United States Secretary 
of the Treasury, and James Guest, head of Consumers Union. Janet 
Corrigan, former IOM staff director for To Err is Human joined us 
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shortly thereafter, as did Robert M. Wachter, founder of the hospitalist 
specialty and Associate Chair Department of Medicine, UCSF, and 
Charles Vincent, UK leader of patient safety research of the University 
of Oxford.
Later additions included Amy Edmondson, Professor at Harvard 
Business School; Sue Sheridan, Director of Patient Engagement, 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute; David Michaels, former 
Head of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; Gregg 
Meyer, Chief Clinical Officer Of Mass General Brigham; and Joanne 
Disch, former Chair of the Board of Advocate-Aurora Health System.
In 2014, Tejal Gandhi became president of the Institute when Diane 
Pinakiewicz retired. Gary Kaplan, CEO of Virginia Mason Medical 
Center, joined LLI when he stepped down as chair of the Board of 
NPSF. He took over as chair of the Institute when I retired in 2015.
In addition to the five white papers, LLI pursued a number of other 
strategic efforts to motivate change for patient safety. From the begin-
ning, the annual fund- raising gala had a major educational compo-
nent. Prior to the evening social event, we presented a full afternoon 
symposium that provided a variety of unique learning opportunities 
for attendees, such as an open forum where they could hear presenta-
tions and question LLI members and breakout sessions on specific 
patient safety topics. The evening program featured an address by a 
world-renowned safety expert.
a b
(a) Susan Edgman-Levitan and (b) Gary Kaplan. (All rights reserved)
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The Institute held a fund-raising gala each year, which included an 
afternoon educational program conducted by the members and an 
evening banquet with a featured celebrity speaker. These were highly 
successful events attracting several hundred attendees each year.
LLI members also participated as faculty in the leadership course 
and other activities at the annual NPSF Congress. A highly popular 
feature was the annual LLI panel where several members discussed a 
current patient safety topic.
LLI Panel. From left to right: Paul O’Neill, Jim Conway, 
Carolyn Clancy, Pam Thompson, Susan Edgman-
Levitan, Julie Morath, Gary Kaplan. (Source: National 
Patient Safety Foundation (now Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement). All rights reserved)
LLI Gala. Source: National Patient Safety Foundation (now Institute for 




The “Must Do” List
As the concept of responding to errors by treating them as systems 
problems instead of blaming individuals became widely accepted, 
some applied the idea to all failures, and the term “no-blame” culture 
emerged. This misconception was countered by the definition and 
promotion of the “Just Culture” as defined by Reason and David 
Marx, who distinguished error from negligence, reckless behavior, 
and intentional rule violations [9, 10].
Rule violations can be tricky, since there are times when a non-
standard response is required in an individual situation. These should 
be dealt with on an individual basis. But most violations are not in that 
category; they result from individual preferences, inconvenience, or 
resistance to change. A fair and just culture demands that such indi-
vidual violators be held accountable. Unfortunately, health-care orga-
nizations varied widely in which practices they placed in this category 
and how they responded to violations. Few consistently enforced 
meaningful sanctions.
Members of LLI were of a single mind that certain safe practices 
were of such undisputed value that they should be universally fol-
lowed and that sanctions should be applied to violators, i.e., some 
failures are truly “blameworthy.” The practices in this category are 
those that (1) are effective at preventing an important harm, (2) have 
substantial impact, (3) are feasible to comply with and audit, and (4) 
have been accepted as a standard by the NQF and professional con-
sensus. These are safety practices that have sufficiently compelling 
supportive evidence that clinicians should not have the right of an 
individual veto. We called them “Must Do” practices.
These concepts were laid out by Bob Wachter in a paper on the 
Health Affairs Blog, The ‘Must Do’ List: Certain Patient Safety Rules 
Should Not Be Elective, that provided the rationale for this approach. 
It identified two practices that currently met the criteria: hand hygiene 
and influenza vaccination for health-care workers [11].
We called on health-care organizations to expect 100 percent adher-
ence to these practices, to sanction violators, and to be willing to ter-
minate clinicians for deliberate and repeated noncompliance with 
either of these practices. We recommended that expectation of 
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universal compliance with required practices be included in bylaws 
and clinician compacts. We also called on the Joint Commission and 
CMS and other regulators and accreditors to adopt these standards.
Financial Costs of Patient Safety
One of the arguments given by health-care organizations for not mov-
ing ahead more aggressively to improve patient safety was that they 
could not afford it, that implementing new practices costs more than 
they save. As measurement of adverse events began to take hold, how-
ever, research showed that the costs of the additional care and pro-
longed hospital stays caused by preventable injuries are substantial. 
The additional cost has been estimated at $16–18 billion annually 
[12] but is probably considerably higher because of underreporting. 
The cost of hospital-acquired infections alone has been estimated as 
more than $10 billion a year [13].
Hospitals were able to absorb these costs because they could bill for 
additional days and services caused by the injury. That began to change 
during the Obama Administration with the move toward value-based 
purchasing. Under bundled and capitated payment programs, the mar-
ginal costs of treating injuries are not compensated, eroding hospital 
margins. Suddenly reducing those harms became more attractive.
LLI decided to write a paper to encourage purchasers to promote 
safety through financial incentives and identify what further steps 
could be taken to strengthen marketplace incentives. In On the safe 
side: the move to value-based payment models could mean improve-
ments in patient safety, Corrigan et al. pointed the way [14]. In addi-
tion to the direct benefit to patients from reducing adverse events, 
creating a safe environment enhances workplace productivity, morale, 
and retention. In the competitive marketplace, improved safety 
enhances the system’s reputation and ability to increase market share. 
Malpractice costs will decline.
We called on executives to increase awareness of the costs by 
including estimates of the direct and indirect expenses associated with 
medical errors in financial statements shared with trustees, leadership, 
staff, and the public and to ensure that a portion of their organizations’ 
capital budgets are allocated for investments in safety such as 
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barcoding. When the financial consequences of unsafe care are 
accounted for, it is clear that investing in patient safety is both the 
right thing to do and the profitable thing to do.
Collaboration with American College 
of Healthcare Executives
As health-care organizations gained experience with changing sys-
tems, it became increasingly clear that more extensive culture changes 
were needed, and this required strong leadership. LLI began to look 
for strategies to engage and motivate health-care systems leaders.
In 2015, LLI approached the American College of Healthcare 
Executives (ACHE) regarding a joint effort. The timing was fortu-
itous. Under new leadership, ACHE was seeking to establish itself as 
a thought leader in the executive space. We formed a partnership to 
sponsor two roundtables on leading a culture of safety, co- chaired by 
leaders of the two organizations.
The participants in these roundtables, held in 2016, included CEOs 
and patient safety officers from a number of hospitals and systems, 
large and small, academics, and leaders of professional organizations, 
such as the AONE, AHA, ANA, and IHI, and leadership consulting 
organizations.
The work of the roundtables was summarized with recommenda-
tions in Leading a Culture of Safety: A Blueprint for Success, pub-
lished jointly by ACHE and LLI [15]. This is probably the most 
comprehensive and useful guide for creating a culture of safety. It is 
described in more detail in the next chapter.
Since 2015, the end of the period of this history, NPSF merged with 
IHI, which committed to continuing support of LLI. Major LLI initia-
tives since then include:
• Partnering with NORC at the University of Chicago to conduct a 
survey of American’s experience with medical errors and views on 
patient safety [16].
• Transforming concepts in patient safety: a report on progress in 
each of the five areas since they were formulated in 2009 [3].
• Framework for Effective Board Governance of Health System 
Quality [17].
• The Salzburg Statement on Moving Measurement into Action: 
Global Principles for Measuring Patient Safety [18].
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Conclusion
How much impact the white papers and other LLI initiatives have had 
on making health care safer is impossible to know. The roundtables 
for the five transforming concepts and the one engaging leaders with 
ACHE were highly motivating for the participants. These key organi-
zational and policy leaders—the “movers and shakers”—were enthu-
siastic participants, and the discussions clearly advanced thinking 
about each of the issues in practical and actionable ways.
The roundtables and white papers also appear to have significantly 
increased awareness of the complex issues in patient safety and deep-
ened understanding of these issues for many other leaders in health 
care. They truly changed the conversation and helped put patient 
safety on everyone’s agenda. To that extent, the Institute has made 
great progress in meeting its charge, to “define strategic paths and 
calls to action for the field of patient safety.”
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Chapter 23
Now the Hard Part: Creating 
a Culture of Safety
In 2020, the coronavirus pandemic killed 1,800,000 people, 346,000 
of them Americans. In that same year, if recent estimates are correct, 
about the same number died as a result of medical errors, all despite 
the enormous effort of the past 20 years to eliminate preventable harm, 
an effort that has involved people at all levels: policy makers, govern-
ment agencies, oversight bodies, quality improvement organizations, 
major health-care systems, and thousands of providers and caregivers 
on the frontline.
Many injuries have been prevented, and thousands of lives have 
been saved. Fewer people suffer from hospital-acquired infections 
and medication errors, surgical complications, and falls in the hospi-
tal. But the overall number of preventable injuries has hardly budged. 
The relentless advances in medical science and the constantly chang-
ing demands of the environments in which we deliver care create new 
opportunities for harm faster than we can keep up.
We have learned a great deal. Driven by the concept that the cause 
of errors and unintended harm is not bad people, but bad systems, we 
have been engaged in an immense experiment testing myriad ways to 
make those systems changes. It has truly been a paradigm shift. Early 
efforts focused on changing processes at the level of the care unit or 
hospital. These were initially ad hoc responses to local problems, but 
with time an impressive repertoire has been developed of standard-
ized practices of proven effectiveness that can be widely adopted (see 
Chap. 11).
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Several large systems, such as the Veterans Health Administration, 
Ascension, Kaiser-Permanente, and others, expanded the use of these 
proven practices to all of their hospitals and clinics. Collaboratives 
have been developed that brought together quality improvement teams 
from a region or nationally to work together to implement a practice. 
Some of these were spectacularly successful, virtually eliminating a 
major threat in those hospitals [1].
Despite these impressive successes, the painful fact is that with few 
exceptions (such as two-factor identification of patients, barcoding of 
medications, and perhaps hand hygiene), most of this awesome array 
of standardized effective practices has not been adopted by the major-
ity of providers and health-care organizations. Health care is still 
stunningly unsafe.
But even if the adoption problem could be solved, relying on uni-
versal implementation of specific practices is not likely to be an effec-
tive strategy for achieving safe health care. The potential number 
required must be in the thousands, and the complexities of health care 
ensure that new hazards will constantly arise for which there are no 
known practices.
If the experience of other industries that have succeeded in becom-
ing safe is a guide, it will require much more than changing our prac-
tices to prevent specific harms. It will require changing our culture. A 
change that was called for in the earliest writings on patient safety [2] 
and in the legendary IOM report [3].
What are we talking about? What is culture, and what is the culture 
change that is required?
 What Is Culture?
The word culture has been used, abused, and misused a great deal in 
the health-care literature. A major disagreement, especially in the UK, 
centers on whether the culture of a group should be defined in terms 
of its attitudes, assumptions, values, and beliefs or in terms of its 
actions, “how we do things around here.” Is culture who we are or 
what we do? I believe the evidence is clear that it is both – and that 
each determines the other, which is the point of this chapter.
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For example, from time immemorial, a well-established espoused 
value and assumption about physician behavior was that the physician 
had the sole authority to make treatment decisions, irrespective of 
external guidelines or internal contrary advice. The result – the prac-
tice – was deference to their authority. When that practice has been 
changed, when a hospital adopts adherence to standards as a condition 
of practice, not only does the “way we do things” change, so do, grad-
ually, the attitudes and the values of the culture overall.
In anthropology, culture refers to social behavior in different soci-
eties or the knowledge, beliefs, and customs of their members 
expressed in their traditions, mythology, or religion. Nation-states 
pride themselves on their cultures, their traditions, their “solidarity” 
(or lack of it), and their particular religious commitment. We also 
speak of culture as a term of human refinement to differentiate elite 
from others.
Within societies we speak of the culture of subgroups, such as the 
military, medicine, “hippies,” or the culture of a firm such as IBM or 
Apple. We note regional cultures such as those of the South or 
Midwest. In all these contexts, culture reflects the deep shared values 
and assumptions that guide us in what we should and should not do. 
Those values are expressed in behavior, “how we do things 
around here.”
When we think of “how we do things around here” in health care, 
the focus is not just on patient care and the provider-patient interface 
but also includes the relationships and interactions of all who work in 
the care delivery setting. Individual medical specialties, nursing, phar-
macy, etc. have strong subcultures, but it is predominantly the organi-
zational culture of the hospital or clinic that determines how patients 
are cared for.
Most of what we know about organizational culture comes from 
studies of other industries. The work of Edgar Schein is preeminent 
[4]. Schein notes that three elements define an organization’s culture: 
its shared assumptions; its espoused values, i.e., what a group ideally 
wants to be and wishes to present itself to the public; and the day-to-
day behaviors. Culture includes everything we do in an organization; 
it makes sense of what we do, it provides stability.
The shared assumptions run deep. They are the “truth” as perceived 
by the organization’s members: their beliefs about human nature, such 
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as whether people are intrinsically self-motivated or motivated by 
money, their perceptions of reality, and their concept of mission. In 
health care, shared assumptions include a commitment to responding 
to emergencies and putting the patient’s interest first. They are the 
unwritten rules.
Espoused values include such things as individualism, respect for 
authority, and working hard. Behaviors are the visible manifestations 
of the culture, the rituals and how we treat one another, labelled by 
Schein as “artifacts” [4]. Others have used the term safety climate to 
refer to these expressions of the culture.
Schein summarizes this in a definition of culture that is widely 
accepted as capturing the essential aspects: “A pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems” [4].
In large organizations such as hospitals, the individual units, ser-
vices, and divisions also have their own cultures. These subcultures 
share some of the organization’s values and assumptions, but not nec-
essarily all, with the result that members of one unit may engage in 
behaviors that differ substantially from those in another. For example, 
when a nurse makes an error, whether the unit’s nursing culture is 
supportive or blaming affects whether they will report the error so it 
becomes known and can be investigated. The culture in the ICU may 
be very different from that in the emergency room or from another 
ICU down the hall.
Edgar Schein. (All rights reserved)
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 A Culture of Safety
What is a culture of safety? The term was first used by the International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group report following the 1986 disaster at 
the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, the cause of which was attributed 
to a breakdown in the organization’s safety culture [5, 6].
A useful definition was later put forth by the UK Health and Safety 
Commission:
The safety culture of an organization is the product of the individual and 
group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that deter-
mine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organiza-
tion’s health and safety programs. Organizations with a positive safety 
culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by 
shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the 
efficacy of preventive measures [7].
One of the earliest and most respected students of organizational 
culture, James Reason, of the University of Manchester, UK, identi-
fied five components that characterize a culture of safety [8]. It 
must be:
• An informed culture: It needs data about incidents and near misses.
• A reporting culture: Workers must feel it is safe to report and that 
it makes a difference.
• A just culture: People are rewarded for providing essential safety 
information, but deliberate breaking of the rules is not tolerated.
• A flexible culture: The organization can reconfigure itself in 
response to a new danger, such as moving from hierarchical struc-
ture to a flattened structure as needed.
• A learning culture: It is able to draw the right conclusions from its 
information system and has the will to implement major reforms 
when needed.
One follows from another. An informed culture can only be built on 
the foundations of a reporting culture. This, in turn, depends upon 
establishing a just culture. Flexibility and learning are only possible if 
the other components are established. But none of this is possible 
without openness and trust.
As Schein points out, a culture of safety can only exist within the 
broader culture of a health-care organization that is committed to 
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providing patients with the experience of high-quality effective care, 
delivered efficiently by valued and engaged workers. While in other 
industries the safety focus is on workers, in health care it is primarily 
on the patient, but to succeed it must also include worker safety.
 Characteristics of a Safe Culture
Unfortunately, few health-care organizations have seriously striven to 
become a safe culture. What should it look like? What are the charac-
teristics of a safe culture in health care?
At the organizational level, in a culture of safety everyone shares a 
commitment to the goal of zero harm and to the continuing improve-
ment and innovation that are required to get there – to the belief that 
anything is possible. There is a sense of individual responsibility at 
every level, that safety is everyone’s job. Leaders exemplify these 
commitments and motivate others to share them. Their sincerity of 
purpose, consistency, and transparency inspire trust.
The individual is valued, and every voice is heard. Leaders seek to 
follow the advice of Paul O’Neill, the highly successful CEO of Alcoa, 
who taught that every worker, every day, should come to work feeling 
they are respected regardless of rank or expertise, supported to do 
their work well, and appreciated for what they contribute.
At the operational level, in a culture of safety people work in teams 
and are open and trusting of one another. They share the mission of 
providing care that is free of harm. There is a commitment to standard 
work, i.e., finding the best way to do something and everyone doing 
it, yet they are open to changing it to make it better. Innovation and 
improvement are part of everyday work and are everyone’s responsi-
bility. They give meaning to work. Patients are fully engaged as part-
ners in their care and in improvement.
At the individual level, in a safe culture, workers feel valued and 
supported. Their deep sense of individual responsibility for safety is 
expressed not only by being careful but by being alert and looking for 
hazards, “accidents waiting to happen.” Errors, harms, near misses, 
and hazards are promptly reported because they know they will be 
taken seriously, promptly investigated, and acted upon.
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A culture of safety is a learning culture. It is an environment where 
everyone is aware of how far their work falls short of what it could be 
and is committed to improve. A learning culture is characterized by its 
members’ ability to self-reflect and identify strengths and defects [9]. 
People pay attention, notice problems, and reflect on them. Problems 
are analyzed, and solutions are imagined and created. Changes are 
implemented.
Schein emphasizes that a learning culture is based on positive 
assumptions about human nature: that human nature is good and that 
people will learn if it is psychologically safe to do so. There is com-
mitment to learning to learn, to truth as discovered by inquiry, to full 
and open communication, to systems thinking [4]. A learning culture 
is based on trust, transparency, and reliability.
 A Just Culture
A culture of safety is also a fair and just culture. What does this mean? 
From the beginning, the fundamental aim of the patient safety move-
ment has been to shift the focus from the individual to the system 
when things go wrong. Some (not your author) have referred to this as 
a “no-blame” approach. For the vast majority of iatrogenic harms, 
probably 90% or more, this is appropriate. The harm was uninten-
tional and resulted from poor system design. The caregiver is truly the 
“second victim.”
But some errors and some injuries are caused by intentional acts. 
For these a no- blame approach is inappropriate.
If the individual intended to cause harm, the act is assault and 
should be dealt with by the legal system. Fortunately, assault is 
exceedingly rare in health care (serial murders, etc.). The much more 
common intentional act is rule breaking in which the caregiver does 
not intend harm, but deliberately fails to follow a standard procedure.
This form of violation is actually quite common. Because of time 
and workload pressures, nurses and doctors often “cut corners” to get 
their patients taken care of, especially if the rule doesn’t make sense, 
doesn’t seem to apply in this case, or prevents them from getting their 
work done. But even if the act seemed justified, the caregiver will feel 
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ashamed if it harms the patient because they will realize they have 
“done something wrong.”
These cases should be carefully investigated. If the broken rule is a 
bad rule, or unworkable, it should be changed, by a process that 
involves all stakeholders. If the existing rule is good and necessary, 
education may be necessary; if time pressures or workloads are the 
issue, these should be addressed. On the other hand, if a violation 
results just from the caregiver’s personal preference or convenience, 
discipline may be indicated, especially if there is a pattern of such 
behavior.
Seeing that indefensible repeated violations have consequences is 
important for co-workers in two ways. They see that justice is done – 
the person didn’t “get away with it” – and it reinforces their own rule-
abiding behavior. A just culture is the necessary balance to a systems 
approach [8, 10].
The term safety culture is sometimes confused with safety climate, 
which is its outward manifestation – its visible evidence, or “artifacts” 
as Schein puts it. Safety climate more appropriately refers to the per-
ception of the culture, what people think about themselves and “what 
we do around here.” It is what we measure when we attempt to mea-
sure safety culture [11].
 High-Reliability Organizations
Much has been written about high-reliability organizations (HRO) 
and whether they are the model for a safe culture. The concept is 
based on a series of studies in the early 1990s by Roberts and col-
leagues of highly hazardous industries, such as aviation and nuclear 
power, that had succeeded in becoming extremely safe [12]. While it 
is true that, unlike health care, these industries had strong business 
cases for safety – they would be out of business if unsafe – the fact is 
that they are amazingly successful.
Weick and Sutcliffe identified five characteristics that account for 
the success of HRO, which they label collective mindfulness: (1) pre-
occupation with failure, the continual looking for and reporting of 
hazards; (2) reluctance to simplify, not accepting the obvious explana-
tion for a failure; (3) sensitivity to operations, paying attention to 
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issues at the frontline; (4) commitment to resilience, the ability to 
detect errors, react, and recover; and (5) deference to expertise, the 
flattening of the hierarchy in an emergency so that the most qualified 
person is in charge, regardless of seniority [13].
Collective mindfulness leads to the essential behavior for safety, 
which is that everyone understands that even small failures can lead to 
catastrophic outcomes and accepts responsibility both for identifying 
hazards early and for correcting them before harm occurs [13].
In other industries, HROs have achieved a culture of safety and 
enviable outcomes. The idea of applying these principles to health 
care is attractive [14]. Certainly these characteristics of structure, atti-
tude, and expertise need to be part of the changes in quality of care 
and experience that make health care safe.
The originator of the concept of HROs, Karlene Roberts, also attri-
butes much of their success to the emphasis on relational aspects of 
the culture: interpersonal responsibility, person-centeredness, being 
supportive of co-workers, friendliness, openness in personal relations, 
creativity, credibility, interpersonal trust, and resiliency [12, 15].
 The Problem
Most health-care organizations fall woefully short of achieving a cul-
ture of safety. With just a few exceptions, hospitals and health-care 
systems, including some of the most highly regarded academic health 
centers, have settled for implementing some safe practices; the culture 
is unchanged.
In a safe culture, there is a strong commitment to the goal of zero 
harm and to the continuing improvement and innovation that is 
required to get there. In health care, safety is too often an afterthought 
or at best a distant second fiddle to the bottom line. There is no sense 
of commitment, no goal of zero harm. Deliberate unsafe care is often 
tolerated, especially among big earners.
In a safe culture, safety information systems collect data on inci-
dents and near misses. Reporting of adverse events or hazards is 
encouraged and leads to investigation, analysis, and, where possible, 
redesign of a process or system to eliminate the risk. In health care, 
many institutions have established reporting system and a process for 
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root cause analysis of events to meet accreditation requirements, but 
their use is often perfunctory. Now 25 years after hospitals were urged 
to stop blaming people for errors, nearly half of nurses surveyed by 
the Joint Commission say they do not report errors because of fear 
that they or a colleague will be punished.
In a safe culture, workers feel valued, supported, and empowered. 
They have a sense of ownership, of responsibility, to prevent harm and 
work well in teams. Sadly, in health care this sense of responsibility 
and empowerment has long been inhibited by a hierarchical system 
that devalues their contributions and makes working in teams diffi-
cult. It is a culture of low expectations and low accountability.
 Why Changing Culture Is so Hard to Do
Creating a safe culture is the key part of the transformation that a 
health-care organization must undergo overall to reliably provide a 
patient experience of high- quality, effective, and efficient care. Under 
the best of circumstances, these are difficult changes to carry off, but 
health care also offers a staggering array of barriers to change.
The first has been resistance by the key members of the workforce: 
physicians. Products of an educational system that traditionally 
emphasized personal responsibility for patient care, many viewed 
standardization as a threat to their independence and personal judg-
ment. Giving up control and sharing responsibility by working in 
teams were hard to do.
Fortunately, that has begun to change. Younger physicians have 
learned the importance of quality improvement and are amenable to 
working in teams. They “get it” and now constitute a significant 
majority of physicians.
The second major barrier to change is an incredibly complicated 
demand/incentive payment system that compels hospitals – i.e., doc-
tors and nurses  – to document that they meet quality and volume 
requirements. The result is an extensive, and, for caregivers, depress-
ing, set of demands on their time that compete directly with their pri-
mary mission of taking care of patients.
This oppressive payment system is the product of two forces that 
changed dramatically in the past several decades: the ability to mea-
sure safety and quality and the rising cost of care.
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Twenty years ago, as the quality and safety movement was gaining 
steam, many complained about the paucity of good measures. For 
safety, what were the errors and systems failures we should focus on? 
For quality, the IOM called for care that was safe, efficient, timely, 
patient-centered, efficient, and equitable [16]. But, again, how would 
we know? Well, in the past 20 years we’ve developed methods for 
measuring all of these. More are needed, but thanks to an impressive 
effort by quality and safety researchers we can now measure quite a bit.
The other major driver of demand/incentive payment changes is 
costs, which have risen dramatically since the middle of the twentieth 
century primarily as the result of awesome improvements in diagnosis 
and treatment that have been heavily weighted toward expensive tech-
nologies. Magnetic resonance imaging, PET scans, and surgical 
robots, for example, cost health care millions of dollars a year. A new 
“miracle” drug may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars a year for a 
single patient.
Facing the need to contain costs, payers and regulators seized on 
available measures to assess performance and used them for accredi-
tation and for value-based financial incentives. Lowered reimburse-
ment rates force physicians to see more patients (production pressure).
A particularly painful example for physicians resulted from the 
generous incentives provided by the government for adoption of the 
electronic health record (EHR). When computerized records were 
being developed, many of us were enthusiastic about their potential to 
improve the quality of care, such as by reducing medication errors and 
making standardized clinical information available. A number of pri-
vate companies rose to the opportunity, each with its own product, 
most of them built around systems they already had for billing and 
financial management. Not only were these clumsy, inefficient, and 
non-user-friendly, they were proprietary and thus would not commu-
nicate with one another.
Finally, the government stepped in—not to regulate and standard-
ize systems as many of us had hoped, but to promote their use through 
a massive subsidy for the implementation of these mostly proprietary 
systems by hospitals and physicians. Because most of these EHRs are 
poorly designed, the result has been a huge increase in the time that 
physicians must spend in documentation.
The resulting burdens of using the EHR, increased production pres-
sure, and loss of control are widely considered to be major factors in 
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the dissatisfaction and burnout that has become increasingly common 
among health workers. We have created an environment where many 
nurses, doctors, and allied health staff are too exhausted, too disillu-
sioned, and too burned out to have the interest or the energy to engage 
in efforts to change. There is little time for reflection, improvement, or 
preventing errors.
In addition to physician resistance and perverse payment incen-
tives, a third barrier to creating a culture of safety stems from finan-
cial threats to institutional survival. In our predominantly 
fee-for-service system, economic survival of a hospital depends on 
the number of services provided and how much they are paid for them. 
To control costs, government payments—Medicare and Medicaid—
are below market for virtually all services. Commercial insurance 
companies pay much better—sometimes multiples of Medicare reim-
bursement. They also negotiate rates with hospitals.
In this system, large hospitals increase their income by attracting 
more patients through providing ever more sophisticated and expen-
sive treatments. Although they have many Medicare patients, large 
hospitals receive the major share of their income from commercial 
insurers with whom they negotiate rates.
Smaller hospitals lose on both counts. They are unable to attract 
more patients with increased services, and they lack the clout to nego-
tiate higher rates with insurance companies. Safety net hospitals, for-
merly city hospitals for the indigent, and rural hospitals fare even 
worse. They depend almost totally on local government support and 
Medicaid, both at “bare-bones” levels.
In all hospitals, the CEO is under constant financial pressure—
beholden to “the bottom line.” The large expensive hospitals, like other 
corporations, vie for increased market share by providing additional 
services. If they become the dominant provider in a region, they can 
exercise monopoly power and can raise their prices. While technically 
“not for profit,” they generate large profits, which they use to expand 
their services and to increase the pay of their physicians and, espe-
cially, their CEOs. According to Forbes, in 2019 the top 13 nonprofit 
hospitals and systems paid their CEOS between $five million and 
$21.6 million; the next 61 paid CEOs between $1 and five million [17].
The fourth barrier to changing culture, compounding all the others, 
is the incredibly complex nature of health care. No other industry 
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comes close. The client—the patient—may suffer from an almost infi-
nite number and variety of diseases. In addition, patients also vary 
widely in what they bring to the therapeutic encounter in terms of 
genetic makeup, physical and mental health, and the effect of the liv-
ing environment where they receive most of their care.
Matching the number and variety of diseases is an incredible num-
ber and variety of treatments, using modalities as varied as chemicals 
(drugs), electromagnetic waves, surgery, robots, and computers. 
Compounding this is a lack of standardization of use. Each form of 
treatment can be—and often is—employed according to the judg-
ment, or whim, of the provider. The result is an almost infinite number 
of ways things can go wrong [18].
Finally, those who provide care are a diverse group. In addition to 
doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, many other workers, such as thera-
pists, aides, clerical staff, and support staff, are essential personnel 
who make a hospital work. There are 180 specialties and subspecial-
ties in medicine alone, each with its unique knowledge, skills, and 
approach to patient care.
The complexity of health care and the formidable array of regula-
tory and financial forces impacting it are awesome. Changing the cul-
ture will require that these interests be aligned and that public-private 
partnerships be developed. But what, exactly, do we want a hospital to 
do? We have a clear idea of what a culture of safety looks like. How 
do we get there?
 How to Do It
How do we transform the dysfunctional cultures of health-care orga-
nizations into cultures of safety? How do we motivate CEOs to make 
safety a priority, take responsibility for making it happen, inspire oth-
ers to join the cause, and create an environment of transparency, 
respect, and personal responsibility?
The leading thought leaders in patient safety have described visions 
of what a safe culture should be but often have been humble about 
providing advice on how to get there.
Reason speaks of “engineering” a safe culture in general, not spe-
cifically in health care. He describes the critical subcomponents: a 
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reporting culture, a just culture, a flexible culture, and a learning cul-
ture. He notes that a safety culture is far more than the sum of its parts, 
that the rest is “up to the organizational chemistry” [8]. How to create 
that chemistry is left unanswered.
Likewise, Vincent describes the ingredients in a safety culture and 
notes that the evidence from studies such as those of Singer [19] shows 
that a better safety climate is associated with fewer adverse events. But 
he, too, shies away from prescribing how to achieve a safe culture [7].
However, in their perceptive and influential book, Safer Healthcare: 
Strategies for the Real World, Vincent and Amalberti provide a pre-
scription for achieving safe care that would, in fact, require significant 
culture change [20]. They observe that the approach to improving 
patient safety has been too limited, focusing primarily on hospital 
care and too little on primary care and home care, and that the method 
used was the same in all settings: improvement of a core issue in a 
narrow time scale with a specific process change such as the surgical 
checklist or CLABSI protocol.
They call for a much broader approach using five safety strategies:
 1. Safety as Best Practice: aspire to standards—reducing specific 
harms and improving clinical processes, such as the CLABSI pro-
tocol and the surgical checklist
 2. Improvement of Healthcare Processes and Systems: intervening to 
support individuals and teams, improving working conditions and 
organizational practices, such as improved handovers, use of daily 
goals and huddles, and barcoding of medications
 3. Risk Control: placing restrictions on performance, demand, or 
working conditions, such as regulations governing radiation ther-
apy, closing unsafe facilities, and limiting individual licenses or 
privileges
 4. Improving Capacity for Monitoring, Adaptation, and Response, 
such as briefings and debriefings, safe reporting, family engage-
ment, and emergency planning
 5. Mitigation: planning for potential harm and recovery, such as pro-
viding patient and peer support after harm
They then show how these five strategies can be used in three set-
tings: hospital, home, and primary care. The specific issue of chang-
ing the culture to enable implementation of these strategies is not 
addressed, however.
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Shanafelt et al. are more prescriptive [21]. They describe the steps 
that must be taken to change the culture of medicine: create psycho-
logical safety for people to learn new things, identify collaborative 
strategies for physicians and leaders to gain experience with new 
modes of working, and provide resources and formal training, advi-
sors, and coaching. They emphasize that the leader must be convinced 
of the need to change and spearhead and support the initiatives. 
Individuals who are the targets of the change must be involved in the 
process [21].
IHI/Safe and Reliable Healthcare Framework In 2017, the IHI 
and Safe and Reliable Healthcare jointly published A Framework for 
Safe, Reliable, and Effective Care [9]. The authors, Allan Frankel, 
cofounder of Safe and Reliable Healthcare, and Carol Haraden, Frank 
Federico, and Jennifer Lenoci-Edwards, of IHI, propose that achiev-
ing safe and reliable care requires attention to three domains: leader-
ship, culture, and the learning system.
The paper provides direction to health-care organizations on the 
key strategic, clinical, operational, and cultural components involved 
with each and how they interact. It provides definitions and imple-
mentation strategies for nine foundational components: leadership, 
psychological safety, accountability, teamwork and communication, 
negotiation, transparency, reliability, improvement and measurement, 
and continuous learning.
Each of the nine components is described with specific major 
points, followed by a section, Moving from Concept to Reality, which 
describes the steps to implementing the ideas in daily practice. For 
example, the Framework uses Edmondson’s definition of psychologi-
cal safety [22]:
• Anyone can ask questions without looking stupid.
• Anyone can ask for feedback without looking incompetent.
• Anyone can be respectfully critical without appearing negative.
• Anyone can suggest innovative ideas without being perceived as 
disruptive.
It then gives advice on how to achieve psychological safety, such as 
coaching, huddles, solicitation of ideas, and providing feedback to 
suggestions. As the authors suggest, the report provides a framework 
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for thinking about patient safety; training, guidance, and support are 
also needed. It is not a blueprint or detailed plan.
ACHE/LLI Leading a Culture of Safety That blueprint is pro-
vided for the key element for culture change, leadership, by another 
publication in 2017, Leading a Culture of Safety: A Blueprint for 
Success, jointly published by the American College of Healthcare 
Executives and the Lucian Leape Institute [23]. The most detailed and 
prescriptive advice published so far, its central theme is that leaders 
create safety. The product of two roundtables of those who have led 
and those who have studied successful transformations, the document 
is “an evidence-based, practical resource with tools and proven strate-
gies to assist (leaders) in creating a culture of safety” [23].
The mission is clearly stated up front: “It is both the obligation and 
the privilege of every healthcare CEO to create and represent a com-
pelling vision for a culture of safety: a culture in which mistakes are 
acknowledged and lead to sustainable, positive change; respectful and 
inclusive behaviors are instinctive and serve as the behavioral norms 
for the organization; and the physical and psychological safety of 
patients and the workforce is both highly valued and ardently pro-
tected…. The elimination of harm to our patients and workforce is our 
foremost moral and ethical obligation” [23].
The document addresses both “foundational” elements—what is 
needed to establish a culture of safety—and “sustaining” elements, 
what is needed to make it permanent. It describes in detail the many 
elements of both strategy and tactics that are needed to accomplish the 
objectives. These are organized into six leadership domains that 
require CEO focus and dedication:
 1. Establish a compelling vision for safety. An organization’s vision 
reflects priorities that, when aligned with its mission, establish a 
strong foundation for the work of the organization.
 2. Build trust, respect, and inclusion. Establishing trust, showing 
respect, and promoting inclusion—and demonstrating these princi-
ples throughout the organization and with patients and families—are 
essential to a leader’s ability to create and sustain a culture of safety.
 3. Select, develop, and engage your Board. CEOs are responsible for 
ensuring the education of their Board members on foundational 
safety science.
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 4. Prioritize safety in the selection and development of leaders. 
Include accountability for safety as part of the leadership develop-
ment strategy for the organization. In addition, identify physicians, 
nurses, and other clinical leaders as safety champions.
 5. Lead and reward a just culture. Workers must be empowered and 
unafraid to voice concerns about threats to patient and work-
force safety.
 6. Establish organizational behavior expectations. These include 
transparency, effective teamwork, active communication, civility, 
and direct and timely feedback.
Leading a Culture of Safety is a landmark publication. It is by far 
the most comprehensive exposition of what is needed to achieve a 
safe culture in health care. It is a blueprint constructed by the most 
respected leaders in the field that makes a clear and powerful state-
ment that the trust and openness needed to achieve a safe culture start 
at the top.
 Examples of Success
A handful of health-care organizations have succeeded in changing 
their cultures. Several are worth examining for lessons learned.
 Virginia Mason Medical Center
In 2000, Virginia Mason Medical Center (VMMC) in Seattle was in 
trouble. It was losing money, and it became apparent that the old 
model based on professional excellence was insufficient. The Board 
and top management had all read the IOM reports and realized that 
they too had quality and safety problems and inefficiencies. The Board 
asked, “if we are so focused on patients, why are all the systems built 
around the doctors?” Agreeing, Gary Kaplan, the new CEO, proposed 
to change from a physician-driven organization focused on volume to 
a patient-oriented organization based on quality of care. The Board 
gave him full support.
Virginia Mason Medical Center
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Kaplan and his senior management team spent the next year look-
ing unsuccessfully for a health-care management system to achieve 
this goal. They then accidentally met John Black, a former Boeing 
executive, who told them of the impact of implementing the manage-
ment system Lean. They visited businesses in the USA that used Lean 
and decided it was what they needed.
Lean is derived from the Toyota Production System that was devel-
oped in the 1930s when Toyota began producing automobiles [24]. It 
is founded on the concept of continuous and incremental improve-
ments of product and process and eliminating waste. It is “a way to do 
more and more with less and less - less human effort, less equipment, 
less time, and less space - while coming closer and closer to providing 
customers exactly what they want” [25].
Lean is based on five key principles:
 1. Value: Specify the value desired by the customer.
 2. Value Stream: Identify the value stream (the steps in a process) that 
provides value for each product, and challenge all of the wasted steps.
 3. Flow: Make the product flow continuously through the remaining 
value- added steps.
 4. Pull: Introduce pull between all steps where continuous flow is 
possible.
 5. Perfection: Manage toward perfection so that the number of steps 
and the amount of time and information needed to serve the cus-
tomer continually fall [26].
Persuaded by Black and Carolyn Corvi, who had led dramatic 
improvements in the production of the 737 aircraft, Kaplan took his 
senior executive team to Japan to study the Toyota Production System. 
They were profoundly moved. Workers and managers worked in har-
mony to produce a flawless product, an automobile. Kaplan’s team 
could see that these methods could be adapted to health care. They 
came home determined to develop a Virginia Mason Production 
System (VMPS).
Aren’t You Ashamed? One experience at Toyota struck home with 
particular force. A sensei (teacher) reviewing a VMMC floor plan 
with the team asked what a certain area was. A waiting room, they 
said. “Who waits there?” Patients. “For whom?” The doctor. The sen-
sei then found that there were 100 waiting rooms at VMMC and that 
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patients waited on average 45  minutes for a doctor. “Aren’t you 
ashamed?” he said [27]. Suddenly the team understood what “patient 
first” meant.
Back home, selling VMPS to the staff was another matter. While 
many—particularly the younger ones who had embraced quality 
improvement—were supportive, some of the senior staff, including 
some department chairmen, were not. They rebelled, objected, and in 
some cases resigned. Education about the new system and training 
leaders took a year or more, but it was imperative, and the investment 
of time proved worthwhile.
The changes proposed were indeed monumental. It took several 
years to implement them, and the work is never done. Four features 
drove the transformation:
 1. A shared vision outlined within a strategic plan that places the 
Patient First in everything, always. The strategic plan evolved into 
a “pyramid” figure with the patient at the top; under that, the vision 
and the mission; and then the values teamwork, integrity, excel-
lence, and service.
 2. Alignment of mission and values from the board down. Alignment 
means all parties share common focus, common goal, common lan-
guage, and common culture. The “pyramid” facilitates alignment—
there is no ambiguity that the patient’s interest is always first.
A key instrument for achieving alignment is the compact, an 
agreement between the organization and physicians that made 
explicit the reciprocal obligations of both. It took a year to develop. 
Additional compacts were developed for leaders and for board 
members.
 3. A single improvement method—VMPS—that enables continuing 
improvements in quality, safety, access, efficiency, and affordabil-
ity, every day at every level of the organization.
 4. A culture predicated on deep respect for people and continuous 
improvement. Two aspects are fundamental: respect, meaning 
every voice is not only heard, but listened to, and teamwork that 
stimulates personal and professional growth and performance.
The transformations of the VMPS were many and profound. They 
have been extensively documented and explained in several books 
that are well worth reading [27–29].
Virginia Mason Medical Center
420
Here are a few examples:
Standard Work A challenge for physicians was the concept of 
standard work, a cornerstone of innovation in Lean. Reducing vari-
ability ensures quality while making it easier to identify and deal with 
necessary exceptions. Standard work means that all have the obliga-
tion to follow a process that is defined by consensus among stakehold-
ers as the most effective and safest. Embracing this concept was an 
essential first step in establishing the new culture. Over the years, 
VMMC developed over 70 “must do” processes.
Kaizen Promotion Office (KPO) “Kaizen” is Japanese for continu-
ous incremental improvement. It assumes that frontline workers are 
the source of ideas of how to remove waste and improve processes but 
lack the expertise to develop the new processes. Expert help is needed. 
At VMMC, the KPO provides that help. The KPO was a clear signal 
that VMMC was serious about VMPS.
Rapid Process Improvement Workshops (RPIW) One of the earli-
est innovations introduced was the Rapid Process Improvement 
Workshop. This is an intensely serious effort to address a defined 
quality or flow problem. Trained and certified Workshop leaders con-
vene a team of stakeholders and KPO experts to work full time for 
5 days to analyze a problem, identify waste, define the value stream, 
and reengineer the process. Stretch goals are set—typically 50% for 
operational issues, 100% for safety.
Examples of innovation from RPIWs include eliminating the wait-
ing rooms in outpatient clinics, cutting triage time in the ER in half, 
and the institution of Saturday hours. A powerful example was rede-
signing the cancer center, which took multiple RPIWs.
When VMMC decided to move the cancer center to a large floor 
with windows all around the periphery, the doctors assumed that is 
where their offices would be. Not so. If VMMC was serious about 
putting the patient’s interest first, they would go to the patients. And 
so it was, with the doctors and nurses having their offices and com-
mon areas internally.
Not only did the patients get the nice rooms, they could stay there. 
Analysis of the “value stream” showed that cancer patients typically 
spent hours walking all over the hospital to see multiple specialists; 
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get X-rays, lab tests; etc., in addition to lying in bed for hours for 
intravenous infusion. The fix? A truly radical idea: let them stay in the 
room and have everyone come to them. Result: the duration of patient 
visits fell by 50%, patient satisfaction rose to 95%, and VMMC took 
care of 1100 more patients a year with no increase in staff [27].
Patient Safety Alerts (PSA) Safe and frequent reporting of errors, 
adverse events, near misses, and hazards is essential to improvement. 
You can’t fix something you don’t know about. VMMC labelled them 
Patient Safety Alerts (PSA) and patterned the response after Toyota’s 
“Stop the Line.” Mishaps were no longer “events” to be reported and 
perhaps evaluated, they were real-time indicators of failure and harm 
and got immediate attention.
Two features distinguish the PSA system from the usual reporting 
system: everyone is empowered and obligated to report them in real 
time, and every report leads to a response. The response may be 
immediate, stopping a treatment to correct or understand an error or 
near miss, or urgent root cause analysis, or as an agenda item for 
improvement. The PSA system enables the frontline worker to 
directly engage leadership in a collaborative relationship. It is also 
tangible evidence of the institution’s commitment to the target of 
perfection.
Since its inception in 2002, the PSA system has resulted in 100,000 
reports that led to responses and changes that over time dramatically 
reduced the rate of adverse events and “near misses.” Risk-adjusted 
mortality declined, as did liability costs.
Patient Safety as a Primary Goal In 2004, Mary McClinton died at 
VMMC during a radiological procedure as a result of accidental intra-
venous injection of an antiseptic, chlorhexidine, instead of contrast 
material. The hospital was devastated. Unequivocally committed to 
transparency, Kaplan went public, explained what happened, and 
apologized. The newspapers remarked on how unusual his transpar-
ency was (and, sadly, still is).
Mary McClinton’s death had a profound impact on the hospital 
staff. In the previous two years, they had made great strides in improv-
ing processes and reducing errors. How could this happen? Clearly, 
they still had a long way to go to achieve harm-free care. But the 
experience with improving quality and the development of a culture 
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of openness and trust gave them confidence to proceed. The response 
was quick and decisive: patient safety would not just be part of the 
transformation, it would become its overarching goal. Prevention of 
harm would be the core focus for the next several years.
Respect for People In 2011, after a decade of incredibly successful 
cultural transformation, a routine survey showed that, like other 
health-care organizations, nearly half of employees still did not feel 
safe in speaking up about a personal mistake. Lynne Chafez, General 
Counsel and leader of the changes at VMMC, asked me to come out 
and consult with them.
We had just written our papers on respect (Chap. 21), so I shared 
our discovery of the unrecognized subtle forms of disrespect that are 
pervasive in health care. It fell on fertile ground. They listened, and 
they responded by developing the Respect for People program as a 
major safety goal. VMMC developed an educational course on respect 
that was required for all 5000 of their staff. The approach has subse-
quently been adopted by hundreds of other hospitals worldwide. It 
identified ten foundational behaviors expected of everyone working at 
VMMC. They speak volumes about the kind of culture it strives to be 
(Box 23.1).
Box 23.1 Respect for People
Foundational behaviors
 1. Listen to understand
 2. Keep your promises
 3. Be encouraging
 4. Connect with others
 5. Express gratitude
 6. Share information
 7. Speak up
 8. Walk in their shoes
 9. Grow and develop
 10. Be a team player
Adapted from Ref. [28].
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 Secrets of Success
The transformation of VMMC was a profound and dramatic culture 
change. It was challenging, it was threatening, and it never stops. 
Reflecting on 18 years of progress, Gary Kaplan identified four key 
transformations that led to successful culture change:
First, Board and governance engagement. Members of the board 
are responsible for governance, not just to attend meetings and leave 
quality to the doctors, but as partners to achieve it. Board members are 
trained in VMPS, and, like all senior leaders, every member of the 
Board is required to go to Japan at least once in their first term. They 
undergo regular self-evaluation as a board and as individuals.
The Board is seriously involved in ensuring patient respect and 
care. Patient care failures and successes are presented at every meet-
ing, sometimes by the patient in person. The Board reviews every red 
PSA (an event that has harmed a patient or has the potential to) and 
must sign off on the prevention plan before it is implemented.
Clearly, it is a very different kind of board from those of most 
health-care organizations. Members are neither appointed by CEO 
nor beholden to him. They are chosen for their expertise, literacy and 
commitment, not their status in the community or largess. They bring 
curiosity, active engagement and dissent in open meetings, and, as 
defined in their compact, relentless commitment to the strategic plan. 
Outside experts such as Julie Morath and Gregg Meyer are included 
on the oversight committee.
Second, Kaplan believes changing minds of leadership is crucial. 
All members of the “C-suite”—including legal counsel and the 
CFO—have to become champions to support middle management. 
Trust, alignment, and workers’ sense of value depend on leadership. 
Trust comes from leaders being vulnerable in the sense of being will-
ing to admit mistakes and take advice from others. Alignment depends 
on leaders who are value-driven, embrace the mission and the strate-
gic plan, and have clarity about purpose. Alignment to purpose and 
respect for people gives workers passion about their work and mean-
ing to their lives.
Continuing development of new leaders is the key to sustainability. 
VMMC has an active program to continually identify, develop, and 
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formally train leaders at all levels. One or two people are always pre-
pared to step up when someone leaves.
The third critical transformation is transparency—truth telling—
shining a light on mistakes. Transparency creates the culture that 
makes reporting work; it reveals behaviors that are not consistent with 
patient first. It ensures open and honest communication with patients 
when things go wrong. A culture of transparency revealed the prob-
lem of disrespect. External transparency, as in the McClinton’s, builds 
trust with the public.
Finally, the fourth transformation is the centerpiece respect for peo-
ple, listening and responding to staff concerns and holding all account-
able for respectful conduct with one another and with patients.
VMMC is a model of the transformation needed for a health-care 
organization to develop a culture of safety. Safety is an organizing 
principle of its daily work, a pillar supporting its mission to provide 
high-quality effective care. Zero harm is the goal, safety is everyone’s 
responsibility, and innovation and improvement are part of everyday 
work. Not surprisingly, year after year, VMMC has been named as 
one of the top hospitals in the nation by Leapfrog. Hundreds of health-
care organizations have come to VMMC to learn how to transform. 
May they all succeed.
 Cincinnati Children’s Hospital
When Jim Anderson took over as CEO at Cincinnati Children’s 
Hospital (CCH) in 1997, he found a hospital that, like most academic 
institutions of the time, prided itself on its research excellence and 
assumed that its patient care was excellent as well. Anderson was not 
so sure. Having been CEO of a manufacturing firm, he knew some-
thing about quality improvement, and he knew CCH could do better. 
Lee Carter, the new board chair agreed. He was especially interested 
in increasing the focus on patients and families.
In 1999, they initiated a strategic planning process that asked their 
various communities about challenges over the next 3–5 years. One of 
the groups said that despite having great physicians and nurses, the 
institution did not provide an environment for the best delivery of 
that care.
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There was more disturbing news. CCH had just joined the Cystic 
Fibrosis Foundation (CFF) National Quality Initiative, a collaborative 
with other hospitals to improve the care of cystic fibrosis patients. 
When they received comparative feedback of baseline data of mea-
sures of nutrition and pulmonary function, they were shocked to find 
that CCH was not only not in the top 10 as they expected, but its 
results were below the national average.
From his business experience, Anderson knew that fixing quality 
problems was not only the right thing to do, but that the savings more 
than offset the costs, making also a compelling business case. Poor 
quality came from inept management. Carter agreed. They could 
do better.
The release of the IOM report, To Err is Human, provided addi-
tional impetus. Quality and safety were compelling issues they needed 
to address. CCH’s new 5-year strategic plan made a commitment to 
dramatically transform the way they delivered health care. Uma 
Kotagal, who had led earlier performance efforts, was put in charge.
Lee Carter’s comment was memorable: “Well, if we are not the 
best, we can certainly be the best at getting better, and then we will be 
the best.” He established and chaired the Board Patient Care 
Committee, composed of doctors, nurses, business people, board 
members, and members of the community.
In the middle of the strategic planning process came the opportu-
nity to apply for a Pursuing Perfection grant from the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation (RWJF) (see Chap. 6 for program details). CCH 
competed against over 200 hospitals and was one of only four chosen. 
They would focus on one evidence-based practice, bronchiolitis, and 
one chronic condition, cystic fibrosis, which they knew from the 
national quality initiative they needed to work on. After a struggle 
with CFF, they obtained the name of the hospital that was the national 
leader in cystic fibrosis care and sent a team to learn from them how 
to improve their care of these patients.
A core requirement of the RWJF grant was transparency and patient 
engagement. The Foundation funded and helped produce a video of 
CCH parents of patients with cystic fibrosis who volunteered to 
describe their experiences. The film was devastating. It depicted mul-
tiple errors in the care they were receiving. Anderson showed it to the 
Board Patient Care Committee. They were speechless, except for the 
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doctors or nurses who said, “Of course, that’s how the system works.” 
Anderson and Kotagal had their work cut out for them.
Participating in Pursuing Perfection had a powerful impact on 
CCH. While it yielded impressive successes, it also revealed how far 
they had to go to build capacity to make widespread change. Kotagal 
realized that people didn’t know how to make change. They needed to 
be trained. She sent key staff to take Brent James’ QI course in Salt 
Lake City.
A central feature of the reorganization was the establishment of 
clinical systems improvement (CSI) teams consisting of a physician 
leader, a nurse leader, and executive for each of five domains: inpa-
tient, outpatient, perioperative, home health, and emergency. These 
CSI teams were responsible for major issues such as flow, safety, and 
patient experience. They worked with and sponsored unit teams 
headed by a physician leader and the nurse manager to test patient 
safety initiatives. All were required to take the course on leadership 
and capability development.
A robust measurement system was developed to document out-
comes, and within each domain influential physicians and nurses 
formed improvement teams for key negative outcomes such as venti-
lator-associated pneumonia, catheter-associated bloodstream infec-
tions, surgical site infections, and adverse drug events. A senior leader 
was assigned as champion for each team. Families were involved as 
members of the teams. Stretch goals were set and met.
Significant improvements occurred and were sustained. As they 
increased QI capability and developed knowledge of reliability 
design, they were able to further improve and simultaneously carry 
out dozens of improvements and build systems capable of 95–99% 
reliability.
Nonetheless, in 2005 the organization realized its rate of sentinel or 
serious safety events (SSE) was still high. With the help of consul-
tants, it decided to change the safety management system to apply 
HRO concepts. They developed five key drivers to achieve a goal of 
reducing the SSE rate by 80% over 3 years:
 1. Restructured governance for patient safety
 2. Developing a highly reliable error prevention system
 3. A transparent culture of continuous learning
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 4. State-of-the-art detection and cause analysis system
 5. Focused intervention on perioperative processes and culture
Senior leaders adopted Patient Safety as the core value of the orga-
nization, and a commitment was made to change the culture by chang-
ing behavior. All frontline staff were trained on key safety behaviors, 
reinforced daily via safety coaches. An organization-wide focus on 
“Days since the last SSE”  continuously gave a sense of wariness and 
unease. SSE were reduced by 65% in 3 years.
A rigorous root cause analysis process was implemented, overseen 
by the legal department to ensure that it was a trusted process that 
everyone could believe in. Senior executives were accountable to 
make sure it happened in timely way. They took ownership of the 
problem. This led the staff to have confidence in the process and 
accept transparency.
In 2005, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, now called Cincinnati 
Children’s Hospital Medical Center (CCHMC), partnered with the 
other children’s hospitals in Ohio and the Ohio Children’s Hospital 
Association to improve safety. The first effort was implementation of 
medical response teams in all of the hospitals. Cardiopulmonary 
arrests outside of intensive care units were reduced by 46%. As 
Kotagal’s successor, Steve Muething, recalled, this was a “game 
changer” for CCHMC: they realized that they could improve better 
and have more influence by working with others.
Under the leadership of Muething and the new CEO, Michael 
Fisher, and with funding from CMS and private industry, CCHMC 
joined the other Ohio children’s hospitals in 2009 to formalize this 
collaboration for safety as the Ohio Children’s Hospitals’ Solutions 
for Patient Safety network. Hospital personnel were trained in the 
Model for Improvement and shared lessons learned with one another. 
ADEs were subsequently reduced by 50% and SSIs in high-risk chil-
dren by 60% in all eight hospitals.
In 2012, 25 hospitals across the nation joined the initial 8 Ohio 
hospitals to form Solutions for Patient Safety (SPS), a network that 
eventually grew to 142 children’s hospitals collaborating to reduce 
serious patient harm. From 2011 to 2018, hospitals in the SPS reduced 
their adverse drug events by 74%, catheter-associated urinary infec-
tions by 50%, falls by 75%, and pressure ulcers by 27%.
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Kotagal and Muething attribute CCHMC’s success to six factors:
 1. Alignment and commitment. From the beginning, Anderson, Carter, 
and Kotagal were clear and unambiguous about the focus and led 
the board, senior leaders, and CSI chairs to share a deep commit-
ment to zero serious harm, leadership improvement, and partner-
ships between physicians and nurses and between leaders and 
researchers.
 2. Structure for change and integration. The creation of Clinical 
System Improvement teams of top leaders for each of the major 
delivery systems gave coherence and clear responsibility for major 
changes to improve flow, processes, and patient experience. They 
worked with unit teams led by trained physician and nurse leaders 
who carried out specific projects, aligning macro-, meso-, and 
microsystem structure across the entire system. Patient safety and 
staff safety were integrated.
 3. Capability and capacity for change. From the beginning, the orga-
nization invested deeply in training in the science of improvement 
and in the infrastructure support, analytics, and operational research 
needed to create good visibility of data, response, and action.
 4. Creation of a culture of continuous learning. Creation of psycho-
logical safety, the opportunities for constant improvement, and 
training in leadership and quality improvement created an environ-
ment where learning is part of everyday life.
 5. Respect for the Science. The belief in the scientific approach 
enabled the organization to be rational and logical and attract very 
bright people with a passion to do well by children.
 6. Transparency. A culture where it is normal and expected that people 
will surface, address, and ultimately solve issues/problems every 
day at all levels, especially when things go wrong, is the foundation 
of trust. Adverse events were promptly acknowledged to the staff, 
patients, and the public, thoroughly investigated, and the results fed 
back to the family and to the clinical staff for improvement.
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center has truly created a 
culture of safety. It has developed, and continues to refine, a sustain-
able model of collaborative patient and staff engagement in continu-
ing improvement that has dramatically reduced harm for its patients. 
It has stimulated other children’s hospitals to change their cultures 
and collaborated with them to do so. They are an impressive model.
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 Denver Health
Denver Health (DH) is an example of an apparently impressive cul-
ture change that turned out to be illusory. Denver Health is the princi-
pal safety-net provider in Colorado, providing health care for nearly a 
third of Denver’s population, 46% of whom are uninsured. In 2004, 
under the leadership of its CEO, Patricia Gabow, MD, and with a 
grant from AHRQ, DH began a major initiative to transform the way 
it delivered care, centered on five “Rights”:
• Right People: a workforce committed to customer service 
and quality
• Right Environment: appropriate patient and work spaces
• Right Reward for employees who demonstrate customer-oriented 
behaviors
• Right Communication and Culture
• Right Process: application of Lean to eliminate waste
Gabow created a new department to take responsibility for patient 
safety and quality and focus on processes to improve care. Programs 
were created to manage high-risk and high-opportunity clinical 
situations, such as failure to rescue, use of antibiotics, CLABSI, 
etc. Systems were implemented to reduce variability in patient care 
processes and outcomes. The initiative was supported by a sophis-
ticated electronic health record that provided order entry and deci-
sion support in addition to data for research and quality 
improvement [30].
Like VMMC, Denver Health developed an intensive approach to 
process change, the Rapid Improvement Event (RIE), a four-day 
group session focused on an identified problem to develop a method 
to remove it. Rapid improvement events resulted in marked advances 
in diabetes care, anticoagulation management, venous thromboembo-
lism prophylaxis, and cancer screening rates.
In its first 4 years, DH estimated that it also gained $42 million in 
financial benefit due to reduced waste. In 2009, it had the lowest 
observed/expected aggregate mortality ratio among 106 academic 
health centers in the University HealthSystem Consortium. Denver 




Gabow retired in 2012, having received numerous awards and hon-
ors for her impressive work at transforming a health-care organiza-
tion. In 2014, she told her story in The Lean Prescription: Powerful 
Medicine for Our Ailing Healthcare System, which she wrote with 
Philip Goodman [31].
Then it came undone. Gabow was succeeded by Arthur Gonzales, 
who quickly undid many of Gabow’s changes in response to financial 
pressures associated with the Affordable Care Act. His leadership 
style alienated physicians and led to resignations of a number of phy-
sicians, including all of the chairs of the major departments. Gonzales 
was later replaced by Robin Wittenstein.
The rapid reversal of the culture at Denver Health illustrates the 
difficulty of making real culture change that is sustainable. The 
impressive transformations implemented by Gabow were evidently 
not institutionalized well enough among the executive leaders, 
employees, and middle managers to withstand a change of top leader-
ship. The culture really didn’t change. And one can infer that the 
board was not totally engaged in the transformation and lacked conti-
nuity of purpose, or it would not have hired a CEO who put financial 
goals over safety.
 Safe and Reliable Health Care
On a national scale, the most comprehensive effort to date to change 
culture by developing organizational capacity and capability is a pro-
prietary effort developed by Safe and Reliable Healthcare (S&R), the 
consulting firm established by Allan Frankel and Michael Leonard, 
two highly respected physicians who have devoted their professional 
careers to improving patient safety. Frankel was for years the chief 
patient safety officer for Partners Healthcare in Boston and on the 
faculty at IHI. Leonard was for many years the chief safety officer at 
Kaiser-Permanente.
S&R trains a health-care organization’s leadership and its person-
nel to create and sustain the environment for safe care. The focus of 
the S&R method is to give frontline personnel voice and a sense of 
community. Voice, or agency, means that everyone feels safe to speak 
up and that their voice is heard and respected and influences what 
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takes place. Community means that everyone feels that their co-work-
ers care about them. The S&R approach changes the structure of the 
management of the delivery of care and improvement so that voice 
and community are intrinsic to everyday work.
The following description is adapted from the S&R website [32]:
The core of the S&R approach is a digital platform called LENS™ 
(Learning and ENgagement System), an interactive electronic 
replacement of the white board where staff gather daily to define 
issues, develop plans, receive updates, celebrate achievements, and 
recognize contributions. It enables physical and virtual rounds, hud-
dles, and improvement work so that leaders and managers can effec-
tively communicate and visibly “close the loop” on ideas and concerns 
shared by frontline teams. This enables real-time coordination and 
improvement as well as alignment and coordination within a unit and 
collaboration across multiple teams. Frontline teams have “voice, 
visibility, and ownership” in shaping their unit’s culture and 
performance.
A key element is SCORE, a system that obtains survey data and 
provides analysis to support LENS. It builds on and expands the ear-
lier surveys of patients and providers developed by Sexton, AHRQ, 
and others but differs by being correlated with outcomes based on 
data from over 700 organizations. SCORE includes questions on cul-
ture, engagement, burnout, resilience, patient experience, physician 
satisfaction, and Magnet. It maps to AHRQ/SOPS, SAQ, and other 
surveys, thus enabling use of previous data to benchmark and show 
a b c
(a) Uma Kotagal, (b) Allan Frankel, and (c) Mike Leonard. (All rights reserved)
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improvement. Data are presented graphically and automated to show 
unit results and trends across the organization.
S&R team of experts provides guidance for becoming a high-reli-
ability organization. The goal is to generate organizational capacity 
and a sustainable architecture for excellence by empowering leaders, 
managers, and teams to clearly understand what they must measure 
and improve across their transformation journey. The S&R approach 
holds great promise. It seeks to change the culture by changing behav-
ior at all levels. To the extent that includes engaging top management 
and the boards in the transformation, the changes should be sustained.
As of this writing, 12 systems of care, representing dozens of hos-
pitals and hundreds of care units, are working with S&R to create safe 
and cost-effective health care. Time will tell if they succeed.
 Making It Happen
What will it take to get hospitals and health-care systems nationwide 
to implement the VMMC, CCHMC, or S&R models to make the 
transformations needed to change their cultures? As the experiences 
of VMMC and CCHMC show, the CEO must have the vision and 
skills to make it happen and the passion and commitment to carry 
through. The Board must share that commitment and provide the 
resources and the backup when the going gets tough.
Perhaps exposure to advanced thinking about leadership, quality, 
and patient safety, such as by the initiative of the ACHE, combined 
with increasing evidence of success by peer health-care organizations, 
will motivate more leaders of organizations to “do the right thing.”
But the motives of others engaged in reform may be less high-
minded. For a decade or so, CEOs have been bombarded by a stream 
of articles in the Harvard Business Review and elsewhere about the 
power of Reliability Science to improve efficiency, including occa-
sional examples in health care. They are beginning to realize that 
managing the complexity of care demands standardization and sim-
plification of services and that these changes require employee 
engagement.
So, to be financially sound and deliver safe care, they have joined 
the trend to embrace reliability science and Lean. The “in” thing is to 
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become an HRO. Many major health-care organizations now have a 
process engineering office and black belt leaders. The employee focus 
has advanced from satisfaction to engagement, resilience, and well-
ness. Resistance to change has lessened as the fraction of younger 
physicians has increased and the values of autonomy and hierarchy 
are being replaced by cooperation, teamwork, and respect.
This is an encouraging trend, but there is a dark side. The major 
trend is directed at the bottom line: consolidation. In our profit-ori-
ented fee-for-service health-care system, market share is everything. 
Across the country, the big guys are swallowing up the little guys. 
Some are long-standing, national in scope, and huge, such as HCA 
(186 hospitals), Ascension Health (151), and Trinity Health (104), 
and span large geographic areas. Others, such as MGH Brigham (14) 
in Boston and Northwell (23) in Long Island, are expanding regional 
monopolies. Others are doing the same thing.
The primary objective of consolidation is financial success. National 
systems implement standardized practices to increase profits by 
improving efficiency and reducing costs. Regional monopolies also 
seek to eliminate competition in order to guarantee market share and 
raise prices.
In fairness, it is important to note that some large consolidated sys-
tems have been leaders in quality improvement and safety. In the cur-
rent milieu, they can be an effective way to spread systems changes 
such as Lean and worker engagement. We have the “Ascension Way,” 
the “Trinity Way,” etc. that, when well directed, can result in signifi-
cant changes.
Nonetheless, in most systems, the CFO keeps management focused 
on the bottom line. The demand for productivity and profits competes 
with quality and safety, and usually wins, as evidenced by the high 
burnout rates among physicians and nurses in many of these hospitals. 
Safety is not the primary goal.
 A Role for Government?
So the big question is what will it take to get all hospital CEOs and 
Boards motivated to make the culture change we need to make care 
safe and efficient? To make patient safety “job one”? There is no clear 
answer, but several possibilities come to mind.
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One would be federal oversight. Congress could create an FAA 
equivalent for health care, a Federal Patient Safety Agency, FPSA, to 
set standards and monitor and enforce compliance. In addition to set-
ting standards for physician competence as described in Chap. 20, the 
Agency would develop standards for all aspects of health-care deliv-
ery in collaboration with representatives from hospitals and health- 
care systems, the Joint Commission, professional societies, and 
experts in quality and safety. As noted earlier, participation by stake-
holders in developing standards ensures relevance and buy-in with a 
higher likelihood of compliance.
Specifically for safety, the Agency would set standards for practice, 
including training in quality and safety, data collection, working con-
ditions, coordination of care, transparency, and reporting. It would 
require reporting of all serious reportable events. Failure to report 
would have consequences, such as prohibiting reimbursement of a 
hospital for any charges for an admission with a SRE. Repeat offend-
ers could be fined and face loss of accreditation.
Given the current political climate, indeed, the climate of the past 
several decades, it seems highly unlikely there would be Congressional 
support for significantly increased regulation. A lesser measure, such 
as requiring enterprise liability in which the health-care organization 
is held accountable for a patient injury rather than the physician, might 
be possible and would be useful, but also seems unlikely.
Can nongovernmental oversight, such as by the Joint Commission, 
provide sufficient pressure to motivate health-care organizations to 
change their cultures? Perhaps. Over the past few years, the Joint 
Commission has steadily increased requirements for accreditation to 
promote quality and safety, including implementation of safe prac-
tices, reporting of SRE, adherence to core measures of quality, ensur-
ing physician competence, patient engagement, and assessment of 
patient experience. (See Chap. 12.) Joint Commission Patient Safety 
Goals have been internalized by many hospitals. These measures have 
had an impact on the cultures.
However, the ability of the Joint Commission to expand its require-
ments is limited by its vulnerability to competition. CMS also accepts 
accreditation of hospitals by other organizations to receive the essen-
tial “deemed status” that enables them to receive payments from 
Medicare and Medicaid. Because these alternative programs are less 
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demanding, they are an attractive “way out” if TJC gets too tough. 
This could, of course, be turned around if CMS gave the Commission 
sole accrediting authority, subject to CMS oversight.
 A “Burning Platform”?
Some believe that health-care organizations will not change in the 
absence of an existential threat, a “burning platform.” That our dys-
functional system has to get worse before it can get better. To really be 
threatening, that threat has to be financial.
Many, your author included, believe that the fundamental cause of 
the dysfunction of the American health-care system is the way hospi-
tals and doctors are paid. The USA is the only advanced economy that 
runs health care as a business. That business is based on the fee-for-
service (FFS) system for paying for health care. The primary goal of 
any business is to make a profit. In a fee-for-service system, the more 
services hospitals or doctors provide, the better they do.
The ramifications and nuances of this system are far too complex to 
be dealt with here, but the implications are clear: in a FFS payment 
system, the need to focus on productivity and profit is a major deter-
rent to hospitals making quality of care and patient safety their core 
mission. Changing to a risk-adjusted capitated system, such as an 
accountable care organization, with oversight to ensure that standards 
of appropriateness, quality, and safety are met, would give new mean-
ing to the “bottom line.” By itself, changing the payment system 
would not change the culture, but it would remove the major barrier 
and provide the right incentives.
Will the COVID-19 pandemic be the “burning platform” that forces 
change? Under its stress, our health-care system collapsed. Increasing 
demand for highly expensive COVID care, coupled with a decline in 
demand for routine services, led to crippling financial losses that have 
driven substantial numbers of hospitals and office practices into bank-
ruptcy, especially rural and safety net hospitals. In our FFS business 
model, when markets collapse, so do providers [33].
The pandemic also significantly undermined the system of funding 
of health care for patients. Millions lost their employment-based 
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health insurance when they lost their jobs [33]. Government subsidies 
were insufficient to make up for these losses.
As of this writing, it is impossible to know how things will turn out. 
However, the crisis has increased the national will for universal cover-
age and for insurance that is not work-related. A substantial majority 
of Americans now embrace the concept that health care should be a 
right. All of the approaches to achieve that goal require significant 
long-term federal outlays, as well as a huge infusion of funds short-
term to prevent further collapse of the system.
Will this unprecedented requirement to fund coverage also lead to 
the recognition of the need to redesign the health-care system to elim-
inate unnecessary, harmful, and wasteful care? To design a system to 
meet patient needs, not to make money? Will it be what it takes to 
move Congress to change the financing of health care from fee-for-
service to capitation, from for-profit care to patient-centered account-
able care? Will this be what it takes to make patient safety a reality? If 
so, our suffering will not have been in vain.
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